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Starting with the hypothesis that not only human intelligence but also its antithesis “intellectual 
disability” are nothing more than historical contingencies, C.F. Goodey’s paradigm-shifting 
study traces the rich interplay between labelled human types and the radically changing 
characteristics attributed to them. From the twelfth-century beginnings of European social 
administration to the onset of formal human science disciplines in the modern era, A History of 
Intelligence and “Intellectual Disability” reconstructs the socio-political and religious contexts 
of intellectual ability and disability, and demonstrates how these concepts became part of 
psychology, medicine and biology. Goodey examines a wide array of classical, late medieval 
and Renaissance texts, from popular guides on conduct and behavior to medical treatises and 
from religious and philosophical works to poetry and drama. Focusing especially on the period 
between the Protestant Reformation and 1700, Goodey challenges the accepted wisdom that 
would have us believe that “intelligence” and “disability” describe natural, trans-historical 
realities. Instead, Goodey argues for a model that views intellectual disability and indeed the 
intellectually disabled person as recent cultural creations. His book is destined to become a 
standard resource for scholars interested in the history of psychology and medicine, the social 
origins of human self-representation, and current ethical debates about the genetics of intelligence. 
C.F. Goodey has researched and published on the history of “intellectual disability,” including 
the ethical and social implications of the concept, for more than 20 years. His articles have 
appeared in a number of scholarly journals, including History of Science, Medical History, 
History of the Human Sciences, Political Theory and Ancient Philosophy. He formerly 
held teaching and research posts at Ruskin College, Oxford, the Open University and the 
University of London Institute of Education, and is currently an independent consultant 
working for national and local government services on learning disability in the UK. 
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This book would not have been possible without all those people and their families who, by swapping 
experiences and ideas with me in the course of applied research and practice, have encouraged my 
belief in the practical applicability of history. Direct support came from Priscilla Alderson, Istvan 
Hont, Linda Jordan, Patrick McDonagh, the late Roy Porter, Lynn Rose, Roger Smith, Richard 
Sorabji and Tim Stainton. I would like to thank the many others who have contributed along the 
way: students, friends, colleagues and those in the medical and psychological professions who 
have discussed these topics openly and without fear. The Leverhulme Trust financed the first stages 
of research. Parts of the book exist in more primitive form in articles written for various journals to 
whose editors and referees I am also indebted (details are in the list of Works Cited). 

Historians should know that freaks, if tolerated – and even flattered and fed – can show 
astonishing influence and longevity. After all, to any rational mind, the greater part of the 
history of ideas is a history of freaks. 






Intelligence stands at the core of modern lives. It marks us out from the rest of nature. It is crucial to 
our sense of self and an instant yardstick for sizing up others. Psychologists measure it, biologists 
search for its DNA, women demand it of sperm donors; learned professors from Harvard to 
Heidelberg foresee our descendants turning into transhuman, bodiless intelligences able to migrate 
as software to other planets. If these are the dreams of intelligence, the nightmare is its absence. 
This means being denied family, friends and ordinary relationships; doctors give us treatment 
without our consent and withhold it when we need it; social workers stop us having sex, sterilize 
us or take away our children; psychiatrists lock us up without right of appeal; police officers 
frame us; courts acquit the parents who kill us; and politicians fund geneticists to make sure people 
like us never turn up again. Both dream and nightmare are so vivid it seems they must be based on 
some hard scientific reality, but the question “What is intelligence?” has only ever been answered 
by a shifting social consensus. So perhaps, like the stuff of dreams and nightmares, it too belongs 
in a realm of mere appearances. But in that case so does intellectual disability. Indeed, our anxieties 
about it may one day seem as strange as some of our ancestors’ anxieties do to us. The pioneers 
of modern science such as Robert Boyle and Isaac Newton were certain that the devil was real, as 
real as this chair I am sitting on is to me; and while we now know he was a mere figment of their 
imaginations, this is no guarantee that some of the objects to which we apply our own, twenty-first­
century scientific method are not just as fantastical. 
Nevertheless, even if intelligence is only a matter of appearances, appearances matter. Social 
structures have not only flattered and fed the concept but set it to work to ensure their own survival. 
It is socially active, helping to bind social structures together, to alienate their human creators 
from themselves and from each other, and to dull our brains with alternating doses of self-flattery 
and self-abasement. It also identifies certain people we do not like having around, and only if 
intellectual disability is also seen as mere appearance can the speciousness of intelligence itself be 
exposed. The concepts of intelligence and intellectual disability are mutually reinforcing. While 
this book chiefly explores pre- and early modern concepts of disability, it is also about intelligence. 
Without each other they are nothing. 
We tend to assume that “intellectual disability” is a permanent historical fixture, that all societies 
would have recognized the same thing in the same human type. But the idea of an intelligence 
that defines membership of the human species is itself modern. And if we sent people we now 
call intellectually disabled in a time machine to ancient Greece and asked if they resembled the 
people in that society with some seemingly equivalent label (“fools,” etc.), the answer would be no, 
even though such an experiment would yield a positive result for physical disability and in part for 
mental illness. Of course there are always people around who seem unable to grasp certain complex 
everyday activities. What changes, though, is the content of those activities and their centrality to 
the life which the rest of us in any one era expect to lead. At any given historical moment, the people 
thus excluded seem to be a separate and permanent natural kind, but in fact their psychological
profile alters radically in the long term along with the social context feeding it. 
All this may seem to reflect a current propensity to turn differences previously thought of as 
natural into identities (ethnic, gendered, sexually oriented, etc.) that have been socially constructed 
by human beings themselves. And yes, it is certainly true that people may be “intellectually” 
disabled in one social institution or context but not necessarily disabled in some other, concurrent 
one. It is true, too, that labelling and separation from ordinary life may be causes of disability 
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rather than outcomes; a person’s identity, who they are or might be, is stolen from them in infancy 
or at diagnosis and is then refashioned by the special institutions in which they are segregated and 
which turn their personal characteristics into a “psychological object.” Nevertheless, to say that 
intellectual disability is a mere social construction is to ignore problems of everyday life which, 
even if they are only the creation of a particular society, are for certain people and for the time 
being real enough, or oblige us to behave as if they were; some of us will need greater support to 
lead the ordinary lives that others take for granted (even if the various professions and services 
are institutionally primed to avoid, at all costs, the provision of support for just such a purpose). 
Disability is always historically constructed, however, because the problems change from one era 
to the next. History is anthropology with time rather than place the variable. 
My starting hypothesis, therefore, is that intelligence and intellectual disability, likewise 
intelligent people and intellectually disabled people, are not natural kinds but historically contingent 
forms of human self-representation and social reciprocity, of relatively recent historical origin. 
Following this introduction, Part 1 discusses the relationship between psychological and social 
inferiority among the ancient Greeks. This is a necessary exercise because early modern writers 
use Plato, Aristotle and others as a reference point and modern psychology often identifies them as 
the first primitive stabs at a psychological science, when in fact the gulf between the Greeks and 
ourselves is profound. Part 2 analyzes the history of intelligence and disability in European socio­
economic and administrative structures, and the ever-increasing importance attached to speed of 
thought. Parts 3 to 5 look at the conduct manuals and the religious and literary texts that present 
intelligence (“wit”) as a self-referential mode of bidding for status, classifiable with concepts such 
as honour and grace, and juxtaposes these with their corresponding concepts of disability. Part 6 
pursues the same themes into the history of medicine, looking at doctors’ changing descriptions 
of problematic intellectual states and of their relationship to the structure and functions of body 
and brain. Part 7 examines the historical roots of the modern doctrinal fusion between biology, 
psychology and ethics, and at the early modern invention of abnormality, its place in natural history 
and accompanying doctrines of cause. Part 8 describes the influence of the sixteenth and early 
seventeenth centuries on Locke’s extensive comments on “idiots” and “changelings,” and how his 
essentially theological doctrine in turn influenced eighteenth-century theories of behaviour and 
thence modern educational and cultural practices. 
Each chapter begins by looking at long-term, cross-historical elements which modern and pre­
modern concepts may share in spite of my starting hypothesis, and then briefly at relevant aspects 
of the recent, short-term history of the formal disciplines (psychology, medicine, etc.): briefly,
because there is already a substantial literature on this. There then follows the main business, which 
is the medium term: the shaping of modern psychological concepts of intelligence and disability, 
starting in the late Middle Ages but concentrated in the “early modern” period that runs from the 
Reformation to the Enlightenment. It can be used as a starting point for further investigation into 
other areas of early modern psychology. I regret not having had the time to extend this investigation 
beyond intelligence and intellectual disability to other basic psychological concepts of the early 
modern era: the emotions, for example, or the will (and the first question would be whether in fact 
such conceptual categories were then or indeed can now be safely distinguished from each other). 
Others will have to have to take up where I have left off. 
Research and debate: opening a new arena 
Previous writers have examined the history of the segregated long-stay institutions, hospitals and 






incarcerated there.1 Yet about the origins of the underlying concepts we know little. Institutional 
records and official publications are easily located, whereas the conceptual roots are spread across 
disciplines and periods and so are harder to find. But similar problems have not deterred researchers 
in the early conceptual history of other disciplines. This research gap reflects social segregation 
itself: out of sight, out of mind. Moreover, to research the origins of a concept is to admit it had 
origins in the first place. If a category so basic had a historical starting point, it might imply that 
there was a time before that when it went unrecognized, and therefore that it could lose its currency 
again in the future. Unstable categories undermine professional confidence. As a result the history 
has been trivialized, in two ways. First, the disability as we see it today must have always existed, 
whether people in the past recognized it or not; historical study is irrelevant or unproblematic 
(“positivism”). Secondly, if the aim is to make things better, then pulling basic concepts up by the 
roots for historical investigation won’t help; history must be seen instead as a march of progress, 
towards the triumph of current ideas and the right way of doing things, which just so happens to 
be our own (“presentism”). 
What we know about the history of the concept so far has come piecemeal from the extra­
curricular interests of a few professionals with varying approaches. The first of these says that since 
disability is a natural, biological-psychological entity that has always existed in the same type of 
person, we can unproblematically match current human types to those of the past. Physiologist Paul 
Cranefield sees certain Renaissance medical writers as the “discoverers” of “mental deficiency” 
because they seem to describe its symptoms and to use a modern disease model.2 Neurologist 
Richard Neugebauer sees in early accounts of legal competence a proto-modern psychiatric 
distinction between “mentally retarded” and mentally ill.3 Psychologist Richard Scheerenberger, 
aiming at an encyclopaedic history of mental retardation and sometimes coming across periods 
in which no seeming correspondences with the modern concept appear, simply plugs these gaps 
with primary sources on physical disability or mental illness instead.4 A second approach says 
that the scientific concept becomes actual only with its psychiatric description in modern times. 
Psychiatrist Leo Kanner, for example, one of the inventors of autism, largely follows the same 
disease model as the first group but excludes from his history all the unscientific primitives who 
lacked a modern expertise; consequently, he says, a history of mental retardation is impossible 
before the nineteenth century.5 A third approach is based on a seemingly more sceptical view. 
Psychologist Inge Mans, for example, begins with the words “Once upon a time there were no 
mentally retarded people.” Like the literary historian Sandra Billington, she puts their early history 
under a broader heading encompassing professional fools and carnivalesque jesters.6 Nevertheless, 
ignoring the difference among these types means somehow preserving certain assumptions about 
a cross-historical condition; “retarded” people may well have existed all along, it is just that there 
1 James Trent, Inventing the Feeble Mind; Philip Ferguson, Abandoned to their Fate; Mathew Thomson, 
The Problem of Mental Deficiency; David Wright, Mental Disability in Victorian England; Mark Jackson, The 
Borderland of Imbecility; Trent and Steven Noll (eds), Mental Retardation in America. 
2 Paul Cranefield, “A seventeenth-century view of mental deficiency,” Bulletin of the History of 
Medicine, 35 (1961); Cranefield and Walter Federn, “Paracelsus on goiter and cretinism,” ibid., 37 (1963); 
“The begetting of fools,” ibid., 41 (1967); Cranefield, “The discovery of cretinism,” ibid., 36 (1962). 
3 Neugebauer, “Medieval and early modern theories of mental illness,” Archive of General Psychiatry, 
36 (1979); “Mental handicap in medieval and early modern England,” in David Wright and Anne Digby (eds), 
From Idiocy to Mental Deficiency. 
4 Scheerenberger, A History of Mental Retardation. 
5 Kanner, A History of the Care and Study of the Mentally Retarded. 
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was once a Golden Age when they had no separate social identity – for these authors a good thing, 
for Kanner not. 
I have tried to open up a new arena. The reader will find positivism and presentism here too, of 
course. I want to add to a store of sound historical knowledge on the topic; and I believe that if the 
past is a foreign country where they do things differently, there is a future country where they do 
things differently and better. Others in the field, too, have called for an “inclusive anthropology.”7 
Now this should arouse suspicions. Although the history of ideas is useless if it does not generate 
new ideas, it may also fairly be asked whether evidence can be proof against contamination by 
some political or ethical agenda, and whether the evidential base for the history of psychology is 
not just as prone to fabrication as for psychology itself. However, suspicions can only be justified 
or relieved by engaging with the evidence on a scale no one else has done till now. Moreover, I 
do not draw on the usual models of radical policy-making in this area (“rights,” “citizenship,” 
“justice,” etc.), borrowed from liberation movements of black people, gays or women, as not only 
are the people we are talking about deprived of such things, they are not entitled to them in the 
first place because they do not qualify for the founding premise of all such models: namely, that 
human beings are equal and autonomous by virtue of being rational. Nor on the other hand does 
my agenda owe much to that seductive form of conflict avoidance which says that, as “bearers of 
discourse,” we cannot stand outside even the thinnest and airiest of concepts, among which the 
concepts under discussion in this book undoubtedly belong. Finally, to all those who still think that 
science can speak to our topic, I have to confess that the scientific and ethical questions (How do 
we know what intellectual disability really is? How do we value the people it describes?) are as 
inextricable from each other for the historian as they are, minus any acknowledgement of the fact, 
for the psychologist or cognitive geneticist. 
We can begin tackling these questions of definition at the most superficial level, that of names. 
Here our psychological object seems more problematic than most. On the one hand, the disabled are 
defined more dogmatically than any other human group. They are still seen as a natural category, 
the last justifiable bastion of essentialism in an era when gender, race and sexuality (for example) 
are no longer natural or essential. This definition allows things to be done to them that are no longer 
justifiable for those other groups; denigration, segregation, elimination and prevention belong to 
their recent and continuing history. On the other hand, do we really know who they are? I ask 
because it seems we don’t know what to call them. Even within the last century the multiplicity 
of names for their condition has been extraordinary: backwardness, cognitive impairment, 
complex needs, cretinism, developmental delay, developmental disability, dullness, educational 
subnormality, fatuity, feeble-mindedness, idiotism, imbecility, intellectual disability, intellectual 
handicap, intellectual impairment, learning difficulties, learning disability, mental defectiveness, 
mental deficiency, mental disability, mental handicap, mental impairment, mental retardation, 
moronism, neurodisability, neurodiversity, oligophreny, slowness, special needs, etc. One could 
double the number. This instability of names surely points to a deeper conceptual problem and, as 
Murray Simpson has demonstrated for the nineteenth century, to the absence of any stable nature 
linking the people thus described.8 Histories of the topic, supposing that names denote the same 
natural kind across the ages, have tended to proceed in parallel with traditional histories of physical 
disability, treating it as a history of freaks when actually it is the history of a freak idea. 
In defining intellectual disability, psychology comes up with a list of particular deficits in what 
it sees as intellectual ability and (which amounts to the same thing) as characteristically human.
7 Herman P. Meininger, “Authenticity in community: theory and practice of an inclusive anthropology,” 
Journal of Religion, Disability and Health, 5 (2001). 




In other words, definitions are circular. Now it is professionally acceptable, even commonplace, to 
say that sanity consists of the absence of mental illness. But it would no doubt be professionally 
crass to say the same thing about intelligence, which is not just an absence of disability but 
self-evidently positive, the crowning feature of our species. If intelligence has any historically 
continuous characteristic at all, this circularity of definition is it. The content of the definition 
itself changes from one era to the next, making it not only circular but contingent at each point on 
historical circumstance. Today definitions come, ostensibly, from a theoretical base in the academy, 
proceeding from there to applied psychology or the genetics laboratory for their evidence base, and 
thence to the social institutions such as health, education, human and social services, employment, 
etc.; their final destination is the everyday mind-set, which closes the cycle by feeding back into the 
academy and providing a covert rationale for the latter’s hypotheses. The student, having stumbled 
across psychology by being “interested in people,” makes this journey in reverse. He or more often 
she, prompted by the mind-set, must at some point face the fact that her chosen profession is not 
interested in people in any way she may have so far thought of them, but only as parts and props 
of a vulnerable institutional order which she herself will help to police and of which intelligence is 
the supreme membership criterion. At this point psychology’s enchanted forest will either swallow 
her up, or she will come to ask about its idea of people, in W.H. Auden’s words, “Was it to meet 
such grinning evidence / We left our richly odoured ignorance?” 
At the centre of the forest – somewhere – is the holy grail of scientific status. Meanwhile 
the ideological core of intelligence can be glimpsed from the very claim that its social critics 
are the ideologues. Take cognitive ability tests (IQ), and the fact that they have regularly been 
modified in response to criticism of their inherent cultural bias. Many psychologists have seen 
this criticism as an ideological intrusion, motivated by an unscientific egalitarianism which the 
science disproves. However, the psychometrician’s very act of responding to criticism, by moving 
away from culturally relative tasks towards apparently more abstract ones seemingly possessed of 
universality, is itself a necessary ideological collusion; the fact that modification takes place at all 
belies any claim to exact-science status that might be made for intelligence as such, exposing the 
emptiness of psychology’s “Newtonian fantasies” about parity with physics or chemistry, about 
objectivity and calculability.9 Its extremely short-term historical shifts undermine not just the claim 
that one can measure intelligence but also that intelligence in itself has the long- or even medium-
term stability of content that an exact science might expect from its object of study. Of course 
there is already a whole discipline, the philosophy of science, devoted to doubting whether the 
subject matter even of physics is real; but doubts about intelligence are of a different and deeper
order entirely. 
Intelligence is a social construction: enough said? 
Disenchantment leads to scepticism. Any champion of the idea that intelligence has a real essence, 
scientifically classifiable in nature, is countered by others for whom it is relative and changeable 
and who regard the attempt to produce “culture-fair or -free” estimations of it as a nonsense.10 But 
this sceptical position usually turns out to be mere bravado. Beneath superficial disputes about 
whether intelligence is measurable or absolute, in the deeper recesses of the mind-set we still need 
to make shorthand judgements of our fellows and to establish our own intelligence: otherwise, 
9 Thomas Leahy, A History of Modern Psychology, 6. 
10 See J. Berry, “Radical cultural relativism and the concept of intelligence,” in Berry and P. Dasen (eds), 
Culture and Cognition. 
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to borrow a classic argument, how could our scepticism be a more intelligent stance than the 
positivist’s? For the sceptic, intelligence is relative or absolute according to where advantage 
lies; there are moments in one’s life when the concept cannot be lightly dismissed. At the same 
time, it seems readily deconstructable in the popular mind: “Rabbit’s clever,” says the famously 
slow Winnie-the-Pooh, “and he has Brain. I suppose that’s why he never understands anything.” 
And as far as academic critiques are concerned, many have come from within the discipline of 
psychology itself. But anyone who claims to have dispensed fully with the essential reality of 
intellectual ability must have dispensed fully with that of intellectual disability too. The moment 
one takes (say) “severe mental retardation” as a positive concept describing a natural kind, one 
automatically reactivates the positive concept of intelligence itself. Even among historians who 
write about “social constructions” and “inventions,” the content of the analysis rarely matches the 
aim: for example, Paul Michael Privateer’s Inventing Intelligence presupposes the natural reality 
of its opposite, “mental disability,” while James Trent’s Inventing the Feeble Mind, despite its title, 
does not challenge the transhistorical psychological identity of the population it describes. 
Disengagement from the whole farrago is not easy, then. Most sceptics, academic or lay, living in 
a segregated society, are unlikely to have had much to do with people whose disability they cannot 
deconstruct unless they can first know some people thus constructed. A professional will at least 
know the person at first hand, even if social and conceptual segregation has distorted the relationship 
between them. And as one of those professionals, without a positive belief in intelligence and 
disability I could not exist. My job is to pass expert judgement on people in a way that distributes 
and perpetuates these appearances formally, as a series of crediting operations that endow this 
natural object, intelligence, with social power. It is in this realm, in social institutions rather than the 
ivory tower, that disputes occur, personal destinies are fought over and injustices become visible. 
In some institutions, such as education and examination systems, they affect the majority of the 
population, but how this happens is often hard to pin down. One stark reality alone is universally 
obvious: the absence of intelligence in the disabled, a separate population whose deficiency is to be 
regretted, quarantined and prevented. “Intellectual disability” is the reserve tank into which anyone 
who needs a justification for other, supposedly more arguable discriminations, can dip momentarily, 
an insurance policy guaranteeing that some of the normal population are more intelligent than 
others: that is, both individually (I more than you, my child more than yours) and in groups (men 
more than women, whites more than blacks, self-improvers more than the underclass). A society 
that congratulates itself on celebrating diversity must understand that signing up to an intelligence 
hierarchy among individuals necessarily entails, in the small print, signing up to and keeping on the 
back-burner an intelligence hierarchy among ethnic, gendered and class-based groups. 
Intelligence as the psychologist conceives it owes its existence to metaphor. The early 
psychometrician Karl Pearson saw it as being like gas particles or planets, at that time the commonest 
objects for statistical treatment in the exact sciences. Intelligence could be handled as if it were, 
like them, a material object. They were all things that could be mass-measured; this similarity of 
method overrode any category difference among them (mind and matter, for example). But stretch 
our imaginations as far as we like, intelligence is not the same sort of thing as a gas particle or a 
planet. So we have to ask: if the similarity of intelligence to material objects is merely metaphorical 
or methodological and no more, then to what class of things does it belong, and what other kinds 
of thing belong with it? 
Calling it a social construction and leaving it at that leads only to the same question begged by 
the positivist. Countless books and articles of the last generation have had the word construction 
in the title, as Ian Hacking has pointed out: for example “Constructing the self”, “Constructing 
oral history,” “Constructing quarks,” “Constructing youth homelessness,” even “Constructing the 







What do all those nouns have in common? Obviously nothing. The scope of “constructing” is 
so broad as to be useless; it comes to mean simply “the concept of,” which can be attached to 
absolutely anything.11 If I say something is socially constructed, I add nothing to my understanding 
of it because I have not indicated how it differs from anything else so constructed, let alone 
how the more general categories to which they might belong differ. Talk of the construction 
of intelligence or its disabilities sidesteps the same question we asked of the positivist: the 
construction of what exactly? As a member of which class of things? This book tries to answer such 
questions. Unanswered, the definition and use of the term will always go to the highest and most
powerful bidder. 
Positivism and social constructionism share a common problem, as we can see from the fact 
that they often drift across each other’s flight paths. Just as the constructionist has to be a bit 
positive about intelligence in order to think that constructionism is the more intelligent stance, so 
the positivist suffering from physics envy will admit when convenient that there is no such thing 
as intelligence. Replying to someone who denied that it exists, the experimental psychologist and 
militant psychometrician Hans Eysenck claimed he had never said it did: “Its existence is neither 
here nor there; intelligence is a concept” or, as we might say, a construction. Admittedly he goes 
on to spoil his unlikely constructionist credentials when he adds “a concept like gravity” (not 
for nothing do gravity and general intelligence share the same symbol, g).12 Nevertheless he was 
following a tradition in psychometrics of being defiant and dismissive about defining one’s object 
of study. As well as Eysenck, Alfred Binet (“inventor” of intelligence testing), Truman Kelley 
and Cyril Burt (pioneers of educational psychology in the USA and Britain respectively) can all 
be found at some point saying openly that a scientific definition of intelligence is impossible, and 
that this does not matter. It is whatever one likes.13 The reason it does not matter is that it can be 
measured, and measurement alone is what matters, since it makes the psychometrician a fully 
fledged experimental scientist at par with the measurers of gas particles or gravity. 
The question as to what class of things intelligence belongs with and what other historical 
concepts it resembles is dealt with in detail in the course of this book. For the moment, we can say 
that till now that question has had answers that are either misleadingly metaphorical (intelligence is 
an honorary member of the class of measurable material objects) or uselessly trivial (it is a member 
of the class of concepts). Of course, philosophers of science have given far subtler accounts of the 
general debate between constructionists and positivists than the crude opposition I present here. 
But where the particular topic is intelligence, any reader who probes the subtleties of this debate 
further (and I do not do so in this book) may well find that they are all ultimately reducible to one 
position or the other. 
Psychologists, for example, frequently modify their position by saying they cannot aspire to 
absolute truth, only to the closest approximation the evidence will allow. This is false modesty, 
however – a covert self-identification with physicists and other exact scientists who routinely apply 
this falsifiability rule to their own objects of study. Then there are Howard Gardner’s “multiple 
intelligences,” some of which do not correspond to psychology’s usual application of the term; or 
the (James) “Flynn Effect,” which shows how the average person of a century ago would score as 
“mentally retarded” in a modern IQ test.14 Yet both authors feel obliged to retain a core concept of 
intelligence as some specifically human essence that is fixed in nature, when all the while their very 
11 Ian Hacking, The Social Construction of What? 1 ff.
 
12 Hans Eysenck, “The concept of intelligence,” Intelligence, 12 (1988).
 
13 Binet, “Méthodes nouvelles,” L’année psychologique, 11 (1905), 191; Kelley, Scientific Method, 77; 

Burt, Mental and Scholastic Tests, 9. 
14 Howard Gardner, Frames of Mind; James Flynn, What is Intelligence? 
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own theories make it redundant. It makes no difference whether intelligence is unitary or modular. 
Which particular abilities come under the heading of intelligence and which not? Who decides? 
Such questions are not just constructionist fooling, since without answers not only the content 
of intelligence but its actual existence remains open to challenge. Perhaps it is those who do not 
attempt answers but carry on as before who are fooling. 
Critical approaches, too, have sometimes had a greater depth than I have room to indicate here. 
There is the idea of social intelligence, for example, which distinguishes between intelligence 
as the ideological product of a social niche whose particular interests it serves and intelligence 
as the general intellectual labour that goes into social production. This critique has had major 
successes in tackling the racial, sexual and class biases of psychometrics and their roots in 
concepts of individualized intelligence.15 Its counter claim is that there is a genuinely existing, 
universal “social” intelligence, in which sense, for example, “there has probably been a concept of 
intelligence, and a word for it, since people first started to compare themselves with other animals 
and with one another.”16 Does the author mean there have been many different words for roughly 
the same concept? Or does he mean there have been many different words for many different 
concepts, which have all turned out to be culturally relative, but that in “social intelligence” we at 
last find a non-relative concept, and it just happens to be his? Either way there is an assumption 
of historical permanence, and of progress. A new and more genuinely positive intelligence will 
rise from the ashes; so it is still, at least potentially, a real object of science, and one that has been 
mapped with increasing accuracy over the centuries. 
A self-defeating consequence of this universalist, cross-historical notion is that all one’s 
contemporaries are as entitled as oneself to insert their own project into the universality slot (“this 
is what intelligence really is”), and that this includes one’s opponents. Everyone is entitled to take 
part in the game: promoters of individualized intelligence, psychometrians using it for the purposes 
of institutional segregation, eugenicists, cognitive geneticists looking for an intelligence gene, not 
to mention cosmologists for whom human intelligence is preordained from the evolution of the first 
cell and inherent in the Big Bang.17 All these idiocies are nourished by powerful socio-economic 
forces with deep historical roots. “Social intelligence” therefore does not compete on a level 
playing field. It says what the social character of intelligence is as a form of being (in intellectual 
labour, for example) without telling us why or how, as a way of perceiving other human beings and 
thus as a component of social action, we can make it prevail over individualized intelligence. And 
it takes for granted a division between intellectual and manual labour when, even in the marxist 
theory from which it stems, that division is itself merely a passing illusion given off by alienated 
production relations at a particular stage of economic development. 
Constructionists have tended to ignore the historical roots of our topic. Georges Canguilhem 
asked what if the madman were rational – but not what if the idiot were. Madness may be the 
sign of an exceptional intelligence that then rubs off on the historian; often quoted in this context 
is John Dryden’s line “Great wits are sure to madness near allied,” its satirical intent passing 
unnoticed. The idiot is a less glamorous character. Radical assumptions about the relativity of 
reason, as demonstrated in the madman’s supposed lack of sanity, remain entangled in conservative 
assumptions about the absoluteness of its absence in the idiot’s presupposed lack of intelligence. 
Disability as absence is not a matter of interpreting the world this way as against that way, but 
of whether someone interprets the world at all, in any way. Constructionist historians such as 
Danziger may have shown how psychological objects such as “mind,” “perception,” “memory,” 
15 Steven Rose, Not in our Genes, 83 ff.
 
16 Ken Richardson, The Making of Intelligence, 3.
 






“emotion,” etc. are not natural kinds at all but values, since they can be shown to have undergone 
fundamental historical change; but while implying that intelligence belongs on this list, Danziger 
probes not so much the underlying concept as the limited psychometric version of it.18 
Furthermore, one can use constructionist language to support a positive account of the disabled 
intellect. Take, for example, the claim that disabled people have abnormal difficulty coping with 
bereavement, and thus that they are a discrete group, “a population for whom the very meaning 
of life is unclear.”19 The authors’ conceptual framework here is Danziger’s “dark construction” 
and the idea of multivocality. However, inasmuch as intellectually disabled people are distinct 
from a majority for whom the meaning of life is clear, their reaction to bereavement is not part of 
some multivocal relativity: rather, they are not comparable to the rest of us in the first place, but 
an anomaly. Using constructionism to support the absolute exception of this one group reinforces 
univocality rather than refuting it. Such adaptations of scepticism to positive ends lie in a respectable 
tradition. As we shall see later in detail, John Locke asks us to be sceptical about whether there can 
be any “real” definition of the species “man,” but only so that he can establish the deeper reality of 
his own seminal redefinition of it as an aggregate of logically reasoning individuals, founded upon 
the exception of intellectually disabled “changelings.” In a similar way, Danziger’s scepticism 
can be cited in support of a positive account of abnormality, even though his premise was that 
intelligence and (we may infer) its disabilities are mere values. At the end of this process is the 
entry of the constructionist language into professional practice, where it lays down how something 
such as intellectual disability should be conceptualized or “constructed” (just as “discourse” is now 
a routine usage in psychology and has thus become itself, in Foucault’s critically intended sense, 
a discourse). 
The idea that intelligence is relative and socially constructed is a truth which, if left at that, 
conceals other truths. Certainly Western societies have at one moment favoured one definition 
of it, at another moment another. But how did we come in the first place to class certain human 
activities as intelligent and others not? It is not just testing that requires critique. It is the entrenched 
medium-term historical inheritance informing our broader, everyday notions of intelligence 
that inhibits critical analysis. We single out a certain assembly of human characteristics – let’s 
assume for the sake of argument that each characteristic, taken singly, does indeed have a real, 
empirically verifiable existence in nature – then we leap to the conclusion that the assembly itself 
(“intelligence” or “intellectual ability”) is real in the same sense as the single characteristics are, and 
that it too exists in nature. This assembly now appears to differ from other supposed assemblies of 
characteristics (“emotion,” for example, or “will”) as distinctly as any of the single characteristics 
do from each other, as chalk from cheese. This is more than some technical example of a merely 
nominal category being made to seem real. It is downright obfuscation, the concrete historical 
details of which will emerge later in this book, as part of a game of social advantage. 
Critique of psychology’s value-based cognitive claims can always be deflected or absorbed 
unless one can establish the spuriousness, and not just the relativity, of the overall concepts of 
intelligence and intellectual disability upon which they depend, and the social realities they support. 
To say that intelligence is pure appearance might imply that its strength is the strength we continue 
to give it, and no more. We mistake it for reality: remove that misapprehension and the thing itself 
would vanish. Would it? There is no getting away from appearances. They have a big stake in our 
lives because they have their own structured reality. Intelligence matters because, as appearance, it 
gives rise to major injustices overlooked daily within a society that invokes it to underpin certain 
18 Danziger, Constructing the Subject, 161. 
19 Jennifer Clegg and R. Lansdall-Welfare, “Death, disability and dogma,” Philosophy, Psychiatry, and 
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accepted rationales of consent, rational choice and personal autonomy. These nurturers of our 
intelligent self-image continue to determine our futures because the image is socially active – and 
it can only be understood as such from a historical perspective. 
Unscientific method and necessary precautions 
Psychology claims to be ahistorical. The assumption that intelligence and its disabilities are more 
or less stable concepts with some core that survives importation across the borders of historical 
enquiry helps psychology to claim universality and therefore scientific status. Historical stability 
underwrites scientific stability. The idea of intellectual disability on this view is by no means a freak. 
Quite the opposite: it is what the evolutionary psychologists would call a “meme,” an idea that has 
gradually evolved and proved its viability by the scientific law of natural selection, as if the idea 
itself were a living biological creature. As a non-scientist myself, I do not feel confident enough to 
make such a leap. I need to undergo certain laborious preliminaries, such as keeping the descriptive 
characteristics, x, separate from human type, y.20 I take human types of the past (“idiot,” “natural 
fool,” etc.) and research the historical source-materials to see what descriptive characteristics were 
then attached to them; and I take modern descriptive characteristics (inability to abstract, reason 
logically, process information, maintain attention, etc.) and research the historical source-materials 
to see to what human types these modern psychological characteristics were then attached. It is 
no good bypassing this precaution, which for a historian should be as rudimentary as is sterilizing 
one’s pipettes for a biotechnician, and just assuming that modern descriptor x describes historical
type y. On the evidence, it does not. 
The Virgin and Child depicted on the front cover of this book, the Madonna del Bordone of 
1261 by Coppo di Marcovaldo, is an illustration of what can happen if this procedure is ignored.21 
A few paintings in this genre are regarded as tokens of an early recognition of our own “intellectual 
disability,” indicated by certain significant physiognomic features.22 In one from the school of 
Andrea Mantegna, both the Madonna and the infant Jesus appear to have a goitre, which –
subsequent to the fifteenth-century date of the painting – became associated with cretinism, whose 
characteristics then fed into nineteenth-century accounts of “idiocy” and the creation of Down’s 
syndrome. Another, by Mantegna himself, appears to depict Jesus with hypotonia or weak muscle 
tone and with fleshy folds round the neck (both characteristic of Down’s). A further painting, of the 
Dutch school, gives a pair of young adults similar features.23 Yet a swathe of modern assumptions 
will have informed the conclusion that these are pre-modern takes on a cross-historical phenomenon. 
Mantegna in particular is noted for his precision in respect of the science of physiognomics popular 
in his time. If these painters saw a distinctive physical feature in their sitters, including inherited 
ones, why not represent it? We seem to be under several urges at once, evidence for which in the 
mind-sets of these painters is lacking. In two of these paintings, the baby has a big gap between 
the big toe and the next one, as well as marked epicanthic folds on his eyelids: are these not among 
20 German Berrios, “Mental retardation,” in Berrios and Roy Porter (eds), A History of Clinical 
Psychiatry, 225. 
21 Church of Santa Maria dei Servi, Siena, Italy. Foto LENSINI Siena. 
22 For example Brian Stratford, “Down’s syndrome at the court of Mantua,” Maternal and Child Health, 
7 (1982); Andrew S. Levitas and Cheryl S. Reid, “An angel with Down syndrome: a sixteenth-century Flemish 
nativity painting.” American Journal of Medical Genetics, 116 (2003). 
23 Follower of Andrea Mantegna, Virgin and Child, Museum of Fine Arts, Boston; Mantegna, Virgin and 
Child, Accademia Carrara, Bergamo; Follower of Jan Joest, The Adoration of the Christ Child, Metropolitan 




the first things a paediatrician looks for when diagnosing Down’s syndrome in a baby? Were the 
painters deliberately representing disability in an iconic religious format, thus attributing a positive 
value to a condition which in modern times we view negatively? That would be to assume that 
they interpreted whatever it was they observed in an exceptional light – good or bad – rather 
than as an ordinary part of life that did not need remarking on other than by its simple physical 
representation. 
By contrast, no one has ever made any suggestion of the above kind about Coppo’s Madonna 
del Bordone. It is the earliest in a clutch of Madonnas that mark the beginnings of Renaissance art 
and of a humanist narrative style that moves away from static adoration or mere idolatry towards 
engaging its viewers in active thought and rational understanding. Not only does the Madonna, 
remarkably for her time, look at the viewer eliciting a response, the infant Jesus seems to be 
doing the same to her, exhibiting his divine intellect. Yes, but look at his toes, which his mother 
is fondling: there is the gap. And close up, there too are the epicanthic folds. Stop for a moment 
as you hurry through those early rooms in whatever large gallery you are in, with their endless 
and seemingly identical Virgins-and-Childs. You will find that many of the baby Jesuses have 
that gap between the toes, and nearly all of them the folds on the eyelids and/or a fleshy neck: this 
seems to be a painterly technique, a way of enhancing ordinary physical features. The hypotonia 
of the other sitters mentioned above can be explained by the fact that these are typical features of 
the “phlegmatic” type – slow and lethargic to be sure, but ordinary too, since the then-dominant 
medical theory of the four humours (of which phlegm was one) meant that people of this disposition 
might have made up a quarter of the human race. Now it is true that we read into the images our 
own values, whether negative or positive. It is entirely appropriate, for example, that the phrase “an 
angel with Down syndrome” should be coined in the journal of a discipline routinely devoted to the 
elimination of angels. But that is not the prior problem. Before embarking on the question of values, 
we have made assumptions about what is actually there – those “intellectual” characteristics –
in the first place. 
What all these paintings – the Mantegna as much as the Madonna del Bordone – are in fact 
depicting, beyond the limits of their era and beyond religion and dogma of any kind, is a social 
relationship that is unconditional. “Intelligence” and “intellectual disability” are thus conditions set, 
in the last resort arbitrarily, upon human relationships in a certain historical period. Any historian 
concerned with the social world at all, let alone with questions of social justice, has a responsibility 
to negotiate a way round these swamps of deconstruction, to cope with the doubts about our topic 
and to account for them. My preliminary step in this direction has been to divide the history into 
three overlapping periods. One is long term, which Mary Douglas describes in Purity and Danger
as having its roots in the history of dirt, that basic pattern-making habit whereby we classify and 
separate what belongs from what is rejected or scapegoated, of which “intellectual disability” 
is a current and temporary manifestation; related to this is our urge to seek certainty about each 
other and about who belongs where, which manifests itself in determinism of various historically 
interchangeable kinds (divine, genetic, etc.). Another period is medium term, and extends from the 
beginnings of modern social administration around 1200 to the present. The roots of the cultural 
concept we are dealing with lie in this initial expansion of social administration and West European 
capitalism: a long period certainly, but a historically specific one. If any such concept can be 
perceived at the start of the period, it is at most a ripple among countless others and was virtually 
undetected by people of the time. The third period is short term and starts with the beginnings of 
the modern discipline of psychology and its doctrines of human intelligence and disability (under 
various names), from the mid-nineteenth century to the present. This book spends most of its time 
tracing the medium term: the growth, amidst social change, of ripple into wave. 
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Certain problems of terminology should be noted. “Intelligence” is a term that has to be defined 
precisely by its context, the more so the further the history goes back. Its various usages and its 
contexts, as well as those of different but cognate terms such as “wit” and “reason,” are explained 
as I go along; if sometimes I use “intelligence” anachronistically, it is to avoid overburdening the 
reader and myself. Likewise I sometimes use the word “psychology” for theories that predate 
the first appearances of that word at the end of the sixteenth century. Like most human science 
disciplines, psychology is descended from medieval scholasticism and has so far not enjoyed the 
transformational scientific moment that (say) physics had with the law of gravity; that is why I 
occasionally feel justified in using the word to describe the entire descent, from Thomas Aquinas 
to Steven Pinker. 
Usually I call the pre- or early modern doctrine “faculty psychology” and the later one “modern 
psychology.” Two caveats are needed here. The first is that psychology, once the word was invented, 
still had to wait another three centuries to become a formal academic discipline, while faculty 
psychology survived beyond the early period and well into the nineteenth century. The second is 
that I use “modern psychology” to cover everything since 1700. This too begs questions. In fact, it 
is usually shorthand here for something more limited, namely the psychology of human intelligence 
as it appears in its subdisciplines – clinical, cognitive, behavioural, educational, developmental, 
genetic – and at their point of interface with social practice. Furthermore, one cannot really speak 
of the history of a single discipline with Locke as founding father, or indeed of a discipline at all as 
distinct from a fluctuating constellation of social anxieties. However, this book ends with Locke, 
and that is because even if the history of modern psychology is highly complex, as a significant 
social practice it is recognizably Lockean. Whenever psychologists are paid to assess someone
or to deny social participation – on the grounds, for example, that this or that person lacks the 
ability to think abstractly, reason logically, process information, maintain attention, etc. – they are 
using criteria which Locke, in his seminal refashioning of theological doctrine, also used, and from 
which he created for such people a separate space in society and therefore in nature. 
I have tried to make the telling of this story accessible to anyone with an interest in the history 
or indeed the future of ideas in the human and social sciences. The range of reference will mean 
that parts of the road ahead are steeper than others, depending on readers’ familiarity with this 
or that stretch of it. Sometimes they may feel I am throwing evidence or mere assertions at them 
which, without previous knowledge, they are in no position to question. But that is because we are 
looking at a greenfield site. The problem will only be solved by others taking up these historical 
themes. Scholars with a deep historical knowledge of early modern culture, if not of our particular 
topic, will know exactly where I have strayed or taken short cuts. However, the road is steep in 
more than one sense. Accessibility is not just a matter of understanding the historical material, but 
of being morally prepared for what one has access to. While there are hard facts to be established, 
there are also hard truths to be faced. Of these, truths about our self-esteem – which is where, 
ultimately, I locate the subject matter of this book – are among the hardest. 
PART 1  







Ancient Philosophy and the “Worst Disability”
 
When we assume that in the distant past intelligence and its disabilities, under any label, existed 
in a sense we might understand them today, we turn a history that is rich and strange into a 
recital of our own prejudices. “Intellectual (dis)ability” presupposes an entire modern conceptual 
apparatus whose basic components would have been altogether obscure to the Greeks or indeed 
to Europeans of more than a couple of centuries ago. When Charles Dickens and William Henry 
Wills, in the 1853 edition of Household Words, claimed under the entry “Idiot” that this “hopeless, 
irreclaimable, unimprovable being” is a “main idea,” meaning a universal truth independent of 
time or place, they belonged to the specific generation which was just at that moment inventing 
such a being, as a complement to the middle-class identity their journal sought to establish: 1853 
was also the foundation year of the Royal Earlswood Hospital, the world’s first mass, long-stay
segregated institution. 
The conceptual apparatus of modern psychology, a product as well as a producer of mass 
segregation, forms a huge barrier to historical enquiry, resting as it does on the following 
presuppositions, each of which will be challenged in more detail at various points in this book. 
(1) Intelligence follows certain laws of human nature, just as atoms and molecules follow the 
laws of the physical universe. (2) These psychological laws determine our place in natural history, 
as strictly as biological laws do; intelligence marks what is fully or typically human, rendering 
doubtful the species membership of those who lack it. (3) Such laws are exhibited in a common set 
of detailed intellectual operations that all members of the species bar a few reveal under observation, 
to varying degrees: logical reasoning, abstraction, information-processing, attention, etc., all of 
which boil down to cognitive competence. (4) The mind can be separated from the body, at least for 
purposes of method, as a distinct object in natural history: hence “intellectual” disability, running 
in parallel with physical disability. (5) Personal identity (which includes intellectual ability) is a 
temporal unity, defined by the permanent state of an individual mind taken as a whole over the 
period between birth and death or senile dementia. (6) Intelligence is a possession of the individual, 
like height or eye-colour. (7) There are many more or less normal people, and otherwise a small 
minority of abnormal ones who deviate from the norm in their cognitive abilities and are situated 
at the furthest extremes: highest in the genius, lowest in the idiot. (8) The causes of intelligence 
and disability belong either to nature or to nurture, or to both, or to some interaction between the 
two. (9) Cognitive psychology (educational, developmental, etc.) is an exact science, based on 
empirical data drawn from the human subject’s performance under observation; hence performance 
is evidence of ability, or simply is ability. (10) Rights are separable from competence; the first is a 
legal concept, the second a scientific one, based on expert assessments of an intelligence that has 
its own objective existence and is prior to the sphere of law as such. (11) Intellect is quite separate 
from morals; how we know about people’s intelligence is one thing, a matter for science, but how 
we value them quite another. 
If today all this goes without saying as part of the modern mind-set, among ancient and early 
modern authors it simply was not said. We can find occasional traces of some of it, but not all at 
the same time or as part of an overall mind-set. That is not because those authors were primitives, 
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have finally come to understand. It is because people did not then ask the same questions about 
each other as we do now, nor will in the future. 
When, as it so often does, a history of ideas starts with the Greeks, it maps out the remaining 
journey as an ascent towards the summit that is the modern discipline. In the case of psychology, 
this helps create the impression that categories describing the mind are stable, permanent historical 
objects. It follows then that they are sound: primitive Greek speculation about them has matured 
into an exact modern science. But if the claim is that Plato and Aristotle are psychology’s founding 
fathers, we ought in the era of DNA forensics to administer a paternity test. We then find that this 
role does not suit them at all. In the history of modern psychological concepts, Plato and Aristotle 
are not ancestors but outsiders, barbarians even. The role of ancestor better suits their intellectual 
opponents of the time, the sophists, who shared certain values with modern psychologists, among 
them the information-processing model of intelligence and the importance of speed. This was what 
Athenians liked to hear about themselves, and the sophists pandered to it. They coached people in
the skills needed for social advancement, sold their expertise in a market economy as complex
in its way as ours is and held a place in the society’s formal structures. Hence they earned the enmity 
of philosophers such as Plato and Aristotle, members of a leisured but politically marginalized 
landowning class. Unlike the sophists, the philosophers did not charge fees and were detached 
from power and the entire public arena; they preferred under the democratic circumstances to 
remain idiotai, that is, in a private capacity.1 
It is easy to misappropriate Plato or Aristotle to underwrite modern doctrine. They certainly 
valued some human activities more than others, some of which can be compared with things we 
ourselves call intellectual. But which of these exactly did they regard as better, and what was the 
out-group thus created (since it was not some golden age without scapegoating or stereotyping)? 
We cannot just assume that the philosophers had concepts such as “ability” or “intellect” to match 
our own, or that it was even possible to yoke two such concepts together in the first place. The texts 
are foreign territory. All we can do is reconnoitre the relevant vocabulary and try to reconstruct
its meanings. 
Ease of learning, “learning difficulty” and sophistry 
It is easy to read into Plato the “scale of nature,” that central Western image of a natural hierarchy 
in which what is lowest in human beings is closest to the animals. But while he does indeed have 
a problem with animals, that is mainly because of their hedonism rather than absence of reason 
per se. We can detect in Plato the ascending series existence-life-intelligence, intrinsic to modern 
human sciences, but only very roughly – not as an obsessive need to maintain the sharpest possible 
separation between species. Instead, human abilities and disabilities are closely related to the more 
fundamental problem of ignorance, in which psychological, epistemological and ethical questions 
are inseparable from each other. 
Plato presents Socrates in a constant state of puzzlement – part feigned, part real – when 
people confront him with an argument that seems too pat. His claim to be ignorant, as he worms 
their pre-packaged thoughts out of them, is a way of claiming intellectual ability for himself. One 
thing Socrates knows for sure: that other people’s knowledge claims are grounded in ignorance, 
plausible only because they happen to be popular or ideologically dominant. The intentions behind 
this ironic method often spiral beyond our understanding. Nevertheless Plato is not being playful 
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for the sake of it; a stable world-view lies beneath. Although it is hard to pin him down to a system 
of thought holding good over his entire output, the late dialogues have a consistent terminology 
and scale of values related to intelligence and disability. 
Sifting through these terms, we find only one that is specific to humans alone: “making 
calculations” (logarizesthai). Thomas Hobbes, a shrewd interpreter of classical source-texts, noted 
how minor an item this was in ancient thought; he viewed calculation, central to his own mechanistic 
psychology, as the down-to-earth reality behind his contemporaries’ preposterous claims to higher 
intellectual abilities. He rightly thought they were misappropriating the Greek terms. Episteme
(“understanding”) is not specific to humans, nor does it pretend to distinguish subjective operations 
of knowing from the knowledge at which they aim. Likewise nous (“intuited intellect”) is attributed 
not only to humans but also to divine beings, planets and occasionally to other animals. Other 
terms such as dianoia and noiesis, meanwhile, are too narrow, since the Greeks saw “intellect” in 
this sense as a succession of thinking states rather than as a prior capacity (“it consists of thoughts; 
these are one in terms of their succession, like numbers, not like sizes or spaces,” said Aristotle).2 
Phronesis (prudence or civic intellect) was less than specifically human, being restricted to citizens. 
Finally, there is logos (“rational account”), which is central to Greek philosophy. Plato nowhere 
says that this is exclusive to humans. Of all such terms it is the most susceptible to context. It can 
be good or bad, support false opinion as well as true and does not seem to cover subjective “ability.” 
Moreover it is the failed rational accounts that are described as “monsters,” not the struggling 
humans who submit them to Socrates’s withering cross-examination. Plato’s Theaetetus, which 
deals with the difficulties of giving a rational account, is peppered with such metaphors. 
Then there are secondary operations, such as “ease of learning” (eumathia) and its opposite “learning
difficulty” (dusmathia). These terms came from the sophists: enough reason to doubt whether Plato
takes them seriously. Ease of learning is a “demotic” quality, he says – not something with which his
Academy would want to be associated.3 In any case, according to the prevailing doctrine of the mean,
there are desirable limits to intellectual activity.4 Moreover, ease of learning does not necessarily
mean having a good memory; it is a necessary condition for the philosopher-ruler’s “understanding,”
but not a sufficient one. The scope of learning difficulty is likewise limited; it is not pathological,
and can go with having a good memory. Although Plato says in his Timaeus that it is a component of
“ultimate ignorance” (amathia, the worst kind), they remain conceptually separate. 
The difference between ease of learning and genuine understanding becomes clearer over the 
course of Plato’s work. In The Republic, from the middle period, he says that ease of learning cannot 
be of use to the philosopher-ruler unless it is accompanied, paradoxically, by the kind of plodding 
steadiness more often observed in people who find learning difficult.5 He does not, however, 
suggest the converse: that “learning difficulty” may be a positive value. In his late dialogue The 
Laws, where he describes the ideal state of Magnesia, he makes good this silence. He suggests 
unprecedentedly (for him) that even if people are illiterate, slow-witted and lack any specialized 
ability of the kind associated with the highest, reasoning part of the psyche, they can be rulers, 
simply on condition that the modicum of rational judgment they do possess is in harmony with 
the part of their psyche that deals with pleasure and pain.6 Whereas the rulers of The Republic rule 
2 Aristotle, On the Soul, 407a. References are to the paragraph numbers given in the margins of most 
English or original-language editions of classical texts; the bibliography lists the most frequently used dual-
language editions. Translations here and throughout the book are my own unless otherwise indicated. 
3 Plato, The Republic, 494b. 
4 Plato, Timaeus, 88a. 
5 The Republic, 486a ff. 
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in the name of the Absolute Good, the rulers of Magnesia seek the good for ordinary people. The 
unlearned can rule and possess civic intellect because what they are judging is everyday affairs, 
and this they are capable of. 
Plato’s “ease of learning” and “learning difficulty” therefore cannot be identified with modern 
notions of a specifically human intelligence or disability. And people who learn slowly and with 
difficulty are not those whom he wants excluded from public life. They are not the real defectives or 
the real threat to society. Elimination is warranted for some people simply because of the particular 
way in which their humanity is expressed. But who exactly is on Plato’s hit list? If disabled people 
of our present type were the enemy for Plato, they would surely appear in a form recognizable to 
us. Many historians have called him a eugenicist because in The Republic he seems (the text is 
ambiguous) to hint approvingly at an alleged Spartan practice of exposing defective new-borns 
at the foot of Mount Taygetos.7 However, it is not clear how the Spartan example could refer 
to anything except visible physical weakness: diagnosing anything else in early infancy would 
have been impossible at the time. Nor is there a clear historical distinction between purposeful 
infanticide and simply abandoning babies in public places. We project a modern, eugenicist impulse 
on to Plato; he recommended it, so it is all right for us. Whereas The Laws describes a state that is 
“ideal” in terms of everyday, second-order reality, The Republic is a poetic account of the first-order 
reality of ideal forms, particular that of justice. We should be wary of seeing everything in it as a
policy recommendation. 
Alternatively, one might try to locate the sources of modern “intellectual” disability in the 
psychological make-up of slaves, which would then justify their enslavement (as it would later 
for European colonialists). But the Greek texts on slavery are not a reliable source for modern 
psychological differentiations of any kind. There is no such thing as a slave psychology, says Plato. 
The nature of slaves cannot be reduced to such simple elements – they are capable of civic intellect, 
of which some free citizens are incapable – nor is it any use for a citizen to be capable of a rational 
account but incapable of communicating it.8 
When Plato decides who is to fail the humanity test, the intellectual criteria are not, as we 
would construe them, dissociated from moral ones; the acid test for deciding who is human has
to do with the supremacy of the Good, though that does not make it any the less an intelligence 
test. In his late dialogues he singles out three types of deficiency, outlining a precise classification
that was missing from his earlier texts. It has a systematic vocabulary, prefigured in a key passage 
at the end of Timaeus.9 Here he lists the reincarnations merited by certain types of intellect and
behaviour. In the highest rank, men are reborn as men, and in the next highest as women. Below
are three further ranks (discussed below). Of these, the highest are those who in their previous
life suffered from “simple-mindedness” (euetheia). They are wise enough to study astronomy but 
stupid enough to think that it comes from using one’s eyes rather from theory: in other words, 
they are seduced by appearances and sense-perception. Such people are “harmless” and are 
reincarnated as birds. Lower down come those suffering from “civic ignorance” (aphrosune), 
who are reincarnated as land animals. This is the only rank that contains subgrades within it (four­
legged, multi-legged, legless); these internally differentiated levels of reincarnation reflect the 
hierarchical differentiation of civic functions. The lowest rank are reincarnated to live in water,
thus breathing the foulest air and inhabiting the lowest region, furthest from the divine heavens: 
those who have lived in “ultimate ignorance” (amathia) and “unreason” (anoia), and the only 
ones whose reincarnation is described as a punishment. These three ranks are associated with
7 The Republic, 460c. 
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heaven, earth and water, and with the three hierarchical divisions of the psyche portrayed earlier
in Timaeus. We shall see now how all three feature in the late dialogues. 
Simple-mindedness 
In The Republic, someone who judges things by appearances and sense perception rather than by 
apprehending their ideal forms is said to be suffering from simple-mindedness (the conventional 
meaning of the Greek term was naivety, or taking things at face value). Plato continues to use 
this term in all the post-Republic dialogues; but whereas in that earlier work it had just meant 
an inability to see beyond surface appearance, in the later dialogues it has a broader range. It is 
deployed ironically, opposing sincere, “simple-minded” ignorance to that of the sophists.10 Simple­
mindedness occurs in Plato’s account of the first stage of human development after the flood. It 
is characteristic of a peasant society with no experience of civilization, that is, “of the skills and 
machinations that people in cities use against each other in their desire to get the upper hand.” 
Peasant society had no distinctions of power or wealth; consequently, “when people heard things 
labelled good and bad, being simple-minded they thought the absolute truth was being spoken, and 
they believed it.” The machinating city-dwellers stand for the power-holders in Plato’s Athens; 
the labellers of good and bad are the sophists and rhetoricians. Simple-mindedness belongs
to the unlamented past but is more desirable than the Athenian present. Plato even puts simple­
mindedness up there alongside courage and temperance in his list of the “virtues” of primitive 
society.11 Since it also means taking things at face value, this comes close to an acceptance of the 
world of appearances Plato had rejected in The Republic. Ironic it may be, but he is only half in 
jest. In these late texts Plato has learned to live with the appearances. 
Civic ignorance 
Second, more severe than simple-mindedness is lack of the intellect one needs to function as a 
citizen: civic ignorance. Coming as it does in varying degrees, it concerns not the Absolute Good 
but the exact skills required for this life: good conduct towards the state, one’s family and oneself. 
One needs it both to rule and be ruled. Some people never acquire it, or do so in negligible amounts 
– though whatever its differential distribution, its actual quality remains unchanged from lowest to 
highest. Civic ignorance (aphrosune) is, correspondingly, an inability to see the need for social curbs 
on the unlimited possibilities of life (in this sense it can also cover madness, paraphrosune). The 
word’s everyday sense means something like thoughtlessness – not thinking when you are capable 
of doing so – and this sense is clearly present in Plato too. He says, for example, that pleasure and 
pain are “thoughtless” educational advisers; obedience to them prevents one from “setting limits.” 
The context is one of education for citizenship, of learning to set and accept political and legal 
constraints. If one lacks civic intellect, one will lack justice, temperance and bravery since it is the 
first cause of these other three virtues. Inability to exercise this primordially intellectual virtue, the 
key to an ethical social life in the treacherous second-order world of appearances, is more serious 
than the simple-minded inability to see beneath them.12 
10 The Laws, 679a ff.; Plato, The Statesman, 276e; 309e; The Sophist, 267e. 

11 The Laws, 677b; 679c.
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Ultimate ignorance 
Even civic ignorance is not public enemy number one. What is the greatest threat to the city state or 
polis? It is what in Timaeus Plato calls “ultimate ignorance”: amathia. He also calls it “the greatest 
disease,” “ignorance of humankind’s greatest concerns” and an “alien” state of mind. It answers 
the question, “Why do states fail?” and is vital to the scheme of The Laws. Still being worked out 
through the late dialogues, its complex significance is only reached here in the last of them, where 
he introduces it with a flourish that rounds off a long purple sentence. 
In the developed form it acquires over the late dialogues, ultimate ignorance is multi-faceted. 
Its starting-point is the ignorance that Socrates congratulated himself on not having, to compensate 
for not having wisdom either: that is, the belief that because you have knowledge about some 
things you have knowledge about everything, and consequently that you know everything when in 
fact you don’t. Initially Plato labels this alone as ultimate ignorance. However, in the late dialogues 
he assigns a separate name to it: “self-deceptive wisdom” (doxosophia). He states also that he will 
not be using amathia in its everyday Greek sense, as the ignorance of the artisan who knows only 
one skill.13 He is now free to use the term for something more complex. 
One new feature is that to be ultimately ignorant, one must have power over others. To explain
this, we need to bring in the much-discussed question of whether Plato thinks one can do wrong
willingly or be punished for crimes committed in ignorance. The usual conclusion is that he 
is ambiguous. But the ambiguity is in our own minds. Even in earlier works he was already 
employing two separate terms. One type was simple ignorance or lack of knowledge (agnoia), 
which is prior to the other, morally corrupt type. The latter (amathia) was also called “double 
ignorance”: an abuse of personal power over others, which deserves punishment. This distinction
becomes more explicit in The Laws, where Plato juxtaposes the two terms in a single passage. One 
cannot be overcome by simple lack of knowledge; one can, however, be overcome by ultimate 
ignorance, because it arises out of the pursuit of selfish pleasure (a point not established in the 
earlier works).14 This identification of ultimate ignorance with abuse of power has a sweeping
range: mismanagement of the state, “disorderly” sexual behaviour, mistreatment of partners,
abuse of slaves. At its root is the ultimately ignorant person’s reliance on rhetoric and sophistry,
on self-seeking relativities that threaten the cosmic and social order as portrayed in Timaeus and
the laws of Magnesia.15 
In addition, then, to self-deceptive wisdom and abuse of power, the ultimately ignorant are 
intoxicated with the pleasures obtainable through that power. Intoxication indicates a disjunction 
between the pleasure principle and rational justification of one’s opinions (the highest intellectual 
ability that can be expected of mere humans). Plato’s example is the Persian rulers, whose loss of 
power he ascribes to their selfish and irrational belief that what was honourable and good for the 
state was unimportant compared with gold and silver; their notion of the good was momentary, 
with no thought of what might constitute the absolute good.16 Plato’s concern here is the balanced 
integration of a second-best, because human, realm: the ultimately ignorant are a bar to this 
integrated society, its real aliens. And because ultimate ignorance causes the destruction of the 
state, people suffering from it are to be excluded from power. They only need to be excluded from
power because they are in a position to wield it; put another way, they have to be excluded
13 The Laws, 689a ff.; Timaeus, 88b; Plato, The Seventh Letter, in Epistles, 344c; The Laws, 679d; The 
Sophist, 231b; Plato, Philebus, 49a. 
14 The Laws, 863a ff.; Plato, Protagoras, 357a ff.; 312c ff. 
15 The Laws, 784c; 777d; 886b ff. 
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from power in utopian Magnesia because they wield it in the actual society in which Plato lived. 
Its constitution requires a supervisory body of examiners, and examiners of examiners, to weed 
out rulers who, in spite of Magnesia having given them a decent Platonic education, do not live 
up to expectations. No one graduates with a certificate guaranteeing a permanent right to rule.
The examiners are a check on backsliding rulers, whom Plato wishes could be put to death twice. 
His final, elaborated concept of ultimate ignorance defines the backsliding: it is the disease of 
advanced society.17 
Plato reinserts “ease of learning” into this ultimate ignorance. His doubts about it have now 
increased. He takes the crucial step of crediting ultimately ignorant people with outstanding 
learning abilities, of the kind that belong to the highest, divine part of the psyche: arithmetical 
reasoning, forethought, making judgements, etc. These abilities are “fully rational”; perhaps the 
phrase is ironic (the word “fully” evokes Socratic misgivings about any kind of claim to complete 
knowledge), but it does not work as irony unless we read it in a positive sense first. According to 
Plato, the desires of the lowest part of the psyche (say, for gold) may harness even the most expert 
and divine “calculative faculty” (logistikon) for their own ends: the first and only time Plato ever 
uses the latter term in a pejorative sense. Whereas in The Republic the very idea of such a fall from 
grace was out of the question, in the more practical context of The Laws it has become a real threat, 
the greatest danger to the state, and the reason why there can be no innate and thus incorruptible 
virtue among rulers. Virtue can be learned, but it can be unlearned too; ultimate ignorance in a 
specifically educational setting is given its own term (apaideusia) – not the simple lack of an 
education but the unravelling of a good one.18 
In ultimate ignorance, then, we have found the real enemy. What has it got to do with “intellectual 
disability” in any sense that we might understand it today? If Plato’s “ultimate ignorance” seems 
not to tally with some kind of intellectual disability in our own sense, it is not some dichotomously 
conceived moral incompetence either. Though “the cause of great and brutal sins,” it is not some 
psychopathic exception.19 It embraces all sorts of people, not only ancient Persian rulers and 
backsliding Magnesian ones but people of influence in Plato’s own society: materialist philosophers 
whose teachings persuade the masses away from piety and hence from social deference; the 
political careerists heading the democracy; sophists who think education should be relevant and 
pragmatic, and that the divine cosmological disciplines (arithmetic, astronomy, etc.) are mere frills; 
and King Dionysios of Sicily, whom Plato himself had tutored but who nevertheless suffered from 
the self-deceptive wisdom and abused his power. The Seventh Letter attributed to Plato tells this 
latter story. It was his one known foray into political activity, as tutor to a future ruler – and it failed. 
Ultimate ignorance is here in all but name when he describes the pointlessness of Dionysios having 
been a quick and easy learner when he was “by nature” (i.e., ingrained habit) bad. Ease of learning, 
if Dionysios is anything to go by, is an “alien disposition.”20 
Plato does at times discuss something closer to modern notions of psychopathy and moral 
incapacity: a “disease of the psyche” akin to madness, in which the calculative faculty is absent 
because these “wicked” and “unjust” people have always sought pleasure immediately. The 
ultimately ignorant, on the other hand, are reasoners able to calculate the relative merits of 
pleasure and pain and to make a convincing pretence of civic intellect; they can postpone the 
gratification of desire, and use their reasoning skills to plan for it.21 Now whereas we can readily 
17 The Laws, 945a ff.; 677b.
 
18 The Laws, 689c; 641c.
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envisage knowledge being abused for immoral ends, Plato regards unvirtuous knowledge as a 
nonsensical notion. Ultimate ignorance is not just moral ignorance; the moral is inseparable from 
the intellectual. Whereas we are used to the notion that intelligent people may have moral flaws, 
Plato asks a harder question: why is amoral intelligence unintelligent? Why does it lead not only 
to the destruction of the state and the misery of the powerless, but eventually to the downfall 
of the intelligent person? That it does so is taken for granted. And if the ultimately ignorant are 
said to have great intellectual abilities, including some that are by definition divine, how can this 
simultaneously involve intellectual failure?
 While amathes in its everyday sense meant ignorant of a particular skill, it could also mean 
being unteachable, as animals are. Plato knows this resonance will be heard within his own complex 
philosophical usage. He says that the sophists call certain people ignorant just because they find 
learning difficult, and suggests the label should apply to them, his know-all peers.22 He classifies 
ultimate ignorance under the genus “unreason” (anoia), a broad category of cosmic disorder.23 By 
contrast with ignorance as simple lack of knowledge (agnoia, referred to above), which though 
“ugly” is merely an absence, unreason as it occurs in the human realm is positively evil. In The 
Laws it covers a wide range of conditions: being mad, immature, senile, female, drunk or a poet. 
It is a sign, in the individual, of an absence of intuited intellect (nous) and thereby of his due 
portion of cosmic order and purpose. It is “the absolute unreason of motion that is never uniform 
or regular.”24 There is an organic link between the cosmological dimensions of intellectual activity 
and the human ones: between, say, the planets revolving on their circular orbits and Magnesia’s 
school curriculum, designed to wean children away from the absolute unreason of their disorderly 
motions driven by sense-perception and towards the perfect order of the circle, through the teaching 
of mathematics. 
In human beings, intuited intellect is specifically associated with the highest, divine part
of the psyche. How then can the opposite condition (anoia), which encompasses the “disease” of 
ultimate ignorance, sit alongside an outstanding calculative faculty in certain individuals? The 
answer is that the reasoning of the ultimately ignorant person contributes to his downfall.25 It is 
certainly present initially; you cannot think you know, let alone actually know some expert thing 
without being a good reasoner to start with. Now while the reasoning faculty seems to be present at 
the outset in the ultimately ignorant person, it is also by definition absent in his state of unreason. 
Unhinged by desire, which originates in the lowest part of the psyche but has used reasoning 
abilities to lay long-term plans for gratification, those abilities eventually self-destruct. Ultimate 
ignorance is unvirtuous knowledge, or rather the upshot of trying to attain this unattainable prize. 
It is a dynamic process that, in coming to fruition, renders useless the reasoning faculty with 
which its possessor undoubtedly set out. You cannot wield power without reason, and initially it 
is compatible with your state of ultimate ignorance. But to the extent that it also gets embroiled in 
excess and attachment to money or to power over others for its own sake, it leads to the loss and 
destruction of power, and of the state. You will end up alone in old age, deserted by companions 
and even your own children.26 Through this process, power becomes not-power. The contradiction 
of suffering from unreason while possessing an expert reasoning faculty unfolds over time, in the 
social and political realm. 
22 Plato, Theaetetus, 195a.
 
23 Timaeus, 86b; The Laws, 689b.
 
24 The Laws, 898a.
 
25 The Laws, 689c.
 
26 The Laws, 730c.
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Plato’s supreme disability is embodied in the person who (a) has power and (b) is ignorant of 
its dialectic: that is, someone who in both respects is the exact opposite of himself. If we want 
to look for cross-historical links from Plato to ourselves, it is in this solipsistic way of thinking 
that we shall find them, rather than in any supposedly positive definition of human intelligence or 
disability. Such definitions are always self-referential, thus bound to time and place. The time and 







Aristotle and the Slave’s Intellect 
Broadly, Aristotle agrees with Plato that the intellectual alien is someone with uncontainable desires. 
The ideal is the mean: a balanced life, centred on the theoretical and civic intellect. Aristotle’s 
modern commentators, however, have had their eyes not only on the man of excess but on certain 
social distinctions, and we shall examine here what Aristotle has to say about these. Just as man has 
a finer sense of touch than the other animals – a sign that he “is the most intelligent (phronimos) 
of all creatures” – so, in relation to each other, humans can be ranked morally and intellectually 
by whether they have hard or soft skin.1 For hard skin, read manual labour.2 These stray references 
aside, his social distinctions centre on slavery. In Book 1 of Politics, he writes about a separate 
population of “natural slaves,” as distinct from slaves by “convention” or “law” such as prisoners 
of war. Were the former the intellectually disabled people of his time? 
Aristotle against the sophists, ancient and modern 
It is commonly thought that this distinction, between slaves press-ganged by brute force and 
“natural” ones whose enslavement is due to some innate slavelike characteristic, was Aristotle’s 
own. However, the nature/convention polarity does not appear anywhere else in his works. On the 
other hand we do know, because he himself tells us, that it was popular with the sophists. They 
asserted that all slavery, even that which others called natural, was in fact conventional: that is, that 
the usual polarity does not apply in this case. Aristotle, like Plato, was dismissive of polarity; as 
an analytic tool it was inadequate.3 He starts his discussion of slavery with the nature/convention 
polarity not because he endorses it but because this is his customary method: he begins with a 
received formula, then seeks to undermine it. He will look for elements of convention in nature, 
and of nature in convention. 
What does it mean to label some people slaves “by nature”? Most of us, weaned on liberal 
theories of rational consent and autonomy, might think he is saying that certain people are born 
with an inferior or disabled intellect, a natural psychological condition that is prior to their 
socio-political status, and that one is therefore justified in denying them citizenship. If “man is 
a rational animal” (to use a phrase misattributed to Aristotle), then natural slaves are just like 
modern disabled people: the exception that tests the rule of human species membership. Many 
commentators have supposed that Aristotle was also being racist, attributing this disabled or 
inferior intellect to non-Greek “barbarians.” From the later Middle Ages the Politics was often 
cited to justify contemporary forms of discrimination. Juan Ginés de Sepúlveda used it to justify the 
enslavement of first-nation South Americans, who he said were “slaves by nature.”4 North American
1 Aristotle, On the Soul, 421a. 
2 Lynn Rose, “The courage of subordination: women and mental retardation in ancient Greece,” 
unpublished ms. 
3 Plato, Gorgias, 482e; Protagoras, 337d; The Republic, 381a. 
4 Juan Ginés de Sepúlveda, Tratado sobre las justas causas de la guerra contra los Indios, 153; see also 
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anti-abolitionist intellectuals used it to justify slavery in the Confederate states.5 In Victorian 
Britain, Benjamin Jowett – the Master of Balliol who in Thomas Hardy’s fictional caricature sent 
Jude back to his obscure labouring ghetto and who in real life was responsible for placing the 
eugenics of Plato’s Republic at the centre of the classics curriculum – cited the naturally slavish 
mentality of the English working classes in order to justify barring them from the “common ideas” 
of philosophy, which should remain the inherited preserve of “the higher classes.” (Jowett’s own 
father, as is often the way, kept a haberdasher’s shop.)6 
In the shadows of Nazism, commentators suggested that Aristotle believed slaves to be
subhuman, interstitial creatures “of neither species [man or beast] but sui generis,” and that 
he “trivialize[s] the distinction” between slaves and animals. Often they have tried to extricate 
Aristotle from his apparent culpability over race precisely by reaching for a disability model 
instead. His doctrine of natural slavery was “neither inconsistent” nor “morally repulsive” since 
apparently it was designed to demonstrate an injustice: that most so-called natural slaves were 
wrongly categorized because actually they had been enslaved by convention, i.e., as prisoners of 
war.7 By true natural slavery, then, he must have meant a small “feeble-minded” group, people with 
“the psychology of the childlike adult.” These commentators’ transhistorical view of disability 
is a necessary antidote to the idea that he thought some racial groups to be of naturally inferior 
intelligence. He was not, it is said, justifying the enslavement of foreigners, but simply talking about 
“a few people” who really are “naturally deficient,” the “backward individual[s] in any society” 
– and this, of course, poses no ethical problems.8 We may note here that rather than eradicating the 
racist interpretation, such comments merely displace it. In implying that one is entitled in these 
exceptional cases to order people about for their own benefit, intellectual disability remains intact 
as a positive principle, lurking there to be applied once again to other groups (such as ethnic ones) 
when the political wind changes. Rather than an antidote to racism, then, the modern “intellectual 
disability” interpretation of natural slavery can be a reserve pool for discrimination of all kinds. 
In fact, Aristotle needs to be rescued from those who would force him either into a liberal
gentleman’s club blazer or into an SS uniform. Nowhere does he say that natural slaves have less
ability at their job than conventional ones.9 They are all “partners in the masters’ lives.”10 His concept
of slavery was largely economic. He does not discuss the slave mind or indeed superior and inferior
intellects at all (other than brief references to the hard-skinned and the senile) in On the Soul, his
account of the human psyche. In Politics, the topic is mainly confined to a single section on household
management. Fifteen hundred years later, the early scholastic commentators on Politics still treated
slavery as an economic concept.11 Only later – in fact, when their own contemporaries began enslaving
5 Harvey Wish, “Aristotle, Plato, and the Mason-Dixon Line,” Journal of the History of Ideas, 10 
(1949). 
6 E.V. Quinn and J.M. Prest, Dear Miss Nightingale, Introduction, xxiv. 
7 R. Schlaifer, “Greek theories of slavery,” Harvard Studies in Classical Philology, 47 (1936); O. Gigon, 
“Die Sklaverei bei Aristoteles,” in Fondation Hardt (ed.), La ‘Politique’ d’Aristote; A. Baruzzi, “Der Freie 
und der Sklave,” Philosophisches Jahrbuch, 77 (1970); W. Fortenbaugh, “Aristotle on slaves and women,” in 
Jonathan Barnes et al (eds), Articles on Aristotle, 2. 
8 Malcolm Schofield, “Ideology and philosophy in Aristotle’s theory of slavery,” in G. Patzig (ed.), 
Aristoteles ‘Politik.’ 
9 Abraham Shulsky, “The ‘infrastructure’ of Aristotle’s Politics,” in C. Lord and D.K. O’Connor (eds), 
Essays on the Foundations of Aristotelian Political Science. 
10 Aristotle, Politics, 1259b. 
11 Albertus Magnus, Commentari in Octo Libros Politicorum Aristotelis, in A. Borgnet (ed.), Opera, 
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people – did they start to assume that Aristotle was making natural intellectual capacity and incapacity
the basis of people’s political status. Many modern political philosophers do now acknowledge that he
is more interested here in the nature of power than in the nature of slaves as such. But there remains an
assumption that he saw some people in terms of modern doctrines of competence, as being “so framed
by nature that they were incapable of full human development.”12 In this view, the nature of slavery
is already covertly present in its political character: there is/was “by nature a position to be filled and
there were people who by nature occupied it.”13 In the modern relationship between a psychology
of intelligence and a politics of consent, this is true: rationality is a precondition for autonomy. But
looked at historically, the concept of a universal human type lacking rationality is a relatively recent
invention, by people who have found ways of asserting that autonomy. 
The slave mind: social, natural or necessary? 
If Aristotle did not say what we think he said, what actually did he say? Certain themes are 
intertwined: the slave population’s inferior position in the nature of the community; the individual 
slave’s natural lack of certain intellectual operations; and the metaphorical expression of both these 
as a relationship between psyche and body. 
We must begin by being pedantic about translation. Aristotle’s exact phrase is not “natural slave”
(adjective plus noun) but “slave in respect of nature” (doulos phusei). Grammatically, “slave by
nature” is another possible reading, but although this rolls temptingly off the modern tongue it
evokes the idea of natural or biological causes and, as we shall see, Aristotle does not argue for any 
such thing. What does “nature” mean here? He tells us at the start that a search for nature involves 
digging beneath the foundations of a given formula, trying to obtain a better account than the current
one. He warns against taking for granted what “nature” means when we apply it to slaves, or to 
politics in general, and particularly against two sophistic assumptions: (1) that there is an abstract set
of techniques for ruling that encompasses all the specific forms of power; and (2) that because one
rules over slaves by force, it is therefore a matter not of nature but of convention alone. 
Assumption (1) is inadequate, he says, because it does not start in the right place. We need 
to know the nature of man, and particularly his social nature, before we can say anything about 
techniques by which he rules. Man is a creature belonging in a community of some kind. The 
supreme human community is the polis or city-state; this, then, is the supreme authority. Aristotle’s 
train of thought from here on is dialectical, in the Greek sense of the word. Starting from a single 
term, “rule” or authority, he asks how it subdivides. Where is “nature” in all its various branches 
and subtypes? It is false to suppose that there is one abstract technique of ruling that can be applied 
across all of them. There are kings, statesmen, heads of large estates, heads of small households; 
these forms of authority are not equivalent or interchangeable. The differences among them are 
qualitative, since each of them has its own distinct goal (telos) and therefore differs from the 
others “with respect to nature.” The same is true of those who are ruled. For example, although 
women are naturally subordinate, their subordination is not the same as that of slaves, as if by 
some abstract common denominator. The distinct nature of the slave is functionally specific to 
the management of the household, a “community in accordance with nature” whose own specific 
goal is to satisfy everyday needs.14 The slave exists in opposition to the “master” (despotes) of the 
12 P. Brunt, Studies in Greek History and Thought, 343; R. Müller, “La logique de la liberté,” in Aubenque 
(ed.), Aristote politique. 
13 Bernard Williams, Shame and Necessity, 110 ff. 
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household. Simple opposition applies only to this lowliest level of authority. (In larger units such as 
the landed estate or the city-state, relationships among social classes are more complicated.) 
In response to assumption (1), then, Aristotle says that the nature of authority consists in specific 
differences. However, all these relationships are subordinate to the supreme goal of the city-state, 
which “circumscribes all the other [forms of] community.”15 The specific nature of the slave is 
expressed in terms of wider goals, in which (as always in Aristotle) causes are already inscribed. 
The causes of slavery lie in the realm of necessity. What determines the slave’s natural difference 
is not biological but technological, a “necessary utility.” If shuttles wove by themselves (robot 
shuttles were not in prospect), masters would not need slaves. Necessity of this type describes 
two particular dialectical pairings that come under the general metaphysical principle “Rule and 
be ruled.”16 One pairing is between slave and master, the other between slave (tool of action)
and inanimate object (tool of production). So when Aristotle says that some people are marked 
out “from birth” to rule and others to be ruled, the cause is not some congenital deficiency but the 
managerial requirements of the household economy. 
If the causes of slavery spring from economic necessity, it hardly seems to matter whether it is 
natural or conventional. Why, then, is Aristotle interested in this question? Typically, he is playing 
along with a formula his contemporaries have confronted him with. Like our social constructionists, 
the sophists were good at seeing mere social convention beneath what their contemporaries saw 
as natural. But Aristotle typically wants to deal with the unnoticed converse of this: that elements 
of nature may lurk beneath a social convention. This brings him to assumption (2), the sophistic 
claim that all slavery is mere convention. The sophists do not object morally to this; they are not 
abolitionists. Slavery may be “not just,” but we do it anyway. It is one of those things that have to 
be. Aristotle agrees, for reasons of economic necessity.17 But unlike the sophists, he feels a need 
to try and square slavery with justice. He could have agreed that all slavery is conventional and 
simply added that it was unjust, as the Stoics did.18 But they only objected to it speculatively: no 
Greek could have imagined a slaveless social system. Aristotle, on the other hand, wants to square 
slavery with justice because he wants to square it with nature. He objects to the sophists’ picture 
of a dog-eat-dog world where anyone who is powerful enough can enslave anyone else for no 
good reason. There is such a thing as society: man is a “political” (polis-inhabiting) animal. It is 
the community itself that is human nature, with its own clear goal; it is not just a set of changeable 
conventions. If so, and if slavery is a part of it, then one is obliged to find something natural in 
the slave. In addition, it is not clear how a “feeble-minded” population group – even if the Greeks 
had been able to conceive such a thing – could have contributed positively to the natural goal of 
community as Aristotle’s slaves do. 
Not every natural slave, then, is actually a conventional one. But also, as Aristotle accepted, 
not every conventional slave is a natural one. All Athenians would have understood the political 
background to this. Plato had described barbarians, non-Greeks, as natural enemies, indeed 
“enemies in respect of nature” (polemioi phusei), by contrast with natural friends such as the 
Hellenic peoples; true, they fought each other, but this was seen as institutionalized factionalism 
rather than war.19 Natural justice said that foreign enemies could be treated like slaves, but that 
among Greeks certain conventions applied, or ought to: enslavement of Greek by Greek was against 







18 Dio Chrysostom, Discourses, 15.
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the Spartans had sent their Athenian captives, fellow-Greeks, into slavery. The folk memory of this 
was still raw in Aristotle’s time. Thucydides, to whom we owe the story, went out of his way to say 
how unnatural the humiliation was. A core Athenian narrative, it may explain why Aristotle was 
so keen to find “natural” characteristics in some slaves. While slavery in general was determined 
by the necessities of the household economy, what made you this or that kind of slave was the 
concrete circumstances of your enslavement. Perhaps then, all slaves were naturally so apart from 
the Athenians seized at Syracuse. 
One of the most embarrassing moments for the modern reader comes when Aristotle says it is 
the “nature and ability” of a slave to be someone else’s possession. Translators try to excuse him 
by rendering the second of these terms as “office,” or “quality,” rather than ability. To say, not just 
that slaves are other people’s possessions, but that it is their ability or capacity to be so, seems 
cruel, even perverse (though if they were our modern “intellectual disabled” people rather than 
racial others the denial of their autonomy might seem less embarrassing). However, we can see 
Aristotle’s intentions better by considering a passage from Nicomachean Ethics, the companion 
piece to Politics. Here he writes about natural as opposed to conventional justice. Natural justice 
is “that which has the same potentiality everywhere” and (unlike the conventional type) “is not a 
matter of what seems good or not”: that is, it is not relative or a might-is-right issue, as the sophists 
would have it.20 Natural slavery is a part of natural justice. We know this because the subjective 
“ability” he writes about in Politics is the objective “potentiality” he writes about in Ethics; the 
same word (dunamis) is used for both. In other words, slavery was a ubiquitous aspect of social 
organization whose horizon no one at the time, not even Aristotle, could see beyond.  
Slave mind and slave body 
In a couple of passages Aristotle is said to create a crude picture of the master as pure psyche and 
the slave as a mere body whose humanity is therefore in question. But we need to examine these 
passages closely. 
In the first passage, the absolute and fundamental division “rule or be ruled” operates in the 
domain of “nature as a whole.”21 He divides this nature into animate and inanimate. “Animate” is 
then subdivided into psyche and body, male and female, intuitive intellect and appetite, humans 
and non-humans. From this list he selects humans (“all humans”) for further subdivision. Who 
would the ruled portion of “all humans” be? The answer is self-evident: we can see them all around 
us. It is those who are ruled now: slaves, or (in this context) so-called “natural” slaves. In short, 
Aristotle does not model the relationship between master and slave on that between psyche and 
body.22 Both pairings merely happen to turn up in the same context, as quite separate examples of 
how the “rule and be ruled” principle operates in “animate nature.” 
It is true that he draws a couple of passing analogies between the two pairings, and that in pre­
modern philosophy analogies are never mere analogies but have some extra, explanatory force. 
However, we need to establish exactly where that force lies in each case. In the first analogy, 
all he says is that using their bodies is what slaves are best at.23 In the other, he says that psyche 
rules like a head of household whereas intuited intellect (nous) rules like a king. Here he merely 
20 Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, 1134b; 1094b. 
21 Politics, 1254a. 
22 N. Smith, “Aristotle’s theory of natural slavery,” in D. Keyt and F. Miller (eds), A Companion to 
Aristotle’s Politics, 142. 
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wants to show that “being ruled” is not a unitary or abstract condition, but (as we have seen) 
varies according to the specific social institution; it is as harmful, he says, to lose sight of such 
specificities as it is to ignore the difference between ruler and ruled overall. In each case, if the 
analogy as a whole held an explanatory force, one would have to conclude, absurdly, that natural 
slaves are automata, or psyche-less bodies. Instead, he goes out of his way to avoid any simplistic 
polarity that denies slaves their humanity. The explanatory element consists only in showing that 
slavery is a natural function of the community. Moreover, being ruled gives them protection. We 
have of course heard the same argument used about social inferiors in our own era: about women 
for example, or about black people under apartheid, and we hear the same argument being used 
today against the social inclusion of people labelled with intellectual disabilities. A conservative 
would suggest that we owe them protection as a benevolent duty, towards quasi-human creatures 
whose prior lack of rationality raises doubts about dealing with them as species members. For 
Aristotle, however, protection was something more positive; it was an aspect of the slave’s positive 
socio-economic function. 
In a second passage he says that slaves are like domestic animals, at least in terms of their 
bodily usefulness. Nature accordingly “seeks to make different bodies for free men and slaves,” 
but sometimes misses its aim.24 This idea of a gap between intention and achievement, so different 
from the quasi-logical classifications of modern biology, is characteristic of Aristotelian nature.
A slave may sometimes have the bodily features of a free man, and a free man (we are to infer) 
the body of a slave. Aristotle, always determined to cover every angle, does not however appear to 
have thought the unthinkable: that the slave might have the psyche of a free man. In any case it is 
difficult, he says, to deduce intellectual features from physical ones. Experts on the mind have long 
since claimed to possess the answer, from bumps on the skull to DNA strings, but Aristotle was far 
more cautious. He does say that women’s social inferiority is mirrored in the constitution of their 
bodies; but generally speaking, the weakness of boundary lines in his concept of nature means that 
the confusion between free and slave-like bodily types is not even a puzzle, it is just a fact of life, 
an everyday reality. “If free men were born as different in body as the statues of the gods, everyone 
would say that inferior people would be worthy of being their slaves,” and it would certainly be 
“more just.” But free men are not born that way. If a slave can resemble a free man physically, no 
clear proof is possible that beneath this bodily appearance lies an inferior psyche. Aristotle’s frame 
of reference is far from that of twentieth-century alarms about racial mixing or the reproductive 
menace of the feeble-minded, let alone today’s liberal eugenics. 
A possible objection arises. Doesn’t Aristotle contrast the “master in respect of nature … able
to look ahead by his thinking” with the slave who is “able to do such-and-such by his body”?25 This 
is not a deficit model, however. Both abilities are positive functions of the household and polis. 
Where Aristotle does discuss a deficit in ability, the creature who pops up is the citiless individual 
who is “unable to belong to a community,” “not part of a polis” and who must therefore be “a wild 
beast.”26 Even here there is no suggestion that the deficit is in the intellect as such. He may be 
thinking of fellow philosophers such as Diogenes the Cynic, who adopted the life of a homeless 
beggar. Where Aristotle describes the natural slave in negative terms, the context is essentially 
socio-economic: “He who in nature is not in possession of himself but of another, precisely this 
man is a natural slave.”27 It is in this context that we must take Aristotle’s assertion that the slave’s 
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Natural slaves in a natural community 
Aristotle’s gestures towards the humanity of natural slaves can, to be sure, seem precarious. He says, 
for example, that slaves “participate in reason (logos) so far as to apprehend it but not to possess it, 
for the animals other than man are subservient not to reason, by apprehending it, but to feelings.”
I have quoted a standard translation.28 The word translated here as “participate” (koinoneo) echoes 
the book’s initial reference to the city-state as the supreme community (koinonia). A better translation 
might therefore be that slaves “belong to the community of reason,” rather than simply participating 
in it. Moreover, to “apprehend but not possess” reason sounds suspiciously self-contradictory, and 
needs closer inspection. Apprehensions or perceptions, says Aristotle in his Metaphysics, are things 
one either “possesses” or not; a halfway state is out of the question, just as a soldier can only be 
either armed or unarmed.29 It is the most clearcut type of opposition. And in the practical context 
of Politics, “possessing an apprehension of good and bad, just and unjust” is a quality that is “prior 
to the household” and therefore holds true of all humans, regardless of their subsequent division 
into masters and slaves.30 This communal awareness of justice “makes the household and the city-
state.” So “possessing an apprehension of justice” is already contained within the overall idea 
of “apprehending reason,” whatever the social status of the possessor. When, therefore, Aristotle 
goes on to say that despite slaves apprehending reason they do not possess it, is he “hopelessly 
confused”?31 Perhaps he is being extra clear. The particular Greek word he chooses for “possess” 
(ekhein) is one that emphasizes use over acquisition. Slaves do not fully use their reason because 
the structure of the community is such that it is not required of them. This does not stop them from 
“having” it in a broader sense. The notion of some modern commentators that Aristotle’s so-called 
natural slaves were an interstitial type between humans and other animals, defined by differential 
intellect, therefore seems unsustainable. Little remains of the frequently noted conflict between the 
slave’s apprehension of reason and Aristotle’s later claim, at the end of Book 1, that people “get it 
wrong” when they say slaves are destitute of reason (logos). 
It is true that of all the terms that might translate as reason, logos is the most mundane and 
susceptible to social context and relativism. It also has juridical overtones; slaves would have been
incompetent to give a reasoned account in court – but only because they had no legal personhood,
not on some separate psychological grounds. Another possible objection comes when Aristotle 
says that the slave lacks civic intellect (phronesis) and that his psyche lacks a “deliberating” 
component.32 Surely these are natural intellectual deficits, by any stretch? Once again we need
some context. If slaves belong to the community of reason, they also have its properly human 
virtues: bravery, justice, temperance. The fourth in the standard quartet of virtues, civic intellect,
is self-evidently absent because the slave is not a citizen. The other three virtues, like the absence 
of the fourth, are specific to his social function. Accordingly, they operate differently from those 
same virtues in the master. Aristotle illustrates this with a further psyche/body analogy. The 
rational part of the psyche rules and its irrational part is ruled, “like the body.”33 He does not say 
that masters possess only its rational part and slaves only its irrational part. Although the idea of 
a bipartite, rational/irrational psyche turns up several times in Aristotle’s ethical writings, the two
28 Politics, 1254b: see Works Cited.
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parts never correspond to two congenitally different types of human being.34 Here as elsewhere, 
he is using them to explain different social functions. 
Although science, in the sense of a natural science of the mind, plays no part in Aristotle’s 
discussion of slavery, psyche itself nevertheless has a scientific significance of sorts. It is the 
overarching principle of movement in living things and thus constitutes a metaphysical boundary, 
like gravity in Newtonian physics. In humans, it is divided into various parts, of which one is the 
“deliberating” part, responsible for ethical choice and the planned life. In the ruler, this part is “fully 
formed.” Women have something of it but “without authority,” children have it but “not complete.” 
As for the slave, Aristotle says nothing beyond the bald fact that his psyche lacks this part. Slaves 
“cannot” plan their own lives, and a group of slaves on their own would not be a polis because 
they would not “share in the planned life.”35 Could he mean that their lack of a deliberative psyche 
is congenital? This would indicate a strictly biological cause quite foreign to all his other remarks 
about slaves (though other Greeks such as the Stoics posed the idea of hereditary slavery).36 Could 
he mean that the deliberating part is triggered only at a certain stage in the human lifespan, and that 
in the slave it simply fails to do so? This looks more plausible to us, if only because we have grown 
up with modern developmentalist notions of a “plateau” in disabled people, who are “retarded” 
inasmuch as they fail to develop beyond a certain stage. However, the notion of a trigger would be 
inconsistent with Aristotle’s clear implication that the free child already has the deliberative part, 
albeit incomplete, at birth. 
We can align the psychological characteristic of deliberation and forward planning with a certain 
social status. The Greek word for this part is bouleutikon. This was originally the name for a theatre
seat reserved for members of the boule or ruling council; as a metaphor for high status in public life, 
it subsequently entered discussions of the psyche. As Lynn Rose, citing the philosophical conundrum
as to whether a tree falling in a forest makes a noise if no one is there to hear, asks: “If a person is, 
by modern standards, intellectually disabled, but the concept of intellectual disability has not yet 
been invented, is that person really intellectually disabled? To take it another step, if a person is by 
his own culture’s standards mentally deficient [such as slaves or women], but mental deficiency is 
the expected and appropriate quality, can we still say that he is disabled in any way?”37 Aristotle’s 
answer to the question of what causes the deliberative part of the psyche to be absent in the slave is 
implicit in his ideas about the nature of politics and community; it can no more refer behind these, 
to some “science” of the mind, than Newtonian physics looks to any deeper-lying discipline for an 
answer to the question “What force causes gravity?” The opposite, in fact: Aristotle explicitly warns 
us against trying. Study of politics and the psyche should not exceed “the extent proportionate to the
things investigated.”38 Nothing beyond psyche causes it, or any aspect of it. There is no mention of 
natural slaves in his On the Soul, the text that describes the general workings of the psyche, though 
later commentators have more than made up for this omission. 
This is not simply to substitute political science for psychological science. Aristotle never argues 
outright for slavery as a structural necessity in Greek society. He has no reason to, because for him, 
it is simply a given. The parts of the psyche explain various everyday aspects of civic virtue. The 
ruler’s intellectual virtue is the supreme social function, of which deliberation is a necessary part. 
A slave’s virtue is relative to his master’s.39 It is positive, and belongs precisely to the function of 
34 Politics, 1249b.
 
35 Politics, 1260a; 1280a.
 
36 Dio Chrysostom, Discourses, 15.
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being ruled; it is not that he is less virtuous than his master when measured on some single scale. 
True, the slave’s virtue is “small” – seeming to imply difference of degree. Is this a deficit model, 
though? That is another matter. His virtue is small because the natural community needs it to be 
small for the purposes of his particular social function, which renders his virtue different in kind 
rather than degree. Unlike free children, slaves should not be taught virtue because they already 
have as much of it as they need for the community to function properly. There would be no point 
teaching them beyond their station. The virtues they do possess for that station are already inherent 
in it. This may be harsh; the rule of life for slaves was not the Delphic command to the free man, 
“Know your self,” but Jowett’s to Jude, “Know your place.” However, Aristotle does not say slaves 
cannot be taught. Indeed, this discussion about the lack of a deliberative part of the soul is precisely 
the point in the text at which he goes out of his way to say that we get it wrong if we deny reason to 
them. It is also the place where he points out that there is considerable overlap between the natural 
slave and the free artisan. In a natural community the artisan’s occupational niche differs from
the slave’s but, says Aristotle, both require exactly the same virtues. 
So much for the slave’s nature. If, then, slavery does not have a psychological basis in any 
sense that we would understand it today, what then remains of the distinction between natural and 
conventional? Why is all slavery not just a socio-political phenomenon? The problem is the nature/ 
convention antithesis itself, which does not neatly correspond to our current obsessions: nature 
versus nurture, genes versus environment and so forth. Our own concept of nature as necessity, 
a deterministic influence on the perceived intellectual disabilities of individuals that are prior to 
decisions about their social and political status, would have been foreign to Aristotle. That is because 
for him necessity and nature were not identical, and indeed hardly overlapped at all. And this 
renders equally questionable the other half of the antithesis, convention. If the slave’s intellectual 
shortcomings were merely some socially constructed stereotype about barbarians, Aristotle would 
have had to agree with the sophists: there is nothing to slavery except how things have actually 
worked out in society, and therefore no real distinction between conventional and natural slaves –
they would all be conventional. Yet he still clearly regards the distinction as useful. 
The reason for this is that, at least sometimes, he talks about nature as something deeper than 
a mere set of descriptive categories, and attributes goals and intentions to it. Moreover, it is this 
strand that predominates in Politics. Nature here is an ideal. He personifies it: as well as trying 
(not always successfully) to differentiate between the bodies of free men and slaves, nature tries 
to create good offspring from good parents.40 Nevertheless, such differentiations among human 
beings are not simply read off from an external, scientific account of nature assumed to say the 
same thing to everyone. Rather, Aristotle theorizes his so-called natural slave from within social 
participation and shared ethics. He sees the acquisition of intellectual virtue as natural in the sense 
that it is based on natural causes, or more precisely on natural goals inherent in those causes. This is 
hardly scientific in any sense that we might understand it, since the causes are dispositional rather 
than determined; they hinge indiscriminately on biology or just plain luck – and social status. Any 
teleological components in the slave’s nature refer to the larger nature of the community rather 
than to that of the individual. Aristotle was no scientific racist, either; if the barbarian character is 
inferior, it is not in terms of some deterministic schema. He says plenty about natural origins and 
natural causes elsewhere in his philosophy, so there was certainly an opening for him to talk about 
“natural barbarians” if he had wanted to. No such creature appears in his writings. If he had seen 
slaves as a separate species in nature on grounds of their inferior intellect, whether in terms of race 
or disability, it would be inconsistent with the way he talks about humans in all other contexts. 
40 Politics, 1255b. 
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“Man is a rational animal”: Did Aristotle say it? Could he have said it? 
Broadly speaking, then, Aristotle’s work provides us with no metaphysical or scientific basis for 
sharply defined intellectual subcategories of human being. Yet he was reputedly author of the 
phrase “Man is a rational animal,” cited ubiquitously across the Middle Ages and the early modern 
period. This phrase seems like the very foundation of the discipline of psychology; the truth it 
contains seems so obviously a classificatory fact of the natural world that it is hardly surprising 
the Greeks had a word for it. Even classicists with an eye for the historical distance of Greek 
thought from the modern world somehow fail to realize that in this instance we are reading modern 
psychology back into Aristotle. They assume he was saying something like “rationality is the 
essence of man” when in fact he said nothing of the sort, nor – given the way his biological works 
divide up the natural world – could he have done.41 And if the phrase “Man is a rational animal” 
were a principle of Aristotelian psychology, it would obviously place a question mark over the 
species membership of individuals lacking rationality, especially those lacking it throughout their 
lives. But no such creature ever appears in his works. What Aristotle had actually written was:
“It is the essential property of man to be a creature receptive of understanding.”42 But this too is 
much less than it seems. 
First, the “essential property” of something in Aristotle is not the same as its “essence.” (Two 
were elided by later Stoic philosophers.)43 An essence is the most consistently important aspect 
of something: in other words, it has a scientific status. Nowhere does he say that understanding, 
intuited reason, civic intellect, logos, or any other relevant Greek concept is, scientifically, the 
essence of the human species. The modern mind-set tempts commentators to gloss him as saying 
so. An otherwise reliable expert, commenting on the vast gulf between Aristotle’s biological 
classification system and ours, writes that his definition of an animal “is described by selecting 
the appropriate disjunctives,” which in the case of man is “biped not quadruped, many-toed not 
hoofed, reasoning not unreasoning.”44 Search as we may, however, we will not find this last pairing 
in the text (though biped and many-toed are there), nor anywhere else in his output. And we cannot 
just assume that Aristotle did not feel like stating the obvious. It is obvious only to us. An essential 
property, by contrast, is not a scientific category at all. It is simply that which establishes the 
relationship of a thing to other things in its external environment. Moreover, when Aristotle writes 
about the essential property of man being related to the “understanding” (episteme), it is merely, he 
says, a “well-established doctrine” (endoxon): generally accepted and thus solid enough to start a 
debate, but no more. Its truth content is not at issue. 
Secondly “receptive,” though this is indeed a literal translation of the Greek, was not some 
psychological metaphor but a technical term in logic. Aristotle was echoing his immediate 
predecessors’ “well-established” attempt to develop a more sophisticated approach to logic. The 
old logic, such as it was, had distinguished between classes of things only in the crudest way. 
Things were either the same or different; they were grouped by identity or by polar opposition – 
and that was that. Aristotle’s older contemporaries, seeking a subtler conceptual apparatus for 
logic, drew it from music and arithmetic. Overtones in music, they said, suggest that sameness 
and difference are not the only possibilities; a single note contains several other different pitches, 
41 Jonathan Lear, Aristotle, 211.
 
42 Aristotle, Topics, 132b and passim.
 
43 Sextus Empiricus, Against the Mathematicians, 11.8; Cicero, Topics, 7.31; Diogenes Laertius, The 
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44  David Balme, “Aristotle’s biology was not essentialist,” in A. Gotthelf and J. Lennox (eds), 
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each of which can also have its own separate existence with its own overtones. Numbers have a 
similar characteristic. And so in logic: some classes, though different, are just contiguous rather 
than mutually repellent, while others, though alike, overlap only partly and are not just identical 
with each other. Plato refers to this as the “mixing” of classes, and he too uses “receptive” to 
describe the relationship of some classes to others.45 
The word usually translated as “receptive” (dektikon), then, signifies logical contiguity in the 
above sense. It is not that human beings “receive” some intellectual content in their subjective 
understandings. Rather, they belong objectively to that class of living beings which has some 
possible point of contact with the class of things to which “the understanding” belongs. Man and 
the understanding, in terms of logic, are not mutually repellent or exclusive categories. Nor do 
they overlap. Overlap, he says for the sake of contrast, occurs in the essential property of certain 
other living beings, i.e., divine or eternal ones. An eternal being “partakes of” (metekhon) the 
understanding (this was again a term in logic that Plato had briefly used); no part of the class 
“eternal beings” lies outside the boundaries of the “understanding.” Aristotle draws a sharp contrast 
between “partaking of” (overlap) and “receptive of” (contiguity). In short, the relationship between 
“man” and “understanding” is an illustration (one among many) of how classes of things relate to 
each other in logic; it is not a grand statement of man’s subjective receptivity to reason. “Receptive 
of understanding” cannot be “capable of understanding,” though this is often how it is translated. 
In Aristotle’s Metaphysics any kind of “potentiality” (dunamis) is something that can change, come 
and go, may or may not develop. Its subjective, human aspect of “capability” although it can be 
part of the “nature” of something, is therefore insufficiently stable to be an essential property, or 
indeed to bear any conceptual relation to it, other than at the remotest level of both being aspects 
of “the good.”46 
The “well-established doctrine” therefore does not come under the heading of psychology at 
all, ancient or modern. And there are further reasons for disconnecting Aristotle from the Western 
tradition as we know it. One involves his account of “nature” (phusis). Nature as such does not 
contain essential properties. If something is an essential property, it has to be true of every man 
qua man; it cannot differentiate among individual men. Moreover, an essential property renders the 
class “man” unambiguously recognizable; in this sense it is more fundamental than a “temporary 
property” or even than a “permanent property.” Although there is in man a calculative or reasoning 
faculty (logistikon) absent from other animals, it is sometimes in control of the psyche but sometimes 
not; therefore it can only be a temporary property, and so is not essential. “Permanence,” meanwhile, 
suggests a need to keep checking whether the features of the property are still there. An essential 
property must be more than all this, and “must necessarily belong” (emphasis added).47 There was 
nothing necessary, on the other hand, about nature. Greek “nature” did not distinguish between 
biological species by watertight Linnaean rules akin to those of logic. According to Aristotle, the 
correct description of the nature of something is insufficient for a correct description of its essential 
property, but the correct description of the essential property of something is sufficient for a correct 
description of its nature. The “nature” of a thing does not have the same classificatory rigour as its 
“essential property.” 
He gives the example of a one-legged man. In this case, the supposed property “biped” seems 
not to apply “by nature,” since “it is possible for that which belongs by nature not actually to 
belong to that to which it belongs by nature.” Unscrambled, this means: natural classification is 
flexible as to particulars. An individual may exhibit a contradiction in nature without this depriving 
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him of the essential property “man.” Blindness, says Aristotle, is a similar case. He includes within 
the boundaries of the natural any apparent exceptions or deficiencies that might test its relatively 
weak classificatory boundaries. He is not trying to say, as we might, that people with physical 
and sensory disabilities are of the same intellectual or moral worth as anyone else, since he has a 
similarly inclusive attitude towards mad people and even to intractable “wild” men.48 This last case 
is especially significant, because as we saw earlier, the wild man living beyond the polis contradicts 
the very principle that is closest in Aristotle to a species definition of man, as creatures living in 
a “natural community.” All exceptions imaginable are thereby covered. Neither two-footedness 
and eyesight, nor even sanity and civilization, are in the last resort essential properties, precisely 
because nature will always throw up certain exceptional individuals whom we would still want to 
call human. 
In short, there is a radical discontinuity between the “well-established doctrines” of Greek 
philosophy and the Western convention of “Man is a rational animal.” Moreover there is a world 
of difference, within Aristotle’s own output, between those doctrines and his own supposedly 
“psychological” text On the Soul, which is mainly restricted to general principles. He does briefly 
mention a “recipient” of understanding there, but only as one example illustrating the principle that 
the psyche is the form of the body’s matter (“one can no more separate body from psyche than the 
wax from its shape”). One might be tempted to infer here that the human species is defined by its 
reception of the understanding, in a modern sense – raising the possibility of exceptions who do 
not receive it. But in fact this passage only refers to particular individuals who already have that 
understanding; the ability is not that of every individual human qua human, merely of someone 
who in a specific context may be said to know something.49 
There are certain inklings of a more exclusive approach in the Stoics. Where Aristotle had 
said that to lack understanding is not like being limbless – understanding and ignorance can turn 
into each other and back through imperceptible degrees, while the limbless do not grow back 
their limbs – the Stoics said that the understanding is tied thus to the human subject: it is a matter 
of possession and privation. Privation, then, means that some individuals are excluded from the 
category of universal man. However, this turns out to mean most of us except Stoic philosophers. 
The ethics of exceptionalism and its interplay with biology and psychology are largely (as we shall 
see in Part 7) a European and modern phenomenon. 
48 Topics, 134b; 143b; Aristotle, Categories, 10a. 
49 On the Soul, 414a; 417a. 
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The Speed of Intelligence: 

Fast, Slow and Mean
 
We now turn to the socio-economic framework of intelligence and its disabilities. Within this 
framework, psychology sets a special value on speed. The present section deals briefly with
this modern phenomenon, its premises and its immediate history since the birth of the formal 
discipline of psychology, as a prelude to examining in detail the complex relationships between 
intelligence and speed in earlier times. 
A choice of models 
Modern social life presents certain people, from birth, as problematical at best, and at worst positively
harmful. “Intellectual disability” is a product of certain historical idiosyncrasies: the complexity
specific to modern social organization, the atomization of modern living arrangements, the demand
from the market and a marketized bureaucracy that each of us answer to it individually (rational
choice), and a shift in the typical Western proletarian activity from manual labour to services – the
latter usually involving intellectual components, however minimal. The person whose disability
is thus generated is also disabled by its characteristic speed. We are dealing here with long-term
social forces. Concepts of socio-economic development and of personal and child development
arose in one and the same historical context. The microcosm-macrocosm picture of man’s place in
the universe, a central feature of medieval cosmology, has been transformed in the modern era into
a picture where the horizontal axis of time replaces the vertical one of space, and a future godlike
human intelligence replaces God himself as its point of aspiration. In this developmental world-view,
the fit between intelligence as a status concept and the hard realities of socio-economic structure is
so tight as to be barely visible. In both respects the norms and goals of development appear as
targets, the value of which lies in being achieved sooner rather than later. It is true that psychometrics
has seen some rivalry between speed and accuracy; in the 1920s, for example, some psychologists
were observing that because first-nation Americans valued accuracy over speed, they needed fewer
attempts to get something right.1 By and large, however, “quick thinking” has become so ingrained
in the administrative structures of West European capitalism that it feels like the only kind. 
What, more precisely, are the abilities in which speed is a positive value? Psychology marks out 
a limited number of abilities as intelligent. One of them is logic, first given a subjective location in 
the human mind in the late medieval period; Jean Piaget’s “mental logic” has become now a formal 
descriptor of intelligence. Another is abstraction, the ability to generalize from particulars or from 
one context to another, which dates from the same period. A further ability, albeit mentioned as far 
back as the Greek sophists, is information processing or the storage and retrieval of information. 
The practicing psychologist regards these abilities as permanent features of human nature; and 
the historian of psychology often regards the belief that this is the case as itself a permanent 
feature of Western thought, in addition to the abilities themselves. Both, however, are at most a
medium-term phenomenon. 











40 A History of Intelligence and “Intellectual Disability” 
Those abilities, it is suggested, occur in time: for example, that the measured speed of immaterial 
mental processes matches the measured speed of certain corresponding material entities. Take “the 
cortical glucose metabolic rate correlates of abstract reasoning.”2 The presupposition is Cartesian: 
that if machine-like bodies can be measured, so too can minds. Nevertheless, it raises problems. 
Measuring metabolic rates in the brain is in principle an uncomplicated business, at least on the 
biochemist’s own terms. But “What is abstract reasoning?” is a much knottier question than “What 
is cortical glucose?” The speed of an intangible cannot be measured so straightforwardly. The 
very possibility of correlation is therefore in question. Even some psychometricians have asked 
whether intelligence is measurable at all if one cannot establish its independence from time.3 In 
fact the very notion of speed in intelligence is historically contingent. The assumption that mental 
processes exist in time and are therefore measurable became embedded only in the nineteenth 
century, when “mental physiologists,” as they then called themselves, got interested in measuring 
reaction times, and subsequently in measuring the intellectual abilities listed above. Underlying 
the relationship between intelligence and speed is a deeper, tripartite framework that appears to run 
across cultures. It seems to be always the case that human intelligence is fast and efficient, or slow 
and deliberative, or a mean between the two. Each of these three models comes with inseparable 
cultural baggage: each is better than the others. Each dominates a particular period or culture, 
though closer inspection reveals that at any period of history all three are at work, and that the 
dominance of one or another is a matter of political and cultural bias. 
In the first model, speed is the absolute value. The question “Can the speed of intelligence be 
measured?” has, buried within it, a positive answer to the quite separate question, “Does quicker 
mean better?” As victims of the currently dominant model, we instinctively view the other two 
from its perspective. Where intelligence is by definition fast, the disabled mind must be slow.
A mind said to be fast, or even just of average speed, has one prospect, that of intensified productivity; 
a mind said to be slow, to the point of disability, is marginalized on just these grounds. 
The second model is a mean between fast and slow. In classical texts this was axiomatic, the
ethical principle being “Nothing to excess.” In the Hippocratic medical corpus, intellectual/moral
soundness (phronesis) consists in a correct blend between fire and water, these being the basic
material elements of the universe whose balanced combination makes up the human psyche. Excess 
fire makes thinking too quick, excess water too slow; in some cases the psyche “rushes forward to too 
many objects,” while in others “the senses meet their objects only spasmodically.”4 In the writings of 
the Roman medical authority Galen, the mean dominates, with the exception of a single passage that
focuses on speed (discussed in detail in the next section). Galenist medical writers of the Renaissance
described mental states by the workings of invisible but supposedly material “elements,” “humours”
and “soul spirits” (more usually called “animal spirits,” the living embodiment of anima or soul). 
Mental health consisted in a mean state between excesses and deficiencies such as phrenitis (fast) 
and lethargy (slow), or mania (fast) and melancholy (slow) or some such. (Renaissance melancholy 
could in fact express “delirium” as well as “stupidity.”) The mean did not exist in a cultural vacuum. 
Melancholy often meant laziness, a social disorder, or despair, a religious one. Seventeenth-century 
religious norms in England posed a mean between sectarian Protestant enthusiasm (fast, mad) and 
Romanist idolatry (slow, idiotic). The big difference in modern psychology is that the mean is no 
longer a balance between opposing elemental qualities but quantitative, the average value of a single
parameter; the ethical desirability of the mean in the ancient model has vanished, though it survives 
in mutterings about people who are “too clever by half.” 
2 R. Haier, “Cortical glucose metabolic rate,” Intelligence, 12 (1988).
 
3 Joel Michell, Measurement in Psychology, 42.
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The third model is the retrograde of the first. Here slowness is an absolute value. It can be 
found in parts of the world beyond the reach of the dominant modern European model.5 Although 
there has been a tradition of “learned ignorance” in the West too, it is not so much a positive trait 
as oppositional and ironic; the most widely cited examples, Nicholas of Cusa’s On the Doctrine 
of Ignorance and Erasmus’s In Praise of Folly, celebrate the piety of unlearned people (idiotae) in 
order to criticize the venality of ecclesiastics. When intended seriously, the slow model advocates 
slowing down one’s rational operations to the point of non-existence: knowledge is reached by 
emptying them from one’s mind. Slow and fast model thus meet at their respective extremes, 
in a state of immediacy: they are alternative ways of being with God.6 The fool, who is void of 
rational thought and therefore wide open to divine truths, is somehow similar to the prophet, who 
intuits them without having to work through a laborious syllogistic process, since in both cases 
knowledge is achieved in zero time. 
The appearance of the fast model in modern psychology 
The fast model opposes disability to genius, a word that originally had connotations of frenzy. 
In the late seventeenth century it began to shake these off, though it remained a form of external 
inspiration with overtones of instantaneousness and divinity. In this sense genius could seize 
anyone across the whole social spectrum, from “happy” to “poor,” as Issac Watts put it. If it 
increasingly singled out the exceptional individual, he scarcely yet constituted a type: he was rather 
a man of genius.7 In science Newton was the exemplar, and following him the late eighteenth-
century mathematician Carl Friedrich Gauss, whose genius consisted in the exceptional speed of 
his arithmetical computations. Meanwhile the Romantics reassigned genius from computation to 
the imagination. It remained external to the self, however. William Wordsworth’s boyhood self is 
possessed by this genius in The Prelude (so too is Newton, whom he mentions there), while the 
alter ego of that self, The Idiot Boy, is possessed by exactly the same force of immediacy.8 
Science itself subsequently demoted calculation from being the mind’s greatest gift to something 
mechanical.9 A major example is Charles Babbage, inventor of the calculating machine and an 
early advocate of time-tested exams. He reassigned the computing tasks to social inferiors, and the 
mundane information processing to a machine. The genius of the human subject, by contrast, lay 
in the “maximum efficiency of [the] mental power” that enabled one to rule over computers both 
mechanical and human, by writing and directing the requisite algebraic calculus of abstraction. 
According to Babbage, this kind of genius (i.e., his own) models the supreme intelligence of 
the Almighty.10 His concern with speed as mental labour saving came partly from his religious 
upbringing. It can be traced back to the popular seventeenth-century Christian literature of men 
like Richard Baxter, whose doctrine of social utility (“saving time”) was partly an attack on the 
idleness of “idiots and illiterates” and the threat they posed to social order: a reaction against the 
corrupt Catholic practice of paying ecclesiastics to buy out time spent in purgatory (“killing time”).11 
5  M. Wober, “Towards an understanding of the Kiganda concept of intelligence,” in Berry and Dasen, 
Culture and Cognition. 
6 Michael Dols, Majnun: the Madman in Medieval Islamic Society, 370. 
7  See Clive Kilmister, “Genius in mathematics,” in P. Murray (ed.), Genius: the History of an Idea. 
8  See Patrick McDonagh, Idiocy: a Cultural History, 24 ff. 
9  Lorraine Daston, “Enlightenment calculations,” Critical Inquiry, 21 (1994). 
10  William Ashworth, “Memory, efficiency, and symbolic analysis,” Isis, 87 (1996). 
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Time had to be redeemed on this earth. It was in any case becoming increasingly important to measure
it for the purposes of social administration and production. To this Protestant ethic of time Babbage
added the value of speed. It was his “machine intelligence” that Marx had in mind when he described
factory production as endowing material forces with intellectual life, and as disabling or “stultifying”
(rendering stupid) the human intellect itself by turning it into an adjunct of material force.12 
The status of calculation within “genius” was subsequently refurbished by Francis Galton, who 
offered himself as its archetype. One was no longer possessed by this genius, one simply possessed
it. The statistical law of normal distribution, the famous bell-curve, was used at the time only in 
public administration (risk) and the trajectory of physical objects (weapons design, astronomy). 
Inspired by Belgian Astronomer Royal Adolphe Quételet’s extension of it to human beings – their 
height – Galton extended it further, to the psychological subject. But do measurers of height, let 
alone actuaries, arms manufacturers or astronomers, start from the same place as observers of 
human personality? Study of the latter lies not in an empirically verifiable realm but in the partisan 
observations made by one group (this group) about what other groups (those people over there) are 
like. All psychology of intelligence and the emotions is a temporarily formalized manifestation of 
what the long anthropological and historical view reveals to be just gossip. Galton, like the modern 
psychology he helped create, did not start from something that was real in any empirical sense. 
What he did was first posit the hypothesis of a quantitative mean and then say that, because a mean 
had been posited, the quantity he was observing must be of something real (Chapter 5 unpicks how 
this subterfuge works in detail, in Binet’s case). A purely abstract mathematical concept was thus 
prestidigitated into a psychological fact. To amplify an argument of Hacking’s, the mean became
the fact of normal intelligence, while the smallness of the numbers at the extremes of dispersion 
became the facts of outstanding genius and egregious disability.13 
Intelligence measurement came about as a more or less direct replacement for measurement 
of reaction times. The seeds for this latter had been sown in 1796 when another Astronomer 
Royal, the British one, sacked his assistant for making observations of stellar transit that lagged 
behind his own.14 He complained not about the assistant being slow, simply about his “confused 
method”; his observations were simply wrong. (They might equally have resulted from taking 
the reading too quickly.) The astronomical problem was solved in 1850 with the invention of a 
reliable chronograph, but it had meanwhile alerted the mental physiologists. For them 1850 was 
a beginning. In that year Hermann von Helmholtz made his claim that nervous impulses are of 
finite and therefore relative velocity, and thereby measurable. The idea that “nervous action” was 
not instantaneous had already been tentatively proposed by astronomers to explain the disparity 
between the two Greenwich observers. It was resisted by Helmholtz’s teacher, the great nineteenth-
century physiologist Johannes Müller, who dismissed the astronomers’ observational discrepancies 
as being due simply to the brain’s inability to deal with more than one sense-impression at a time.15 
He couched this in terms of faculty psychology, the descriptive system which had dominated 
discussions of psychology from the Middle Ages and which located the source of human abilities 
in certain static “faculties” of the brain (imagination, judgment, memory). The quality of these was 
paramount, and their active operations secondary to it. However, a crucial assumption was already 
shared on both sides of this dispute, namely that speed is a main constituent of mental activity.
It merely had to be decided where these all-important variations of speed should be sought: in the 
intellectual “faculties” as traditionally conceived, or in experimental study of the nervous system. 
12 Simon Schaffer, “Babbage’s intelligence,” Critical Inquiry, 21 (1994).
 
13 Hacking, The Taming of Chance, 107.
 
14 Edwin Boring, A History of Experimental Psychology, 133.
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The emergence of modern psychology as a discipline owes much to this victory of mental 
physiology over faculty psychology. If the speed of the mind was already an issue, its measurability 
was now in prospect. Gustav Fechner coined the term “psychophysics” for it in 1860. Three 
years later Wilhelm Wundt succeeded, on the basis of Helmholtz’s observations, in showing that 
perception times vary. The first phase of practical psychometry consisted in a technique known 
as mental chronometry: time and the mind were one. Mental chronometry, though “a paragon 
of exactness,” was not at first applied to tasks measuring supposedly intellectual abilities of any 
seriousness.16 A big leap was still needed. In the 1860s the Dutch physiologist Frans Donders 
researched reaction times in terms of thought reactions. He asked his subjects to discriminate 
and choose, rather than simply react to a single stimulus or to stimuli involving only one sense.17 
However, the thoughts involved were little more than perceptions; they merely involved differential 
rates of reaction between sight and hearing, which hardly seems like the “abstract thinking” that 
was later to be demanded in cognitive ability tests. Donders himself denied that any but the simplest 
mental processes could be measured. Wundt tried to complexify them but all he did was bring in 
the other senses; he added to the experimental conditions (for example, by fuelling the subject with 
brandy), but not to the intellectuality of the task. At some point, however, speed was to become 
constitutive of intelligence; this took three successive forms. 
(1) From Galton’s own writings we can detect how the interest in measuring speed in terms 
of reaction gradually shifted to measuring it in terms of ability. There is a glimpse of it in his 
comments on the work of Wundt’s former assistant James Cattell. Most of the items which Cattell 
observed under the heading of “mental time” involve reaction to and perception of simple external 
stimuli; a couple of them seem to involve more complex abilities (“the time of mental association” 
and “the time it takes to remember and to come to a decision”), but they do not necessarily involve 
abstraction, logical reasoning or information-processing. Galton’s criticism, appended to Cattell’s 
publication of the results, ran: 
One of the most important objects of measurement is hardly if at all alluded to here and should be 
emphasized. It is to obtain a general knowledge of the capacities of a man by sinking shafts, as it 
were at a few critical points. In order to ascertain the best points for the purpose, the sets of [reaction­
time] measures should be compared with an independent estimate of the man’s powers.18 
In other words, Galton thought there might be a correlation between stimulus-response times 
and a separately estimated set of “powers” or abilities. The wobbly syllogism must have run, 
subconsciously: “Fast = good, able = good, therefore able = fast.” Now there would have been a 
problem about measuring some of the actual powers Galton specifies here: being “eager, energetic; 
well-shaped; successful at games requiring good hand and eye; sensitive; good at music and 
drawing.” This is hardly the stuff of IQ. It resembles rather Gardner’s multiple intelligences, or 
better still the Elizabethan educationist Richard Mulcaster, for whom the sum of human abilities 
was “to read, to write, to draw, to sing, to play, to have language, to have learning, to have health 
and activity.”19 It hardly mattered, though, that the powers suggested by Galton were so diffuse as 
to resist measurement. By 1890 the Wundt-Cattell project of mass measurement of reaction times, 
16 See Ruth Benschop and Douwe Draaisma, “In pursuit of precision,” Annals of Science, 57 (2000). 
17 Josef Brozek and Maarten Sibinga, Origins of Psychometry, 12. 
18 James Cattell, “Mental tests and measurement,” Mind, 15 (1890). 
19 Richard Mulcaster, Positions wherin those Primitive Circumstances be Examined, which are 
Necessarie for the Training up of Children, 208. I have modernized the spelling and (where necessary) the 
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their master-plan for mapping the whole of “the generalized mind,” was itself about to collapse 
under the weight of its own unmanageable arithmetical detail, and with it therefore (temporarily) 
any possible hypothesis about correlation between reaction times and general “powers.” 
Wundt’s failure probably helped to divert psychologists’ motivations towards measuring the 
as yet vaguely outlined “powers” and “capacities” instead. Measurement as such, the pursuit of 
mass data in a society of mass institutions, was the driving principle, and took precedence over 
whatever object of study it happened to light upon. It was Galton’s disciple Karl Pearson who 
refined the idea of a mass-measured “intelligence.” Meanwhile another disciple, Cyril Burt, and 
another of Wundt’s pupils, Charles Spearman, singled out what they chose to nominate as the 
strictly intellectual component among Galton’s “powers.” They proposed a unitary or “general” 
intelligence, g, giving Lewis Terman the conceptual tools with which to refine Binet’s mental 
age scores into IQ. Their reification of intellectual ability (Binet himself had not regarded the 
individual’s score as an immutable fact) made its measurement more feasible. It promised to justify 
psychology’s exact-science status, more so than reaction times. Several decades therefore lapsed 
before there was a serious effort to reinvestigate the correlation between speed of reaction and 
the measured set of abilities we now call intelligence. Binet hypothesized a relationship between 
reaction times and attention span, and there was occasional discussion in the 1920s and 1930s, 
but these attempts led nowhere (though they did revive the question of speed versus accuracy).20 
Indeed, there was a tradition derived from Herbert Spencer claiming that the correlation was an 
inverse one, since inferior races had faster reaction times and this was compensation for their 
inability to abstract or “generalize” as Europeans did.21 
One factor influencing the revival of interest in speed was information theory, introduced into 
the study of intelligence in the early 1950s. The human subject no longer received and reproduced 
information from the environment but “processed” it, in “bits.” This inspired two new moves. One 
was in educational psychology where a member of Eysenck’s school, drawing on this doctrine, 
posited a “complex structure of time” within tests, and concluded that time should be factored 
independently. A slow accurate performance and a fast inaccurate performance could yield the 
same score, the score itself being the overriding scientific fact.22 The other move, closer to Galton’s 
original hypothesis, was Arthur Jensen’s. His claim was that fast reaction times do strongly 
correlate with intelligence and are indeed its best indicator. It involves a fudge, since his definition 
of information processing covers both reaction to stimulus and complex reasoning itself. Be that 
as it may, his claim differs from the way in which predecessors envisaged the relationship between 
intelligence and reaction time. Reaction time was not then an independent variable (Galton’s hints 
to the contrary being an exception) but just one among several items within the battery of tests 
itself. For Jensen, on the other hand, intelligence – chiefly “racial intelligence” – is the point, and 
reaction time not only separate but secondary.23 
(2) With the shift of interest from reaction times to ability, speed has become a constitutive 
and practical component of the latter. Tasks have time limits, over which the test administrator has 
discretion. The pseudo-clinical environment requires precision, a formal termination of the task so 
that the participant can move on to the next one. The tester has a stopwatch, or at best will ask the 
subject beforehand to say “I don’t know,” as a way of identifying the appropriate moment to move 
on. Limiting the time is more than a banal administrative convenience. It deserves a name of its 
20 Edward Thorndike, The Measurement of Intelligence, and the series of responses that make up 
Archives of Psychology, 93 (1928); see also Raymond Fancher, The Intelligence Men, 59. 
21 Graham Richards, “Race”, Racism and Psychology, 21, 32. 
22 W.D. Furneaux, “Intellectual abilities,” in Eysenck (ed.), Handbook of Abnormal Psychology, 167. 
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own: ability time. The social processes at work here had already been operating on the Astronomer 
Royal. On his observations depended not just the calibration of the Greenwich clock but thereby 
all observations of place and time in industry and social administration. Meanwhile speed and 
its measurement became fundamental to educational psychology at the same time as it became 
fundamental to factory labour and Frederick Taylor’s industrial psychology. Commodification of 
time was the basis both for psychology and for the wider demands of the economy. (This is also 
the historical context in which the British colonial service became the first European working 
environment to assess abilities by time-tested exams.)24 The Book of Ecclesiastes can be ignored: 
the race is to the swift. In the test situation you may puzzle at length over the very concept of 
a correct or incorrect response to some task; in fact this will be quite probable if you have a 
philosophy of science doctorate or an extra 21-chromosome. But as in the world of manual and 
intellectual labour, the clock dictates. You are moved on to the next task, having scored zero.  
(3) More recently a third phenomenon has emerged: the constant intensification of ability 
time. This is reflected in the information-processing components of cognitive ability tests. In the 
abstraction tasks of the Wechsler psychometric scales which now dominate the field, a correct 
answer given quickly scores higher than a correct answer given more slowly. Its historical context 
is the increased concentration of intellectual labour in the economy, and the intensification of 
the flows by which communications networks dominate social space. Meanwhile the “efficiency 
theory” of brain function now claims that the brain achieving a higher IQ score and working 
more quickly uses proportionately less energy. This doctrine is based on studies of people with 
disabilities labelled intellectual in whom inefficiency is presupposed to be a neurological slowness 
of intellect – a method not only circular but demonstrating just how co-dependent the concepts of 
intelligence and intellectual disability are. Moreover, this biochemical efficiency (fast intellect as 
energy-saving) seems to have its roots in fiscal efficiency: fast intellects are time-redeeming, the 
eugenic elimination of slow intellects a saving on public costs.25 In the vanguard of this movement 
towards constant intensification are the transhumanists, who warn that human beings must aim at 
developing their intellects sufficiently to compete with the exponentially increasing information-
processing speeds of computers. Their inspiration is artificial intelligence, itself modelled on 
the neuronal networks of the human brain, which envisages (as in the recent title of Gregory 
Stock) a “Metaman: the merging of humans and machines into a global superorganism,” and an 
incorporation of machine speeds in human thought processes to pursue Babbage’s mission.26 
The fast model and the distortion of the mean 
Psychometrics, in the form of IQ, now presupposes the fast model. The sophisticated reader may
already consider IQ a dead duck, and there have indeed been enough lethal critiques of it to
stuff a museumful of ducks, the most effective coming from within the discipline itself.27 But 
IQ remains active theoretically because all the abilities deemed to define what is specifically
human (information-processing, logical reasoning, abstraction, etc.) seem to consist in something
24 Gillian Sutherland, Ability, Merit and Measurement, 97, 115. 
25 F. Song et al, “Screening for fragile X syndrome,” Health Technology Assessment Publications, 7 
(2003). 
26 See also Nick Bostrom, “How long before superintelligence?” International Journal of Futures 
Studies, 2 (1998). 
27 Michell, Measurement in Psychology; Richards, “Getting the intelligence controversy knotted,” 
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measurable, even if one might want to ask whether they are not specifically human because they are 
measurable. And it remains active institutionally because psychology is now, as Burt more or less 
acknowledged it to be, a sub-branch of social administration, providing a rationale for rulebooks 
that differentiate and segregate “intellectually disabled” people from the rest of us.28 IQ has also 
been given a fresh lease on life by biotechnology; in association with twin studies, it constitutes 
the very raison d’être of the new cognitive geneticists, whose anxieties tend to hone in on the same 
group of people. We do not yet know the total number of shots that must be fired into IQ’s corpse 
for a pronouncement of death to be forensically sound; the answer lies not with psychologists or 
historians but in social processes in which the importance of speed is currently increasing, not 
diminishing. IQ’s rise has been well documented and I do not propose to go over it again.29 Its 
history is relevant here only to illustrate how it has incorporated notions of speed. Speed was 
perhaps the first object of psychological investigation that looked as if it might exist in the same 
realm as physics. But even if one accepts that mental processes exist in time and therefore their 
speed is measurable, this in itself does not itself supply the exact-science status which psychology 
seeks, because the reality of any “intelligence” whose speed might be measurable is – unlike a 
stopwatch – dependent on a shifting human consensus across history and social groups. 
Since the emergence of psychology as a formal discipline, the case for the fast model has seemed 
to need no justification. It is simply a part of a socio-economic machine that demands maximum 
yield from commodified ability-time: a machine in which psychology is a cog. In a sense, the fast 
model has not obliterated the others even now. The idea of the mean persists in today’s doctrines. 
However, it would have been unrecognizable as such to pre-moderns. The classical mean meant 
“moderation in all things.” The statistical mean presents us with a bell-shaped curve in which at 
one end speed is desirable and superior, while at the other end the slow intellect is to be avoided 
as self-evidently pathological. One would not describe as too fast a brilliant mathematician whose 
ability score lies at the opposite deviation from people labelled with severe disability, even if he 
or she is looked on as a freak. Greek philosophers would have been bemused by a mean where a 
greater value is placed on one of two extremes; that is why early statisticians decided to change 
the terminology so that genius ceased to be described as “error” (the original term in statistical 
physics) and became, less pejoratively, an upward “deviation from the mean.”30 
If the ethical aspect of the mean does still register with modern psychology, the ways of
dealing with it are necessarily tortuous. The Nazis, for example, noted that non-whites were 
slow and unintelligent, but also that the Jews were pre-eminent in intellectual life. They lacked
racial strength and character, however, since according to Ernst Rüdin, the founding father of
psychiatric genetics and author of Hitler’s Law for the Prevention of Hereditarily Diseased
Offspring, their “quickness of understanding” made them too clever.31 A more recent example is
the cognitive diagnosis known as hyperlexia, a “developmental disability” whose symptoms are 
“reading too soon … a precocious ability to read words far above what would be expected at [the 
child’s] chronological age.” Hyperlexia fills the vacant deviation opposite dyslexia, balancing
out reading norms with a bell curve of their own. But it can only do so by accommodating the 
contradictory terms “ability” and “disability” in the same diagnosis, as above. On the websites,
parental excitement at the advanced development of their children is reflected paradoxically in
their adoption of a “Why me?” profile otherwise ascribed to parents of children with severe 
28 Burt, Mental and Scholastic Tests, Preface to second edition. 

29 See Daniel Kevles, In the Name of Eugenics; Richard Lewontin et al., Not in Our Genes.
 
30 Donald Mackenzie, Statistics in Britain, 56.
 
31 Cited in Joseph, The Gene Illusion, 25.
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disability; conversely, the parental literature on dyslexia is at pains to emphasize the child’s
intellectual normality and to remove the moral taint of disability.32 
If the mean survives in this strange form, the slow model is marginal as never before. People 
marked out by modern intellectual disability face a dilemma. Do they resist the dominant fast 
model and pursue a radically slow existence, admired for the traits that make them different and 
making a virtue out of their supposed developmental plateau? In this sense they are a residue 
of Rousseau’s natural man, setting a moral example by their uninhibitedness and other childlike 
characteristics. Or do they try their limited best to catch up with the norm, getting their small 
achievements recognized just as the coat tails of the last non-disabled person vanish into the 
distance ahead of them? Both of these prospects for slow people marginalize them. Either: disabled 
people are a type that constitutes a complete difference in kind, celebrating diversity in defiance 
of conformism and prevailing norms; marginalization then ensues because these norms are in fact 
proof against defiance, and the psychological difference thus celebrated can only reinforce the 
social segregation which the norms themselves have created. Or: the modicum of abilities they do 
possess, constituting a difference in degree only, is pursued as far as possible, thus showing that 
they are more or less the same as anyone else; marginalization then ensues because in fact it always 
turns out to be “less”: norms are engineered to ensure that they never catch up. Slow people have 
the prospect of a futile running backwards and forwards from one to the other model. Any further 
alternative would presuppose a deep change in the structures of social organization. 







Quick Wit and the Ingenious Gentleman 
We saw above that there is a world of difference between the ancient philosophers and the Western 
tradition which has claimed them as the fountainhead of its own ideas, at least in respect to the topics 
we are discussing – if not quite so much difference between the Western tradition and those sophists, 
ideologues and educators who were bound to the political and social institutions of Greece and 
Rome. Nevertheless, the classical philosophical texts were the starting point, however interpreted 
and read, for most writers on faculty psychology and human behaviour from the late Middle Ages 
onwards. What sources did they use in placing an increasing value on the fast model? 
The classical source-texts 
We can begin with Plato’s Theaetetus, in which the relationship between mind and external reality 
appears as a receipt, processing and storage of information. This passage is much cited by early 
modern writers.1 Modern historians have claimed it to be a primitive, “incomplete and tortuously 
argued” account of modern cognitive psychology.2 Theaetetus is not in fact a psychology text but a 
philosophical one, about the difference between knowing and believing, and concludes that while 
we cannot know anything for sure, we can at least say whether or not our opinions are rationally 
justified. At one point Socrates slyly coaxes his promising young interlocutor Theaetetus into 
saying that of course we can achieve certain knowledge. Socrates disingenuously agrees with him. 
The psyche is – or is like – a wax tablet, he says. We perceive objects in the external world through 
our senses, and these objects reach the human soul as “signs” on the wax. (Stoic philosophers used 
the word “impressions” for the same thing, thereby launching a still prevalent way of speaking 
about the mind.)3 The signs should be of optimum clarity, depth and duration. Ideally, the person 
who “learns easily” (he is eumathes) remembers what he has learned and does not confuse one sign 
with another. The result is certain knowledge. However, the soul’s wax may be too soft, or too hard. 
Where it is soft and can receive signs, the person may be a good learner; but wax tends to melt and 
so his memory is bad, because the signs become difficult to distinguish from each other. The result 
in this case is false opinion. Where the wax is hard, he “learns with difficulty” (he is dusmathes). 
What he does learn he remembers well, but the signs are once more unclear, this time because they 
are only faintly impressed. The result again is false opinion: “When such people see or hear or 
think, they cannot assign each [external object] to its corresponding [sign] quickly; they are slow, 
and because they assign them to the wrong places they largely see, hear and think incorrectly.”    
Plato is at the very least ambiguous about speed here. Quick impressions seem at first sight to 
be a good thing. But if being quick means having a bad memory, speed cannot lead to rationally 
justifiable opinion. Perhaps one can simply be too quick, making a mean speed preferable? But 
Plato’s criticism runs deeper. At the start of the dialogue, he has Socrates praise Theaetetus for 
possessing both a good memory and “quick thinking” (agkhinoia). Praise from Socrates usually 
means that the interlocutor is going to be taken down a peg, and indeed it turns out he has encouraged 
1 Plato, Theaetetus, 194c.
 
2 Daniel Robinson, An Intellectual History of Psychology, 52.
 
3 A.A. Long and D.N. Sedley, The Hellenistic Philosophers, 236 ff.
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the speedy young tyro to approve the wax tablet model with the precise purpose of informing him 
forthwith that it is nonsense. 
All this suggests that Plato positively distrusts speed. We have already seen that in his Utopian 
state of The Laws people who are slow, illiterate or find learning difficult are qualified for political 
office as long as they use the abilities they do possess to moderate their pleasures. His distrust of 
immoderate people with fast-moving psyches is reflected in the wax tablet model. This model 
seems to be someone else’s, which he is lampooning because it reduces the search for knowledge 
to something mechanical. He refers here to the “all-wise Homer’s” admiration for “rough, dirty” 
psyches, and any time Plato mentions poets we know his intentions are ironic. His target is the 
sophists. They are the ones with the dirty minds. From everything we know about Plato, he would 
surely have thought it trivial to describe the act of knowing in quasi-material terms drawn from the 
first thing that happens to be lying around, namely the wax tablet on which the student was taking 
his lecture notes (about the wax tablet); he would have mocked, on the same grounds, a model of 
human cognitive ability based on the information-processing properties of the psychology student’s 
laptop. His attack on the sophistic ideology of knowledge as merely instrumental – a matter of self-
advancement – involves attacking their predilection for speed. 
Aristotle touches on the wax tablet model in his own account of the psyche.4 Some have taken 
this as a gloss on Plato’s text.5 More probably both men were referring to an already prevalent idea, 
independently of each other (it also turns up in the Greek drama).6 Aristotle’s most influential text 
on speed was not these passing remarks, however, but certain others in Posterior Analytics, a work 
that deals with logic. His logic is a set of objective structures; inasmuch as some corresponding 
subjective element is involved, it consists in the individual’s laborious elaboration of demonstrative 
proofs, from intuited first principles. In a brief aside, Aristotle asks us to distinguish this logic-
related understanding (to epistasthai) from three other things: opinion, sense perceptions and 
“quick thinking” (agkhinoia).7 The first two obviously bear no resemblance to a logic-related 
understanding. Quick thinking, however, reaches conclusions similar to the latter. It too discovers 
the middle term of a syllogism, the connection between two intuited givens. It differs, however, 
in that it occurs “without pause for thought.” It is not just that a fully elaborated logic-related 
understanding takes longer; the length of time is a mark of its value, whereas quick thinking is 
mundane, takes short cuts and thus does not really follow logic at all. It arises only in chaotic 
situations that for practical reasons resist the careful building up of syllogistic proof. Aristotle uses 
as an example the decisions made by military commanders or midwives: empirical ones, by contrast 
with logic-related understanding, which involves philosophical and mathematical first principles. 
Nevertheless it was “quick thinking” that Renaissance medical writers would find interesting in 
Aristotle. And more importantly, in claiming adherence to Aristotle, they were to confuse quick 
thinking with a full-blown subjective capacity for logic, and to pass it off as the latter. 
The Renaissance writers’ chief reference point on speed was in fact neither Plato nor Aristotle 
but Galen. Where today we speak about mental processes and abilities, Galen in The Art of Medicine 
was concerned with the health of a bodily organ, the brain, of which mental processes were just 
one organic facet. Unusual brain states were not ultimately fixed or determinate in any individual; 
pre-modern medicine held no place for geniuses or idiots. As for speed, a key passage (much 
commented on by Renaissance Galenists) ran: 
4 Aristotle, On the Soul, 430a; On Memory, 450b.
 
5 Draaisma, Metaphors of Memory, 24.
 
6 Aeschylus, Prometheus Bound, l.789.
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Quick apprehension indicates a fine brain substance, slowness a thick one. Ease of learning 
indicates a good receipt of impressions, and [good] memory indicates a stable one. Correspondingly, 
difficulty in learning indicates a difficulty in receiving impressions, and forgetfulness a fluidity in 
this respect.8 
Galen seems less critical of speed here than Plato or Aristotle, but in the ensuing passage he 
recommends a balance between too much and too little “stability of opinion.” Galen’s treatment 
of mental states usually has some moral twist, so perhaps by juxtaposing quick thinking with 
excessively shifting opinion he wants to contrast them: the first is a desirable type of speed, the 
second an undesirable one. Be that as it may, even if Galen does take fast to mean good, he means 
good in a narrow sense: speed indicates that the substance of the brain is physically healthy.  
We see from the classical texts how all three models can be at work simultaneously. Plato 
and Aristotle are so suspicious of quick thinking that their insistence on the mean actually seems 
to approve the slow. The fast model dominated public life. The Odyssean quick-wittedness on 
which Athenians prided themselves was appropriate to a febrile merchant economy in which the
sophists forged their mercenary vocations; quick thinking was supposedly Pericles’s outstanding 
characteristic, and he spun this image of itself to the democracy. It was an image foreign to the land-
owning class to which the philosophers mostly belonged. Their disdain for it is evident in Socrates’s
ironic references to himself being slow on the uptake. Gentlemen of leisure did not have to hurry;
Plato’s and Aristotle’s student Theophrastus, in his seminal study of character types, allocates speed 
of movement to the labouring classes. Galen’s more ambiguous attitude to speed may have been due
to his closer personal links to Roman state power, its sophists, rhetoricians and educators. 
The arrival of quick wit on the medical curriculum 
The seeds of an intelligence specific to humans were sown during the twelfth-century beginnings 
of modern capitalism, with the expansion of trade and urban populations and consequently of 
ecclesiastical and state administration. The universities arose partly as training schools for these 
purposes. In this context, intelligence was both a theological concept that would gradually lose its 
divine connotations and descend to earth, and a quotidian concept (“wit”) that would eventually 
rise to a higher, quasi-divine level. 
We can trace the importance of speed to this process from standard medical textbooks. Most 
important were the many Renaissance commentaries on The Art of Medicine, which of all Galen’s 
works had the most influence on European medicine. In one or the other of its two Latin translations 
this work had a permanent place, together with Avicenna’s Canon, in the many versions of the 
basic compendium supplied to all medical students from the mid-twelfth century onwards. Known 
as the Articella, this compendium also had a cultured readership well beyond the medical realm. 
Galen’s brief remark on the relationship between speed and mental states thereby entered the mind-
set of the learned doctor and of other professionals with the arrival of university-based medical 
teaching. There it stayed, variously reinterpreted, until the eighteenth century. In addition to the 
two Latin translations, at least eight commentaries on The Art of Medicine had appeared before 
1500; a century later this number had doubled.9 Two books in particular, from the Italian heart of 
European medicine, were added to the standard curriculum: Pietro Torrigiano’s commentary on 
Galen, written in Bologna around 1300 and first printed in 1489 with the two translations, and 
8 Galen, Ars Medica, in C. Kühn, Opera, i, 319. 
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Niccolò Leoniceno’s revision of these latter, first published in 1508. These are the authorities most 
often cited by Renaissance doctors. 
In paraphrasing the classical source-texts Torrigiano, possibly inspired by his teacher Taddeo 
Alderotti, made certain crucial elisions. First, he created a short circuit between logic as a set 
of objective structures and a logical reasoning that goes on in the human subject. Whereas for 
Aristotle syllogisms had their own objective structures from which the subject’s “logic-related 
understanding” was well separated, for Torrigiano logical structures arise directly from human 
reasoning; “composing and separating phantasmata,” the human ability for abstraction, somehow 
just “end up in” a syllogism, i.e., in the phantasmata correctly abstracted.10 Secondly, he identified 
Aristotle’s logic-related understanding, a patient elaboration of syllogisms, with the “quick 
thinking” that Aristotle had dismissed as having nothing to do with logic. Torrigiano took them to 
be the same thing. And of the two, it was the “quickness” term (agkhinoia, Latin solertia) that he 
used to describe this new amalgam. Quick thinking now just is logical understanding, rather than 
a spurious, rushed imitation of it. Thirdly, he solemnized the marriage of Galen to Aristotle. He 
assumes that when they wrote about quick thinking they were sharing a mutually comprehensible 
concept, though there is nothing in either author to suggest that Galen had been referring to
his predecessor. 
Leoniceno’s revised Latin translation of The Art of Medicine reinforced these elisions, in such a 
way that speed started to invade the domain of ability. In one of the two standard translations, “quick 
thinking” (agkhinoia) had been rendered as solertia (an exact Latin equivalent) or praesentia, 
“presence of mind”; in the other it was rendered as “ease of learning,” probably as a result of this 
latter appearing in an adjacent passage of Galen’s original. Leoniceno retranslated agkhinoia as 
ingenium, and this then became standard.11 It was usually rendered as “wit” in English, though I 
shall retain the Latin term to avoid confusion with other contemporary resonances of wit (superficial 
cleverness, the external senses or “five wits,” etc.). Leoniceno claimed here to be getting closer to 
the original Greek. But in fact ingenium was ambiguous. In late medieval philosophy it had been 
something quite unlike quick thinking: it was the technical term for the meticulous discovery of the 
linking terms in syllogisms, the “logic-related understanding” described by Aristotle; it was used 
thus by Albert the Great, doyen of the early scholastic philosophers.12 Leoniceno, by contrast, was 
a pioneering humanist who made a point of distancing himself from medieval convention. When 
he used ingenium for “quickness of apprehension” he had in mind not the scholastics’ term but the 
everyday Roman sense of the word, which did indeed signify an everyday cleverness. Moreover, 
it had speed as its foremost quality; the humanists’ authority Cicero commends ingenium for 
precisely this reason.13 With his “improved” translation Leoniceno was therefore making a point. 
Humanist writers, in their dedicatory prefaces to books on medicine, law and other professional 
disciplines, praise each other interminably for their “ingenious” qualities. That was how they liked 
to see themselves: clever and up to speed. 
Two quite distinct primary meanings of ingenium were therefore available: one descriptive 
(of an operation of the intellect), the other normative (a judgement on its performance, in terms 
of speed). In medieval and early modern psychology, operations and performances were sharply 
distinct categories, even if for today’s psychologist operations just are performances. Renaissance 
writers would still have been aware of the distinction; in Shakespeare’s Love’s Labour’s Lost, for 
10 Pietro Torrigiano, Plusquam Commentum in Parvam Galeni Artem, 39v–54r. 
11 Niccolò Leoniceno, Galeni Ars Medicinalis, 295. 
12 Albert, Summa de Creaturis, in Borgnet (ed.), xxxiv, 516. 
13 Cicero, On Oratory, 80; see also E. Hidalgo-Serna, “The philosophy of ‘ingenium’,” Philosophy and 
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example, the comic parody of scholastic debate between Moth and Don Armado hinges precisely 
on whether or not “ingenious” means quick. Nevertheless, the boundary between the two usages 
would gradually erode. 
The fast model in Renaissance Europe 
Before tracing this erosion in detail, we need first to know something about the conceptual 
framework in which they lay, the Renaissance’s overall doctrines of soul, mind and intellect. 
One important aspect of this was the tension between doctors’ pagan-derived medical theories 
and the demands of Christian theology.14 Galen was known to have been sceptical about the soul 
or psyche being immaterial, since he seemed to say that it was just a variety of combinations 
of bodily temperament, which then explained the individual “differences in character that make 
people spirited or otherwise, thoughtful or otherwise.”15 Aristotle seemed to be more ambiguous; 
he regarded the psyche as the set of abilities that animates and maintains the body, rather than 
something simply inextricable from it. And in an isolated and much-touted remark in On the Soul, 
he said that intuited intellect (nous) comes to human beings “from outside”; theologians cited 
this as evidence that he thought of the soul as immaterial, perhaps even immortal. If Aristotle 
could be reconciled thus with religion, and Galen and Aristotle with each other, then it might be 
possible to make Galen a quasi-Christian, despite his evident materialism. Medical writers tried 
to match theological truths with their own expert ones, which had uncomfortably pagan origins 
in these classical writers. They asked themselves: in pursuing medicine, how do we defend the 
immateriality and immortality of the soul against arguments to the contrary – heretic and atheist 
arguments which may (heaven forbid) even suggest themselves to us, since our textual authorities 
are pagan? Defence of the soul’s immortality was central to Christian Galenist theory about the 
human intellect and (as we shall see later) to early modern psychology. It was driven by the same 
degree of obsession as defence of the white ruling class’s superior minds later drove Galton. 
Another important element in the conceptual framework was the theory of faculty psychology. 
Closest to God, or in some versions overlapping with him, is man’s “rational soul” (sometimes 
called the “intellective” soul). Closest to corrupt, mortal flesh and its passions are the five “external 
senses.” In between are the “internal senses,” consisting of certain intellectual faculties organically 
linked to the body: imagination, “reason” in the sense of human reasoning (also “judgement,” 
or some such term) and memory. Imagination is anatomically located in the front ventricle of 
the brain. This receives images from the external world via the external senses and brings them 
together in a “common sense,” which then assigns these particulars to certain universal ideas. 
Reasoning or judgement, in the middle ventricle, contemplates the ideas, joining premises to 
conclusions (though this part of the picture is especially prone to variation). The ideas are then 
stored in memory, in the rear ventricle. Some version of this model remained intact for centuries.16 
It survived the arrival of new theories of brain anatomy that rejected ventricular localization; and 
it proved adaptable to the wholesale changes in medical theory of the mid-seventeenth century, 
influencing medical education well into the eighteenth. It also entered the wider culture. Locke 
14 See Pietro D’Abano, Conciliator Controversiarum, 114. 
15 Galen, Quod Animi Mores, in Kühn (ed.), Opera, iv, 786. 
16 See Ruth Harvey, The Inward Wits; George Bruyn, “The seat of the soul,” in F. Rose and W. Bynum 
(eds), Historical Aspects of the Neurosciences; Katharine Park, “The organic soul,” in C. Schmitt and
Q. Skinner (eds), The Cambridge History of Renaissance Philosophy; Eckhard Kessler, “The intellective 
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preserves the basic faculty psychology framework for his discussion of intellectual operations in 
the Essay concerning Human Understanding, and John Milton uses it in Book 5 of Paradise Lost 
to describe God’s creation of Adam: two works which no educated British person of the eighteenth 
century could fail to know. 
This crude outline of faculty psychology will do for the moment, but a caveat is needed.
Whereas in the classical texts the soul (psyche, anima) has plenty of work to do, in medieval 
philosophy this sense of activity has been taken over by the understanding (intellectus), now the 
more “animate” entity of the two. Early modern medical and philosophical sources tend to remain
unclear whether by “soul” they mean the Christian idea of some divine, semi-detached haze that 
just hovers around us, or our working faculties (in which sense it is often indistinguishable from 
mens, “mind”). In the mainstream of scholasticism, the character of the faculties involved in
intellectus to a certain extent drifted towards the realm occupied by anima. Aquinas, for example, 
is interested in the faculties mainly because their existence deductively proves the nature of the 
soul, and he is therefore less interested in their active operations. In the fourteenth century there 
was a minority view, prefiguring Juan Luis Vives, Michel de Montaigne and Locke among others,
which sought a detailed account of those operations, proceeding empirically after a fashion.17 
However, this belonged to a rarified, metaphysical school of thought; in the broad scheme of
things, the concretization and reification of the detailed operational activities of the mind is a 
historical development of the early modern period. 
Resuming now our discussion of the rise of wit or ingenium, we shall see that (1) the operations 
increasingly took precedence over the faculties to which they belonged and to which they had once 
been secondary; (2) the distinction between performance and operation began to be elided, with 
the result that speed becomes normative; and (3) regardless of whether the description of faculty 
psychology becomes simplified or more complicated, the operation of ingenium tends to assume 
leadership. Strictly speaking, ingenium was one operation of one faculty, the imagination. Indeed, 
that is what it remained in many texts through to Galenism’s last eighteenth-century gasp. But there 
was also constant renaming and reclassifying of certain operations from one faculty to the other, 
in which ingenium was often reassigned to the superior reasoning faculty.18 Once Leoniceno’s 
humanist contemporary Pietro Pomponazzi had disrupted European intellectual life by asserting 
that the existence of the rational soul was a matter for faith alone, not scientific demonstration, the 
desire for a demonstrable knowledge of man’s place in nature refocused on the detail of intellectual 
activity. As one of his disciples put it: “the soul of man is a substance by which man is man, that 
is one in its essence and many in its virtues and faculties: to which … many instruments are 
available,” and it was the latter with their operations that needed investigation, rather than the 
faculty as such.19 
In addition, an already existing minority theory which said that the faculties were localized 
in various sections of the brain, always controversial, became increasingly so. It had materialist 
implications. If an injury occurred to imagination or memory, did it only affect that faculty, or 
might it not affect the reasoning faculty too? And if so, why not the immaterial soul as well? To the 
usual examples of brain injury or sleep, the sixteenth century’s philosophy curriculum now added 
that of “the stupid” (stulti ac fatui), though as usual whom the author means by this is an open 
question.20 It highlighted the more fundamental question: if there is an immaterial rational soul, 
17 J. Zupko, “What is the science of the soul? A case study in the evolution of late medieval natural 
philosophy,” Synthese, 110 (1997). 
18 For example Nicolas Coeffeteau, A Table of Humane Passions, Preface. 
19 Simone Porzio, De Humana Mente, 36. 
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how does it link to intellectual faculties that belong to a material bodily organ, the brain? Are these
organic intellectual faculties partly separate from the higher rational soul, or merely (as Albert had 
described them) “accidents” or secondary “qualities” of it?21 Under such sceptical questioning, the
initial instinct was to add categories or subdivide existing ones. But some writers clearly felt that
this increased complexity only made things worse. Instead, they simplified. Many went so far as to 
treat the numerous conflicting names for various faculties and operations as a homogeneous lump, 
a unitary “mind.”22 From the 1630s, René Descartes’s mind/body dualism was there to encourage
them, but medical men interested in the psychological faculties had not waited for him to tell them. 
Over time, then, the word ingenium often came to describe not just the operation (one among 
several) of one faculty, but a whole faculty or ability in itself. Speed became entangled with the 
notion of a single overarching ingenium, especially among medical writers. This Ciceronian usage 
of the term dominates commentaries on The Art of Medicine. Oddo degli Oddi writes not about 
ingenium alone but about ingenium et ars (skill), as if they were equivalent, whereas in scholastic 
philosophy they had represented a contrast between the theoretical and the mundane.23 Oddi 
also fuses ingenium with previously suspect “ease of learning”: both “belong to the [immaterial] 
rational soul itself.” Ingenium “not only discourses, composes and divides easily, but previously 
apprehends singulars easily,” thereby straddling both the imaginative and reasoning faculties. Salvo 
Sclano employs ingenium and tarditas (slowness) as a contrasting pair, while Giovanni Argenterio 
criticizes a fellow commentator for using “speed” (celeritas) as a synonym for ingenium on the 
grounds that the latter is not only speed, it is synonymous with the intellect as a whole.24 Jérémie 
de Dryvere uses this latter argument about ingenium being an overarching principle to refute the 
localization of faculties in the brain and its materialist implications, which seduced the vulgar, 
“common herd of physicians”; partly, then, this move towards homogenization under the aegis of 
wit was a move towards sounder theological principle.25 
The humanistic ingenium, with its connotations of speed, gained prominence through this 
reduction of complexities. Scholastic philosophers had allocated speed no special value in any 
of the various operations of the reasoning faculty such as discursus (the relating of premises to 
conclusions), contemplatio (“study” or meditation on these) or even discretio (their subsequent
application), let alone the ingenium as they conceived it. On the rare occasion when operations 
are described in terms of speed, they are so quick as to take place in zero time, and then only in 
angels, “prophets” or exceptional humans who have “an extemporary knowledge, and upon the first
motion of their reason do what we cannot do without study or deliberation.”26 But in the Renaissance 
this territory was invaded by the more everyday quick-wittedness of ingenium, as the humanists 
conceived it. The basic stuff of the soul – its “substance” – came to be homogenized with its various 
faculties; the faculty was homogenized with one of its operations, ingenium or wit; and the whole 
came to be homogenized with the performance criteria – speed included – of that operation, blurring 
the previously fundamental category distinction between potentiality and actuality. 
The distinction between everyday intellectual activity and the immaterial intellect formerly 
located “beyond the wit of man” also began to disappear. “Wit” is already ambiguous in the 
fourteenth-century Piers Plowman of William Langland, who at one point personifies it as
21 Albert, Summa de Creaturis, 335.
 
22 Katharine Park, “Albert’s influence on late medieval psychology,” in J.A. Weisheipl (ed.), Albertus 

Magnus and the Sciences. 
23 Oddo degli Oddi, Expositio … Artis Medicinalis, 132. 
24 Salvo Sclano, Commentaria … Artis Medicinalis, 319; Giovanni Argenterio, In Artem Medicinalem, 218. 
25 Jérémie de Dryvere, In Τεχνην Galeni, 120. 
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the lazy, henpecked swine of a husband before whom Dame Study (contemplatio) casts her pearls 
of wisdom, while at others Langland already clearly sees wit as close to wisdom itself.27 The social 
sources of this elevation in the status of wit lay in a growing bureaucracy of clerks and literati, 
who administered the burgeoning fields of canon and civil law for their rulers and developed 
authentification systems for establishing the status of their superiors, both social and religious, 
through canonization. R.I. Moore has described this shift, starting in the eleventh century, as the 
triumph of aspirational clerks over the illiterate. Sucking up also meant spitting down: “Common 
interests, common values and common loyalties were expressed in bottomless contempt for those 
who did not share their skills: … the illiterates, idiota, rusticus – all words used regularly to 
describe those accused of heresy, and expressing perhaps the broadest and most universal of the 
stereotypes …, like those of heresy, leprosy [and] Jewry.”28 Around 1200 lepers were banned from 
inheriting property, as idiots were later to be, and were segregated by law; leprosy was a “disease of 
the soul.” Fear was expressed in the language of contamination, contributing both to the solidarity 
of the group operating the administrative systems and eventually to the status elevation of wit in 
general; melancholia and then idiocy replaced leprosy as better approximations to the opposite of 
whatever it was the administrative caste prided itself on. This was a lengthy process, as gentry and 
episcopate – i.e., those with an ability to present themselves as the channels of social and religious 
status – continued trying to beat off fellow-literati further down the ladder. If only very loosely, 
we can associate speed with more radical individuals among the latter group, encouraged by the 
onset of humanism. 
Resistances to the fast model 
With exactly the same theological intent as those who were reducing faculty psychology to an 
all-important ingenium, some commentators took the opposite line and resisted the erosion of 
category boundaries. Francisco Vallés, physician to Philip II of Spain, warned against confusing 
ingenium, which as a mere operation can vary according to individual performance, with the 
unalloyed immaterial intellect “which is in all of us per se by its own perfection.”29 Battista Fiera’s 
commentary of 1515 attributed speed to ingenium alone, a discrete and subordinate “operation” 
which “moves very quickly to track down the middle term and cause.” He warns against identifying 
it with the whole faculty or ability (potentia) and in particular with the immaterial rational soul, 
attacking the dunces “who believe that Galen thought of the faculty and the operation as the same 
thing.”30 Whereas Torrigiano had earlier assumed the existence of an immaterial soul, Fiera is 
now having to defend it, though of course that was what the homogenizers were trying to do, too. 
He interweaves biblical authority with earthly, often pre-Christian ones: a rhetorical intrusion of 
theology into faculty psychology and medical theory about the brain that was to become routine a 
century later, among those who coined the term “psychology.” 
A different form of resistance to this trend towards homogenizing ingenium with speed can be 
seen in Giambattista da Monte, an unlikely conservative since he had studied with Leoniceno and 
was himself, in many respects, the most radical innovator of Italian Renaissance medicine. For him 
it was not just the blurring of boundaries between faculty and operation, ability and performance, 
that was the mistake, but the actual value placed on speed. He criticized “the new men” not just 
27 Langland, The Vision of Piers Plowman (B-Text), 10.5; 5.587.
 
28 The Formation of a Persecuting Society, 139.
 
29 Galeni Ars Medicinalis, 31.
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for over-simplifying the elaborate apparatus of scholastic tradition but on the more particular 
grounds that they judged performance by speed when it should really be judged in terms of depth 
and penetration. Albert had thought of ingenium as “subtlety,” says Da Monte. “It conceives the 
minutest thing … so that it contains all the differentiations of that thing, completely and perfectly, 
and nothing is lacking from those differences … all the way to the bottom.”31 Endorsing Plato, 
Da Monte insists that ingenium and “ease of learning” are quite distinct: “those who learn easily 
or rather apprehend easily, are not ingeniosi. People like this, while they very easily learn, just 
as easily forget.” And whereas ingenium consists in “weighing carefully,” easy learners use their 
powers “precipitately” and “suddenly.” It may in fact be better to be slow. For Da Monte, speed is 
simply excess: rashness and nothing else. As in Plato, it precludes accuracy, and for Da Monte it 
also precludes comprehensiveness. Where Plato had made his point ironically, Da Monte makes 
his by straining the vocabulary of speed and forcing its terms (agkhinoia, solertia) to mean “depth” 
and “penetration” instead. 
The concept of depth was not in fact so conservative, since it suggested a greater complexity of 
the mind, which may thereby be empirically observable, even if it does not reveal its secrets at all 
quickly. Montaigne’s disciple Pierre Charron held “the mind of man” to be “a dark and deep abyss, 
an intricate labyrinth, full of corners and creeks, and secret lurking places: such is the disposition 
and state of this exalted part of the soul, distinguished by the term of intellectual, which consists of 
vastly many … faculties, and operations, and different movements, each of which have their proper 
names and each of them infinite doubts and difficulties peculiar to them.”32 The soul should be 
studied, he says, not via the faculties but via these operations. Vives, in his description of ingenium
as one of the human or “natural graces” and “a universal virtue of our minds,” was “less interested 
in what the soul is, but rather how it is and which are its effects.”33 
The Cartesian mind, on the other hand, might seem the ultimate reduction of faculty psychology. 
But Descartes himself looks backwards as well as forwards. The text that lays the groundwork for
the famous “method” of “the ingenious Descartes,” as he was called, bore the title “Rules for 
the Direction of the Ingenium.” He uses this term for the general activating principle of all the 
faculties. He prefers the one disembodied half of a dualistic model to the complexly arranged 
faculties noted above; but in so doing he also in some sense preserves them. In the sense that it 
is an activating principle, his ingenium has the characteristics of an operation, which is what the 
scholastics had said it was; but precisely because it activates faculties (imagination, reasoning, 
memory) which the scholastics had seen as prior but somehow inert, it somehow becomes a faculty 
itself. It is above all ingenium, not the static faculties nor even mind, reason, intellect or soul 
(animus), that separates man from beast-machine: “Nothing quite like this power [of ingenium] is 
found in corporeal things …. According to [the] different functions the same power is also called 
either pure intellect, or imagination, or memory, or sense-perception; but it is ingenium in the 
proper sense when it is forming new ideas.”34 What about its relationship to speed? Descartes says 
that the ingenium appears to grasp propositions and the connections between them immediately, 
but that this “simultaneous” understanding is deceptive. It is achieved only by training the faculty 
of memory. Once the thinker has laboriously worked out a chain of reasoning, the temporal 
aspect of the chaining can be discarded, so that he seems to be “intuiting the whole thing at once” 
even though it has actually been memorized: “so in this way the slowness of the wit (tarditas 
ingenii) is improved upon and the ability enlarged.” Descartes is using here Galen’s phrase from
31 In Artem Parvam Galeni, 310.
 
32 Pierre Charron, Of Wisdom, i, 130. 

33 Juan Luis Vives, De Anima, 77; Américo Castro, Spanien, Vision und Wirklichkeit, 556.
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The Art of Medicine, quoted above. However, whereas earlier commentators saw Galen’s “slowness” 
as a condition that was defective and organic to the body, Descartes sees it as normal (at least for 
the first outing of any new propositional synthesis), and ingenium as operating independently of 
the body. 
Reductionism continued, fed by the Cartesianism it had formerly prefigured. By the time of 
Luca Tozzi’s late seventeenth-century Galen commentary, ingenium has become a whole empire. 
It is (1) “the power of discovering very quickly the middle terms leading to the knowledge of 
causes,” (2) generalized across the brain and (3) coterminous with the “immaterial rational soul.”35 
Cognitive speed is no longer a quality of invisible matter such as the humours or soul spirits, but of 
an invisible immateriality, the Cartesian mind. Ingenium is now important enough to be a species 
marker in natural history, the main distinction between man and beast. Nor does this overarching 
concept retain any element of overlap with medieval philosophy’s “divine intelligences” at the 
other end of the scale; it is “proper to humans alone.” 
However, alongside the reductionist trend in faculty psychology and the resistances to it, there 
was also stasis. Accounts of ingenium as just one particular operation of the imagination, as it had 
been for Albert in the thirteenth century, can be found in works written or consulted in the middle 
of the eighteenth century. The Art of Medicine commentaries, even later ones, do not pursue the 
relationship between speed and ability systematically. Moreover, in most other medical contexts, 
the health of brain and intellect still consisted in a mean between fast and slow. The continuing 
strength of the mean in the wider culture is pithily expressed in the example Blaise Pascal chose 
to give for its definition, which happens to have a bearing on our topic: “Mean. When we read too 
quickly or too slowly, we do not understand anything.”36 This casts doubt on whether the speeding-
up process was purposive or even conscious. The Galen commentators, whose approach to any 
topic would always start with pasting together a variety of seemingly relevant classical texts, can 
be found approving Galen on the desirability of speed in one and the same paragraph as approving 
Hippocrates on that of a mean.37 (It was more important to present the Hippocratics, only recently 
revived, as being at one with Galen than to deal with the contradiction.) Speed, though sometimes 
preferable, was never necessary to intellectual ability, as it is in modern educational psychology. 
On the other hand, the idea of an overarching, specifically human intellectual ability whose 
performance is estimated in terms of (among other things) its speed was undoubtedly becoming 
dominant in the society beyond the learned doctor’s study.    
Quick wit as cultural capital: the ingenious gentleman 
“Fast equals good” was for a long time a minority habit, in the routine discussion of one or two 
passages in an ancestral medical curriculum. Meanwhile, in the everyday world, the clock had 
become not only a model for the workings of the universe but had altered urban and commercial 
perceptions of time. Replacing the craftsman’s balance as the core technological metaphor, 
it supplied a new way of measuring intellectual activity and facilitated notions of productivity.
(We could also note here the rise in the 1650s of the first coffeehouses, where the early Royal 
Society held its meetings; speedy caffeine was more suited to calculative skills than beer, its 
melancholic predecessor.) If speed of wit was an esoteric corner of theoretical medicine, in the real 
world its profile was increasing, and feeding, if slowly and unevenly, into the professional mind­
35 Luca Tozzi, In Artem Medicinalem Galeni, ii, 42.
 
36 Pascal, Pensées, 244.
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set and finally the academic one. Professional intellectuals, among them the medical humanists 
whose texts we have been analyzing, had the precarious job of both advising power and toeing its 
line, and the tension between speed and the traditional convention of the mean reflected this. In 
Elizabethan England, for example, Roger Ascham revived Plato’s seeming ambiguities about the 
wax tablet in a widely consulted handbook on education. The pupil with a “hard and rough wit” 
(evoking the hard, rough hands of his labouring family) will grow up to be a mere steward or an 
apprentice, even though he may be “wiser” than the pupil whose wit is “quick and light” and who 
will therefore get on in the world. Nevertheless, asks Ascham, who is to say that these “natural 
graces,” quickness and lightness, are not also signs of divine grace?38 It would have been tactless 
for a courtier (Ascham was Elizabeth’s secretary) to say outright that a quick-witted climbing 
of the greasy pole was incompatible with divinity when most of the Tudor court were upstart 
commoners who had done just that. 
At the end of the seventeenth century Locke, though he defined wit as “the assemblage of 
ideas, and putting those together with quickness,” was more concerned about the mean, and the 
pathology of “wrong judgement” that lay on both sides of it.39 There is “heat and passion” on one 
side and “sloth” on the other; if the latter is a mark of the “idiot” and his “want of quickness … 
in the intellectual faculties,” the former are marks of a politically dangerous sectarian religious 
enthusiasm. Speed remains largely insignificant in Locke’s psychology. The same is true of his 
eighteenth-century readers. The nonconformist educator Isaac Watts warns, “Presume not too much 
upon a bright genius, a ready wit, and good parts; for this, without labour and study, will never 
make a man of knowledge and wisdom … When they ha[ve] lost their vivacity …, they bec[o]me 
stupid and sottish.”40 More scientifically oriented writers such as David Hartley wrote about the 
internal movement and association of ideas in terms of physics, likening them to the “vibrations” 
of Newton’s Optics; on this basis he differentiated individual intellects from each other by their 
strength, vividness, intensity and (in the case of “idiots”) their educability – but not their speed.41 
James Mill noted the time it takes for ideas and thoughts to animate the muscles; he saw speed as 
an operation of the faculty of will, but did not discuss differences in speed among individual wills 
or intellects.42 At this theoretical level, then, the relationship between intellect and speed plateaus 
in the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, precisely on the threshold of the momentous
leap in machine speeds and in the complexity and speed of social life. 
However, the history of eighteenth-century theories of the mind needs complementing with the 
developments at a more mundane level, as described in Graham Richards’s Mental Machinery. 
Speed was as much an indicator of social status as of psychological status. While the arrival of an 
overarching ingenium in the later medical texts coincides with its attribution to ever wider social 
strata, its elite character is nevertheless preserved in the “ingenious gentleman,” a stock character 
in tales of intellectual exploration from the mid-seventeenth century onwards. In the immediacy of 
his abilities he is a descendant of medieval philosophy’s “prophet.” The Royal Society itself was 
modest on this score: the title page of the early issues of its Philosophical Transactions announced 
that they were drawn from “the labours of the ingenious.” But there was also a consistent tendency 
to believe that elite brains could perform intellectual activity without having to labour at their 
studies whereas from other people, however healthy their brains, the same activity required time. 
Traditionally angels, and at inspired moments philosophers themselves, had been exempt from 
38 Roger Ascham, The Scholemaster, 25.
 
39 John Locke, An Essay concerning Human Understanding, 156; 160.
 
40 Isaac Watts, The Improvement of the Mind, 6.
 
41 David Hartley, Observations on Man, i, 30. 
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the labour of constructing syllogisms, their understandings being not just quick but instantaneous.43 
Like them, the ingenious gentleman had an instant understanding that exempted him from the
opprobrium of apprenticeship. The fact that the ingenious gentleman did not need training, unlike
the artisans with whom he now had to associate and who assisted with his experiments, helped to 
shore up his (often dubious) social status, and to offset any depreciation resulting from the fact that
the road to knowledge in increasingly important areas of life now required base mechanical skills. 
Instant performance had its objective counterpart in “natural magic,” which was distinct from 
ordinary nature not by being supernatural but by the extraordinarily reduced time it took to operate. 
Latent within nature, magic was a legitimate source of scientific inquiry (Robert Boyle’s quest to 
tap into it led to some of the first principles of modern chemistry). The founding narrative of genius 
in this sense was the story of the Pentecostal descent of the holy spirit. A typical example from 
everyday life in the medieval period was speaking in tongues, like the old peasant woman who 
suddenly spoke fluent Latin when seized by melancholy, only to lapse into monolingualism upon 
recovery.44 The ingenious gentleman, and thence the Galtonian genius, are her natural successors. 
43 See Noel Brann, The Debate over the Origin of Genius in the Italian Renaissance. 
44 D’Abano, Conciliator Controversiarum, Differentia 37. 
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the Place of Intelligence in Anthropology
 
One’s intelligence is not determined by the hard realities of time and labour alone but also, and 
equally concretely, by the realm of appearances. In this and the following two parts, we shall look 
at the social manifestation of these appearances alongside certain other concepts with structural 
similarities to intelligence, and then at the historical interplay among them. 
Forms of self-representation 
It is by appearances that we judge others, they judge us and mutual recognition or misrecognition 
occurs. Intelligence is one such form of mutual (mis)recognition. Disputes about it are disputes 
over status. Status is usually seen as a two-tiered structure: at the upper level, an abstraction of 
social goals; at the lower, any concrete evidence or collateral one might have for claiming it. 
Lower-level evidence varies with the values of a given historical or cultural context. For instance, 
it may be that I own a diamond mine, or my great aunt’s second cousin was a Duke or I am 
completely chaste. Hypothetically at least, the reality of each of these can be externally confirmed; 
they are more than just concepts. In our own meritocratic mind-set, intelligence too belongs on this 
level; it is something to be called upon as concrete collateral when claiming status, and is assumed 
to compete for recognition on the same taxonomic level with (for example) wealth. 
But this two-level structure is inadequate. Looking at the sheer variety of candidates for 
status across history and cultures, we find another level mediating between abstract status and its 
collateral. This level consists of what are indeed only concepts (though as such they play an active 
social role). Nor are they externally verifiable – indeed, that is often their whole point. Concepts 
such as honour, for example, or grace, have been described by anthropologists in such terms. 
Honour and grace are not themselves concrete collateral: they bring no offering to the great god 
Status except the promise offered by the word itself. That is because they are wholly internal to 
the game of bidding for status; they are, so to speak, its “modes.”1 Modes of bidding belong in 
the realm of appearances and mutual recognition alone. To people claiming status on grounds of 
their honour or state of grace, a request for hard evidence is insulting because it would expose that 
very flimsiness. This point has often been made. Aristotle rejected honour’s claim to constitute 
the good life, because “it seems rather to exist in those doing the honouring than in him who is 
honoured.”2 The seventeenth-century theologian Pierre Nicole recognized its modal role. If honour 
has any reality, he says, it lies not even “in our inclination to love it, nor in the belief that such an 
inclination is natural” but in the mere “inclination to attach it more to one thing than to another.”3 
As a nobleman in a much-quoted phrase from Lope de Vega’s The Commanders of Cordoba admits, 
“Honour is something one does not possess …. It is that which exists in the other,” a homage paid 
to power. Evidence is therefore always contingent and arbitrary. Honour is that which the person in 
1 Don Herzog, Happy Slaves, 92.
 
2 Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, 1.5.4.
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power says it is. Ultimately, said Hobbes, my honour is just my assertion of my social rank against 
others, the display or “manifestation” of “the value we set on one another.”4 Likewise with my 
being in grace: God has predestined my soul for salvation, and this gift of grace obviates the need 
for any evidence base such as absence of sin. If I know I am in grace, that is enough. True, only 
God can know what is “essential and constitutive of [the] being of grace”; but it is also a human 
and social phenomenon, since we discern it in each other “mediately and secondarily, by the effects 
and operations … manifestative of such a being.”5 
Honour and grace, then, are examples of bidding modes: they connect status at its higher level, 
as an abstraction of values and goals, to its lower level, as concrete collateral to be used in support 
of a bid. That is why such modes are not susceptible to objectivist definition, why there is endless 
controversy about what constitutes them and why people claiming status will talk about their honour 
or state of grace as if it were self-evident when actually the terms are purely self-referential. 
Back, then, to intelligence. In what class of things does it belong? We tend to answer this in 
two ways. One is scientific: it belongs in the same class as gas particles or planets. The other is 
sociological: it belongs in the same class as (for example) money, against which it competes. Usually 
we think of it in both ways at the same time. But intelligence no more resembles a pound coin than 
a planet. In the universal poker game of self-representation, its only collateral is its own name 
and the deference this commands. Intelligence is thus the same kind of thing as honour and grace:
it belongs to the class of claims to status that are purely self-referential. Like honour and grace, it 
is a mode of bidding for status and nothing else. Like them, it belongs in the realm of appearances, 
even if it never lets us forget the reality of these appearances in any social interaction where 
someone is pulling rank. Like them, it is located midway between status as a sum of general goals 
and status as the array of concrete items upon which one calls when making a bid. Like them, it fills 
the round hole of individual human uniqueness with the square peg of abstract hierarchy. And like 
them, it creates not just an in-group but an out-group that is definitively disqualified from entering 
the bidding in the first place. 
The idea of an intelligence that is (a) specifically human, distinct from any other creature animal 
or divine, and (b) an individual possession, is not something universal and transhistorical but arises 
out of early modern games of social bidding. In this period, honour, grace and intelligence (“wit”) 
at times occupied or fought over the same conceptual space. In its age of innocence, contemporaries 
sometimes saw intelligence in this way themselves. When Descartes remarked, “No one desires 
a larger measure of good sense than he already possesses,” he could equally have been talking 
about the other two modes.6 Conversely, when the Jesuit authority on human behaviour Balthasar 
Gracián wrote “With the world full of fools, there is none who thinks himself one or even suspects 
it,” his readers would have understood “fool” in terms of disablement from any or all three.7 
Intelligence and the structure of status 
Honour, grace and intelligence are not the only possible “modes” of this type, but in the early 
modern period there is a dynamic, historically formative interplay between them. We can start 
by establishing their common structural components. I draw here on the anthropology of Julian
Pitt-Rivers, who first noted the structural similarities between honour and grace and who (along 
4 Leviathan, 62.
 
5 John Flavell, The Method of Grace, 405.
 
6 Descartes, Discours de la méthode, 7.
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with Pierre Bourdieu) also touched, if very half-heartedly, on their resemblance to intelligence. I 
will flesh out that passing intuition.8 
First of all, honour, grace and intelligence all entail personal destiny and collective perfectibility, 
a permanent place in the cosmos that transcends the temporality of individual lives. Death with 
honour, the traditional motto of the defeated, signifies that one may forfeit life itself so that honour 
can live on; with honour, wrote Edmund Spenser, we are “eternized … in th’immortal book of 
fame.”9 The constitutive element of selfhood lies in the group identity of “the honour society” 
(the societas, as contemporaries called it), where honour lifts one so far above the nonentity of the 
mass that withdrawal of status is the difference between life and death. Similarly, with grace come 
salvation and a life everlasting among the company of the elect, thereby marking one off from 
the reprobate and doomed. Likewise intelligence is the individual possession of the intelligence
society – that is, the 98 per cent or so of the population who participate collectively in a future 
intellectual perfection, marked by developmental goals and the practices of genetic enhancement 
and eugenics. Perfection can be retrospective too: the honourable man’s glorious ancestors 
(Spenser’s “eternal brood of glory excellent”), whose precedent seems impossible to reproduce; 
Adam’s state of grace, corrupted by the Fall; the gene pool that has degenerated from its original 
state, as in Galton’s fears about racial degeneration and regression to the mean. 
All three modes sanctify the person. Each confirms the legitimacy of an individual’s behaviour 
by referring it to external authority. In a form appropriate to the mode (the king disburses honourable 
titles, God dispenses grace, the psychologist allocates IQ scores), selected individuals are invested 
with some of the superior’s sacred authority. Although this authority is in fact arbitrary, in receiving 
its blessings we abnegate our right to question it, thereby binding ourselves to accept practices 
which a different generation, in different historical circumstances, might regard as utterly wrong. 
With sanctification of the person comes purity of the group, raising anxiety about inauthenticity
and pollution. The arriviste buys the coat of arms which only a person’s bloodline entitles them to; 
by pretending to be honourable, he pollutes the group. The hypocrite fakes the outward behaviours 
signalling confirmation of grace at holy communion; he thereby defiles it, since the devil himself 
is able to “counterfeit all the saving operations and graces of the spirit of God.”10 People called 
intellectually disabled are stereotypically good mimics but also mere mimics, of intelligent 
behaviour; educational psychologists are at their most alert when someone already labelled as 
severely autistic appears to give eye contact, thus mimicking human interaction, or when someone 
with a supposedly deficient intelligence appears to be reading but is merely, like a dog, “barking 
at print.” The disabled person is not really interacting, reading, thinking, self-aware, ambitious, 
in love or expressing opinions, like everyone else, but merely copying surface behaviours he sees 
around him. In all these examples, the physical presence of the polluter threatens to destabilize 
the group and its internal bonds. Bastards adulterate noble and honourable blood; reprobate 
communicants pollute the truly Christian receiver; the disabled contaminate the gene pool and 
defile the community of the intelligent. (If this were not the case, one would not need segregated 
social activities and institutions.)
 We find too an anxiety about self-authentification, directed inwards at one’s self-esteem and 
personal autonomy. A gentleman’s ancestry is the permanent guarantee of his honour, yet depends 
also on an unattainable certainty as to who his real father was; if his pure bloodline falls in doubt, 
8 “Postscript: the place of grace in anthropology,” in J. Peristiany and Pitt-Rivers (eds), Honour and 
Grace in Anthropology; The Fate of Schechem; “Honor,” in E. Sills (ed.), International Encyclopedia of the 
Social Sciences. 
9 The Faerie Queene, 1.10.59; 1.5.1. 
10 Jonathan Edwards, A Treatise concerning Religious Affectations, 40. 
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so does his autonomy and freedom from having to bow to the will of others, and perhaps he must 
join the servile out-group which by definition has no such autonomy. People otherwise certain of 
their own salvation worry about their status with God whenever they suffer a personal setback, 
however clearly the Bible says that grace is conferred once and for all. And one’s intelligence, that 
which endows modern personhood with its sense of permanence, may be denied by the formal 
entrance requirements of educational and social institutions. The genealogy that certifies the 
nobleman’s continuous honourable bloodline; the gift of grace by which the godly man is born 
again forever; the autobiographical “self” whose intelligence has a birth-to-death consistency and 
permanence: all are ways of whistling in the dark of transience, as we veer between self-flattery 
and self-abasement. 
There is also in each mode a tension between self-authentification and authentification by 
others: between the felt, internal aspects of each mode and the verifiable, external ones; between 
what I advance as a claim and others’ recognition of it; between private and public behaviour; 
between potentiality and assessable performance. Honour, grace and intelligence each form a
nexus between the ideals of a society and the reproduction of those ideals in individuals who are 
able to extort from others a validation of the image they cherish of themselves. Authentification is in 
each case a source of socio-cultural conflict or coherence; it underpins the rituals specific to a mode 
(interpersonal violence, prayer, command of grammar), its rites of passage (dubbing, confirmation, 
developmental assessment) and forms of verification (jousting, trial by ordeal, academic exams). 
All three are forms of apparently equal exchange amongst creatures who are actually unequal. 
The man of honour exchanges forms of honourable address with the socially inferior stranger, out 
of “politeness.” The quality of being polite or “polished” (clean) oneself obliges one to attribute 
this quality, if only whimsically, to the unclean. The cost of this ambiguity is the eventual collapse 
of the mode itself. First the merchant or yeoman farmer and then even the road sweeper has to be 
addressed as Mr or Esquire. In religion, where inequality is at its starkest, grace is often known 
as “the friendship of God,” while in secular terms grace is a form of social reciprocity illustrated 
(as Marcel Mauss observed) by words such as gracias, grazie and so forth, which show that the 
reciprocity is actually an obligation from one party to another and therefore intrinsically unequal. 
The case of intelligence remains obscure to most of us, because it is the form of exchange in which 
we remain enmeshed today. The relationship between the intelligent and the intellectually disabled 
is nevertheless one of exchange, inasmuch as the credit of the one could not exist without the debit 
of the other; it takes place without the awareness of either, or perhaps only with the awareness of 
the latter. (A milder version is the advanced meritocratic principle of rule by exam-passers.) To 
deal with ambiguities about equality, all three modes place seals of official public recognition on 
reputations that would otherwise stand in doubt, giving them the illusion of permanence. The effect 
is to suppress the immediacy of human reciprocity, objectifying and depersonalizing it in the form 
of contracts and sanctions. Intelligence itself is a contractualized form, internalized within each 
individual, of this felt need for social reciprocity and exchange. 
Each mode is a legitimation of certain kinds of behaviour, relating the world as it is to the world 
as the in-group would like to see it. Honour is a disculpating factor, rendering admissible the motive 
for any behaviour so long as one is a member of the honour group. Grace brings “justification,” 
God’s suspension of sentence for the elect few; in the extreme version of this doctrine known as 
Antinomianism, no action can be sinful if the actor knows he is in grace. Intelligence, too, can 
legitimize otherwise reprehensible behaviour, such as the genius’s neglect of spouse and children. 
Grace, honour and intelligence are the halo that surrounds power. They turn its brute facts into moral 
arguments, and have all been used to moralize the language of politics. Though they appear to be 
evaluated by some objective knowledge system, they are in fact evaluated from within in-groups of 
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extend more or less to the boundaries of the human species should not blind us to the fact that in the 
past both honour and grace entailed exactly the same claim; they cast the out-group (commoners, 
hypocrites) as “monsters of nature,” even if at that time such monsters formed the majority of the 
population. If this claim with regard to honour and grace seems ludicrous to us and with regard 
to intelligence does not, it is because intelligence is our own preferred way of bidding for status; 
the out-group may be very small, but that does not alter its structural similarity to those other out-
groups. All these legitimations belong to the extensive medium-term period of centralization of 
power that runs from the surge in administrative outreach in the thirteenth century to the globalized 
information societies of the twenty-first. Bidding modes are characteristically pushed forward by 
ambitious groups not quite at the centre of power; consequently they become a preoccupation of 
state power itself, as it responds to the threat. Henry VIII’s governmental revolution, for example, 
centralized the honour codes that had till then been policed by semi-autonomous groups of nobles. 
Jean Calvin’s godly government of Geneva transformed grace, which the Reformation held to be 
a matter of the individual’s relationship with God, into a monopoly of the state. The totalitarian 
tendency of modern liberal societies is obscured by its offer to individual citizens of a spurious 
access to social power against a previously entrenched elite, through their certifiable intelligence 
(“meritocracy”). In adopting the principle of each mode, state power renders illusory any promise 
of personal autonomy which that mode may have begun by offering, and uses it to bind individuals 
more tightly to the social order. 
Important to legitimation is precedence. Each mode is competitive within itself: struggles 
take place wherever precedence is intrinsic but the outcome in doubt. Each in-group has its own 
technical gradations of excellence (honourable title, canonization, Mensa membership) that are 
also presented as moral gradations. In addition, if communities of honour, grace and intelligence
are circumscribed by the vulgar, the ungodly and the disabled respectively, there are also groups 
whose bid is ambiguous. Alongside honourable gentlemen are gentle women, whose honour is 
something quite different from men’s; alongside the godly are those whose state of grace mere 
mortals cannot know; alongside the intelligent are those whose status is ambiguous because 
postponed, such as children (hence that thoroughly modern notion, “cognitive development”). 
Friction also arises from the contradiction within each bidding mode between the porousness 
of borders (a steady trickle of people being admitted to the in-group or expelled) and the fact that 
membership is super-determined by a necessity that is beyond time or place. Thus there is tension 
between status ascribed and status achieved. Is my innate honour subject to fate, or can I act to 
rescue it? Am I saved by God’s predestined grace, or can I work at my salvation? Is my intelligence 
determined by my DNA, or is it improvable by nurture? These debates are the contentious political 
face of the modes. Lives, and potential lives, hang on the outcome. The tensions are only ever 
resolved temporarily, by quota systems which impose a conceptual discontinuity and social frontier 
between the back row of the elite and the front row of the excluded, and which reserve a place for 
the offspring of the in-group in each mode.11 
There is also a struggle to maintain the inherently abstract and general character of a mode, 
without which it would break down because hard evidence would be needed instead – a need that 
contradicts the very principle of the modes themselves. The struggle is against concretely verifiable 
and therefore degraded accounts of the mode. Honour cannot be substituted with ersatz alternatives 
such as mere honesty, which can be properly monitored and is therefore bourgeois. “Special” or 
“saving” grace, which inexplicably guarantees salvation regardless of mere earthly merit, must be 
sharply distinguished from “natural” graces, the empirically verifiable gifts or abilities that entitle 
11 Pierre Bourdieu, “Epreuve scolaire et consécration sociale,” in Actes de la recherche en sciences 
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one to command others in the secular realm. And intelligence as generalized intellectual ability 
exists over and above the specificity of particular abilities, with their susceptibility to mundane 
forms of verification. 
To avoid calls for evidence, all three bids are forced instead to blur the distinction between
individual, subjective ability and objective abilities or powers (property differentials, contractual
freedoms, verifiable scientific knowledge and so forth), creating the illusion that certain objective
powers are the personal, internal quality of individuals. It then turns out that personal ability consists
in facing down people who might otherwise feel they were your equal. Just as in property disputes
nine-tenths of the law is possession, so nine-tenths of intelligence is the silencing of anyone who
would dispute your claim to it. A psychometric test may sometimes be called upon, though usually
all that is needed is the minutest of signs given off. Since each mode can in fact be used to signify
more or less anything one likes, or its opposite, according to the power of the parties involved, such
randomness has to be disguised by an apparently stable theoretical basis in the form of a script that
is read off from some external, objective source and means the same thing to everyone. In this way
personal abilities acquire the same ontological certainty as the corresponding objective powers. 
Randomness also involves what Mauss calls a general theory of magic: each mode can vanish
and pop up again anywhere with fresh principles, differing from one time or place to another. Its
principles are refreshed by appealing to the new “facts” of the mode that establish one’s right to
give instructions or to talk first, and down. These principles usually involve only tacit consensus,
since the mere hint of spelling them out may cause offence or threaten the principle itself. Only
when the threat becomes real does it become necessary, despite everything, to codify the consensus
explicitly, producing (as we shall see) grace and honour quotients, GQ and HQ, as well as IQ. These
codes are the official signs of one’s rank in a universal order, identically social and natural, where
it might otherwise stand in doubt. Bidding modes for status start out by being sensed emotionally,
as reciprocal but unverifiable “states of the heart”; but at certain historical points, the pressures of
socio-economic change call for desperate measures, not to say desperate measurements.12 Detached,
objectified, abstract, impersonal accounts are drawn up as a last resort against the impending meltdown
of a mode, and this new pseudo-legal, pseudo-scientific hierarchy is then inserted in the minds of
individual subjects who internalize it informally as a new state of the heart and a new source of social
cohesion – and of friction. The friction occurs within spaces so homogeneous, at least to an outside
observer, that difference is created out of nothing. A newly arrived Martian, for example, asked to
consider variations in intelligence among earthlings, would surely be baffled by the question.13 
There follows, in all three modes, a confusion of sign with substance. In a technique characteristic 
of power, the insignia of a mode precede its facts. The sign of a lion rampant on a coat of arms may 
not make the owner brave, but it helps to enhance his power: “reputation of power, is power.”14 
Calvin and Oliver Cromwell took their earthly triumphs as the sign they were in grace and therefore 
fit to rule. This confusion of sign with substance renders the “nature” of the mode deterministic 
and elevates it into something unchangeable. Accreditation operates in reverse order: the sign, with 
its exactitude, arrives first and the thing it codifies comes after, in a clearly identifiable historical 
sequence. The same happens with IQ and cognitive ability scores, as we shall see shortly. Social 
tensions are relieved by this constant turning of the sign or outer manifestation into inner truth, 
display into identity (honourable, elect, intelligent). However, the relief is never enough because 
there can be no guarantee that one has really reached the heart of the onion. Always controversial, 
signs indicate differential degrees of a mode as they are constantly readjusted to the objective 
12 Pitt-Rivers, “Postscript,” 215.
 
13 Bourdieu, The Logic of Practice, 136.
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structures legitimizing it. The natural distinction they identify correlates with one’s distance from 
the swamps of vulgarity, reprobation or intellectual disability, and legitimizes social segregation. 
Finally, the necessity of each mode is confirmed by that most clearly verifiable aspect of human 
beings, their physical make-up. Grace, honour and intelligence are all associated with the body: 
blood in the gentry, “soul spirits” in God’s elect, genes in the intelligent. The head especially,
as the point of control, ritually signals the authenticity of a bidding mode: the crowning of a 
monarch, the sign of the cross over the head, or the touch on it with a book in academic degree 
ceremonies. The body’s importance also means that all three modes are the business of physicians. 
The body can be decisive in proving group membership, and in ousting certain individuals from 
full membership of the natural human kind. 
The structural, historically continuous feature of these self-referential status bids is precisely 
their modal function, their ability to block our view of the facts of power. “After all,” to quote the 
historian Marc Bloch, “what is a social hierarchy other than a system of collective representations 
that are by their very nature mobile?” The name of any bid smells as sweet as any other, even 
if in concrete historical contexts they compete with each other because each is implicated in its 
own respective political ideology. Despite their similarities, the modes are structurally different in
one respect. While they all command charismatic recognition, intelligence seems to stand out from 
the other two because of the numbers involved. The possessors of honour and grace were few and 
proud of it. But if the proud possessors of intelligence are a group consisting entirely of charismatic 
individuals, there are by now an awful lot of us, about 98 per cent of the population. The only 
people in awe of us, one hopes, are the “intellectually disabled.” Intelligence is a generalized 
charisma, its historical roots lying in the Protestant dispersal of sacredness to the laity. Bourdieu, 
in describing charismatic honour and grace as forms of symbolic capital, dips a toe in this water 
when he puts educational qualifications in the same category as the other two modes. However, 
he does not put intelligence as such there; he assumes it has a genuine, untouchable substance that 
is somehow separate from the sign. One can only think that this is because he is seduced by one 
of the “realist typologies” he himself criticizes elsewhere. Intelligence, though absent from his 
analysis, ought to be a supreme illustration of his own definition of symbolic capital as “the self-
consciousness of a dominant class.” As our political leaders keep telling us, “We are all middle 
class now.” And inasmuch as intelligence characterizes the middle classes above all, the dream 
Marx ascribed to them of “a bourgeoisie without a proletariat” is also the dream of an “intelligence 
society” eugenically cleansed of the unintelligent. 
“Merit” and modern intelligence: the immediate historical background 
By the late nineteenth century, the shift in ideological balance from honour and grace to
intelligence – from “arms” to “letters,” seminary to seminar – and the split between religious and 
secular-scientific learning were more or less complete. Revisiting the concept of the genius in this 
context, we find that as scientific knowledge began to be thought of as the genius’s possession, 
the branch of it known as psychology gave rise to scientific knowledge about the genius (and, of 
course, its opposite). A status concept was thereby transformed into an objective scientific entity, 
subsuming the characteristics of grace and honour under those of a supreme intuited intellect (nous, 
for which “intelligence” was the preferred translation). 
Hints of this were already around in the eighteenth century, when a descendant of the (Robert) 
Boyle family received the following piece of flattery from an expert on human behaviour: “Every 
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of honour … you are likely to transmit the revered name to future generations.”15 Honourable
line and intellectual line are one here. (Boyle himself had, in fact, died childless.) To take another 
example, what could have postulated an invisible and universal force – gravity – if not an invisible
and universal force – intelligence – with Newton at its summit? Newton was the last historical 
exemplar of the medieval prophet, that is, someone whose route to knowledge was an unmediated, 
intuited intellect; but by the same token he was a prototype of the modern genius, the era’s most
honoured mind and, in terms of grace, God’s elect instrument. “God said, let Newton be, and all was 
light.” The public deference he obtained confirmed the honourable and elect status of all those who 
bestowed it, endowing them with a third, intellectual claim to status that reflected Newton’s own
intellectual glory. However, by contrast with the honourable person’s disdain for labour and God’s 
preference for faith over works, intellectual status of this sort seemed to demand quite hard works, 
at least for ordinary mortals. Mathematical puzzles became acceptable pursuits in The Gentleman’s 
Magazine or Monthly Intelligencer and (because they did not threaten female honour either) The
Ladies’ Diary, and were a prototype for the first written, time-tested exams.16 The year 1682 saw the
launch of the Weekly Memorials for the Ingenious, a digest of the latest intellectual pursuits. The elite
still aspired to the emblems of honour and the signs of grace; now they also sought the accreditation 
of their intelligence. And if “elite” is, as sociologists have observed, a nebulous concept, then so 
much the better: it is entirely appropriate to the bidding modes and their unwavering superficiality. 
Two names stand out in the history of forms of accreditation: Galton and Binet. The roots of 
modern intelligence in honour and grace were nurtured by Galton, even if he rarely used the word 
itself. The stimulus for his first book Hereditary Genius was his own youthful record, disapproved 
by his family, of intellectual failure. Cousin Charles (Darwin) was a genius, their mutual grandfather 
Erasmus Darwin had been a genius, so Galton naturally aspired to genius too. He needed a field in 
which it could be expressed, and he found it in his theory that genius runs in families.17 Although 
he excluded people whose reputations were due solely to hereditary title from his underlying 
principle that “high reputation is a pretty accurate test of high ability,” Galton’s description of the 
genius remains steeped in the vocabulary of honour. Genius and esteem were close, not necessarily 
because esteem was the outcome of having high ability but because they were conceptually alike. 
True, the anthropometrical laboratory he went on to construct measured people from all walks of 
life. But he had been right the first time: the families of “men of reputation” are precisely where to 
find genius, provided one can keep slipping in one’s own definition of the abilities that comprise it. 
To complain that such families are not a proper population sample is to presuppose that intelligence 
can be an object of scientific investigation with an observable essence across social classes, rather 
than simply another bidding claim cognate with honour. 
Historians have written much about Galton’s role as innovator, but little on what got him there. 
The nonconformist culture of Galton’s family background had long ago turned optimistic about 
the general availability of grace; elect status was not some blind Calvinist conundrum solved only 
in one’s afterlife destination, it was manifest here on earth in the inner light of (nearly) every 
individual’s nature.18 It nevertheless had the deterministic overtones of earlier predestinarianism. 
These overtones entered psychology partly through the work of the eighteenth-century dissenting 
clergyman Joseph Priestley, whose studies both of exact science and of human nature found room 
for what he now termed “necessitarianism.” Galton took this term and squeezed what had been 
15 Thomas Salkeld, The Compleat Gentleman, Dedicatory note.
 
16 Andrew Warwick, Masters of Theory, 130; C. John Somerville, The Secularization of Early Modern 

England, 185. 
17 Adrian Wooldridge, Measuring the Mind, 75. 
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a trinitarian mind-set (divine necessity, malleable nature, human nurture) into a new, dualistic 
one of nature versus nurture.19 No doubt in using the term he was just pitching his tent on the 
clergy’s lawn, but he was also refurbishing the causal basis on which geneticists might account 
for intelligence. As for nurture, when Galton wrote about improving the human stock, he used 
metaphors of “husbandry” and “grafting.” If these look quasi-biological and therefore modern, 
we must remember that priests had been routinely using them a couple of centuries earlier in 
their advice on how to rear the children of the elect. Galton’s “powers” and abilities therefore 
had a subliminally divine element. They were to take precedence over mere high breeding of an 
earthly kind. He reconstituted grace and election on a scientific basis that justified the claims of
an intellectually elite family like his own to the same status as the older aristocracy, which had so far 
ranked above it in terms of bloodline and honour.20 The same is true further down the social scale. 
When Burt justified IQ tests by their raising of a few innately intelligent working-class children 
to their proper station through entry into grammar schools, he was of this same tradition. If one 
were to say that social selection by intelligence testing leads to the company of the elect, it would 
be more than mere metaphor; there is an organic historical link. The contemporary prominence of 
Plato’s Republic is again relevant, with its “noble lie” about the golden child who, having been 
born into a bronze family, is reallocated to a golden one.21 
We have already seen that the procedure for establishing intelligence as a scientific concept 
consists first in conjuring up the notion of a mean purely as such. Subsequently, and only 
subsequently, this mean becomes something concrete; as “intelligence,” it in fact consists in 
whatever is lying around in the conjuror’s mind-set at that point. The sign becomes the thing itself. 
It is therefore nothing more than what those with the power say it is, as were honour and grace: a 
dummy category, a magic hold-all into which they can pack whatever they like according to purpose. 
Binet is a classic case. In 1904 a radically anti-clerical government commissioned him to deal with 
the consequences of its closure of thousands of church schools, the central plank in its separation 
of church and state. The left-wing parties were full of men of science and physician-legislators, 
the prime minister Emile Combes being himself a doctor who had specialized in psychology; the 
Third Republic’s prominent medical interest in hereditary degeneration was linked to its sense of 
political and social malaise.22 The closure seems to have decanted into the recently established state 
educational system certain children whom it did not want. As a network of separate special schools 
was just then being established, Binet was required to design a stricter system that could identify 
those children to be quarantined, or “helped,” as historians have put it. Where did the idea come 
from in the first place, that some children might need to be ejected? The existence of some notional 
out-group is a priori for those fearing pollution. Someone must be ejected, but who? At this stage 
the slate was blank. No criteria existed for what exactly defined a problem child in the new system. 
Binet’s underlying criteria were as arbitrary as the means of assessing them needed to be precise. 
He began by noting that certain things are absent in certain children. What things, exactly? He 
fell back, as one does, on his own previous and somewhat desultory professional history, which 
was a mix of theoretical remnants of faculty psychology and disparate empirical studies that 
had largely led up blind alleys. He notes that what is absent in problem children – that is, those 
already shortlisted for segregation, on a pure hunch – is the faculties of attention span, judgement, 
adaptation, critical spirit, abstraction and generalization. He then takes the unilateral decision to let 
precisely these things comprise a standard, which he calls “mental age.” Finally he goes back and 
19 Francis Galton, Inquiries into Human Faculty and its Development, 234.
 
20 Wooldridge, Measuring the Mind, 75.
 
21 The Republic, 547a.
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applies this standard to each individual “mentally defective” child on the shortlist; he compares 
the child’s performance with the norm by establishing the (inevitably lower) age of the average 
child at whose level the defective one is operating. The child might look at this process slightly 
differently: he or she is being measured precisely according to those criteria which it is suspected in 
advance he or she will fail to meet. Binet, by contrast, is looking at success: a chance government 
summons has led him to the holy grail that will redeem the psychology of intelligence, and perhaps 
all psychology, by curing it of its inexactness. 
Binet, unlike Galton, was a worrier, whose work underwent anxious recensions: there is 
probably no unitary intelligence, it is not actually a concrete characteristic like height, people will 
over-systematize my ideas, we must prevent teachers from trying to eject normal children who are 
merely disaffected or uninterested and so forth. Yet his only major effort to deal with his anxieties 
was to say that it does not matter what the tests are of so long as there are plenty of them.23 In the 
1920s, following the failure of the new applied disciplines to agree on a common definition of 
intelligence, Kelley’s blunt closure to the debate ran: “Mental tests measure something, we may 
or may not care what …. The measuring device as a measure of something that is desirable comes 
first, and what it is a measure of comes second.”24 The whole claim to exact-science legitimacy was 
loaded off from the substance of this elusive target, intelligence, and on to measurement alone, the 
codification of status. For the psychometrician the arbitrariness of content is not a failing but an 
endorsement, since the closer one is to measurement the closer one is to experimental psychology 
and thus to the aura of an exact science. Here is the point at which a subjective bid for status 
convinces itself that it is objective scientific knowledge. Our own everyday presuppositions about 
intelligence are the product of this psychometric turn. Pychometrics was the vehicle through which 
the reification of social relations was transferred from the domain of honour/degeneracy and grace/ 
reprobation to that of intellectual ability/disability. 
Intellectual disability and meritocracy 
If intelligence is purely self-referential, then those first psychometricians were right to conclude 
that it cannot and need not be defined. Nevertheless, it does have one core constituent that covers all 
contexts and might point to its rightful place in a dictionary of synonyms: intelligent means better. 
The word can only function as a disguised comparative. So, it is true, do all descriptive terms in 
the human sciences. None is neutral. But “intelligent” is not only value laden, it is content free.
Its comparativeness is synonymous with biological hierarchy as such. That is because (as we 
shall see in Chapter 17) intelligence not only describes but in some sense also is, first, the place
of humans in relation to other animals, and second, the place of some humans in relation to other 
humans. It is the scale of nature itself. 
The ideological thrust of intelligence can be meritocratic, or conservative, or both at the same 
time. Currently meritocracy predominates. When Michael Young coined this term in The Rise of the 
Meritocracy, he was being ironic; he was describing how modern social systems and their forms 
of accreditation block access to people without educational qualifications. Our present political 
class has detoxified and repackaged it as apple pie, alongside freedom, democracy and choice. 
In fact it has been stood on its head, to become rule by exam-passers. There is a long tradition 
of such ambiguity over the usefulness of the concept of merit to political power. In the early 
23 Alfred Binet, A Method of Measuring the Development of the Intelligence of Young Children, 67; Les 
idées modernes sur les enfants, 103. 
24 Kelley, Scientific Method, 77. 
 
In-group, Out-group 73 
seventeenth century there was a prevalent ideological tension between honour and merit, sparked 
by the monarch’s sale of honourable titles to state-employed commoners and rich merchants. 
In religion, the tension was between grace and merit; the latter one could earn by accumulating 
good works, while grace came from God (it was external, “gratuitous”). Could one achieve grace 
by one’s own merit? Whereas Aquinas had seen the relationship between grace and merit as “a 
synthesis of divine condescension and human effort,” Luther and the Reformation saw them as 
mutually exclusive, as did many Counter Reformation Catholics. The absolutist political doctrine 
of rule by divine grace was partly an attempt to control these tensions.25 And as John Carson’s The 
Measure of Merit has shown, the residue of such anxieties would help shape the formal disciplines 
of psychology in countries whose political cultures have had strong meritocratic pretensions such 
as France and the USA. 
In a meritocracy, to rise by merit means to rise by ability, not by inherited title or a hotline to 
God. Does this include the abilities of road sweepers? Does each ability command equal status 
regardless of what the ability is? One has to ask because status by its very definition consists of 
ranks; and if that is the case, then abilities too must come in ranks, otherwise there would be no 
way of pegging one to the other. Hence some abilities have a higher value than others. But by 
what criteria? What constitutes the merit of one sort of ability against another? Although the vague 
impression often given is that abilities are equal but different, meritocracy (some abilities are more 
equal than others) is at one with conservatism (hierarchy is natural). One’s level of intelligence 
both determines one’s vocation or calling and is that calling, one’s place in a natural social 
hierarchy – a principle already announced in a seminal text of the 1590s familiar to all historians 
of psychology, Juan Huarte’s The Examination of Men’s Wits. In fact keeping the streets clean may 
require such abilities as coherence, comprehensiveness and empirical adequacy (if not in so many 
words), but these abilities are ranked below the same abilities as applied to trading hedge funds, 
running a government department or writing books on conceptual history. Meritocracy cannot 
favour “ability” over bloodline or wealth without passing hierarchical judgements that involve 
matters intellectual and their concomitant social and political interests. This Whig-Tory hybrid 
existed embryonically as early as 1659. At the point when restoration of the English House of 
Lords was under consideration, some suggested that henceforth it should be based on appointed 
life peerages alone, so that “no asses with golden trappings, may be admitted to sit and bray upon 
our tribunals and seats of judicature” – while taking care that the elected House of Commons keep 
out those who have “no better education … than their shops or exchange.”26 
Even in a meritocracy, then, the merits of intellectual ability cannot exist in the abstract. It 
seems more like professional ability. The latter covertly assimilates the former. Young himself 
compounds this, by thinking (like Bourdieu) only of educational levels. The failure of both writers 
to go for intelligence as such neuters their critical intent. It is a form of intellectualocentrism, to use 
Bourdieu’s own term. The assumption remains that behind the insignia of qualifications is some 
abstract substance. And certainly, from the standpoint of the successful meritocrat, professional 
knowledge just is intelligence. Why else would medical and psychological professionals come to 
choose a label such as “intellectually disabled” for their clients? It is an officialization strategy (to 
use a term of Bourdieu’s), which raises their own specific expertise to the level of a generalized 
intellect. The professional identity that constitutes their interest in the social hierarchy is elevated 
into a disinterested science governing the sphere of public reason; this is achieved by disconnecting 
certain other people from that sphere and reducing them to a purely private condition (the 
stereotypically private thinker at the moment is, of course, the “autist”). Status is a zero sum: it can 
25 B. Gerrish, Grace and Reason, 133.
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only be acquired by one person by being taken from another. “Intellectual ability” – divine reason, 
now become human – maintains the due distance between professionals in psychology and their 
disabled clients. It makes them high or lowly, and orders their estate. 
Reducing “intellectual” ability to professional merit is a way of defending one’s status against 
the threat from external structural necessities. It provides the grounds on which people in a higher 
calling (of which psychology is merely one, though it supplies the rest with a rationale) can establish 
or hold their ground, against the threat from potentially equalizing counter tendencies that might 
want to corner some intelligence for themselves. In this way, it is also a form of mutual awareness 
and political bonding between fellow-members of a status group. A constant maintenance and 
renewal of the self-referential bid for status is crucial to systems of social administration and 
order as they respond to external threat. It enables them to obtain the consent of the minds they 
structure. In labelling someone intellectually disabled, I am defining myself as intellectual. This 
word, intellectual, claims a universal value and precedence for certain expertises required by the 
dominant political ideology and institutions, and which my group possesses as bearers of intellect 
on behalf of the rest of society – reducing the whole of “intellect” to the sum of our expertises 
and thereby closing down any subversive potential or inherent freedoms the word may suggest. 
This group, because its self-definition constitutes a vested interest in the argument, can invent and 
reinvent intelligence at will: that is, until extreme circumstances demand the invention of a whole 
new bidding mode. 
Underlying all concepts of intelligence is the conservative assumption that one cannot have 
order without hierarchy, either in society or nature. And undoubtedly it seems a bedrock truth that 
some people are more able than others at some particular thing. This general acknowledgement 
of hierarchy explains why the psychometricians, just when you thought you had seen the back of 
them with some irrefutable critique, keep popping up again to say that men are more intelligent than 
women or whites than blacks. The game is never up with such assertions. The psychometrician may 
say he wishes the figures didn’t turn out this way but they do; to object, he says, is to be deluded 
by an egalitarian ideology which, however worthy, is not borne out by the regrettable scientific 
facts – and in any case he is only talking about averages, not individuals.27 But the egalitarianism 
he claims to be opposing is a straw man. Belief in equality before the law or before God may by 
now be a commonplace, but is there anyone who believes in equality of ability? Even a diehard 
constructionist would be hard pressed to deny that some people are better than others at some 
things (at deconstructing, for example). Unequal ability, it appears, has some incontestable essence 
to it. Nevertheless, what is certainly arbitrary and constructed is the classification of some of those 
things as intellectual and some not. Assessing whether one person is more able than another at 
some particular thing is one kind of thought, and may in some cases be empirically verifiable. 
Naming a general category – intelligence, for example – and putting some abilities into it while 
excluding others is at root another kind of thought, to which the idea of empirical verification is 
irrelevant. They do not belong together. The first is a judgement, the second a sorting of terms. The 
confusion between those two entirely different types of thought process is key. To clear it up would 
be not to relativize intelligence but to annihilate it. Yet abandoning a concept so socially powerful 
requires a revolution. 
Concealed within this arbitrary sorting of human beings is an absolute judgement on the 
performance of things deemed to be intellectual. Today’s professionals exercise a monopoly of 
power over that judgement, while in a fit of displaced egalitarianism they relativize other kinds 
of judgement whose claims to be absolute are perhaps not so tenuous (moral or aesthetic ones, 
27 Paul Irwing and Richard Lynn, “Is there a sex difference in IQ scores?” Nature, 442 (2006); Lynn, 
“Skin color and intelligence in African Americans,” Population and Environment, 23/4 (2002). 
 
 
75 In-group, Out-group 
for example). In this confusion, the purely nominal classification of certain abilities as intelligent 
or intellectual is passed off as real. I may be especially able at maths, for example, or ironic 
humour, or orienteering, or recognizing another person’s concealed emotions. The only thing they 
have in common is that I can be judged as being better or worse at them. That judgement may in 
some cases be real enough. But to be useless at maths or orienteering is a chosen characteristic of 
intellectual disability, to be useless at ironic humour or perceiving hidden feelings is not; and in
fact some people labelled with severe intellectual disability are better at ironic humour and 
perceptiveness than some people classed as highly or just normally intelligent. No distinction 
between intellectually better and worse can exist unless some temporary, subjective and purely 
human consensus has been reached as to which particular abilities “intellectual” or “intelligent” 
covers and which not. Talking about emotional intelligence, which might seem to cover humour 
and perceptiveness, does not solve the problem, since exactly the same point can be made here too. 
Indeed it is on these flimsy grounds (the consensual sorting of intellectual from emotional) that 
some “high-functioning” people with the Asperger label, despite supposedly being humourless, 
bad mind readers, are not intellectually disabled at all and may indeed be geniuses. 
Finally, like Leo Kanner, one might agree with all the above and assume that the critique 
of intellectual hierarchy just outlined is entirely valid, but – it goes without saying – cuts out at 
some point near the bottom of the scale, where the selection of certain abilities as intellectual 
becomes no longer merely consensual but is indeed objective, separating off a discrete set of really 
intellectually disabled people who are therefore exempt from an otherwise historically constructed 
group.28 Surely there must be some such creatures. But the exemption would only work if one 
were already assuming that they exist separately in nature as some biological subspecies, which 
is indeed the historically contingent premise on which the modern notion of intellectual disability 
has been built. They are exempt from egalitarian principle only because that principle, in order to 
exist at all, has already exempted them. 











Having dealt with structural similarity of the three modes of status bidding (honour, grace and 
wit), we are now in a position to look at how they interact in the early modern period, at their 
historical similarities and mutual displacements. All three belong to the same early modern socio­
cultural matrix, occupying at times a single conceptual space. Sometimes all three, or any two, are 
competing with each other. Sometimes they coalesce. Or they morph into and out of each other. 
Any one of them may be used to moderate tensions between the other two, between their invisible, 
internal aspects and their visible, external ones. A change of mode may temporarily disguise the 
redistribution of privilege, or its defence, in the face of excessive social mobility. 
The nature of ability 
The three modes are a rough frame of public reference by which judgement is passed on other 
people. The honourable, the elect and the intelligent are cognate groups, as at the other end are the 
masses, the reprobate and the intellectually disabled. No doubt a Venn diagram would yield only a 
small number of primary sources where contemporaries saw intelligence as overlapping with the 
other two modes. But sometimes it is the only way a text can be understood. 
A prime example will suffice for the moment. Richard Mulcaster, Elizabeth’s education 
policy adviser, was also head teacher of Merchant Taylors’ School. In this role he had to deal 
with the porousness of in-group boundaries, as many of his pupils were tradesmen’s sons. It was 
a long-standing problem that had surfaced during the Peasants’ Revolt two centuries earlier, when 
Parliament unsuccessfully petitioned Richard II to prevent serfs’ children from going to school, so 
as to “save the honour of all freemen of the realm.”1 When Mulcaster discusses his own school’s 
admissions policy, he seems uncharacteristically muddled. Discussing “the difference of wits” in 
children, he writes about the “natural ability” of the gentry and the “natural towardness” of the
non-gentle. Both groups should be “set to learning … as the whole common weal standeth upon 
these two kinds. If all rich be excluded, ability will snuff, if all poor be restrained, then will 
towardness repine.” This distinction between ability and towardness seems to us redundant, since 
he identifies the same cognitive components in both: wit, memory, numeracy and so on.2 Is he 
is just trying to please two different audiences at once, to give the nod to intelligent commoners 
without alarming his gentle readership? At any rate he is ambiguous at best, impenetrable at worst, 
until we realize that by this word ability he means, indiscriminately, both wit and the inheritability 
of a landed title. There is no essential category distinction between the power of noble blood with 
its concomitant external (political, legal) qualities, and internal reasoning powers. “Towardness,” 
meanwhile, was generally identified with “the multitude” who stood at two removes from the 
genuine virtues of “honour.”3 
1 Cited in Nicholas Orme, Medieval Schools, 220.
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On the one hand, genteel landed property is the source of an ability that could not exist without 
it; as an earlier Tudor authority had put it, “such men having substance in goods by certain and 
stable possessions … may (if nature repugn not) cause them to be so instructed and furnished 
toward the administration of a public weal, that a poor man’s son, only by his natural wit … seldom 
may attain.”4 On the other hand, there is a difference, a fundamental one, between honourable and 
dishonourable property ownership: between the rich who “bear the cognizance of virtue, whereto 
honour is companion” and those “counterfeit gentlemen … too filthy to be honoured upon earth 
with either arms by herald, or honour by any,” or between land as synonymous with honour and 
land as what it was increasingly becoming, a commodity. The moment one realizes where the 
category boundaries are and are not drawn, the difficulties of interpretation disappear. Towardness 
can only be observed once children are in school; ability precedes it, since it is given in the gentle 
and not in the commoner. It is not so much that one expects ability in the former but not always in 
the latter; rather, ability as innate intelligence and ability as social power are inseparable. Ability is 
“answerable to their parents’ estate and quality.”5 It lies in the gentleman’s “freedom of his cunning, 
and not to strain her for need”: in other words, distinguishing intellectual ability from wealth might 
look suspiciously like having something to prove. Of course, the wealthy commoner may “be in the 
same case for ability, though far behind for gentility”; but in that case his cleverness has “the worst 
effects.” That is why, as is exactly the case with honour too, “it is not wit, that carrieth the praise, 
but the matter, whereon, and the manner how it is, or hath been ill or well employed.” 
Mulcaster goes on to discuss the bottom end of the intellectual scale: “infirmities in nobility 
by descent.” The modern reader has to make similar adjustments here. Such disabilities exist 
“either naturally by simpleness, or casually [sc. accidentally], by fortune.” Natural simpleness in 
the gentry, though “to be moaned in respect of their [social] place” (it was the assumed natural 
condition of most non-gentles), “yet is to be excused in respect of the [individual] person.” To “rail 
upon nobility as too much degenerate” and morally responsible for their own infirmities was to 
usurp the divine role in allocating or withholding grace. (Degeneracy was also a “fall from grace.”) 
In any case, at the opposite pole to the ability of the genteel and noble stood not simpleness but 
“idleness” or neglect of “the honour of their houses,” and thus of the abilities inscribed in their 
own social rank – going into business, for example, or marrying a tradesman’s daughter. All three 
modes are in play at once here, as they often were for Mulcaster’s contemporaries. 
Honour and grace in crisis 
In order to appreciate the part played by “wit” and human reasoning in settling the tensions between 
honour and grace, we need first to understand the relationship between these latter two. “When 
Adam delved and Eve span / Who was then the gentleman?” was a rhetorical question, the answer 
obvious to any religious egalitarian: Adam’s spade symbolized the tiller of the soil, who was the 
equal of any gentleman in his ability or inability to receive God’s grace. But its shape also resembled 
a heraldic shield, and in this sense it symbolized the honour society with Adam as its founder: an 
elite that singled out certain people from within the generality of the commonwealth. In the Middle 
Ages honour had referred to military valour, and this tended to exclude grace; the man of honour 
could offload responsibility for his state of grace to monastic types who would intercede for him, 
or he could defer it to old age, when he could be “unmanned” (grace had feminine connotations) 
without shedding honour. However, by the early seventeenth century grace had muscled its way to 
4 Elyot, The Governour, 15r.
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the centre of the political and ideological stage. On the one hand, even in the republican England of 
the 1650s people were still being beaten at the magistrate’s orders for not raising their hat to their 
landlord (“hat honour”); on the other, criticism of traditional honour norms, based on the idea of 
the creaturely equality of souls before God, had been mounting for decades. 
One type of criticism was sceptical. Montaigne, for example, described honour as foolishness 
and the typical earthly illusion, an “empty image … with neither body nor form.” Honourable birth 
and religious virtue positively precluded each other. Not only a gentleman’s honour but his very 
substance was “a quality dependent on others”; real virtues were inner, religious ones, even in his 
public role as a governor. Honour was located in the imaginatio – a random and dangerous place; 
“men place [honour] where they want,” by contrast with the ultimate reality of grace.6 This link 
between honour and the imaginative faculty was widely made, often satirically (the symptom of 
Don Quixote’s diseased imagination, for example, is his obsession with chivalry). 
Other critics of honour tried instead to co-opt its terms. Calvinist theologian William Perkins, a 
stickler for the strict division between elect and reprobate, makes honour a mark of our creaturely 
equality. Access to grace and election may be restricted, but all of us – “Jew and Greek, slave 
and free,” as St Paul had put it – share honour, by virtue of God’s love. To be dishonourable was 
therefore, paradoxically, to have power (particularly intellectual power) here on earth, like the 
Pharisees, whose hubristic sense of their own honour lay precisely in their assumption of a superior 
wit and learning. It was a mark of original sin: “Such a one is every man by nature, he lifteth up 
himself, saying, I am the man, and treadeth his brother under his feet.” The hubris comes from 
thinking “of all other men beside ourselves: such and such a man is far inferior unto me, a base and 
contemptible fellow in regard of me” (emphasis in original).7 Catholics too co-opted the violence of 
traditional honour codes for divine purposes in their notion of the “church militant.” Paintings of 
the Archangel Michael display him in full armour, spear in hand, leading the nine orders of angelic 
intelligences in the heraldic attire of their rank; and eventually any old bishop could have his 
official portrait taken against the background of an altar cloth emblazoned with his own personal 
coat of arms. Conversely the traditional honour clans of the nobility co-opted religious terms 
when resisting the incursions of an increasingly centralized state. Their last-ditch rebellion against 
the Tudors named itself the Pilgrimage of Grace. A century later, Bunyan’s famous hymn would 
reverse the emphasis, insisting that “true” valour is Christian perseverance. 
These tendencies to fuse honour and grace can be seen at the symbolic level of coats of arms. 
Abuse of heraldry, that “sacrament of knightly dignity,” was also a pollution of the sacraments
of religion:8 
None can by order of arms … put to vile use any Christian’s banner … [nor] pollute any sign or 
token of arms. Therefore gentlemen should not suffer …. Much the Miller’s son, to be arrayed in 
coats of arms, as I have seen some wear at Whitsuntide … in maypole mirth, which have been 
pulled down and given to them by the churchwardens. 
Plebeians pollute heraldry as reprobates pollute the eucharist; these churchwardens’ negligence was 
a threat to the social order in both respects. A cosmological abyss separated “the vessels of honour, 
the elect, the children of promise” from “the vessels of dishonour and wrath, the reprobate.”9 
St Paul, discussing the gift and refusal of grace, asks the Romans: “Hath not the potter power over 
6 Montaigne, Essais, i, 41; Nicole, Essais de morale, 39. 

7 William Perkins, Workes, ii, 467.
 
8 Gerard Leigh, The Accedence of Armorie, 239. 
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the clay, of the same lump to make one vessel unto honour, and another unto dishonour?” Satan’s 
angels were dishonoured by their apostasy; Cain’s progeny became servants. Philip Sidney, who 
as a devout Calvinist slain in battle represented the late Elizabethan ideal of a combined grace and 
honour – possibly the original of the phrase “a paragon of virtue” – himself represented reprobation 
and dishonour as identical in his Arcadia; Spenser’s The Faerie Queene personifies them both in 
the venal knight Sans Foy (“Faithless” or “Disloyal”). 
The honour society’s ideologues depicted the substance of a gentleman in terms of his soul. 
Gentility was “spiritual,” a “quality of the soul,” “a secret disposition of the soul to honourable 
things.”10 Certain tensions were inherent in this picture. A “new man” is someone reborn in Christ, 
but the same phrase also indicates an upstart who has arrived in society via his appointment by a 
new, state-controlled honours system; a “man of means” is someone capable of living independently 
on the interest from his estate, but the same phrase is used for being in possession of the means to 
salvation. The anxiety provoked by these contradictions (Do I really belong socially? Can I really 
get through the eye of the needle?) focused the gentleman’s attention inwards, on how he stood 
with God as well as with his peers, and hence on the consistency of his personality over time. 
This was to prove fertile soil for later notions of human intelligence as a natural constituent of 
personhood, an individual possession. 
These nervous accommodations between honour and grace occurred in shifting political 
contexts and national cultures. In England, when Puritan gentry make appeals to creaturely 
equality and claim that only God could know whether someone is in grace or not, it is sometimes 
as a power play against the bishops, who did indeed claim to know. A Puritan leader might assert 
that power should lie with “those of best rank according to God’s account,” but did so as a way of 
attacking the government’s depredations on his estates, so that he could defend “the luster of this 
house” and his family name, which “is and ever shall be precious to me.” His appeal to creaturely 
equality was thus an appeal to a not-so-new earthly hierarchy: fellow Puritans were to infer that 
his family ranked rather better with God than theirs.11 At the same time, there was a blurring of 
the lines between “common” or “natural” grace, that is to say the gifts required here on earth to 
maintain social order, and “special” or “effective” grace, which is divine and is not necessarily a 
reward for earthly merit but simply elects some and ensures their salvation. His Gracious Majesty 
the King of England was dispenser of all the earthly honours that went with natural graces, but 
he was also the chief distribution channel for divine grace. Secular power, both over people’s 
estates and their access to the sacraments, could properly exist only in someone who was himself 
in grace. Although the monarch was “but a servant to execute the law of God and not to rule after 
his own imagination,” in practice honour did not so much concede ground to grace as join with 
it, as the arbitrary possession of the ruler. Henry VIII could therefore say both “I rule therefore I 
am in grace” and “My state of grace entitles me to rule.”12 Special and natural grace unite here, as 
instruments of divine necessity and social control. 
This erosion of earthly and divine boundaries can be traced in Baldesar Castiglione’s The Book 
of the Courtier of 1528, translated and read throughout Western Europe. Castiglione’s notion of 
“imitative grace” (sprezzatura) confounded honour with grace in similar ways. As one of his disciples 
put it, the distinctive mark of a gentleman is “a certain natural grace, which shines like a divine light
in all his exercises and even his least important activities” (emphasis added): in other words, a kind 
of acting ability. It was paramount to avoid giving offence, even if you knew that the requisite virtue
10 Gilles de la Roque, Traité de la noblesse, 17.
 
11 J.H. Hexter, “The English aristocracy,” Journal of British Studies, 8/1 (1968).
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was absent in the person you were honouring and that he was merely acting; one avoided doing so 
“for courtesy’s sake …, because it belongs to the conversation of human society” and to the social
order.13 The real boundary was therefore not so much between genuine and false claims to social
rank as between those who had got themselves into the position of being entitled to put on an act in 
the first place, and those who had not. Francis Bacon provides us with a similar example. Though he 
locates honour mainly in religious virtue, this virtue is nevertheless the property of an already closed 
group. Your social peers will honour you for the virtues you really do possess, but the honour that
comes to you “from the common people … is commonly false and naught,” so “shows, and species 
virtutibus similes [appearances that resemble virtues], serve best with them.” Unlike Castiglione, 
Bacon thought the gentry should reserve their acting skills for social inferiors.14 
In England, as across Europe, religion not only refurbished the ruler’s earthly honour by 
designating him the “godly prince” but internalized this image within each of his subjects. There 
had to be something within human beings that would respond to God’s external, supernatural 
gift and to royal decree alike. Political and military decisions now required not just the priest’s 
blessing but an inner religious motivation. Troops on the eve of battle were told, “No man can 
be honourable without divine inspiration and inward motion.”15 Some people probably adopted 
religious language from cynical motives, but generally talk of grace indicated a genuine obedience 
to secular authority. The crucial text in this respect was John Foxe’s 1563 Book of Martyrs, read by 
nearly every literate English person for the next half century: to the idea of monarchy as a divine 
calling, Foxe added a providential pattern of history that explained the past and pointed the elect 
nation of the English towards its future destiny, with which the obedient Protestant could identify. 
Purely secular honour was a sinful worship of the individual will; conversely, the faith bestowed by 
God’s grace gave men courage in battle. The violence of the honour mode was thereby transferred 
to that of grace, rather than merely suppressed. Puritans, borrowing their language of violence from 
the honour mode, fantasized about an Anti-Christ who was making war against the elect and whom 
a godly ruler (Cromwell, as it turned out) must defeat. 
In Spain too, justifications of earthly honour were increasingly made in the Counter Reformation
language of grace. In the dramas of Lope de Vega and Calderón, the king makes regular appearances
in the final scene to confer grace in a way that takes no account of the recipient’s earthly status. Rather
than merely parodying sacramental powers, the royal act is sanctified by its divine connotations.
The suggestion of the equality of souls before God is sometimes used to raise the profile, while
obscuring the continuing subservience, of the peasantry, who at times might even be considered an
entire elect caste. (Foxe too exemplified the elect in the lower and middling orders.) This idea was
invoked to counterbalance the social importance of the rising professional castes, who were in merit-
based competition with the old nobility for honours and titles. The latter perceived the professions
to be dominated by descendants of forcibly baptized Jews and Moors, a counterfeit nobility with
contaminated and polluting blood. Via this radicalized route, the idea of the elect nation – where
uniform faith and national honour are the same thing – came very early in Spain, lasting at least until
Franco. The Inquisition fought heresy “in the service of God and his majesty, and for the honour of
the Spanish nation.” The discriminations involved become natural ones; as one of Lope’s characters
says to a Moor, “Without my faith there is no nobility … whoever has God is noble, whoever doesn’t
is a dog.”16 
13 Nicole Faret, cited in Mark Motley, Becoming a French Aristocrat, 13; Baldesar Castiglione, The 
Book of the Courtier. 
14 Francis Bacon, “Of praise,” Essays, 133. 
15 John Norden, The Mirror of Honour, 15. 
16 Cited in Américo Castro, Le drame de l’honneur, 23 ff. 
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In Geneva, Calvinist playwrights (among them Calvin’s political successor, Théodore Beza) 
wrote popular didactic dramas that used contemporary social anxieties around land inheritance, 
primogeniture and bloodline as metaphors in the teaching of grace and predestination.17 The landed 
inheritance was the Promised Land, which was reserved for the Calvinist elect, the bloodline of 
Abraham; Catholics, stripped of their coats of arms, were a disinherited line. Reprobation and 
disinheritance were one and the same. The key biblical characters in this genre were the twins 
Esau and Jacob. Esau was born first, but God decreed that he serve the younger, through whom 
the bloodline of Abraham would continue. The story shows how personal salvation is predestined, 
a product of grace. Neither legal primogeniture nor moral merit – Jacob gets his father’s blessing 
by trickery – can alter God’s predeterminate decision. Honour and grace then pass through a 
single, elect bloodline from Jacob through to the community of Geneva itself, having prevented 
the dispersal of the Promised Land among a multitude of heirs and protected its latter-day saints 
against disinheritance. Echoes of Esau and Jacob remain in Alexandre Dumas’s The Man in the 
Iron Mask, where Louis XIV turns out to have a dastardly twin who claims his inheritance, and 
indeed in the obsession modern cognitive genetics has with twin studies (even if the emphasis here 
is on sameness rather than difference). 
In France, the political tensions between honour and grace arose out of the nobility’s anxieties 
about social status and religious belief, which reinforced each other. Many nobles thought they 
partook of the purity of Christ’s blood not only at communion but by direct descent in their own 
noble veins – an idea that eventually found its way into the racism of Gobineau. But at the same 
time, they had to endure public investigation into false claims to nobility. These were conducted by 
non-noble functionaries who went under the unfortunate professional title of les élus, at the same 
time as Protestant nobles were using this term to describe their own religious status.18 Humiliated 
by such inquisitions, and alarmed at the state’s mass sale of honourable titles to commoners, they 
insisted that “nobility should remain the endowment of a minority, of the elect” and promoted a 
eugenics of virtue.19 Election was, in a more than merely homonymous sense, an earthly as well as 
a heavenly status; religious writers had in any case long noted the irony in having both a “company 
of the elect” of God and a Pope “elected” by mortal cardinals. Accordingly, ordinary guides to 
earthly social rank were presented in hyperbolic terms of religious purity and defilement. One 
such writer introduces the topic thus: “Since it was proposed to me to discourse on true Nobility, 
it seemed to me that I should do as those do who seek religiously and in good conscience to enter 
a Temple, and who must first be purified and prepared for divine thoughts and holy meditations, 
leaving at the door all those affections which might prevent them from raising their spirits above 
temporal things.”20 
During the European fiscal crises and spectacular advancement of merchant capital of the 1590s, 
the increasing grants of titles to commoners for cash or services began to demand theorization. 
Some behavioural authors took an openly bourgeois line, attacking the idea that purity of blood 
was a product of ancestry. Virtue, especially that which consisted in wisdom and learning, could 
accumulate over a couple of generations and in that way become hereditary; a law of acquired 
characteristics arose, with metaphors drawn from animal husbandry. Other writers strayed even 
further from the criterion of bloodline. The most essential aspect of man was the soul, whose 
gradations were subject not to laws of nature but to divine necessity. There were indeed “rights of 
17 Daniel Smail, “Predestination and the ethos of disinheritance,” Sixteenth Century Journal, 23 
(1992). 
18 James Wood, The Nobility, 3. 
19 Christophle Bonours, Eugeniaretologie, cited in Devyver, Le sang, 68. 
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blood”; it was just that they were not the product of ancestry or nature but donated by the King, who 
stood in for God and filled the role of necessity here on earth by handing out titles.21 These writers 
projected the same principle back into history. The origins of honour, they said (correctly), lay in 
the feudal ruler’s allocation of fiefdoms to his personal warrior servants, rather than anything more 
ancient: “hence … our ancient and immemorial nobility of which the commencement is unknown, 
does not come by right of nature, as liberty does, but from the ancient right and disposition of the 
state.” The ruler could likewise remove at a stroke any taints in nature – pollution by marriage to a 
merchant’s daughter, for example – with a “restitution of native rights.” While it was true that only 
God could “make someone a bloodline noble who is not one by nature,” he delegated this job to 
earthly rulers. Necessity, at once divine and political, could override nature. 
A huge theoretical apparatus was wheeled in to justify this position. Aristotle’s theory of the 
final cause, in which natural causes are explicable only in terms of their goals, was used to justify 
divine right: honour and titles belonged to the science of nature because their true goals lay in their 
source, which was the monarch.22 By Louis XIV’s time, strict social practices had been generated 
to deal with tensions over honourable precedence and the rivalry among those immediately below 
him. A formalized prestige fetish came into existence: a set of rituals upon which courtiers, all 
signed up into an Order of the Knights of the Holy Spirit, depended both for their spiritual salvation 
and for their degree of social distance from the out-group and from each other, and consequently for 
their whole personal identity.23 To be demoted or ejected was at once social death and death of the 
soul. The minutest discriminations of the external honour insignia conferred by the king were also 
those of the inner, divine grace he transmitted; these involved elements of public performance at
court. Verification by insignia was also naturalization; the visible hierarchical signs presented
at court were drawn from nature, following earlier authorities who had ranked coats of arms by 
the emblematic creatures which were displayed on them and each of which had their place in a 
biological hierarchy. The arrival of new forms of biological classification in the eighteenth century 
among naturalists such as Buffon may owe something to the wider mind-set created in the interim 
by the strict courtly ranking of the emblems of honour and grace. 
Wit to the rescue 
Such were the tensions, combinations and recombinations between honour and grace. How did 
specifically human intelligence (“wit”) come to resolve them? Was this somehow a progressive 
change? Intelligence is a change of nomenclature for the way the abstract goals of status are 
accommodated to the brute facts of life; it is the bourgeoisification of honour and the secularization 
of grace. But if honour and grace really were principles of a value-rational society and intelligence 
of a succeeding goal-rational one (as Weber might have put it), the first two should have been 
withering away during the gestation of the third – and the opposite is the case. The language 
of honour and grace became increasingly central to early modern politics, and only as its 
accompanying codifications became increasingly rigid were they absorbed within that of wit. The 
absorption process was facilitated by another of the structural similarities noted above. Each mode 
has three elements: an in-group in whom the mode is embodied (the gentle and noble, the godly 
and elect, people within the band of normal intelligence and above) and a set of external signs (coat 
of arms, catechism, cognitive ability score). A team of experts (heralds, pastors, psychologists) 
21 Charles Loyseau, Traité des ordres, 29 ff.
 
22 Guillaume de Oncieu, La précédence de la noblesse, 13; 38.
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operates border controls, distinguishing genuine from counterfeit, maintaining in-group quotas and 
verifying the external insignia that confirm these borders as natural ones. Command of the public 
sphere takes place in the name of the appropriate mode, banishing autonomous honour, personal 
grace and private intelligence (autism, for example) to the margins or worse. 
Although the dominance of intelligence today might lead us to think of it as a progressive 
victory of wit over the other two modes, popular texts of the time dealing with everyday matters 
of child-rearing, education and personal virtue, often mixed up with accounts of genealogy and 
heraldic science, reveal a more complex relationship. The competition and complementarity 
among the three modes rearranged the terms in which political power was justified, and forged 
new relationships between state power and the “virtues” or types of excellence it required. 
Tensions in the relationship between externality and internality, outward show and inward 
reflectiveness, reality and appearance (central to the Dutch portraiture of the period, for example) 
are clearly perceptible. The public coat of arms required “the privy coat of a good conscience,” 
but this sense of complementarity is equally matched by that of tension.24 Grace was in some 
sense external, since it could not be generated from within oneself; but more often it bore internal 
connotations of faith and a one-to-one relationship with God. The proponents of grace contrasted it 
with the pure externality of honour. Hence Cromwell’s demand for Sir Peter Lely to paint him, unlike 
Charles I, with his warts intact (perhaps in mitigation for his acceptance of the Lord Protectorship 
and retention of the vanquished Antichrist’s own official portraitist). Predestinarians of all colours 
– Protestants first, then the Jansenist school of Catholicism – claimed that honour’s externality was 
surely the positive sign of a corrupt interior. Honour was external also in that to exist at all it had 
to be recognized by other people. Its official performative rite was heraldic display; the Jansenists’
critique of honour would resurface among the Jacobins, who regarded heraldry as “barbarous and 
arid emblems which speak only to the eyes.”25 
Since this exposed honour to the charge that it was only external and therefore superficial, 
its defenders had to cite in support its internal constituents of blood and lineage, or at least of 
virtue acquired over generations. Honour was in this sense a “true substance …, that needeth 
the mixture of no other colours than its own beauty,” by contrast with the “mere popinjays, who 
glory more in the painting or varnish of honour” – what mattered was one’s “natural or original 
disposition.”26 Yet “natural” here does not indicate biological necessity. And we should note what a 
recent preoccupation bloodline and the “true substance” of time-honoured ancestry were. The very 
principle of succession of titles was made law only in the fifteenth century. It then took another two 
centuries for an English court to deem honourable titles inalienable. It did so on the grounds that 
they were a natural and “invisible hereditament in the blood.” “Hereditament” was a legal term for 
inherited land. In its new usage here, gentry and honour are the internalization of an external good: 
the subjectification of an objective ability or power (landed property). 
The contrast between honour as external and grace as internal was thus not straightforward. 
And in fact these attempts to enhance the internality of honour led to a change of mode. Of all its 
internal virtues, the most honourable had to be an “inward mind” that matched “outward glittering”: 
a gentleman “should surmount the rest in store of wisdom” and, moreover, “quickness of invention” 
(emphasis added).27 And the constancy that had been an external, public value of the honour society –
loyalty and promise keeping (“a gentleman’s word is his bond”) – was increasingly supplanted 
24 Francis Bacon, Letter to Lord Henry Howard, 3 December 1599, in J. Spedding, Life and Letters of 
Francis Bacon, ii, 161. 
25 Jacques-Antoine Dulaure, Histoire critique de la noblesse, 280; 284. 
26 Francis Markham, The Booke of Honour, 4; Richard Brathwait, The English Gentleman, 59. 
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by the internal value of consistency over one’s lifetime, a religious quality and, increasingly, an 
intellectual one in which intelligence was a personal possession. The honour clan’s mutual solidarity 
became individual solidity, a permanence of those qualities, while the external display so important 
to the old honourable behaviours turned into the mere superficiality of everyday manners. Likewise 
internality as the sense of personal autonomy and freedom from external compulsion, central to a 
gentleman’s honour, was transmuted into a modern rational autonomy. 
Wit, in addition to usurping honour’s own internal qualities, began to usurp those of grace, 
as we shall see. Tensions between all three modes were a source of political disorder and led to 
attempts at synthesis. Castiglione, for example, by associating gentry with humanist learning rather 
than the martial valour of the traditional honour code, was addressing the crisis in social identity 
that followed a long period of civil and religious wars on the Italian peninsula. It was already 
hard to sustain any pretence that the identity concerned was not bourgeois. Traditional chivalry 
was codified into a “technically rigorous cultural model, more theoretically trained, more rigidly 
selected,” a virtuous pursuit of professionalism.28 The trick was to handle the shifting personnel, 
functions and vocabulary of the honour society while representing it as the immutable hierarchy of 
a natural order. Men of wit (ingenium) and quick soul spirits but no genealogy could obtain honours 
for services rendered. As recipients of the prince’s grace, they then represented themselves as a 
company of earthly elect (electi), by contrast with the out-group of the plebs. This instant election 
not only qualified them as gentlemen (cavalieri), it instilled in them a systematic knowledge of 
their own gentility, at which point any labour they may have expended on acquiring this knowledge 
suddenly became invisible and unmentionable. 
Castiglione’s characters politely maintain the fiction that it is hard to be the perfect courtier 
without being of noble birth; but, and more seriously, those claiming noble birth must have the 
ability appropriate to their public duties. Wit, as professional merit, therefore achieved pre­
eminence because of its place in a system of social exchange: status for skills. This went with the 
intensified codification characteristic of any bidding mode, an increasing requirement for status to 
be performed that extended to the most mundane behaviours, such as table manners. The key to a 
courtier’s professional knowledge (scienza) was knowing how to imitate natural grace. He had the 
ability to perform as a member of the honour society, and only as a result to be one. This ability was 
an inner quality and even had its own corresponding bodily complexion (the “sanguine”). Grace as 
imitated to perfection, even if natural and not spiritual, could “correct natural defects,” in a parody 
of Christian rebirth.29 
The interplay between modes was presented in terms of faculty psychology. One French writer 
in the Castiglione tradition presents the faculties of the human Soul (capital S) as a descending 
series: understanding, spirit and soul (small s). Understanding is that which “some call … a portion 
of divinity” and comprises the power of cognition and of ordering things wisely. Spirit is “the 
mediator between terrestrial and heavenly things,” and can float upwards to the understanding or be 
dragged downwards. To soul belong the passions, senses and corresponding bodily temperaments. 
“Can we find anywhere in nature images that correspond better to the prince, the nobles and the 
people, than this triple distinction of our Soul?” The prince’s equivalence with the ruling faculty 
is more than metaphorical. He just is the “rational Soul” or “understanding,” and as such he holds 
together the macrocosm of external world and the microcosm of the individual psychology. This 
not only allows him to disburse honours, it consists in his disbursing honours, which then become 
28 Giancarlo Mazzacurati, Il Renascimento dei moderni, 234.
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imprinted physically and materially on his subjects’ soul spirits. Hence “honour is the greatest 
earthly good, and no other; goods are only such to the extent that they participate in honour.”30 
The tensions were particularly great in England. From the late sixteenth century there was a
deepening ideological fissure between self-assertive honour and the pursuit of godly behaviour,
at a time when the weakness of existing forms of coercion was forcing government to pursue
the internalization of social controls. This fissure made room for wit’s status to advance within the
mix of cultural norms. One of the highest political achievements was to calibrate successfully
the fulcrum of the three status modes. Impending social breakdown is always evidenced by a perceived
lack of discipline in the upcoming generation, and a famous moral panic of Elizabeth’s reign was the
strike by Eton pupils against corporal punishment. It led her secretary and former tutor, the alarmed
Roger Ascham, to come up with a new handbook on pedagogy, whose opening statement of intent
ran: “In writing this, I have had earnest respect to three special points: truth of religion, honesty in
living, right order in learning.”31 With these three great goals of public life in mind, educators like
Ascham and Mulcaster sought to mould what they called a “monarchical learner.” By this they meant
someone who, in ruling himself, would therefore accept the rule of another. The honour society had
originally been a pluralist system of solidarity among semi-autonomous nobles, with the monarch as
first among equals; this pluralism had produced the century of civil strife that was resolved only by
the Tudors, along with their monopolization of the honour system. There was now a single seat of
authority. Henry VIII tamed semi-autonomous nobles by making the principle of honour obedience
to himself, rather than obedience to a separate, self-standing code to which he too might have been
bound. Honour, following Cicero’s Roman model, now came from service to the state, as a reward
for the professional wit of an expanding clerical caste with its administrative and legal abilities. 
The most widely consulted advice on behaviour during Henry VIII’s governmental innovations 
was Thomas Elyot’s The Governour, which advocated replacing military prowess with learning 
as the core skill of the gentry. Honourable lineage was important as a surface decoration that 
might help preserve due deference from the lower ranks. But it had to be complemented by inner 
religious virtues, shorn of any implicit egalitarianism. It was in any case becoming less clear where 
the virtue of a religious “understanding” or intellectus stopped and professional wit started. The 
governing elite, a lay intellectual caste that had traditionally been inculcated with the public virtues 
of Aristotle’s Ethics, had now to be imbued with an internal honour that was achievable through 
grace. This moralization of politics was reflected in a moralization of administration, though the 
abrupt end to Thomas More’s career shows that the moralizers sometimes pushed their luck. 
Cultivation of a higher religious learning was now a requirement of public life, intrinsic to the self-
image of the man of honour. Perversely, it would in the end fuel opposition to the absolute state. 
While Elyot’s ostensible theme is honour, which many of his readers might have identified with 
military valour, his opening chapter is nevertheless entitled “The Understanding.” A token nod to 
intellectual distinctions between the angelic orders, as evidence for the varying degrees of their 
divinity, yields within a few lines to a discussion of the earthly social differentiations that imitate 
them. Just as the individual’s understanding is the most important part of his soul, “most nigh unto 
the similitude of God … so should the estate of his person be advanced in degree, or place, where 
understanding may profit.”32 God does not distribute natural graces equally. Some men are “set in 
a more high place” because they “excel other in this influence of understanding … by the beams 
of their excellent wit.” Unlike Calvin, who kept the spiritual gift of divine grace separate from 
the natural gift of a corruptible human reason that should therefore not encroach upon religion, 
30 David de Rivault, Les estats … du Prince, du Noble, & du tiers Estat, 247.
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Elyot fuses the understanding (intellectus), divine origin and all, with natural, everyday human 
wit (ingenium). Wit is an “instrument” of the understanding, a mobile, practical force engaged in 
“finding out” rather than merely contemplating. 
The most usually cited authorities on honour, Ramón Lull and Bartolus of Saxoferrato, had 
already regretted any lack of learning in a gentleman. However, they saw learning merely as 
complementary to lineage and valour, whereas Elyot now has a positive agenda for instilling it. 
He invokes the divinity of the understanding only and precisely in order to sanctify the secular 
authority of wit. Human understanding thus reconceived hangs on to its divine doppelganger by 
the thinnest of threads. In replacing one mode with another, Elyot is acknowledging the structural 
importance of self-referential status modes in general: 
It can none otherwise stand with reason, but that the estate of the person in pre-eminence of living, 
should be esteemed with his understanding … whereunto must be added an augmentation of 
honour and substance: which not only impresseth a reverence, whereof proceedeth due obedience 
among subjects: but also inflameth men naturally inclined to idleness, or sensual appetite … to 
dispose them to study. 
In short, honour is kicked upstairs to become a vague aspiration in the moment that it becomes 
modally subordinate to the understanding. Its role now is to conceal any lingering Calvinistic 
contradiction between the understanding’s divine, spiritual role and its natural, earthly one. And 
that is how it would feature in Locke’s Essay, whose very first sentence appeals to this principle: 
“Since it is the understanding that sets man above the rest of sensible beings, and gives him all the 
advantage and dominion, which he has over them; it is certainly a subject, even for its nobleness, 
worth our labour to enquire into.”33 It would become, in the words of his close acquaintance 
Joseph Glanvill, a matter of defending “the honour of our faculties” against the unreason of
sectarian fanaticism. 
The erection of wit 
Some late Elizabethan writers went further than Elyot and came up with the concept of an “erected
wit”: a natural grace that, though human, might escape the taint of corruption. Echoing growing
millenarian tendencies, they imagined that Adam’s total understanding of nature before the Fall
might be restored to his descendants. It is true, says one, that Aristotle’s “desire to understand” is
part of man’s (sinful) nature and so can corrupt, as Calvin warned – but only “if special grace, or an
excellent education (which cannot be without grace) do not fashion and frame the mind to the right
use of it.”34 The second use of the word grace here is syntactically ambiguous: does it refer to the
special (i.e., divine) grace of the opening phrase, or to the merely human, natural grace implied by
“education”? This ambiguity is the cautious expression of an increasingly optimistic perspective on
our ability to develop quasi-divine understandings here on earth. There was, as Mervyn James has
described, a “composite Tudor court culture which aspired to be honourable, religious and wise,” and
the erection of wit coincides exactly with failure to paper over the cracks between the first two.35 
A major example of this self-conscious search for three-way synthesis is Sidney’s A Defence 
of Poesy. Like Elyot’s, this was a much-read text aimed at “governors” that sought to improve the 
33 Locke, An Essay, 44; Glanvill, “Anti-fanatical religion,” 20, in Essays. 
34 Lodowick Bryskett, A Discourse of Civill Life, 15. 
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existing classical curriculum with new inputs from religion. Sidney advocated self-examination 
as a training for good conduct. He had translated and absorbed the French Protestant Philippe de
Mornay’s De la vérité de la religion chrétienne, approving the role of human effort and natural 
virtue as supplements to faith, as well as the role of rational consent in face of political tyranny.
A necessary ingredient of self-examination was the “strengthening” and “purifying [of] man’s wit” 
in order to purge its intrinsic corruption. He presents it in faculty psychology terms: purification 
is “the enriching of memory, enabling of judgement, and enlarging of conceit” or imagination. 
The man of honour matures, from his quest for glory in private violence, into the “wisdom” that is 
true honour and consists in obedience and service to a just public order (“the king his majesty, his 
councillors, officers, and administrators”).36 More than just everyday cleverness, the “final end” of 
wit is “to lead … us to as high a perfection as our degenerate souls, made worse by their clayey 
lodgings, can be capable of” – to the point where it becomes “erected wit … not at all corrupted.” 
That the devoutly Calvinist Sidney could express such an un-Calvinist notion, even if tentatively 
(the text goes on to display some second thoughts), illustrates the depth of the crisis. Only an 
erected wit could negotiate the abyss between honour and grace. 
Wit now seems to be an independent entity, at the same level as the other two modes rather than 
merely complementing one or the other. Elyot had already put civic intellect (prudentia) in the first 
and most honourable place in the cultural identity of the gentleman. But Sidney’s “erected wit,” 
albeit restricted to the gentry, went beyond that old Aristotelian mantra. The idea that honour and 
nobility might have an intellectual component of sorts was not entirely new, nor was his proposal 
that wit could yield in part a “knowledge of a man’s self” through his conscience. What was startling 
was his notion that it might shake off original sin and lead to a “perfect … knowledge of a man’s 
self” (emphasis added). Human understanding – that is, purely human and thus synonymous with 
wit – was a political project that could only mediate between honour and grace if it could be hived 
off from the cosmological and divine associations of the scholastic intellectus. Elyot had still seen 
man’s reasoning abilities as a second-hand version of divine ones; they were the road to knowledge 
but would always be blocked at the last step by the need for some additional, spiritual element 
beyond the operations of mere wit. Sidney, in contrast, writes about the human understanding as a 
natural grace with a superadded perfection of its own. His insistence on self-examination is key to 
this. For Elyot, man’s understanding is honourable as long as he contemplates the divine; Sidney’s 
project for man is “to lift up the mind … to the enjoying [of] his own divine essence” (emphasis 
added). His erection of wit is already aimed at something like the modern psychological project: at 
intelligence’s own (circular) rationale and self-justification. 
The political context of Sidney’s three-way synthesis was matched in an ecclesiastical one by 
his contemporary Richard Hooker, Elizabethan England’s leading authority on church government. 
Both men recognized the hubristic implications of promoting a specifically human understanding, 
but while these made Sidney hesitant, Hooker cocoons them in ambiguity. Sometimes, when 
writing about human “reason,” he claims that the elect have one type of reason that is divine, aided 
by “special” grace, and another type that is not divine but merely natural. At other times, however, 
he writes about a reason that is naturally human and exists irrespective of whether one is elect or 
not, and describes this as “divine.” In other words, human reason can be divinely enhanced even 
while retaining its role as a merely natural grace. Whereas Calvin restricted the application of 
reason as a natural grace to earthly matters and warned that any intrusion of it into religion would 
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lead to depravity, Hooker uses it to hint that humans may not be totally depraved, that they may 
have a divinely tinged “ableness” (his term) of their own.37 
Many behaviour guides (and, later on, Locke) draw on these writings of the Sidney circle 
and of Hooker. According to one, “those which think themselves gentlemen, only because their
fathers … did descend of noble houses” are exactly the same as those “void of grace which wisheth 
no order of obedience in commonwealth to be observed.”38 The solution to both is learning; 
ignorance is the contrary of all three. Learning is “next to the omnipotent God”; its particular 
disciplines of grammar, logic and rhetoric persuade “by grace, and divine assistance” and hence 
have supernatural efficiency. But the greatest persuader, Sidney noted, is poetry, reason’s supreme 
expression and an “instrument” of divine grace, with a “utility, power, and virtue” whose movement 
doctors can trace in the body. It has been said that “the nexus of grammar and grace is found … at 
the surface of discourse” in these texts, and must not be “reduced to a doctrinal statement.”39 But 
this begs the question of how what is at the surface of discourse becomes doctrinal subsequently, 
and hence enmeshed in material interests. These latter are implicit in the Sidney-inspired practical 
guides to everyday behaviour just as they are in today’s psychology textbook. The Protestant 
emphasis on reading for oneself, on the principle that “grammar is next to godliness,” created a 
new out-group of the unlearned and illiterate, thus drawing closer to the role of verbal reasoning 
sections in cognitive ability tests, which help to exclude a group labelled as intellectually disabled. 
The very existence of such out-groups amounts to a doctrinal statement. 
In the early Stuart culture some 20 years after Sidney’s death, a fusion of honour, religion and 
humanist learning was briefly achieved, but as a tool of absolutism. Its court literature represents 
kingly authority in terms of a supreme honour which, in combination with the other two modes, 
infiltrates his subjects and enables them to overcome the passions, and more importantly the self, 
in favour of political obedience. In order to achieve this, honour as old-fashioned vainglory (one of 
Bacon’s idols of the tribe) is effaced, in favour of what Ben Jonson in his court masque The New Inne
calls the “honour that springs from reason.” With this the elite took on a particular psychological
identity. “Contemplation,” formerly typical of the learned monk, now typified the gentleman. It set 
him on the path of what Bacon called “the great restoration” of man’s prelapsarian understanding, 
and rendered him sufficiently reasonable in the meantime to avoid turning into a “factious or litigious 
sectist” who might challenge the absolute state.40 The civil war period was to prove the futility of 
this line. Parliament’s support was supposed to have come from men “of a lower state … that love
freedom and to be something themselves,” whereas the king’s was said to come from “the nobility 
and gentry … men of implicit faith, whose conscience is much regulated by their superiors,” i.e., 
their earthly ones, and “whose honour is predominant over their reason and religion.”41 
The civil wars also saw the rise of the “invisible college” (precursor to the Royal Society), a 
new attempt at fusion in which wit was even more clearly in the lead – though as Steven Shapin 
has demonstrated, the other two modes are constantly in play; both Boyle and Newton liked to 
hint that their extraordinary intellectual abilities proved their descent by blood and faith from 
King Solomon. Gentlemen of the college built mutual trust by a deliberate, pacific abstention 
from all discussion of current political conflicts as well as from their loosely associated disputes 
over honour and grace; the gap was filled by promoting the modal status of the human subject’s 
“ingenuity,” embodied in an objective, scientific method which they knew to be secure because
37 Cited in Nigel Voak, Richard Hooker and Reformed Theology, 278.
 
38 Humfrey Braham, The Institucion of a Gentleman, unpaginated.
 
39 Cummings, The Literary Culture of the Reformation, 281.
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“a man of honour would not write a lie.” In this milieu at last, it was conceivable that there is
“no truth … so far elevated out of our reach, but man’s wit may raise engines to scale and conquer 
it.”42 And that would include truths about man’s wit. 
Literary treatments of wit and foolishness 
The three status modes and the relationships among them leap from the pages of the canonical
literary texts of the time. Book 1 of Spenser’s The Faerie Queene, contemporary with Sidney,
portrays a man who arrives at court and is at first denied honourable status because of what the poet
in his prefatory letter calls a “clownish” (rustic and stupid) appearance. Sent on a trial mission, the
anonymous knight ends up being providentially bathed in a “living well” of saving grace that enables
him to restore a family’s noble lineage from pollution by a dragon. Evidently capable of noble deeds,
he is, as it turns out, one of those creatures whom “men do changelings call, so changed by faeries’
theft”: in other words, the ploughman who raised him is not his real father. He discovers this when
he arrives at the New Jerusalem built by God “for those to dwell in, that are chosen,” where faith and
reason are one. An old man named Contemplation (this being the supreme function of the reasoning
faculty) offers himself as a guide. The knight, on being shown the company of the elect and told
that he will be joining them, wonders: “Unworthy wretch … of so great grace / How dare I think
such glory to attain?” Whereupon the old man tells him his true name and genealogy, which are his
entitlement to membership: he is Georgos, sprung “from ancient race / Of Saxon kings.” 
Spenser’s readers well knew both that georgos was Greek for “peasant” and that St George was 
patron saint of knightly gentlemen. This ambiguity reflects the poet himself. A journeyman’s son 
claiming aristocratic family connections, Spenser had been educated at Merchant Taylors’, where 
no doubt headteacher Mulcaster had typecast him with plebeian “towardness” rather than innate or 
landed “ability.” This circumstance certainly rounds out for us Spenser’s description of the purpose 
behind The Faerie Queene (to Sir Walter Raleigh) as being to “fashion a gentleman or noble person 
in virtuous and gentle discipline.” Here, in the Tudor elite’s state of denial about the emptiness of 
their own claims to ancient lineage (a good proportion of Henry VII’s ancestors had been servants), 
is the source for that canon of obsequious disbelief and disgust at the ordinariness of one’s own 
social origins that pervades English literature through to Dickens and Harry Potter. 
The “changeling” explanation offered by Spenser for the knight’s (and possibly his own) status 
re-emerges in a reversed format in Locke’s changeling, which was one of the most important 
textual models for modern concepts of severe intellectual disability. Instead of a country clown 
who turns out to have been born noble and elect, we have here a creature whose appearance is not 
clownish, whose physical and bodily matter suggests the “form” of a rational soul, who is born of 
parents belonging to the human species, but who exhibits no signs of rationality throughout his life 
and therefore turns out to lack a soul and to be possibly not even human. Translating this back into 
Tudor terms, we might say that he is intellectually a ploughman even though born to an honourable 
and elect line: the opposite of Spenser’s knight. 
Old man Contemplation is only one of Spenser’s allegorical descriptions of human reasoning 
as it interfaces with social and religious status. We also find “workman’s wit,” which builds the
House of Pride. It falls down: so far, so conventionally Calvinist. Then there is “mortal wit,” which 
sways with the winds of Providence; “sudden wit,” which is over-quick to counsel despair; “the
weaker wit of man,” lacking the necessary complement of faith; and “practic wit,” i.e., the devil’s. 
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Yet contrasted with all these is something positive, namely “poet’s wit.”43 Like Sidney, Spenser 
promotes poetry not only as the highest form of reason but as a policy tool: the appearance of 
poet’s wit in Book 2 coincides exactly with the appearance of the Queen herself. Elizabeth is 
represented as Medina (the mean), dispensing honours and transmitting divine grace in order to 
reimpose a peace that has been shaken by Acrasia (intemperance). To match this public allegory 
there is also a private, inner one. A knight-errant on a quest for temperance is conducted by Lady 
Alma (“Soul”), herself dressed in heraldic garments, on a journey through her palace. Each room
is named after one of the three psychological faculties.44 The House of Alma is organic to the 
knight’s inner self: his journey through the palace makes him who he is. After passing through
the rooms of imagination and judgement, he arrives at memory, and this is where Spenser chooses 
to itemize Elizabeth’s genealogy; his lengthy recital of her honourable line gives memory a lopsided 
importance by comparison with the other faculties, just as theological texts tend to devote more space 
to memory than to the other faculties because of its importance to confession and the conscience. 
Ending the ancestral list with the present incumbent, he assembles all three modes together to sum 
Elizabeth up: “Nobler liveth none this hour, / Ne like in grace, ne like in learned skill.” 
Shakespeare invokes the triad frequently. Hamlet laments that his reflective understanding 
“quartered hath but one part wisdom, / And ever three parts coward.” A heraldic device consisted 
of four “quarterings.” The coward occupying the other three and negating Hamlet’s honour is his 
conscience, which in Puritan doctrine is the one residue of divine reason still lodged within human 
beings after the Fall: “Thus conscience doth make cowards of us all.” Love’s Labour’s Lost opens 
with the King of Navarre telling his courtiers that the tension between worldly glory (the struggle 
for a fame “registered upon our brazen tombs”) and religion (the struggle against “the huge army of 
the world’s desires”) can be resolved, because both offer a window on immortality. Abandoning the 
usual court life and turning it into “a little academe, / Still and contemplative” will enable them to 
see this. However, this dramatic intervention by the intellect is subordinate to the main dichotomy 
between honour and grace, which Navarre is unable to repair; reasoned contemplation can only 
flourish in withdrawal from the real political world where the dichotomy is being played out. 
The best-known texts to evoke the triad of status modes involve Falstaff. His famous soliloquy 
on honour in I Henry IV is often cited to illustrate the decline of the honour-rational society. It is, 
however, more than that. We can set his dismissal of honour alongside his other famous soliloquy, 
from II Henry IV, which is a celebration of wit. Honour as military valour is the contrary of wit 
and therefore foolish, a disabled rival in the bidding game of worldly advancement. Falstaff’s
wit is not just a trivial ability to amuse his companions or the audience. It is the human understanding 
itself, represented here by the “discretion” (discretio or discrimination, a key operation of the 
reasoning faculty) which Falstaff calls “the better part of valour.” If Falstaff is “not only witty in 
myself but the cause that wit is in other men,” he is a cause in the Aristotelian sense: wit is that 
to which all men, as a species, naturally tend. Hotspur in the opposing political camp calls people 
who disregard their own honour “foolish”; the fat knight is a fool because his shameful behaviour 
contradicts his ascribed membership of the honour society. It might be supposed that when each 
identifies the other as a fool, he is invoking some external referent, specifically the person whom 
today’s psychologist would call intellectually disabled. But no such person yet existed. Lack of a 
sense of one’s own honour is, for Hotspur, foolishness defined, not foolishness by metaphor. He 
who does not pay attention to his own honour is a fool at root; that is what a fool is. 
Falstaff’s honour soliloquy, parodying conventional eve-of-battle meditations on God and 
death, is set out in question-and-answer format like a catechism: “What is honour? A word … Who 
43 The Faerie Queene, 1.4.5; 1.6.6; 1.9.41; 1.10.19; 2.1.3; 1.4.32.
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hath it? He that died a’Wednesday,” etc. His sign-off line – “Honour is a mere scutcheon, and so 
ends my catechism” – juxtaposes two politically hostile ways of claiming status, but can only be 
understood by its covert reference to a third. A scutcheon was the emblem on a shield that verified 
its owner’s honourable status (in Puritan terms a meaningless outward show), while the catechism 
verifies the communicant’s receptivity to grace. But for Falstaff, neither is an adequate means of 
authentification. His self-seeking wit is subversive of the other two modes, rather than just a purely 
hypothetical solution to the tensions between them as it was in Love’s Labour’s Lost. Wit, with 
Prince Hal’s embodiment of it eventually usurping Falstaff’s, competes successfully with grace for 
the role of inner man, as the main opposition to the externality and superficiality of honour. 
A similar nexus appears in lines as central to Spanish drama as Falstaff’s are to English. 
Calderón’s The Mayor of Zalamea features Pedro Crespo, a peasant whose daughter has been raped 
by a nobleman. He claims, absurdly for a peasant, that his honour has been insulted and therefore 
he may kill in revenge: absurdly because, as any nobleman knows, honour is lacking in peasants. 
To justify himself Crespo universalizes the concept of honour, in defiance of existing social norms: 
“Honour is the patrimony of my soul, and my soul is God’s alone.” This is not mere metaphor, nor 
is honour here just some external adornment to the soul. The word “patrimony” suggests property, 
both in a legalistic sense (God is the soul’s ultimate owner) and in a faculty-psychology sense 
(honour is a property of the soul). The lines are in fact a paraphrase of Aquinas, who had written 
that the understanding (intellectus) was the patrimony of the soul, and the intellective soul from 
God alone – not from the parental act of conception, and thus not from honourable ancestry.45 
When the Thomist ex-seminarian Calderón substitutes honour for the human intellect here, he is 
pointing out their kinship; both belong to the same class of things, along with the gift of divine 
grace that is freely offered to every soul, even a peasant’s. 
Crespo’s social levelling of honour helps bring the intellectus down with it into the real social 
and political world. Honour, intellect and grace are transposable with each other both as status terms 
and as naturalized “psychological” ones. His claim is both religious (all souls are equally honourable
because they come from God) and secular (honour is a quasi-material inheritance, like land – a
protectable personal possession). The prospect offered – that horizontal honour might consist not
only of equal access to grace but of earthly equality – is nevertheless a ruse of power. The granting 
to a peasant of his own quasi-autonomous sphere was also a strengthening of the bonds tying him
to the state; the King appears in the final scene to endorse Crespo’s claim but also thereby his own 
supremacy, as sole distributor of earthly honours. Like meritocratic intelligence today, horizontal
honour helped to naturalize the structures of political authority. Any form of self-assertion, even that
of a peasant, was permissible – natural, even – just as long as it did not challenge those structures. 
A final, summary example is George Herbert’s couplet “The pliant mind, whose gentle measure /
Complies and suits with all estates,” which encapsulates the three-way relationship in a single 
poetic breath. Here any tension between the creaturely equality of grace and earthly hierarchy 
is resolved by the flexibility of the reasoning mind, which is perhaps why this poem had trouble 
getting past the ecclesiastical censors. “Gentle” refers both to social rank and to the resolution 
of conflict, while “measure” contains the sense of “pace,” a mean speed, as well as being the 
poem’s reference to its own stanzaic structure. The mind’s pliancy allows it to negotiate political 
tensions among “estates” both social (high/low) and religious (elect/reprobate). The poem’s title, 
“Content,” implying as it does social and not only personal peace, provides the cloak under which 
all three modes are interchangeable but have the reasoning mind as their subject and therefore as 
first among equals. 











On the eve of psychology’s birth as a formal discipline, Wordsworth hints at something like the 
status modes described above. He writes to a friend about the part played in public life by certain 
“modes of sentiment.” Honour and grace are there, in what he calls the “civil” and “religious” modes 
of sentiment. Intelligence is there too but only in its negative form, in a comment he makes about 
the “sentiment” of “loathing and disgust which many people have at the sight of an idiot.”1 Readers 
had criticized “The Idiot Boy” because they claimed it was not a subject fit for poetry. Their disgust 
is not natural, says Wordsworth, but inspired by class disdain. Ordinary people, who actually live 
with idiots (the rich board them out), do not have this sense of disgust because for them idiots 
like the poem’s Johnny Foy are just part of normal life; Wordsworth’s inclusiveness is a refusal to 
succumb to the fear of pollution which out-groups inspire and by which their conceptualization is 
inspired. It is to these various types of out-group and their early modern sources that we now turn. 
Here we shall be looking in outline at how all three modes work together; a separate and more 
detailed analysis of each mode comes in Parts 4 and 5. 
Children 
Certain people are disqualified, by nature, from even entering the bidding for in-group membership. 
For some, this state is temporary. Modern notions of childhood are inseparable from those of 
adulthood as a state of fully developed intelligence and the concomitant ability to give rational 
consent. Take Locke’s account of religious toleration and political heterodoxy in the Two Treatises 
of Civil Government, written in response to the publication in 1680, at a politically provocative 
moment, of an absolutist samizdat from the civil war period, Robert Filmer’s Patriarcha, or the 
Natural Power of Kings. Locke’s premise is that each human being possesses the light of reason, 
individually, given that “each man’s mind has some peculiarity as well as his face that distinguishes 
him from all others.”2 The point of this heterodox reason is that it will eventually guide all persons 
to a single revealed truth if they are allowed to pursue it freely by themselves. In the first treatise, 
Locke gives us his view of the historical Adam. For Filmer, Adam was first in a chain of rulers 
over other men; for Locke, he was all human beings, a universal man who had bequeathed to 
them their right to rule over the animals. In other words, he represents a human equality from 
which difference emerged only subsequently. The original state of equality was one of original 
sin. The esoteric biblical exegesis of the first treatise then leads directly into the modern political 
philosophy of the rest: from the equality of sinful humankind in Adam to the rational property 
differentials among his descendants. The fence around property is also the fence around the self. 
It encloses not only differential amounts of material property but differential amounts of interior 
space, inhabited by the individual’s reason. 
1 Letter to John Wilson, June 1802, in Ernest de Selincourt (ed.), The Early Letters, 292. 
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Our modern notions of intellectual competence, derived partly as they are from Locke, are 
thus ramifications of the myth of Eden. The individual’s reason, says Locke, is constituted in the 
historical act of freeing itself from the dominion of others: in society from paternalistic political 
rule, and in families from the father. This sets up a distinction between (a) minors, who are now 
(more sharply than before) temporary idiots over whom paternal rule is morally justified on 
grounds of psychological immaturity, and (b) people come of age – “free and intelligent agent[s]” –
over whom paternal rule suppresses God’s gift of reason because it treats them not as freely 
developing adults but as unfree children of the monarch (“idiots” in the old sense). Locke separated 
adult psychological status from that of children and therefore from childlike adults. He reinvents 
“idiots” in order to oppose absolutist politics. If opposition to Filmer’s paternalism requires that 
children will develop into adults and that adults ought not to be treated like children, a narrower 
but sharper conceptual space is thereby created for the person come of age who ought still to be so 
treated: a character who had till now lay in obscure corners of jurisprudence and whose diagnostic 
traits were in any case different. The residual paternalism in Locke’s concept of idiotic adults 
drives his anti-paternalist argument about autonomy for the rest of us. 
And just as the child develops into an adult, so immature societies develop into adult ones.
In Locke’s mind, God is at this very moment intervening in history with a new revelation of which 
Locke and his contemporaries are the bearers, and which sanctifies the reasoning adulthood of 
the society just then developing around them; this adulthood extends beyond the honour society 
and the company of the elect to wider sectors of the population who are no longer the children 
they had been. And so the secularization of psychology, said to start with Locke, is not so much a 
progressivist replacement of selective, divine “special” grace by a universalized natural grace but 
rather a universalization of the former. Intelligent adulthood is the new election, brought down 
to earth and historically located midway between Adam and our redemption at the day of glory, 
in preparing for which an earthly “application of mind” is now required.3 The politics of rational 
consent, to which Locke’s Whig political doctrine was the handbook, remains in some sense the 
road to the kingdom of the saints, with the intellectually disabled – Locke’s idiots and changelings –
in the out-group role formerly occupied by reprobates. 
The lower orders 
When the Leveller John Lilburne said, “Christ doth not choose many rich, nor many wise, but the 
fools, idiots, base and contemptible poor men and women in the esteem of the world,” all these 
groups were parts of a single concept.4 And when Locke’s Quaker friend William Penn prefaced 
his own account of toleration with the remark that absolutist and paternalist ideologies “cannot 
convince the understanding of [even] the poorest idiot,” did he mean here a wage labourer, or 
someone who is disabled in their understanding?5 We cannot tell, nor did he. Locke’s own idiots 
in the Essay (as distinct from his purely mindless “changelings”) occupy a similarly ambiguous 
niche between sociological and psychological definition. Where psychology and social class 
interface, deficiencies of intelligence are never far away. Sometimes the political target is at the top 
of the social scale, as in the above examples, but more often it is those underneath. The psalmist’s
much-quoted line, “Man that is in honour, and understandeth not, is like the beasts that perish,” 
3  John Dunn, “From applied theology to social analysis,” in I. Hont and M. Ignatieff (eds), Wealth and 
Virtue, 119. 
4  Cited in Jacques Barzun, From Dawn to Decadence, 270. 





“Souls Drowned in a Lump of Flesh” 95 
was taken to indicate those who do not understand how man’s access to divine reason makes him 
different from the animals. People who do not understand their own honour are of a piece with 
those who do not have honour (which in the psalm is a recuperated term for grace). This is what 
medieval writers meant by pagani (literally “country-dwellers”): labouring, illiterate, unbelieving –
and therefore semi-bestial. The same line from the psalms was used in the early modern period 
to attack the Anabaptists. Mainly artisans or traders, they abused the notion of creaturely equality 
before God by trying to put it into practice on this earth. They did not understand that only some of 
them – and perhaps in view of their non-gentle status none of them – were elect. 
The out-group of social class is “natural” partly in terms of its degeneracy. This initially involved 
all three modes at once. The bloodline virtues of the honour society were something which “nature 
in her own operation, doth seldom digress [sc. degenerate] from.” That word “seldom” is crucial, 
because it pitches nature somewhere between deterministic necessity and the vagaries of nurture. 
It leaves room for the existence of certain ascribed members of the honour society who “neither 
by celestial grace nor by learning, nor endeavour … aspire unto the habit of virtue,” and since this 
makes them “thereby unfit for all public action,” they are to be reclassified with commoners, as 
merely private individuals. Nicole Faret cited the widely discussed case of a French nobleman who 
had served as a magistrate, though barely able to sign his name: “How then could he judge matters 
of honour and human life?”6 
Faret, expert on honour and a cobbler’s son, noted that natural graces cut across class divisions. 
Some non-gentles may have a “good seed.” Even the gentleman’s seed has to be “carefully 
manured.” Nature and nurture here overlap, in antithesis to “the sower,” who is a personification of 
divine necessity and its “secret” predestined goals; grace may be read both under the first heading, 
as natural grace, and under the second, as “a beam of divinity” or superaddition for those who 
lack the natural eminence of honourable birth. Meanwhile at the bottom end of the scale, there are
creatures “so unfortunate, as a man may say they are cast into the world by force, or that they
are not made but to serve for objects of sport and scorn to other men.” In other words they are fully 
determined: both by religious necessity, like reprobates, and by social necessity, like household 
jesters. In such people there is no spiritual grace and no natural grace, but also no nurture that can 
come to the rescue of the latter. They are an unimprovable, absolute exclusion. This creates space 
for an intellectually “middling sort … a mean of those which have not received such extraordinary 
favours of nature, neither have they any remarkable imperfections.” Such people are educable in 
the natural (professional) graces and, by hard work, come to “deserve the esteem” of the honour 
society. This middling sort is modern and meritocratic: it is not a point of balance like the classical 
mean, but an aspiration towards one extreme and away from the other. 
Mid-seventeenth century England is especially rich in such ambiguities around class and 
degeneracy, which are reflected in the very title of Baxter’s 1681 Compassionate Counsel to All 
Young Men. Especially, 1. London apprentices. 2. Students of divinity, physic, and law. 3. the sons 
of magistrates and rich men. Is 1-2-3 a descending or an ascending scale? He would rather, he 
says, be ministering to 3 or 2 than, as he is, to 1. (The Restoration bishops had just dumped an 
inner-city parish on the provincial Baxter as punishment for his heterodox views.) Nevertheless, 
he points out that category 3 contains “the ill examples of too many persons of your rank. You are 
apt to think that their wealth and pomp and power makes them … more honourable. And if they 
wallow in drunkenness or filthy lust, or talk profanely, you may think that such sins are the less 
disgraceful. But you can dream.” The title, self-consciously reversing the honour rankings, hints 
at the creaturely equality of souls. The Baxter who in the 1650s had seen man’s reason as just one 
preparation among many for an imminent rule of the saints now saw preparation more soberly
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as “a good succession of the several generations,” demanding a curriculum with a correspondingly 
greater reasoning element. “A Christian’s child,” he says, “is born with no more knowledge than a 
heathen’s, and must have as much labour and study to make him wise …. O what a blessed world 
were it, if the blessings of men famous for wisdom and godliness, were entailed on all that should 
spring from them! And if this were the common case! But the doleful miseries of the world have 
come from the degenerating of good men’s posterity,” from regression to the mean.7 
Sidelined by political events, Baxter redeploys the surface language of the elite in pursuit of a 
deeper strategy: the abandonment of a theory of imminent grace in the elect and its transformation 
into a theory of intellectual development for all. The road to salvation now lies in hard intellectual 
graft. And the absence of intellect that once denoted degeneracy within the honour society alone, 
having been taken for granted in the masses and feared only at moments of social disorder, now 
induces a permanent and generalized fear of any individual displaying such absence, from across 
the entire range of humanity. 
Another concept highlighting pseudo-egalitarian tendencies, religious and secular, was that of 
the “capable subject.” This referred either to those capable of receiving God’s grace or to those 
with earthly capabilities such as landed property, or (more usually) both in the same person. In 
contrast stood “the uncapable multitude,” which was the phrase Charles II reached for when he 
banned preaching on predestination out of fear that it would stir them up.8 Uncapable – disabled –
in what sense here? Talk about “uncapable” subjects helped smooth over elite disputes about 
grace by uniting them in defence against the out-group. An out-group is only ever a temporary 
manifestation, in whatever mode, of a prior category, that of the representative otherness which 
each era seems to manifest in different ways. The modern concept of intellectual disability was just 
then being inserted in this role. When in the 1670s Joseph Glanvill, a Royal Society member and 
acquaintance of Baxter and Locke, criticized the doctrine that the elect are few, he appealed to a 
concept of “general grace.” This, he said, had been offered “unto all men, in the light of reason, the 
[natural] laws written upon our hearts, and common aids of the spirit … in its universal diffusion 
through the world without let, or impediment … communicating itself to all subjects that were 
capable” (emphasis in original).9 However, this subject, in whom divine grace is naturalized by 
being embedded in human reason and natural law, is still not an everyman. It hovers between the 
creaturely equality of souls and social hierarchy. In generalizing (divine) grace, Glanvill is not 
exactly discarding election. “General” grace differs from the divine grace of the elect few not so 
much by being universal as by being mouldable to fit whatever social boundaries one might want 
it to fit (like “general” intelligence, in fact). 
Locke simply ignores the language of grace, describing capability in terms of its detailed 
psychological operations. However, that is not because he was a sensible fellow, modern before his 
time, but because talk of grace was surplus to his requirements. In fact, in founding a seemingly 
universal and classless psychology, he was not abandoning the mode of divine grace at all, nor indeed 
that of honour. Rather, he absorbed both within a primarily intellectual vocabulary. The uncapable 
multitude, the “hydra-headed monster” recently let loose by civil war, very gradually thereafter 
would become a minority. Two centuries later public education, dominated by Nonconformism 
and its remaining subliminal beliefs about election, had transformed “a mad, bad and dangerous 
people” into citizenry of the middling sort, respectable rather than honourable, leaving behind only 
7 Compassionate Counsel, 386.
 
8 Isabel Rivers, Reason, Grace and Sentiment, 54.
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a small, pathological intellectually disabled population (alongside and merging into the unskilled 
working class) to be as feared as the “multitude” once was.10 
The importance of social class to the interplay between bidding modes and their respective 
out-groups is apparent also from the detail of church politics. When Hooker outlines the principles 
or “laws of ecclesiastical polity,” he makes human reasoning a back-up to the holy spirit, its job 
being to persuade us that revelation is authentic. Whereas Calvin would have regarded this as 
blasphemous because our reasoning corrupts religion, Hooker thought corruption occurs mainly 
outside the honour society. He notes that the “common people” are “credulous and over capable 
of … pleasing errors.” They have only the holy spirit to go by, and this means they can easily 
convince themselves that something is from the holy spirit when in fact it is from the devil.11 
His example is religious sectarians who claim powers of “prophecy,” or instantaneously achieved 
reason. “Understanding of the scriptures,” he warns, is “dependent not principally of the sharpness
of men’s wits or of their learning” (emphasis added). The common sort take their quick, unreasoning 
apprehension of the holy spirit to mean that they are elect, whereas in fact no one can know he 
is elect unless the holy spirit works laboriously through his intellect to convince him of the fact. 
Questions of election and social class overlap almost completely here. Only “almost,” because 
when Hooker writes about speedy and unreasoning “common people” as above, he is not playing 
it straight; he is actually referring in coded terms to the Presbyterian gentry, who in Hooker’s time 
formed an opposition tendency within church and state. One dealt with one’s opponents’ claims to 
grace and therefore to possession of the right political policy by representing them in the persona 
of idiots, of the common sort. 
A similar interplay can be seen at local level, in authority’s management of the hard facts of 
everyday behaviour. The parish was a unit of social administration; the church was its town hall, 
and reports on anti-social behaviour among the common people were posted on the door. Honour 
rankings were marked within the physical space of the church itself, pews arranged by degree of 
comfort and the amount of rates paid; local social status overrode creaturely equality (though this 
also meant that fights broke out over who could sit where). During services, the lower sort were 
barred from the chancel because it was assumed their behaviour would be indecorous, a likely 
token of reprobation. By the 1650s some churches were lifting the bar, but not completely, as we 
shall see later. All were agreed that “idiots” should be excluded from communion. But who were 
now these idiots? If no longer the generality of the common people, did they still include the 
illiterate, or servants? The latter were not always expected to attend church at all. It was said that 
gentry who brought their servants “were as good send their horse,” that epitome of the reasonless 
brutes over whom man was born to rule.12 
Women 
As with class, so with gender. At the trial of the charismatic preacher Anne Hutchinson, 
Massachusetts’s blessed magistracy proclaimed that for women – who after all were natural idiots –
to get together and think in abstractions, as her all-female caucus did, was to remove honour 
from men and to strip reason of its inherent maleness.13 Hutchinson, by claiming that she knew 
10 Boyd Hilton, A Mad, Bad, and Dangerous People? England 1783–1846. 
11 Voak, Richard Hooker, 230. 
12 Cited in Martin Ingram, “From Reformation to toleration,” in T. Harris (ed.), Popular Culture in 
England. 
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who belonged to the company of the elect and that the magistrates did not, was impugning their 
honour. The only honour appropriate to women was that which they derived from their husbands’
or fathers’ possession of them. The opposition between grace and male honour (at least of the 
old self-assertive kind) implied an identification between grace and female honour. As Pitt-Rivers 
notes, to renounce one’s honour is also to cry for mercy, like a woman: without self-assertiveness, 
there is only submission. 
The softer side of feminine values could be of considerable use to male power. While woman’s 
rightful place was in the private sphere of home, private men were a potential threat. Private male 
reasoning might lead to heresy or opposition. The Tudor elite had therefore been cautioned to rear 
its infants in an exclusively female environment, to avoid exposing them to the rough manners of 
male clan members.14 The nobility till then had reared its children and those of its feudal vassals 
in the old martial honour codes, often within the private household. Henry VIII’s increasingly 
centralized state apparatus, with increased control of the honour codes, found this practice suspect. 
Testostrionic men were to be kept away from the nursery because their private minds and self-
assertive behaviours might set a bad example to the young, fostering oppositional defiant disorder 
or an unreasoning disdain for reasons of state. The young had to be socialized into obedience 
to its head, though he himself was less radical feminist than serial femicide. The Puritans who 
grew in political strength over the next generation would have been the first to learn to police 
themselves in this way. Their rejection of the honour clans’ way of bidding for status, in favour of 
an internal religious grace and regeneration or “new man,” was their rejection of machismo for a 
more feminine quality that would eventually enable Puritan elites, male of course, to manage more 
softly and delicately the levers of power. “Have a new master: get a new man,” was Caliban’s 
advice to his fellow menials in The Tempest. (In Shakespeare’s ironic inversion, this new man was 
a libertine, a drunken servant.) 
A comparison may be drawn here with modern intellectual disability doctrine, notably around 
autism, and its involvement in the recuperation of radical feminist values. The autistic brain with its 
excessively private reasoning, says Simon Baron-Cohen in The Essential Difference, is an extreme 
version of the male one. Therefore we are to think of the female brain as normative. As Cordelia 
Fine has comprehensively shown, Baron-Cohen is unaware of the socially constructed character 
of notions of gender.15 But it should further be noted that when the new man, like his Puritan 
counterpart, aspires to these feminized behavioural norms – “empathy”, for example, as that which 
the “autist” cannot perform – he finds in them the constituents of a new managerial technique for 
maintaining, in the long run, a social control that remains patriarchal, and his. 
The seminal insult 
One final element is to be noted in the three-way relationship and its out-groups: the role of satire 
and insult. When a satirist of the time, with Socratic irony, calls himself an “idiot,” rather than 
pretending to be intellectually disabled as we would understand it, he is more often representing 
himself as a member of the out-group in all three modes at once, with the aim of recalibrating 
the relationship between them. Take, for example, the reaction to Castiglione’s elision of the 
distinctions between divine and natural grace and between honourable lineage and professional 
merit, with reason subsumed under both and ability reduced to performance and imitation. By way 
of contrast, his younger contemporary Giovanni Della Casa creates the persona of “an old idiot”
14 Elyot, The Governour, 17r.
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(un vecchio idiota), whose defining psychological characteristic is an inability to enact the 
performances required of him as a member of the social elite. In an Italian context of great social
mobility, where reason is explicitly reinterpreted as imitative grace and honour consists in sham
genealogies whose invention is openly admitted to be a mere ritual of office holding, one’s only 
resource is to renounce membership of all three in-groups at once. What Della Casa wants us to infer 
from that ironic assumption of the title “idiot” is that imitative grace is an actual absence of true 
grace, and that in a true gentleman, honour does not have to be performed; it simply is. True grace
and true honour are, instead, inborn nature plus reason. Only if the “nobility” (however dubious) 
adopts this novel approach, where a natural, specifically human wit reinforces the other two and is 
at least equal to them in value, can its bid for status remain competitive against the sophistries of 
the arrivisti.16 
Today’s insults (“idiot,” “retard,” etc.), especially when applied to one’s peers, assume a 
referent. They say: you are like that pathological group over there. In the early modern period, 
the very existence of any such group or referent is questionable. Where there is textual evidence 
for such insults, it is in the class sense of the idiot as labourer or layman. When an opponent’s 
argument is said to be “popish, that is very plebeianly and idiotically spoken,” we still – this is 
the later seventeenth century – have no clear sense of the category boundaries between these three 
descriptive terms.17 Satire and insult in the primary sources can therefore be read as applying in any 
bidding mode, and a vast range of reference is often incorporated in the “disabled” identity. This is 
clear from the many books about character types published in the seventeenth century in the genre 
inspired by Theophrastus. The satirist Samuel Butler, for example, writes of the man who 
Believes the honour that was left him as well as the estate is sufficient to support his quality without 
troubling himself to purchase any more of his own; and he meddles as little with the management 
of the one as the other, but trusts both to the government of his servants, by whom he is equally 
cheated in both. He is like a fanatic, that contents himself with the mere title of a saint and makes 
that his privilege to act all manner of wickedness.18 
To Theophrastus’s standard example, involving social class, Butler has added the religious element 
of an empty Antinomian claim to be among the elect. Or take the following entry, “Dunce,” added 
(allegedly by John Donne) to Thomas Overbury’s famous work in the same genre: 
He hath a soul drowned in a lump of flesh … the most dangerous creature for confirming an atheist, 
who would swear his soul were nothing but the bare temperature of his body. He sleeps as he goes, 
and his thoughts seldom reach an inch further than his eyes. The most part of the faculties of his 
soul lie fallow …. One of the most unprofitable of God’s creatures, being, as he is, a thing put clean 
besides his right use, made fit for the cart and the flail, and by mischance entangled amongst books 
and papers. A man cannot tell possible what he is now good for, save to move up and down and 
fill room, or to serve as animatum instrumentum, for others to work withal in base employments, 
or to be foil for better wits, or to serve (as they say monsters do) to set out the variety of nature .… 
He is mere nothing of himself, neither eats, nor drinks, nor goes, nor spits, but by imitation, for all 
which he hath set forms and fashions …. He speaks just what his books or last company said unto 
him, without varying one whit, and very seldom understands himself …. Rip him quite asunder, 
and examine every shred of him, you shall find him to be just nothing but the subject of nothing: 
16 Berger, The Absence of Grace, 196.
 
17 Glanvill, Saducismus, 47.
 
18 Samuel Butler, Characters, 67.
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the object of contempt. Yet such as he is you must take him, for there is no hope he should ever 
become better.19 
This is a rich mix: it refers to intellectual opposition (“dunce” is from the philosopher John Duns 
Scotus), original sin (the drowned soul), atheism, materialism (the soul as merely the “temperature” 
of the mortal body), lethargy, reliance on the external senses, emptiness or absence, horse-like 
beastliness, lack of autonomy, unstable opinion, manual labour, natural slavery, monstrosity, 
imitation, incurability – though little, it seems, that might be recognizable as disability to a modern 
psychologist. There is no sense that the author might be distinguishing between the people insulted 
and some separate population that provides a reference point for the insult. Passages like this are 
not metaphors by which one sneeringly or jokingly compares one’s peers with some positive,
pre-existing intellectually disabled population, so much as an early co-creator of a referent that is 
itself modern. 
19 Thomas Overbury, Characters. 
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Virtue, Blood, Wit:  

from Lineage to Learning
 
It is not often that we can see all three modes of bidding for status – honour, grace and wit – in full 
focus at the same time. We have abundant evidence, however, for the separate ways in which each 
of the two older modes and their corresponding concepts of disability feed into the modern one. In 
this and the next chapter we shall look at this process in terms of social status (honour), and in the 
following two, in terms of religious status (grace). 
Changes in the types of collateral offered against recognition of status can be gleaned from the 
widespread early modern genre of conduct manuals and courtesy books: “behaviour guides” as I 
shall call them. These popular psychology texts form a continuous tradition, taking in key works 
such as Castiglione’s The Book of the Courtier (1528), Henry Peacham’s The Compleat Gentleman
(1622) and Francis Nivelon’s The Rudiments of Genteel Behaviour (1737, much consulted by 
contemporary portrait painters), through to those of the intelligence society: Edward de Bono’s 
How to Have a Beautiful Mind (2004), for example. These guides, whether from the sixteenth 
century or the twenty-first, reveal the nexus between the ideals of the society and the facsimile 
of those ideals in the individual who aspires to personify them, and who has the ability to extort 
from others a validation of the image he cherishes of himself. In modern societies this validation is 
extorted by the creation of the disability we call intellectual, which can be traced back to the types of 
disqualification made on the grounds of honour. Before looking at the question of disqualification, 
however, we need first to examine the positive concept of honour to which it relates, and about 
which James and Shapin have already written. 
We shall start by looking at the relationship of honour to social structure and mobility in the 
early modern period, and at ways in which honour was scientifically assessed. The discussion will 
then centre on the modal shift from honour to wit and learning, often via the mediation of “virtue.” 
We need to remind ourselves yet again here how intrinsically slippery such concepts are. Honour 
may simply mean reputation and glory, or it may mean a supposedly more substantial, class-based 
“nobility.” Nobility itself is sometimes synonymous with gentility, sometimes (and increasingly) 
a distinctly higher form of the latter. The inflection of these terms in any case varies according to 
author and/or national context. More than this by way of a general analysis of terms and we shall 
find ourselves drowning. We will engage with the texts first, and then see. 
Social structure and social mobility 
For the “real life” landscape of early modern social structure, we must seek elsewhere. We might 
find, for example, how when the chips were down, gentry would bond with the merchants and 
yeomen to defend common interests. We are looking here instead at the history of surfaces, of 
human self-representation. Even if societas, “the honour society,” was something fairly nebulous, 
its members knew exactly who each of the others were. This mutual recognition is itself one aspect 
of social structure, and therefore we need at least a brief account of the latter. 
At first sight, intelligence seems to play a quite different role in social structures from the role 
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“achieved” and “ascribed” status. Intelligence seems to be a quality within each individual, on the 
basis of which people achieve status by replacing each other in the structure: “social mobility.” 
Lineage, by contrast, seems to be ascribed to families and groups by external social codes that
pose absolute barriers to mobility, at the same time as creating anxiety about the porousness of 
those barriers. At first sight the intelligence society has no barriers that can be porous or otherwise, 
since intelligence is supposedly intrinsic to the species as a whole (allowing for certain differences 
of degree in individual capabilities and the amount of effort one puts in). But in fact intelligence, 
too, is an ascribed status: the intelligence society is a caste into which one is born socially, with 
social restrictions imposed on membership, just as was the case with honour. We have only our 
notional intellectually disabled people to explain to us that this is the case, and their categorization 
as intellectually disabled pre-empts all possible critique by disqualifying them from membership of 
the group that has the ability to explain anything. 
The honour society’s ideology of limited membership was one thing, actual social mobility 
quite another. Meritocracy’s historical fable runs: once upon a time, you got on because of who you 
were (i.e., who you were descended from); now you get on because of what you can do, which is 
chiefly ranked by your intellectual ability. This kind of achievement-based system is supposed to 
have been suppressed in earlier times by an elite marked out by bloodline and inherited juridical
powers. The onset of gentry and nobility is pushed as far back in time as possible, almost to a state 
of nature, thereby creating the historical myth of semi-permanent rule by an honour group, which 
in fact mirrors that group’s own idea of itself as reaching back to the dawn of the species. The
truth is something else. The difference between aristocracy and meritocracy is not between less and 
more social mobility, but between two different ways of closing off privilege and passing it on to 
one’s offspring. And it is not just that meritocracy is the new aristocracy. Aristocracy, as historians 
have long known, was the old meritocracy, “governing solely by virtue of birth (not usually that
ancient), royal caprice, or flat cash payment.”1 Detailed family records were not kept before the 
thirteenth century; nor, once they were, could descent be traced back more than a few decades. 
Partly this was because of structural changes in kinship; strict patrilinealism, which made tracing 
the family line important, was a relatively new system. And partly it was because even as the 
system was taking root, the ruling elite was undergoing constant change and infiltration. Let us 
compare the kinds of advantage people have sought to pass on to their offspring then and now: the 
gentility qualifications of parents around 1500 (juridical ones attached to landed estates) and the 
merit-based qualifications of parents today (“intellectual” or educational ones). In modern societies 
upward mobility is structurally restricted above all by parents’ lack of educational qualifications, 
but this bias evens out over three generations or so. In the earlier period, changes of social rank 
through land acquisition probably evened out over a similar period. We cannot take it for granted 
that there was less social mobility in the thirteenth or seventeenth century than in the twenty-first. 
To do so is just to repeat the meritocratic fable that the undeserving have been replaced by the 
deserving, who by objectively justified criteria such as intelligence just happen to be us. 
The very origin of gentility was meritocratic. In the property revolution of the late medieval 
period, lands were handed out in return for military service regardless of social background; 
“honour” could be used synonymously to mean a grant of land. Hereditary titles, and with them 
early modern notions of inherited honour, only came about once the king, then merely the strongest 
among equals, needed a system for keeping track of his peers’ ambitious sons. Conversely, titles 
were a guarantee to chosen individuals that the king’s favour could not be revoked. Economic 
capital was a means to the upkeep of these gentle appearances, which were the more real and valued 
entity. Titles, having begun as a form of ID card, only became systemized during that phase of early 
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modern capitalism which was already beginning to spawn an intelligence-based meritocracy too; it 
seems to have been possible even then to describe oneself to the Court of Chivalry as “a gentleman 
by birth and a linen draper by trade” while keeping a straight face.2 
As the French revolutionaries would (correctly) point out, titled nobility started out as gangs.3 
The system did not settle into one of primogeniture and hereditary surnames until the thirteenth 
century; in England, hereditary entitlement to a seat in the House of Lords came as late as the end 
of the fifteenth century, it having been an appointed chamber until then. The system of heraldic 
assessment and the genre of behaviour guides began immediately after this. The gap between the 
most pukka gentleman and the arriviste “shot up with last night’s mushroom” (a frequent trope) 
was slight. The real question was, exactly how recently arrived? Not just in James I’s two-a-penny 
honours sales or in the contemporary mass ennoblement of professionals in France but all along, 
urban trade or peasant avarice sufficed to buy a title, at some decent interval following purchase of 
the land. Expansion of the gentry had always occurred from the bottom up because heralds had a 
direct financial interest in granting coats of arms. In the 1540s the English state monopolized the 
business of collecting fees for the granting of arms. The nobility’s crisis of prestige then came only 
when monarchs accelerated the granting of new titles, to reinforce the elite with good administrators 
and merchants who could supply the treasury with ready cash. The value of titles declined with 
their increase in number; like grade inflation in educational qualifications, these over-rapid shifts 
in precedence threatened the stability of existing occupants of the social niche. Honour after 1600 
increasingly became not just an attribute of caste but concretized in the person, an individual 
possession emanating from within, even as it was reinterpreted in terms of obedience to the state. 
Religious authorities attempted, with some success, to replace bloodline with the soul and the mind 
as the locus of honour, which helped justify a limited extension of status down the social scale. It 
also sowed the seeds of honour’s decline, since it meant the individual might be author of his own 
code; this semi-classless honour was eventually reduced to bourgeois “honesty” (financial and 
contractual), thus provoking conflict with the anti-mercenary bias of the old honour codes. 
The purity of the in-group had in any case revealed certain inherent structural problems. In 1200
the nobility was tiny, and knighthood a lower, specialist stratum; when they merged, the former’s
system of primogeniture and hereditary names met up with the latter’s codification system of heraldic
coats of arms.4 The problem was that the more tightly codified the patrilineal family, the more easily
it died out. Plague exacerbated this. Gaps in the gentry had to be filled by servants from the great
houses or men from the religious establishments beyond the honour society, without whom the elite
could not have regularly renewed itself. Villeins studied at Paris and Oxford, taking up posts in the
expanding ecclesiastical and state administrations and forming a literate secretariat for household
economies increasingly reliant on documentation. A leading English recruiter from the ranks was
William of Wykeham, himself unashamedly a tradesman’s son, Lord Chancellor, and founder of
the first Oxford college. Gentry and merchants in England, like nobility and bourgeoisie in France,
shared a common cultural space despite the flamboyant noises about honour continually heard from
the higher stratum. One of the most popular genres in the first wave of new, printed books among their
bourgeois consumers were albums of medallion engravings illustrating the coats of arms to which
they aspired; in republican Italy, whose ruling families tended to have very recent merchant origins,
the coat of arms at first modestly embossed on the covers of book-keeping ledgers eventually found
a prominent place in the portraits these family members commissioned of themselves in ancient
dress, proclaiming their direct biological line of honourable descent from the ancient Romans. 
2 Cited in George Squibb, The High Court of Chivalry, 172.
 
3 Dulaure, Histoire, 47.
 
4 See Georges Duby, The Chivalrous Society, 9 ff.; 85 ff.
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Some, then, are born honourable and great, some achieve greatness and some have greatness 
thrust upon them: in the second case through merit, and in the third by one’s lord (or in Malvolio’s 
case, lady). Conversely, it would be no enormous scandal when as great a nobleman as Lord North 
apprenticed his eldest son to a turkey merchant on account of his intellectual disposition; he was 
excessively fast, having “too much spirit” for his books or to be useful to the state.5 Younger sons 
regularly entered trade. “What a gentleman is, is hard with us to define,” wrote the legal historian 
John Selden. “In other countries he is known by his privileges; in Westminster Hall he is one that is 
reputed one; in the court of honour, he that hath arms.”6 Even in France, where nobility was more 
formally defined, a noble father would marry his daughter to a bourgeois if it meant no dowry was 
expected; and the commoner to whom a nobleman sold his land could assume a title, any challenge 
to it being legally invalid after a fixed period even if he continued working with his hands.7 Such 
people claimed noble descent to avoid certain taxes from which nobles were exempt. In neither 
country did the heraldic expert require more than three generations on both sides (mere living 
memory) for a gentle line to be written down as “ancient”: that is, if prompt payment of his fee did 
not obviate the need to trace it in the first place.8 
Certainly there were massive complaints about upstarts and “new men.” But the new man 
differed from the old only in the sense that whereas people had once been honoured for military 
service to the state, now it was also for professional services, which involved a notional intellectual 
component. The fifteenth-century legal authority Sir John Fortescue claimed, “There is scarcely 
a man learned in the laws … who is not … sprung of noble lineage,” but that was in principle 
only. Judges were knighted from scratch, recruited from the sons of yeomen, merchants or even 
artisans.9 Indeed, it was a stereotype of the lawyer that “his very calling writes him esquire, though 
his scutcheon sometimes cannot speak him gentleman, except by way of admittance” (that is, 
having come from outside the group).10 Conversely, people who lost their land were not easily 
prised loose of their gentility. The claim to status in all its self-referentiality belongs as firmly to 
the social structure as any more concrete form of collateral. The Spanish hidalgo (“gentleman”) 
is an abbreviation of hijo de algo, “son of something,” recalling the complaint of the respectable 
English family fallen on hard times “We came from something, you know.” The something in 
question is the title as such, rather than the long-gone landed estate. Status modes take on a life of 
their own when a group establishes an identity that may help it to corner some advantage which it 
can pass on to its descendants, hence psychology’s longstanding interest in the hereditary nature 
of intelligence. In the shift from one mode to the other, the intelligence needed to preserve one’s 
patrimony became intelligence as patrimony. 
Honour and the assessment process 
If honour and intelligence are similar in their relationship to social mobility, so too are they in 
their forms of assessment. Heraldic devices bear a functional resemblance to psychometric scores. 
The tensions of shifting social stratification, between society as it was and society as some of its 
5  Roger North, cited in Jerrilyn Marston, “Gentry honor and royalism in early Stuart England,” Journal 
of British Studies, 13/1 (1973). 
6  Table Talk, 2031. 
7 See James Wood, The Nobility. 
8 Anthony Wagner, Heralds, 10; see also M. Bush, The European Nobility, 126 ff. 
9  Cited in Joan Simon, Education and Society in Tudor England, 13. 
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members wanted it to be, led to Canute-like attempts to preserve social difference in the existing 
honour mode by refining heraldry into a scientia, a branch of theoretically justified knowledge. 
This science, which patrolled the borders of the honour society, was no less specialist and complex 
than the psychology which patrols the intelligence society. A hobby of great interest to those who 
aspired as well as those who already belonged, it features in many of the behaviour guides of the 
period. It consisted in complex genealogical calculation, of which coats of arms were the quasi-
mathematical indices. Heraldic science helped to negotiate the gulf between structural realities and 
the desire of the upwardly mobile for legitimation. Any mode of bidding for status, to be effective, 
requires public recognition and therefore external display. Honour had to be seen to be done. Its 
tools of authentification were exact signs that separated out-group from in-group, and grades of 
superiority within the latter. How the idea that heraldic knowledge is a branch of natural philosophy 
would have struck natural philosophers in other fields, especially in the physical realm, is unclear. 
Bacon thought that laws of evidence could not be applied to honour because it was all in the mind 
(“a satanical illusion and apparition … against religion”) and therefore impossible to gauge.11 One 
might criticize psychometrics from the same standpoint, since intelligence is likewise all in the 
mind. In fact it is often seen as all of the mind too, making the potential confusions even greater. 
Heraldic science provided forms of assessment on which to base a jurisprudence of honour. 
The honour society’s previous way of settling its tensions had been by private violence, which the 
absolute state found as threatening as private reason. Matters of honour had tended to be settled 
by duelling. This reached its high point in the later sixteenth century, that is, precisely as heraldic 
science was beginning to take shape. As the “point of honour” the duel, like the cognitive ability 
test, was a pseudo-legal institution in an arena where the law itself was not competent, and where 
the claimant to status must get himself formally authenticated by others at his own evaluation or 
else find that his claim is empty. Honour had to be impregnable from below, since its very premise 
was that inferior groups existed who lacked it. Destroying someone’s honour not only reduced 
him to the ranks, it raised the destroyer; as the English Hymnal points out, “Conquering kings 
their titles take / From the foes they captive make.” One recalls here the special esteem accorded 
to professional caregivers in segregated institutions for the disabled, or St Francis who with his 
pathological hatred of lepers was reborn in Christ the moment he condescended to touch one. 
Decisions made by duel were deterministic, a form of necessity or fate. Sixteenth-century 
rulers tried to ban duelling, stood in for necessity themselves and assumed full responsibility for 
arbitrating all claims to honour. Whereas duels proclaimed the victor’s autonomy independently of 
central power, heraldic signs offered the state a sanitized public equivalent which it could turn to 
its advantage by controlling the distribution of status. Moreover duelling, while caused by man’s 
“natural inclination” and passions, was opposed by his “natural intelligence” (intelligentia).12 
Accordingly, heraldry became more scientifically rigorous during the sixteenth century: a new 
means of dealing with social mobility rather than the relic of an antique system about to be swamped 
by it. Anecdotal memory (idealized by epic poetry) gave way to precise genealogy, and previously 
disparate conventions to a unitary bureaucratic system. The herald, originally a tournament umpire, 
now analyzed armorial bearings, especially in England where the absence of clear-cut political 
privileges for the gentry meant that coats of arms bore the main proof of their gentility. Most of 
the legal “abilities” or privileges that marked out a gentleman (to hunt deer, carry weapons, etc.) 
had fallen into disuse, leaving only non-substantive, para-legal ones, of which heraldic display was 
chief. The high period of coats of arms began in Henry VIII’s reign, when a permanent Commission 
was set up to regulate them. Republican parliamentarians were still insisting on theirs a century 
11 The Charge, Touching Duels, in Works, iv, 401. 
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later; only with the revolution of 1689 did the formal value of heraldic signs fade. Even then, they 
were still used as psychological indicators. They denote behavioural traits, for example, in the 
caricatures of the anonymous eighteenth-century satirist lampooning aristocrats with fake coats of 
arms (“two priapuses,” “two virgins weeping,” etc.).13 
Heraldic science was based on three principles, each with its equivalent in the science of 
intelligence measurement: (1) the idea that honour and its differentials are natural phenomena 
which therefore self-evidently justify social distinctions, and of which the coat of arms is the 
external sign; (2) a theory of honour as individual possession, a form of property in those signs; 
and (3) a system of assessment, or heraldic visitations authenticating that possession. The elision 
between the signs or “tokens of nobleness” and its substance is typical of status modes in general. 
The sign itself becomes a substantive personal property, just as the statistical mean used in 
intelligence measurement, having started out as a purely numerical sign, subsequently becomes the 
natural phenomenon of intelligence: that is to say, what the measurer has decided intelligence is. 
The heraldic Commission’s freedom from state interference was a nod to the previous honour 
dispensation which in principle had been pluralist, the monarch himself being subject to its rules. 
However, the Commission was his initiative and existed for his benefit. The herald carried royal 
letters patent, showing that the right had been delegated to him. If some of the monarch’s fellow 
nobles had previously held honours within their gift, now he was the fount of all honour, reinforced 
by his role as the earthly mediator of divine grace. Honour required state authentification as well 
as self-authentification. Out on the road, though, the herald remained his own master. As the 
honour society’s informal judiciary, his quasi-forensic task was to separate the genuine from the 
fake. This was no simple matter. Henry’s first Commission asked the heralds to assess “good 
honest reputation” when awarding or approving coats of arms. Men “issued of vile blood” were 
to be excluded. However, that was in theory; in practice, reputation meant “service done to us 
or another” or “possessions and riches” above a certain level. Also excluded were “heretics 
contrary to the faith”; religious wisdom was now a reinforcement to state power, thrusting the 
clergy into an honour system that had traditionally excluded them. After the first Commission, a 
herald periodically visited claimants to gentle status at home or summoned them to attend him. 
Anyone who could not justify his coat of arms had his dishonour posted up in public. The Court 
of Chivalry held tribunals which testify to the widespread practice of inappropriate display by 
those not entitled. Those who passed the test had their coats of arms entered on a pro forma, “small 
tickets … printed with blanks,” the upper half of each page drawn with empty shields (to be filled 
out with the relevant emblems) and space for a brief verbal description.14 
Before this period, it was assumed that two gentlemen meeting for the first time did not compare 
genealogies; all they needed (as Cicero had said) was a quick glance at each other. The new heraldic 
scientists thought it took a bit more than that. The social order was at stake: it was well known 
that “no coat of arms is more beautiful than a villein’s.”15 Yet at least one manual on coats of arms, 
having begun with a rigorous exclusion of merchants and mechanics, goes on to qualify this out of 
existence by selecting “laudable” trades and crafts that might be eligible. This seems to mean any 
trade as long as the person under assessment could stump up the fee. The very same people who 
in one context might be “night-grown, mushrumps, start-ups,” could in a more favourable one be 
“gentlemen of the first head,” that is, founders of a new honourable line.16 The latter phrase, like 
“meritocrat,” had started out as ironic but very quickly turned positive. Goalposts moved here 
13 The Heraldry of Nature, 48.
 
14 Wagner, Heralds, 5, 101; see also James, “English politics.”
 
15 Cicero, De Officiis, 1.30; Marois, Le gentil-homme, 264.
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and there, just as they do with intelligence when its constituent parts are selected, reselected and 
reconstituted even as the principle of measurement maintains its supremacy all the while. 
For someone to be “creator of his own honours” in this way was justifiable because his fee 
contributed to the upkeep of the heraldic system, thereby improving the commonwealth. Law was 
at the centre of this trade. Many of the behavioural writers were at the Inns of Court, as were the 
prospective owners of coats of arms among their readers; this was the same professional caste 
which, at the opposite end of the status spectrum, was just then creating a new and antithetical caste 
of dishonourable “idiot” incompetents at the Court of Wards and helping to sequester their estates. 
Gentlemen of the first head were contrasted with “dunghill or truck-knights, whose honours have 
no other … scale to rise by but only their wealth,” and who pay “common scriveners” to paint their 
coat of arms. In principle “honourable places [are] due to great estates,” so how did one distinguish 
between money which could buy honour and that which could not?17 The answer seems to be that 
you paid through the appropriate channel. Although proofs of authenticity in heraldic science were 
based on lineage, an under-the-counter trade in coats of arms had always gone on, and in fact they 
had started out as legally alienable property. The law only prohibited this practice at the same (late) 
point when it confirmed the inheritability of titles. 
Heraldic scientists built into their professional role an excluding jargon called “Blazon,” part-
pictorial, which they could use with each other, knowing that clients would not understand. Like 
IQ, it was an abstract code. Interest in Blazon grew sharply in the 1620s, in reaction to the Duke 
of Buckingham’s notorious honours-for-sale policy (Peacham, the best-known popularizer of 
heraldic science, was tutor to the son of Buckingham’s chief political rival). As the coats grew 
more complex and scrutinized, so did the usefulness of Blazon to heralds. It ensured that their 
expert services were always needed. It is impossible to convey in paraphrase the flavour of some 
of these texts. The minute hierarchical grading of coats, with added symbols for birth order (first, 
second, third son, etc.) and differentiations for the number and type of quarterings, was as complex 
as chi-squaring. Or the science could be disarmingly simple while equally exact: the Hall of Nobles 
in Stockholm, for example, displays their coats of arms with numbers running in order of their year 
of introduction, oldest families first. 
If heraldry later came to be seen as what Voltaire supposedly called it, “the science of fools 
with long memories,” it had critics even at the time. Some of the criticism came in the rival mode 
of grace. William Perkins, characteristically trenchant, says: “No man is to stand upon his gentility, 
or glory in his parentage for nobility and great blood, but only rejoice in this, that he is drawn out 
of the kingdom of darkness.”18 Erasmus mocked the air of intellectual difficulty heraldic experts 
cultivated and the status this lent them: people think this, rather than religion, is the supreme 
intellectual accomplishment. When gentlemen discuss it, “their forehead and upper brows [are] 
drawn together with very great gravity, as it were a matter of marvellous difficulty; yea and with 
great enforcement bringing forth plain trifles [and] think other in comparison of themselves scarce 
to be men.”19 Other criticisms came from the champions of honour themselves. They complained 
about charlatan “armorists” whose “impostures conspire in the concealing of their imagined 
secrets.”20 These writers feared that heraldic science might threaten the very principle of honour, 
because it protested too much; after all, the very call for evidence contradicts the principle behind 
status modes. One early seventeenth-century author for example, in a textbook description of 
character types, describes the herald thus: 
17 Markham, The Booke, 42; 69. 

18 Perkins, Workes, iii, 293.
 
19 Desiderius Erasmus, The Manual of the Christian Knight, 93.
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To the making of him went not a generation, but a genealogy. His trade is honour, and he sells it, 
and gives arms himself, though he be no gentleman. His bribes are like those of a corrupt judge, 
for they are the prices of blood. He seems very rich in discourse, for he tells you of whole fields of 
gold and silver, or and argent, worth much in French but in English nothing.21 
In criticizing the heralds, this author is seeking to preserve the autonomy of country gentry, whose 
honour was self-evident and needed no checking. At the extreme, though, heraldic science was a 
“mockery,” its sole aim to rake in assessment fees.22 
When the experts defended themselves, it was characteristic of status modes in general that 
they did so via their opponent’s psychological deficiencies: “the pride they have in their own wits 
and understandings, weening themselves to be very wise, where indeed they are very simple,” 
and their “rashness, and want of judgement” (both these latter being precise terms in faculty 
psychology). The experts invoked a typical claim of the human sciences: to historical permanence, 
and hence to nature. One fifteenth-century text universally consulted through the early modern 
period identifies the hierarchical insignia of honour as “the nine colours in arms figured by the nine 
orders of angels” – medieval philosophy’s nine intelligences, corresponding to the nine celestial 
spheres – “… show[ing] which be worthy and which be royal.”23 This demonstrated for experts the 
cosmological dimension of their expertise. According to this same author, “Christ was a gentleman 
of coat armour.” A principle of nature and the cosmos thus reinforced one of socio-political order: 
“Bondage … began first in angel[s] and after succeeded in mankind.” Practice, as well as theory, 
was read back into antiquity. Heraldry was traced back at least as far as the Roman patricians who 
put up wax images of their ancestors; and he who had none to display “was called by them … a new 
fellow, a son of the dunghill, fatherless.”24 Sitters for portraits wore classical dress embroidered 
with their coats of arms. 
The perceived cross-historical validity of Blazon thereby credited honour with being a natural 
and permanent substance. And what was historically true had to be anthropologically true, across 
present-day cultures. John Gibbon, one of Charles II’s heraldic officials, commented on people he 
had seen in Virginia with tattoos on their bodies and emblems on their shields. They proved that 
“heraldry … is ingrafted naturally into the sense of the human race”: that is, its “internal sense” or 
psychological faculties. These indigenous practices proved that heraldry was universally human 
in the same way as, for Locke, the existence of “intelligent Americans” proved that the human 
understanding was universal and that they were not “mindless” as their Spanish enslavers had 
called them. Personality could be read off from a coat of arms as from the shape of a skull. Sign as 
well as substance were inalienable properties of the mind itself: 
Arms … shall be accounted … the significations, and outward marks of virtues, which have 
proceeded, from the soul or mind of the first bearer. And therefore … arms, are things so excellent 
and honourable in themselves, that they are not to be accounted, in the nature of goods, riches 
or lands.25 
Honour was not concrete collateral, therefore, but an intangible principle located in a universal 
realm of nature where it “sympathizes with every noble and generous disposition.” Not only 
that: heraldry meant that honour was scientifically demonstrable, indeed “the most refined part 
21 John Earle, Microcosmography, 93.
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of natural philosophy, while it taketh the principles from geometry, making use almost of every 
several square and angle.”26 Assessment of heraldic insignia was therefore what we now call an 
exact science: moreover the ultimate exact science, which rendered the social as well as the natural 
order eternal. Coats of arms, with their minutely divided orders of precedence, built hierarchical 
human honour into the structure of the universe. At the same time we must note that Gibbon saw 
nature as a modifiable set of “dispositions.” On the one hand there was scientific rigidity; on the 
other, nurture made a difference. Hence the line between elite and non-elite remained unclear. It 
meant both that there could be boundary crossers (however rigorous the membership criteria), and 
that the sons of gentry had better shape up. 
Sometimes the scientiae of law, medicine and heraldry unite in a single account of natural 
classification. Take the lawyer writing a foreword to his friend’s guide to heraldic science, a 
textbook as meticulously positivist as anything in today’s psychometrics. The author is praised 
for reducing “an art (much like our law), unmethodized, to … a method” and “rules.”27 He makes 
armorial bearings “most natural,” not in the sense of faithful pictorial representation but in that of 
natural history: “This work, did ransack heaven and earth, / Yea nature’s bulk itself, or all that is / 
In nature hid, before this book had birth.” The author is the true heir of the great Roman naturalist 
Pliny. He has revealed the psycho-social laws of nature, by cataloguing the heraldic animals, plants 
and stars that act as their emblems and signs: “Nature’s secretary we may style / Thy searching 
spirit …. All that honour arms must honour thee, / That hast made arms from all confusion free” –
a presentiment of Pope’s encomium on Newton. Turning heraldic signs into the substance of honour 
thus leads to a harder-edged account of nature. 
The author himself heads his text with the Hobbesian declaration, “Nature is ruled by an 
intelligence that does not err.” This strictness about nature is required because of the “confused 
mixture” into which coats of arms have descended. The confusion, he says, lies not in the intrusion 
of upstarts or fake coats of arms but in the science itself, in its present state. It needs to be made more 
exact. At the beginning, even Noah’s despised worker-son Ham had his own armorial bearings. “In 
this first assumption of these signs, every man [emphasis added] did take to himself some such 
beast, bird, fish, serpent … as he thought best fitting his estate.” These insignia were not at the 
outset hierarchical or exclusive but simply “marks to distinguish tribes, families, and particular 
persons from each other.” So how did honour differentials arise subsequently? They did so first 
in the mind of “the ingenious beholder,” who notes “after some sort [sc. classification] the natural 
quality and disposition of their bearers.” The gradual hierarchization of the insignia of honour 
thus runs interactively with improvement in the intelligence of observers, so that (as in every good 
pseudo-science) we cannot tell whether the differentials are ante or post factum. 
Another feature of this increasingly scientistic approach is primogeniture, which starts to 
change from a legal concept into one that abstractly represents the natural order of things. With 
inheritable honour increasingly a possession of the individual, it became important to stress that 
this still did not make it a form of concrete collateral; it was not a commodity one could pass up or 
alienate, like one’s property. The eldest son’s right of inheritance was a biological definition of the 
person. Hence Jehan Scohier’s slogan, “The eldest son never dies.”28 (It is worth noting here that 
“Jehan” was a medievalist affectation, sporting what the French came to know as “the heraldic h.”) 
Primogeniture is “separate from the law of succession, and is not subject to the laws or customs of 
the country, but follows the order of nature alone.” To establish this, the writer creates the fiction 
that in some countries it is the second son who inherits, “thus perverting the order of nature, with 
26 Henry Peacham, The Compleat Gentleman, 139.
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no assurance or conformity in the office of arms, nor among heralds.” Writing in opposition to the 
inflation of honourable titles, his tactic is to affirm the hereditary principle as deterministically 
as possible: “The right of primogeniture in itself cannot be prescribed, either by the sons or by 
anyone outside the family …. [It is] immutable … and here is the living reason why the right of 
primogeniture cannot be sold.” The book contains a correspondingly comprehensive catalogue
of coats of arms, whose scientificity proves the natural honour of primogeniture, just as IQ scores 
prove natural intelligence. It is when the social need for tighter authentification arises – when there 
is a threat of being swamped or polluted – that one has to intrude this more deterministic sense 
into nature. 
Virtue: mediating between honour and wit 
Pitt-Rivers notes how hard it is to separate the two terms, honour and virtue. Of the things that 
“accompany honour like a shadow,” virtue was the most frequently mentioned. It too, however, 
could be variously interpreted. Was virtue “blood … conjoined with wealth,” or that “which … 
because it proceedeth from the mind, is true and perfect”?29 It had long been recognized that 
virtuous conduct did not necessarily depend on one’s bloodline; but the migration of virtue to the 
mind signalled a decline in the language of honour. Virtue (excellence, or perhaps “superiority”) 
became more clearly a value term than honour itself. In the migration of status bids, it was a magic 
carpet on which the author could beam down from one mode of bidding to another, or mediate in 
the conflicts between them. 
This is evident from the way heralds and behavioural writers dealt with their own dubious 
lineages. Cicero, who wrote about honour, was noted for having been, like most of them, plebeian 
by birth. Peacham (in a fictitious persona) admits, “Being a gentleman myself, I have been many 
times asked my coat, and except I should have showed them my jerkin, I knew not what to 
say.”30 To this conundrum of self-authentification, he replies that he just knows he’s a gentleman, 
despite having to labour for his living by tutoring. The conundrum was solved by that value-laden 
slipperiness of “virtue.” Heralds were needed because the king could not “pierce into every dark 
and obscure corner that lies hid within his dominions.” And it was precisely the existence of some 
unvirtuous, ignorant gentlemen that created a market for the behavioural expertise of the herald. 
Peacham accuses heralds of “deal[ing] more bountifully with a fellow who can but teach a dog … 
than upon an honest, learned and well qualified man” to advise on the upbringing of their children. 
The bourgeois flavour of that word “honest,” as distinct from honourable, sidesteps the delicate 
question of his own social status being not quite that of those whom he is lecturing about their 
ignorant and degenerate behaviour. This mission – to rescue from itself an elite whose behavioural 
norms one claims to represent despite one’s own dubious social origins – is another literary fixture: 
think Jane Austen. It typifies many of the writers in this genre and gave them career opportunities. 
Gibbon, who held the post of Bluemantle Poursuivant at the College of Heralds, was a shopkeeper’s 
son with a politics that was high Tory. (Heraldic science was associated with the Tories’ attachment 
to Royal Prerogative.) These writers read their own humble social origins back into the history 
of the science. The first feudal heralds, they said, had been “mechanical men” who looked after 
their lord’s armour and were knighted in return.31 It is worth noting here that key figures in the 
invention of modern intelligence and intellectual disability grew up in similarly status-ambiguous 
29 De Oncieu, La précédence, 28; Giambattista Nenna, A Treatise of Nobilitie, 29r.
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positions of some kind: Baxter, the son of self-improvers; Locke, from the smallest of small gentry, 
bitterly dependent on patronage; Galton, from a wealthy but nonconformist family which resented 
its exclusion from the charmed circle of the Anglican ruling elite. 
Assumptions of virtue made up for faults of pedigree. Sir Thomas Browne describes virtue as 
“nobility without heraldry.”32 Heraldry was “a good enough illustration of the antiquity of the race, 
but not the nobility of its successors; although they may be known by … [coats of] arms, they are 
only noble by their virtues.”33 But the more rigorous the science, the less it could cope with such 
interpretive fluidity. And it coped least when virtue was reinterpreted as learning. Virtuous purity 
of blood had once been said to resemble the marble of a statue, and learning its surface decoration. 
At a certain point, however, they became man and wife: noble ancestry and “that sweet bride, 
good learning.”34 One encyclopaedia of heraldry points out that in Latin ingenui, the well born, 
reads almost the same as ingenii, the quick-witted; they must have a common etymology, since 
these qualities are interchangeable.35 The same notion appears in Elyot’s seminal text on how to 
train up a learned gentry. Though his reformed curriculum culminates (routinely for the time) in 
Aristotelian ethics, he recasts Aristotle’s “great-souled man” as the Tudor gentleman, honourable 
and in grace. The continuance of a noble line depends on each generation’s renewal of the virtue 
that existed in nobility at the outset, and renewal then comes from following his recommended 
philosophy curriculum. He draws no category distinction between virtue as learning ability and 
“ability” as the power derived from landed possessions – nor even, he hints, from upwardly mobile 
merchants’ wealth, as long as they agree to play the game. One eye is on incumbents; the other tips 
the wink at any social climber who might end up being useful. The categories overlap, inasmuch as 
all are ways of establishing a niche for one’s son in a fluid socio-economic structure where lineage 
may turn out to be not enough. 
Honour is being framed here, in the late sixteenth century, in an increasingly abstract 
terminology that is civic as well as scientific. Its virtues are performed in public service. Sidney, 
while acknowledging the importance of heraldic science to a knowledge of human behaviour, said 
that he was not interested in men’s pedigrees: “it sufficeth to know their virtues.”36 It is striking 
how often even writers with the most rigorous approach to heraldic science also credit virtue with 
a higher value than lineage. But the contradiction is in our eyes only. For contemporaries, one 
essence was not replacing another. Virtue as learning and virtue as bloodline belonged to the same 
class of things, or at least occupied similar taxonomic slots. If learning-based virtue was a cuckoo 
in honour’s nest, the behavioural writers did not spot it. The moral autonomy of the individual in the 
old honour society had been his “franchise” (Lull’s word), a form of freedom consisting in personal 
self-assertiveness whose ultimate sanction was violence and whose psychological location was 
the will.37 During the seventeenth century this autonomy was relocated from the will to reason; 
freedom and the franchise came to reside in the individual’s formal civic maturity, his rational 
ability to allow himself to be governed or (later) to actively consent to this. The behaviour guides 
such as Peacham’s continued to be cited, but they are not a good indicator of what was going on 
in everyday life, since the actual practice of honour on the ground, like that of intelligence today, 
32 Browne, Religio, 66.
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was mundane and taken for granted, a prosaic interaction among social peers; it was a system of 
reciprocity and communication, and indeed of “intelligence” in this latter sense.38 
The idea that one collateral substance has been exchanged for another is therefore illusory. In 
the displacement of an honour society by an intelligence-based meritocracy we can see a structural 
rearrangement of practical means by which power is validated, through bidding modes that are 
at root interchangeable. “Virtue” drew a veil over any conflictedness in the relationship between 
lineage and learning. Such conflicts over one’s evidence base tend to be harmful to self-referential 
status claims; the very idea of evidence threatens the person claiming it. (This nebulousness brings 
to status its permanent air of crisis, and if today we talk contradictory nonsense to each other 
about intelligence, it is just that we do not notice our condition as one of crisis, nor do we notice 
the chains – social, cultural, political – in which intelligence binds us.) Once virtue, the substance 
of honour, began to be associated with individual intellects and their learning, the next step was 
its sublimation into something made up of intellect, thus rendering talk of honour redundant. Of 
course the war between excellence of bloodline and excellence of the intellect went on for a long 
time. A mere century ago for example, Proust’s hidebound aristocrats, the Courvoisiers, still cast 
intelligence as the “burglar’s jemmy” with which upstart commoners were threatening to break 
into their hallowed circle. Yet for several centuries, intellectual merit and bloodline, bride and 
groom, had already been advancing hand in hand. 
Noble lineage and Christian learning 
The identification of virtue with learning had a strongly Christian inflection. If intellectual virtues 
increasingly infiltrated the concept of honour, there was a corresponding halo of honour around the 
intellect itself, as a theological object. For the scholastics, all branches of learning were “among 
the number of honorabilia” because “they show that the intellect is perfectible.”39 And one branch 
of learning was higher on the scale than the rest: “Knowledge (scientia) of the soul is more
certain and worthy of honour than other kinds of knowledge … because of the excellence of its 
object and the certainty of knowing it.” The honourable occupation of the intellect as subject is to 
contemplate the honourability of the intellect as object.40 This circularity makes it proof against the 
corrupting influences of the body; the intellect is “more noble … because the ability (potentia) of 
the intellect is not something organic like the senses.”41 Of course one might object that the words 
honourable and noble are especially loose and unspecific here, and simply mean something like 
“better”; but as we have already seen, this is true of all modal terms, including “intelligent.” 
Renaissance writers transformed Aristotle’s slightly dismissive notion of honour – that it lay
in the eye of the person conferring it – into a more positive theological explanation for the origins 
of human nature: “Honour being an external adjunct, and in the honourer rather than in the 
person being honoured, it was necessary to make a creature, from whom [God] might receive this 
homage.”42 This made honour a central principle in natural law, which is how it also came to be a 
species characteristic and a component of human faculty psychology. There were already inklings 
of this in the leading Roman educational authority Alexander of Aphrodisias, a contemporary 
of Galen’s and a substantial influence on Arab and thence Western scholastic philosophers.
38 See Marston, “Gentry honour.”
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Honour, he said, is the common possession of all men as distinct from animals.43 On this natural 
history basis, the relative honour of the intellectual faculties and operations of certain groups 
becomes, at the lower margins, a test of their species membership. Albert, discussing half-human 
“pygmies,” says their chief characteristic is that they “do not heed the shame resulting from what 
is unseemly or the glory resulting from what is noble …. No animal but the human is ashamed of 
doing foul deeds.”44 Honour thus marks a discontinuity on the scale of nature. As he also says: 
One property of man that makes him a man is to be shamed by the perpetration of ugly acts. This 
does not happen with any other animal except man. And so he is said to be a creature of inveterate 
shame, because when on occasion men assume the irrationality of brute nature, they are moved by 
the honour of reason [rationis honore]. 
The reason of human beings is thereby entailed in their honour as much as vice versa. Albert 
attributes honour to all humans; it is horizontal, an aspect of creaturely equality, the only exceptions 
being half-human or mythical. However, these exceptions are a reminder that the psychological 
criteria are also, and inseparably, social ones (the pygmy, for example, is unable to “maintain a 
perfect political system or laws” and “has no civility”), and that in this sense they mark a vertical 
division. Lack of reason and lack of social honour, in the out-group, are more or less coterminous: 
the one is not merely a metaphor for the other. 
The honour of some men in relation to others has its parallel within the individual, in the 
hierarchy of psychological faculties and operations. The operations of the reasoning or judging 
faculty were seen by most writers as “more noble” than those of the imagination because the 
latter was linked to the external senses and hence to the material world; others thought the nobler 
part was the imagination because wit (ingenium) operated from there, and upon this depended 
the subsequent quality of the reasoning faculty’s own operations.45 Bodily matter too, the organic 
location of the faculties, reflected this hierarchy, some particles in the blood being “nobler” than 
others and thus more fit to receive and be directed by the soul spirits.46 
Ingenium or wit lurked within classical concepts of honour, based as they were on public 
and professional office holding and its related abilities (the Roman word nobilis simply meant 
“notable”).47 The chief Christian sources for the early modern behavioural genre – Aquinas, 
Bartolus, Erasmus – had quoted Cicero liberally in their attempt to Christianize the military 
concept of honour, though without focusing greatly on professional wit. Aquinas placed honour 
“nearest to virtue” in the order of desiderata. Virtue was what taught the truly honourable man 
to adhere to a mean between the “blameworthy” extremes of “despising of honours” and “an 
inordinate appetite for them.”48 Bartolus identified honour with non-military virtues, but in terms 
of Christian character as much as learning; he divided nobility into a triad of necessity, nature and 
nurture/convention: “supernatural nobility” (given by and known only to God), “natural nobility” 
43 Alexander of Aphrodisias, Ethical Problems, Problem 29. 
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(ranks of virtue within species and across species) and “political nobility” (donated by the ruler).49 
In Erasmus, Christianization clearly does not mean intellectualization:50 
Let it not move thee one whit when thou hearest the wise men of this world, men of sadness 
endowed with great authority, so earnestly disputing of the degrees of their genealogies or lineage, 
…. Let other men be kings’ sons: to thee let it be greatest honour that can be, that thou art called, 
and art so indeed, the son of God …. Take heed what manner of fellows Christ chooseth: feeble 
persons, fools, vile as touching this world. In Adam we are all born of low degree. 
Rather than a call for equality here on earth, this is ironic advice to the gentry. Admiring the religious 
status of the unlearned is simply his way of warning his own social peers to cease being their own 
worst enemies. The reference to sadness plays on the ambiguity of melancholia, a sign of wisdom in 
the scholastic culture but of disability in a humanist one such as Erasmus’s. “Fools” is his translator’s
word for idiotae, the word used in the Vulgate Bible for the disciples prior to their receiving the holy 
spirit. In this context the moral and the purely intellectual are seemingly separated: “Better an idiot 
untaught and well living, / Than a vicious doctor ill mannered and cunning.”51 
This humanist notion of Christian virtue fitted comfortably with the function of behaviour guides 
as training manuals for the career ladder. Hence their self-contradictoriness about membership 
qualifications. The arriviste could use the Christian idea of creaturely equality, suitably hedged, 
to penetrate the honour society. With dedications and preambles that typically address “the 
honourable assemblies of the Inns of Court” and “wish the reader advancement by virtue,” the 
behaviour guides incorporate learning-based virtue in their natural philosophy of honour, in the 
pursuit of group interests as well as of maintaining the existing order.52 The paradigm was William 
of Wykeham’s famous motto “Manners maketh man” (rank me by my behaviour, not my ancestry), 
appended to the coat of arms he had acquired from scratch. Aspiring entrants to the in-group and 
established members alike complained about the degeneracy and lapsed virtue of “nobility and 
gentry nowadays, [whom] you shall see … bred as if they made for no other end than pastime and 
idleness …. Good men and such as are learned are not admitted amongst them.” Moreover, “the 
affairs of their estates they impose upon others”; in other words, virtuous Christian learning means 
having enough wit to prevent your own rapacious stewards from robbing you.53 And when Elyot 
(drawing on Erasmus and Bartolus) casts learning as a form of religious humility by contrast with 
the arrogant military might of an unrestrained nobility, he is recommending humility towards the 
monarch. Knowledge is knowing your place. 
Christian creaturely equality and learning-based honour therefore had their limits. While
heraldic science treated the virtues of the mind with respect, its main task was still to conserve the 
importance of bloodline. However much the behaviour guides may have insisted that there is no 
honour “in hawking, hunting, hastiness, mighty power, vain vaunts, trains of horse, and servants, 
riot, mischiefs, bravery, roisting port, or great line” and located it instead in a Christian virtue defined 
by reading learned books, eminence in learning typically occurs in people who are “noble through 
their house and ancestors,” and only incidentally in those who “are of themselves noble.”54 
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One promoter of inner qualities lets the cat out of the bag. “Handicraftmen in these days,” he 
says, “have obtained the title of honour,” squatting “in the house of worthy fame … and at this 
day do bear those arms which were given unto old gentry.” That is why “noble and gentle men 
must diligently labour to excel others in virtue, or else there will rise comparison [sc. equality] 
of worthiness” – and of course social chaos.55 In his dedication to Lord Fitzwalter he belittles 
coats of arms as mere externals or “coloured things”; to itemize them, as conventional dedications 
do, would be mere flattery. But this protestation is itself a piece of flattery, since he takes the 
opportunity to list instead Fitzwalter’s internal, learning-based virtues. Just because we are all 
descended from Adam, says the writer, it does not mean there is no hierarchy. Adam was even 
then the gentleman. “Degree,” as intellectual differentiation, has existed from the dawn of time, 
headed by “gentlemen … which by their learning and knowledge excelled others, and were for that 
cause thought worthy of greater honour.” “Nobles have the better nature,” he says, but nature is 
inseparable from nurture and can be transformed by it through virtuous learning. The same goes 
for your future stock. Preserving status, in a system of landed inheritance as in a meritocracy, 
means preserving it for your children too. And that is why, as again in today’s meritocracy, you 
should focus on their education: “Honour falleth to no man by descent; no man can entail honour 
to his heirs male, the which enfeoffeth a man in lands and possessions, [and] cannot therewith 
give virtue unto him, without the which no man can be rightfully called honourable.” To obtain 
virtue requires “labour” instead, an intellectual labour in its broadest sense, and avoidance of 
“idleness.” This overlaps with religious doctrines (Protestant and, increasingly, Catholic ones), in 
which intellectual labour is becoming a preparation for grace. Christian learning has turned into a 
crutch which honour cannot do without. 
Definitions of virtue: the rivals to learning 
The chief rival to learning in its various forms was ostensibly military virtue. But the former did 
not simply replace the latter. The conventional pairing of “courage and wisdom” (fortitudo et 
sapientia), ubiquitously cited in the Middle Ages as rival sources of moral authority – military and 
ecclesiastical – were now united in the person of the great nobleman. It was “false and ridiculous” 
to say that it must be arms or letters; there is “a double ray of honour,” such that “valour and 
knowledge are the best parts of the virtues.”56 On the one hand, learning-based “virtue on its own 
does not ennoble.” On the other, weapons training can be “a school of idleness,” leading to the 
“ignorance” that is “a vice and dishonour to nobles.”57 Weaponless virtue was useful to emergent 
theories of absolute power because it helped to pick out compliant nobles from potentially rebellious 
ones; medieval tales of opposition between knighthood and priesthood nevertheless continued to be 
recycled, since stories about ancestral military exploits were locked into the claims of genealogy. 
The rise of virtue as nobility of mind was not necessarily the decline of virtue as military 
valour. Both alike helped firm up the hereditary principle. The idea of any kind of honour being 
hereditary, “an exceptional quality transmitted by the blood,” was recent.58 Most behaviour guides, 
while they endorse inner virtue or even mere acquired professional merit, also and in the same 
breath insist on lineage and bravery. A textbook from James I’s King of Heralds (a court office), for 
example, devotes its first three sections to soldiery, knighthood and duels. Only in the last section 
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is wit discussed and virtue defined as “true perfection of reason” acquired by “habit”; by an abrupt 
switch, honour is then defined as what one achieves as a result of this latter virtue.59 The author 
has trawled the entire range of contested notions of honour, glossing over their disparities in order 
to bring in and flatter every conceivable subgroup of gentry or indeed professional non-gentry into 
obedience to the state and the monarch. Strong emphasis on bloodline and its supposed association 
with military virtues was a reaction, not a preface, to the social and political shifts taking place in 
this period, which is why it appears so often alongside the appeal to learning-based virtue, usually 
within one and the same text. They grew up together. 
The allocation of virtue to learning and professional wit was a reaction to social instability, 
which writers addressed by making increasingly extravagant claims for their close relationship 
with lineage. The ultimate destination would be nineteenth- and twentieth-century concepts of 
inherited intelligence. Elyot writes that “Virtue joined with great possessions or dignity, … long 
continue in the blood or house of a gentleman, as it were an inheritance.”60 With this notion of 
virtue as a genealogy of the inner self, the self-referentiality of status could renew itself. Its rise in 
importance coincided with the gentry starting to claim direct blood descent from Prester John or 
Hector of Troy – a claim more characteristic of the late sixteenth century than of earlier ones.61 As 
for the man whose genealogy was dubious, Golden Age arguments came to his rescue. His present 
social position was an aberration. He should cultivate his intellect so that in him “the ancient and 
reverend nobility may return,” alongside “the glory of their wit and learning.”62 Lists of non-
martial virtues could of course be moral as much as strictly intellectual in character; yet such moral 
claims, frequent as they are, tend to be presented as aspects or “fruits of the human understanding,” 
which consists of “science and intelligence.”63 
A rival to learning and “the desire to understand” that was denied any claim to virtue was money, 
the love that dare not speak its name. Spanish writers like Cervantes and the anonymous author 
of Lazarillo de Tormes treat this satirically, comparing honour’s empty self-referentiality with an 
empty wallet. Their satire rests on the fact that like is not being compared with like: honour is 
appearance, not real collateral. It will not get you a square meal. The behaviour guides, by contrast, 
simply contradict themselves about wealth – or so it seems to a twenty-first-century reader. “What 
things shall a courtier most rely upon? His God, his king, his wit, and his purse,” says one.64 In 
order to achieve learning-based virtue from non-gentle origins, one must already be capable of 
generosity, including of a financial kind. To be poor, non-gentle and virtuous is impossible. To be 
poor, gentle and virtuous, on the other hand, is not. Distinctions are made as to particular kinds 
of wealth: “I speak not … in defence of all new risen men, but only of such as worthiness hath 
brought unto honour,” says the King of Heralds quoted above: that is, the sort of worthiness that 
derives from some intellectual component, usually in professional learning. He contrasts these men 
with the “vulgar,” with the “hogling … that was but lately digged out of a dunghill, whose wit and 
honesty both, doth only consist but in compassing of crowns” and in “servile functions.”65 The 
official line was that it is a certain type of money grubber, the one with gold bath taps, who is to be 
positioned as far down the social scale as possible. Another writer, subdividing the ungentle into 
villeins, merchants, burgesses and servants, ranks villeins as the highest of these four because they 
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“minister … necessities to man’s life,” unlike the merchant.66 What seems contradictory to us (can 
money buy honour or can’t it?) was quite straightforward to people of the time who lacked a firm 
category distinction between socio-economic ability and intellectual ability. 
Lineage and professional skills 
If, then, wit and learning – in a relationship with lineage that was part collision, part collusion –
were gaining the upper hand in defining the in-group and in its closure of ranks, what exactly 
was the content of that learning? One author, ostentatiously favouring the inwardness of learning 
over the outward display of genealogical insignia, goes on to identify the paradigm of learning as 
knowledge of those insignia, and of the biographies of honourable men. These are, for the gentry, 
“the perfect mean to sharpen their wits.”67 They show us that what constitutes “learning” is often 
circular within any bidding mode, thus directly reinforcing it; just as the educational psychologist, 
in testing intelligence, tests above all the subject’s potential to be an educational psychologist, so 
for the heraldic scientist the epitome of learning is knowledge of heraldry. One thing it is not, says 
this author, is scholarship. The mind has “more serious employments” than learning just for the 
sake of it. To devote one’s life to scholarship is “to desert the mistress to make love to the maid” 
and as a result to exhaust one’s soul spirits, with disastrous effects on the body’s reproductive 
abilities and thus on the continued excellence of the genealogical line.68 
The link between cultural representations of learning and its social practice is the professions. 
Giambattista Tiepolo’s 1743 Virtue and Nobility Putting Ignorance to Flight, for example, depicts 
these allegorical figures in classical dress; it invites the viewer to admire and honour the profession 
of its commissioner, a lawyer, by embellishing it with the trappings of ancient ancestry.69 Is this 
reduction of learning-based virtue to everyday professional ability essentially modern? Perhaps, 
but if so, its history is longer than one might think. Tiepolo got his theme from emblem books of at 
least two centuries earlier. Fundamental to professional learning was the ability to read and write, 
and many trades had long needed literacy from their apprentices. Within the honour society the 
need had always been there; even in the twelfth century, the philosopher John of Salisbury had 
likened an unlettered king to a crowned donkey. The nobility needed at least enough wit to avoid 
being cheated by their estate managers. It was not unusual for higher nobles to attend university, 
while younger sons would need to be literate for a career of service to the state. By the sixteenth 
century it was clearly recognized that a Master of Arts degree had “the power to create gentility,” 
if not any actual enthusiasm for one’s studies.70 
Alongside the instant expertise of the “ingenious gentleman” noted in an earlier chapter, a 
contrary and once dishonourable notion began to take hold: that it had to be complemented by 
intellectual labour, “a sweat of the brains” as Boyle called it.71 A gentleman needed “double honour, 
[to be] both eugenes and polymathes,” in Peacham’s words. Shirking was a sign of degeneracy. 
There was condemnation of gentry who “hate all things that must be obtained by industry, who 
most degenerately entrusting their wits as well as fortunes with their inferiors, have made them 
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master of both.”72 In England, the demand for professional learning had grown during the early 
sixteenth century as a single administration of law arose out of formerly disparate legal entities 
loosely tied to relatively autonomous noble clans. This centralization, which required increasing 
numbers of officials, coincided with the state takeover of the herald’s functions. For the architects 
of the Tudor state such as Thomas Cromwell, public verification of honourable descent as a tool 
of control became more, not less important. Many of the architects were of non-gentle origins 
themselves; Cromwell, who as Henry VIII’s Chief Minister was created first Earl of Essex, was 
a blacksmith’s son. This paradox irked the oppositional gentry: both the Pilgrimage of Grace and 
the engineers of Cromwell’s eventual execution called for “villein blood” to be removed from the 
King’s council. 
The goal of professional learning was sound magistracy. The focusing of virtue on wit and 
learning, and of wit and learning on administrative skill, was made possible in England partly by 
the rise of secular grammar schools, of which St Paul’s, set up by Erasmus’s friend John Colet 
in 1509, was the chief example. Similar demands for a schooling in learning-based virtue as the 
state’s response to political and religious fragmentation sprang up in France, where the first state 
academy for nobles was established in 1594. Promoting the image of the cultured nobleman, it 
was a reversal of the previous stereotype (for French noblemen “to read a good book … is in 
their eyes to seem like the son of a doctor or lawyer”), which in any case merely may have been 
a convenient fiction.73 In Molière’s Le bourgeois gentilhomme, Monsieur Jourdain’s middle-class 
ignorance contrasts with the noble learning of Comte Dorante. Even though learning had in fact 
long been a part of noble life, it was presented as a novelty because only now was it a necessary 
mode of self-representation, formally recognized as part of the nobility’s administrative role. 
Whereas commoners needed five years to graduate in law, three was enough for a nobleman, 
“either because they are more apt at understanding the sciences than non-nobles … or because it 
is the gentleman’s desire for honour that forces him always to excel.” (His superior intelligence 
might have also more material causes, according to this author: one of the nobility’s privileges 
was to hunt partridge, whose meat produces “a sense and intelligence more delicate than in those 
fed on beef and pork.”)74 The gentleman’s duty to dispense justice and maintain the common good 
demanded a disinterested virtue – and an administrative ability – which entitled him to honour and 
privileges from the community. It was his intellect and his honour together, then, that constituted 
“the advantage I have of the vulgar.”75 
Genealogical claims were therefore only one element in the accumulated symbolic capital 
shoring up professional privilege, at a time when the accumulated economic capital of non-gentle 
but in fact highly literate and numerate merchants was increasingly vital to the state. The tensions 
here are clearest in France, where it led to the genealogical “nobility of the sword” being more 
rather than less clearly contrasted with the upstart “nobility of the [lawyer’s] gown,” and to a 
sharper distinction between honour and “merit.” When behavioural writers warned against putting 
“honour and shame, merit and demerit, on the same rank,” as if honour and merit could be of equal 
value, it was a sign that the vocabulary in which self-referential status bids were conceived was 
already changing.76 Merit, it seemed, was replacing personal forms of authority based on ancestry 
with an impersonal culture enshrined in professional and administrative ability. Champions of merit 
defined it as ability in the “liberal sciences.” One even narrowed it down as far as mathematics, 
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the “captain” of all other kinds of learning, as long as it was “employed in the government of 
people”: that is, civil service accounting, a precursor of the nineteenth-century social statistics that 
inspired the first psychometricians.77 Conflicts over promotion to the in-group forced disputants 
into a consensus about the types of professional learning that were honourable; it was agreed to 
include anyone “dignified with the title of Doctor, or graced by some office of reputation,” even 
if (with the rapid footwork characteristic of status modes), once “that be taken away, he shall be 
reputed a common person” again. Doctors should automatically have coats of arms even if born 
ungentle, as should lawyers.78 
In a key move, Henri IV tried in 1604 to accommodate the bloodline concept of honour to this 
new outlook, by making crown offices in law and finance saleable but subsequently inheritable. 
The criterion of lineage turned out to be adaptable to circumstance, lubricated by the cash that 
passed hands in the ennoblement of both sword and gown. French and English writers accused 
each other’s countries of instigating this practice. Peacham said that when Louis XI ennobled his 
Chancellor, he had “unworthily advanced [him] from a stocking-mender” for pecuniary advantage; 
his French contemporary said that the practice was already observable in England, “where one 
must have a certain income in order to be ennobled.”79 Merit was a quality of the honnête homme, 
covering bourgeois honesty as much as genteel honour. In reaction to the rise of this “new” 
professional, assemblies of French nobles in 1616 and 1627 showed that the existing aristocracy 
knew a trick or two. To resist the inflation of honours and the degradation of self-referential honour 
into a collateral honesty, the nobility itself began to promote “merit” – but by the Humpty Dumpty 
method (typical of status bids) of redefining the term. Offices should be distributed by merit,
yes – as long as one defined merit as birth. Of course few in the assembly could trace their own 
nobility further back than two or three generations, so it was scarcely an argument against “new 
men” in genealogical principle, only against the numbers to be allowed in at any one point. 
The threat of being swamped by outsiders could be averted by concentrating on the “cultivation” 
of blood, by educating your offspring: a precursor to Jean-Baptiste Lamarck’s biological principle 
of descent by acquired characteristics. It was not enough to be well born. Parents, said the 
behavioural writers, had to feed the plant and “spread from the earliest age the seeds of virtues” by 
“honest nurture.” While nurture and nature were sometimes set off against each other – Browne, for 
example, is grateful that his own virtue came “from the seeds of nature, rather than the innoculation 
and forced grafts of education” – his point was that nurture, as custom and firmly planted good 
advice, should become nature, of a type that would recur in succeeding generations. This was more 
characteristic of the period. The classical sources such as Pliny had looked on nature as a “nurse.” 
The element of determinism lies not in nature but in blood. That is why blood has to be pure; hence 
the need for a correspondingly precise scientificity of heraldic assessment. If a noble marries a 
non-noble, the blood takes a hundred years to become completely “distilled” again; by contrast, 
the man of honour who commits a crime “nevertheless conserves his original nobility, since the 
virtue passed into him with the blood of his ancestors comes as much from his proper essence as 
from the character which nature has imprinted upon his person.” Blood as internal necessity stands 
in contrast to “nature” as acquired characteristics.80 
This necessity has its external, political aspect in absolute monarchy: “honours and baronies 
… were [first] granted by the king,” with the result that “now being so invested in our blood, and 
become hereditary, they cannot be revoked.” The king could also “grant” a pedigree retrospectively, 
77 Faret, The Honest Man, 69. 

78 Segar, Honor, Military and Civil, 225; Ferne, Blazon, 19. 

79 Charles Loyseau, Traité des ordres, citing Smith, De Republica, 114. 
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or even “repair a fault of birth in those to whom nature has denied it.” The idea that “none are 
[in] honour originally, but such as are belonging to the king” influenced the historiography too. 
“Nobility dative” (i.e., given by someone else) was an expression of pure necessity; it reflected 
the fact that the source of human honour was Adam and that it was given by God, with the king as 
his understudy. It was superior to “nobility native” (i.e., bestowed or acquired by nature), which 
was less determinate. Nobility granted by the monarch is instantaneous; it “purges the blood and 
the ennobled man’s posterity of all taint of mechanical labour, and distils it to the same quality 
and dignity as if his race had been born to it.”81 In short, it can be relative and malleable (merit) 
at exactly the same time and in exactly the same social context as it is absolute and deterministic 
(blood), just as intelligence is for the modern professional who talks of intelligence in terms of 
constructions and discourses but nevertheless needs it to get on in the world. Bloodline combined 
with meritorious wit was the identity politics of an ascendant class. 
In Spain, as we have already noted, the tensions between a much-discussed limpieza de sangre
(“purity of blood”) and the newer gentry’s learning-based merit centred on supposed ethnic and 
religious difference. Professional service to the state was seen as coming disproportionately from 
the descendants of forcibly converted Moors and Jews, who at some point became feared more 
than peasant or merchant stock as the source of pollution. There were complaints about their 
clever “imitations” of honour. Those of Jewish blood had in fact their own self-image of inherited 
intelligence, drawn from their ancestors’ Judaic doctrines of lineage. They were perceived as 
contributing significantly to the number of courtiers, magistrates and leading churchmen, as well as 
of lower-order professionals who complained about having to serve stupid masters of pure Spanish 
blood. (The myth ran that “it is a sign of noble lineage not to know how to write your name.”)82 
It was these learned men of converso stock whom the behavioural authority Bernabé Moreno de 
Vargas had in mind when he warned about the subversive social effect of such imitative skill: “The 
commoner judges things not as they are but as they appear; and seeing that some men have the 
ostentation, words and title of gentlemen, he takes them for such.” People “ambitious for honour” 
who adopted spurious coats of arms were to be punished in law, whereas nobles who lost their land 
did not thereby lose their nobility. Nevertheless, Bernabé did not oppose the dubbing of conversos
or plebeians if it was done by the king, the necessary instrument of God’s grace. 
A classic example of this type of passage from chivalry to learning comes in the dénouement 
of Don Quixote. The man who finally cures the Don’s diseased imaginative faculty is the clever 
“Bachelor [of Arts] Sanson Carrasco,” as Cervantes pointedly always styles him. Carrasco’s 
university qualification represents merit-based learning, against those nobles who in playing tricks 
on the Don “have turned into fools themselves” (the type of the “artificial fool,” discussed in more 
detail in Chapter 9). Likewise he gets to be the Don’s sidekick, replacing the peasant smallholder 
Sancho Panza, who may have been “a man of some standing (if a poor man may be said to have 
standing), but whose brains were a bit short of salt.”83 The loss of Don Quixote’s foolishness, the 
restoration of his senses, is also the loss of his sense of honour. This fits the broader historical shift 
that was taking place in faculty psychology at the time. Wit (the book’s ironic subtitle dubs him
el ingenioso hidalgo, “the gentleman of wit”) is relocated away from the imaginative faculty where 
mere appearances such as honour first impact on the mind, and towards the superior faculty of 
reasoning. It is not that Don Quixote’s foolishness calls his honour in question; rather, the sense
of honour itself is typically foolish. 
81 Brooke, A Discourse Opening the Nature of that Episcopacie, 80; Ashley, Of Honour, 51; Joachim 
d’Estaing, cited in Devyver, Le sang, 212; Milles, The Catalogue, 2; Loyseau, Traité, 34. 
82 Bernabé Moreno de Vargas, Discursos de la nobleza de España, 86v; 42v. 
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Honour, learning and perfectibility 
Virtue also plays a role in the transformation of honour-related principles of personal destiny into 
intelligence-related ones of group perfectibility, in service of the state. “To what end,” asked a 
Tudor ideologue, “are so many monuments and pedigrees granted to [an] excellent m[a]n … so 
much the apter unto virtue as he is of greater birth, dignity or authority … but that by them they 
meant to teach posterity to be forward in virtue by imitation of their ancestors?”84 The eugenic 
perfectibility of future generations, interwoven with earthly preparation for the second coming, 
became a central issue. “Honour,” it was said, “consisteth in the perfection of kind.”85 There were 
three ways of doing it, in accordance with the necessity-nature-nurture triad: 
The first, antiquity of blood (by descending from noble parents); the second, nature (by the bettering 
of our disposition); and the third, proper virtue (by assuming and accomplishing things good and 
excellent).… These … are lively roots from whence honours may grow; for we daily see that 
fathers, grandfathers and great grandfathers have their images and portraitures lively represented 
in the bodies of their children; and why not then the virtues of their minds. 
Virtue here, being a matter of nurture, helps to admit “minds” into the schema and then feeds back 
into the determinism of blood. 
In reaction to the honour-inflation crisis of the early seventeenth century, some French writers 
insisted that the horde of newly ennobled merchants and professionals were receiving only a 
nominal nobility; it was not the restitution of some real, quasi-biological superiority. But others 
tried to accommodate the bourgeois influx by invoking a nascent theory of development. They 
subdivided the in-group into a supreme noblesse parfaite, a developing noblesse croissante and 
a newly dubbed noblesse commençante.86 This transposition of derivation from into development 
towards group perfection soothed the political tensions that arose from the inflation of honourable 
titles. Previously nobility had been the conservation of an immemorial record, within a largely 
spatial and steady-state cosmology; now it was an investment in staged future growth, within 
a temporal one. The three stages above were said to correspond with “infancy,” “puberty” and 
“maturity,” for which the author drew on the science of alchemy (lead needed three operations 
to be refined into gold). The three past honourable generations required for heraldic verification 
are now projected into the future. A static microcosm-macrocosm picture of the world was being 
replaced by one where the individual’s development and perfectibility is that of the species: the 
beginnings of a Kantian universal history. 
As group perfectibility became the goal, inheritance lost none of its force. Instead, the modes of
honour and intellect fused and were extended beyond elite families to the nation, and finally to the
human race in general. Previously, “nature” in social divisions (despite all the wild metaphor about
the “multitude” being a hydra-headed monster) had been in the last resort a difference of degree: 
“Nobility announces itself in one and the same species of nature … having in a greater degree of
perfection that which is natural and proper to its species, than the other things of the same species.”87 
At the twilight of the traditional honour mode, its last-ditch defenders such as Henri de Boulainvilliers
turned it into a primitive theory of “natural” class struggle by asserting that social divisions follow
species-like differences in kind, by race and class. Some of his Enlightenment contemporaries turned
it into a doctrine of national honour, one branch of which fed later into fascism’s “blood and honour”;
84 Ashley, Of Honour, 51.
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others turned it into égalité and the brotherhood of man. Baron d’Holbach, for example, described
revolutionary America as a “citizen nobility.” The American constitution’s right to bear arms, while
no doubt it refers to actual weapons, might also be read in terms of coats of arms, pointing to the
same thought: that every citizen has the right to be regarded as a gentleman. 
Hereditary honour also fed into French republican notions of democracy and the perfection of
man. The idea that honour might inhere in a universal bloodline proved compatible with meritocracy
from the start. As an egalitarian of the 1770s, arguing for all children to wear school uniforms, wrote:
“Uniformity favours equality. In vain has so much been written and said about genealogy, titles,
coats of arms, birth; all men are born equal, of the same father. Nature has engraved that truth in
ineffaceable letters on every cradle.”88 By “letters” he is implying heraldic insignia, now universalized.
The 1789 Jacobins, with their claim that a fake aristocracy had filched the term “honour” from an
originally egalitarian human community, were suggesting that honour could be redefined as reason;
in bestowing this reconceived honour now upon all humans, they were restoring its true substance.89 
However an abstract concept of fraternity, if defined in advance of the individuals comprising it, will
inevitably mean the exclusion of some of them: an exclusion upon which that concept depends for
its very existence. The intimations of equality in American citizen honour still ruled out labourers
and the poor, let alone slaves. Likewise with French national honour: it was “a French gentleman
[emphasis added] that one desires to have, the habits, the manner, the grace which is truly French
and not foreign.”90 If boasting about one’s ancestors had come to be frowned upon, this attitude long
remained ambiguous. Proust’s Duchesse de Guermantes, for example (who surely knew Hippolyte
Taine’s De l’intelligence, widely read in the France of the time), was noted for choosing her friends
by their intelligence rather than their birth. Judging people by their ancestry was old hat, but Proust
notes that somehow the servants never forgot to address her as Madame la Duchesse. 
When the radical egalitarian Thomas Paine wrote that the idea of hereditary legislators was 
as absurd as that of hereditary mathematicians, he little thought how he would be trumped by the 
absurdity of history. We did indeed come up with hereditary mathematicians. In Galton’s Hereditary 
Genius, for example, mathematical abilities are the inherited intellectual property of the white race 
and (despite problems of regression to the mean) must be passed on to future generations. Galton 
came from a Western tradition which told him that humans are worthier than other animals but also, 
by similarly intellectual criteria, worthier than some other humans whom it might therefore be more 
appropriate to classify as degenerate (labourers, black people) or quasi-brutes (idiots, imbeciles). 
Just as control of marriage within the elite became stricter from the thirteenth century onwards in 
order to enhance the inheritable symbolic capital of honour, so today eugenic insemination – in 
line with Galton’s proposal that only exam-passers be allowed to have children – is designed to 
enhance the inheritable symbolic capital of intelligence and the social distinctions it affords. The 
history of intelligence has been intrinsic to the channelling of distinctions of blood and honour into 
racial separateness: first English rather than French (Spanish, Italian, etc.), then white rather than 
black, then human rather than – what, exactly? The conceptual space certainly arises there, inviting 
us to fill it with something inferior or plain pathological. By “human race” we mean the rationally 
choosing and consenting race, with its powers of logical reasoning, abstraction and information 
processing. If that is the case, then from the perspective of someone deemed to lack these things 
the anti-racist slogan “One race, the human race” remains on an ethical continuum with racist ones: 
that is, until the urge to seek and fill the conceptual space with not-quite-humans is recognized as 
being itself the pathology. 
88 Cited in Jay Smith, Nobility Reimagined, 145; 192.
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“Dead in the Very Midst of Life”:  

the Dishonourable and the Idiotic
 
Here we shall be asking: who were the people that lay beyond the scope of honour, and what 
connection did this have with their intellectual status? Honour was a universal way of ordering 
social relationships, with an all-encompassing prescriptive force that justified discriminations of 
social class and gender and, to a lesser extent, ethnicity and religion. Intelligence too is exactly 
this, although its discriminations around class, gender and race and their claimed evidence base in 
IQ have become contentious, not to say (with certain recurring exceptions) passé. Only in the case 
of the so-called intellectually disabled does ordeal by intelligence not appear to be discriminatory 
or unjust. 
Claims to honour, as to intelligence, are valid only if there is also a group that has no claim. 
This out-group can be subdivided. First, certain people are not born to the in-group. But secondly 
there are odd individuals who are born to the in-group, who therefore have a notional claim to 
the honour collectively ascribed to their group, but who nevertheless lack it. From the standpoint 
of any dominant status mode, these two types do not appear to differ from each other, since the 
modes generally presuppose that what it is to be honourable (elect, intelligent) is also what it is to 
be human. In the case of intelligence, the criterion for being human is to think abstractly, reason 
logically, process information, etc. There is no sense in trying to differentiate between one type of 
person who belongs outside the intelligence society and another who belongs in it but is incapable 
of meeting these criteria; the result would simply be a tautology. The same was true of concepts 
of honour for the sixteenth-century reader. One would not, at that time, have tried to differentiate 
between a type that lay beyond the honour society (labourers, shopkeepers, women, etc.) and a 
type that was born within that society but was incapable of exhibiting signs of belonging to it, 
however clear the difference is to us now. That is why, in the primary sources, we find that a single 
set of terms (“idiot,” “fool”) covers both types. Since the difference in respect of honour has been 
discarded and therefore is clear to us, we can take these types separately and in turn. 
Class, race and gender: idiots before the modern stereotype 
In terms of social rank, the out-group were “idiots” in the old sense of uneducated: a large sector 
of the population. And as Lynn Rose points out, the conceptual distance between the uneducated 
and the supposedly uneducable is short.1 When Alexander distinguished between “philosophers 
and idiotai,” the latter meant people naturally lacking ideas or abilities – but it also meant ordinary
people.2 Stoic philosophers, said Alexander, mistakenly exaggerated the importance of fate; they 
too could sometimes be “idiots” and so this word could, in all non-satirical seriousness, extend as 
far as philosophers with the wrong ideas. Conversely, both philosophers and idiots were capable 
of having the right ideas about fate; the fact that these two groups were divided in their intellectual 
natures did not mean that they could not be united in their response to an intellectual question. 
1 Rose, “The courage.” 
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The early church fathers used idiota to mean someone lacking religious wisdom, and in theology 
up to the eighteenth century it continued to be synonymous with indoctus (uneducated).3 Albert 
described idiotae more precisely as people who “do not discern the universal from particulars,” i.e., 
those who do not make abstractions.4 Like Alexander, he seems to have meant everyone who was 
not a philosopher and some of those too. The point was repeated later by Locke when he suggested 
that idiots (among whom he might still have included landless labourers) are like animals because 
they “abstract not.” The deficiency is the same for Albert, Locke and today’s psychologist; it is 
just that the number of people to whom it is attributed has gradually diminished. The abstracting 
skills which Albert attributed solely to those of his learned colleagues who agreed with him around 
the year 1200 have become, roughly speaking, the skills which psychology defines as universally 
human, bar a few freaks, around the year 2012. 
As we have already seen, the social vocabulary of gentility and honour in the late medieval 
period is reflected in the theoretical vocabulary of philosophers as they order their knowledge into 
ranks. “One kind of knowledge is more honourable than another,” says Albert in the above text; it 
all depends on the “incorruptibility” of the subject matter and the “certitude” with which one can 
reach conclusions. Lurking within this hierarchy of knowledge is the claim to honour of people 
who know and can demonstrate such certainties. The most certain are geometry and the existence of 
God, plus “the nobility and utility of knowledge of the soul.” Abstraction and theoretical knowledge 
consist of things separated from the material world, and their highest form is knowledge of how 
the human soul undertakes this separation. One’s place at the top of the hierarchy, natural and 
social, thus springs from one’s ability to know one’s place at the top of the hierarchy. According 
to Albert, souls “lose honour to the extent that they are immersed” in the images of the material 
things encountered in everyday life, and which themselves have varying degrees of honourability 
and incorruptibility. The soul’s theoretical knowledge of its own theoretical faculty of knowing 
descends into corruption by degrees that correspond with social rankings. Recognizable modern 
class stereotypes emerge after this first wave of scholasticism, in the Renaissance commentaries 
on Aristotle. As writers inserted elements of his On the Soul into their commentaries on his 
quite unrelated theory of social rank in Politics, in order to support the latter with psychological 
explanations, so they inserted elements of his Politics into their commentaries on his theory of the 
human psyche in On the Soul, in order to support the latter with explanations drawn from the hard 
facts of social rank. 
Disqualification by social rank was marked not only by deficiencies in the processes of 
knowing, such as abstraction, but more obviously by lack of substantive knowledge: that is, of the 
ideas which the processes of knowing produced. Not so long ago parents of English working-class 
children, on the rare occasion they might mix with those of a higher social class, would routinely 
warn them “Don’t go getting ideas.” An abbreviation of “Don’t go getting ideas above your 
station,” this became a warning against expecting too much of life or betraying one’s own class. 
But the abbreviated version brings out its core point: ideas above your station in the early modern 
period were ideas as such, and ideas – any ideas worth the name, i.e., the abstract ones of religion, 
mathematics and the soul – were to be found only in the honour society. Of Stoic origin (koinai 
ennoiai), they became known in early modern texts as “the common ideas” (communes notiones) or 
more often simply “the ideas.” They did not circulate freely among all social groups but identified 
a particular one: “common” in the sense of being held in common by a restricted group whose 
members could recognize each other by their grasp of them. Honour lay in the possession of these 
ideas, just as modern intelligence lies in the possession of the common processing mechanisms 
3 For example Pierre Poiret, Cogitationum Rationalium, 262.
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such as abstraction that lead to ideas. Albert had gone so far as to say that “the common ideas are 
called ‘honours’ (dignitates vocantur).”5 
The exclusions and boundaries aligning the social with the psychological in this way track the 
transition from early modern to modern. No clear category distinction existed between lack of the 
common ideas, a natural characteristic of non-gentle ranks in general, and their lack of honour. 
Indeed, in faculty psychology, honour itself was often presented as a constituent part of one of 
the faculties. This survived the breakdown of absolutism and of monarchy itself; it was an anti-
monarchist parliamentarian who described honour as “that to the commonwealth which the soul is 
to the body,” its “mind,” to be kept separate from the “distempers which threaten the body politic.”6 
In a slipperiness characteristic of discussions about class, the word communes for these ideas also 
evokes the commons or general population, when in fact only people of social standing possessed 
them. (One recalls here that English private schools call themselves “the public schools.”) The 
inference might be drawn that only the elite are fully human, and that those who lack the ideas, 
in belonging outside it, might belong even outside the communitas, in the sense of being bestial. 
When “society” dresses itself up as the whole population, it arrogates to itself the definition of the 
human species; other groups are unnatural or deformed, in this case intellectually. Extreme social 
discriminations, to be justifiable, must have roots in nature. It is natural for some men to rule, not 
only over beasts but over bestial men. 
As psychological truth (knowledge of the soul, mind and self) began to form a third set of 
common ideas alongside religious and mathematical truths, it too reformulated the out-group 
according to its own specific terms: “discussion of the soul is very obscure, and therefore God has 
only given knowledge of it to those who are deeply learned, and when the masses ask about this 
problem … it is not their concern.”7 It might be that “idiots, the unlearned and peasants can be 
holy without any such knowledge,” but only by providence.8 Elyot’s “monster with many heads,” 
as a threat to the gentry’s “eugenia,” would re-emerge in the Edwardian eugenicists’ fear that the 
wrong social class was reproducing – a problem solved, some of them thought, by the slaughter 
in the trenches.9 Inability to abstract and lack of “ideas” now tend to define only a small disabled 
out-group, though it would perhaps be over-hasty to think these other prejudices have gone away. 
In the words of a currently serving British cabinet minister and former educational adviser to 
government, “It’s not only the thick but the reasonably thick part of the population, perhaps 70% 
or 50%, who are completely incapable of conducting a normal life in the terms in which we as 
the privileged elite understand it.” Comforting ruminations about one’s distance from the “stolid 
masses” (to use Michael Young’s satirical formula) are, paradoxically, necessary to the meritocrat’s 
self-representation. 
Both the common ideas and the psychological operations needed for grasping them were matters 
of interest to the early modern professional and to the maintenance of his privileges. His subjective 
relation to the social order was the ascription of him to a caste whose badge of membership was not 
only the claim to ancestry but the “ideas” held in common with men from other professions. The 
intellectualocentrist ideology was related to a feeling of being under threat from the socio-economic 
mobility of groups immediately below the threshold: merchants, well-off artisans, yeoman farmers. 
When lawyers, mostly upstarts themselves, proposed barring yeomen’s sons from the Inns of Court 
and reserving law for those “immediately descended from a nobleman or gentleman,” absence of 
5 Albert, De Unitate, in Borgnet (ed.), Opera, ix, 452.
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honour and of intellectual or professional ability alike was implied.10 And when, conversely, it was 
suggested that gentlemen’s sons be barred from taking up apprenticeships, it was not only because 
they ought not to be in trade (they often were) but because gentlemen, being “ingenious” by their 
very nature, ought not to be seen as needing to spend time or labour on acquiring mundane skills. 
A leading early Royal Society member asserted that knowledge of the soul, let alone of 
mathematics or religion, was impossible for “vulgar apprehensions,” but admitted that intellectual 
ability could sometimes be found in people outside the honour society. In their case, he said, it 
was “necessity” that made them wise, not their nature: either practical necessity, or the necessity 
implied in a divine suspension of natural laws. More usually the “common people” have “dull 
wits,” indicative of a “brutish nature,” the evidence being above all that they “have no … feeling 
of honour and renown.” The yokel with a comic accent, allowed just one speech at the end of 
an allegorical dialogue on honour, angrily denounces heraldic science as “an old smoky coat … 
rotten and full of holes.” He is reproved by the knight: “Thou favourest nothing but thy plough:
nobility and the signs thereof is far above thy capacity.” The herald moderating the dialogue asks 
for the yokel to be excused, because by his very nature he is incapable of knowing Blazon and 
cannot be held responsible for his own ignorance.11 
Questions of social class are involved in the transition from the scholastics’ general, deductive 
knowledge of the human soul to a modern, purportedly inductive knowledge of individual minds. 
The transition appears quite seamless. Wherever we find the clearest proto-psychiatric language, 
there we find also the clearest references to honour and social ranks, and that is because for 
contemporaries these two sets of references were cognate. Consider the following passage from 
Charron, which encompasses a wide range of textual conventions: faculty psychology, the medical 
theory of temperaments, species difference, the theological doctrine of idleness as living death 
and classical references such as the ranking of souls in Plato’s Republic and the transmigration of 
animal souls in Timaeus: 
[The soul] may properly enough be reduced into three classes, each of which is capable of being 
subdivided again, and hath several distinctions and degrees comprehended under it. The lowest 
of these are poor and weak souls, not much removed from … brutes. And this defect may be 
sometimes from the faults and imperfections of the natural constitution: too great a predominance 
of cold and moisture in the temperament of the brain, as fishes, whose composition is of this kind, 
are reckoned the lowest and most wanting of all other animals. This infirmity is born with us, and 
derived from our parents. Sometimes it is chargeable upon accidental failings afterwards: want 
of due care to awaken and exert the natural powers, and letting them rest upon our hands till they 
degenerate into senselessness and stupidity. Of these we can make no certain account, nor can 
they be esteemed a certain species; for in truth, they are not in a condition to govern themselves as 
men, but are minors and ignorants all their days, and ought to be constantly kept under the tuition 
and care of others wiser than themselves. They snore and nod with their eyes open; and while they 
seem to live and act, are dead in the very midst of life; moving carcasses.12 
This could easily be taken as some transhistorical group identifiable by their pathology: an extreme 
deviation from the norm, with an essentialist question mark over their species membership – that 
is, the same tiny minority our own scientists know as intellectually disabled. But then we get the 
specifics. These souls are “the boors and common people, without sense, without apprehension, 
10 Cited in Simon, Education, 337.
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without judgement … living under subjection and management .… In a word, such as are but just 
men, and no more”: that is, the majority of the population. 
Codes defining the boundaries of the honour society, as they become rigidified, reflect the 
pressures of social mobility. Take, for example, the conventional employment by logicians of 
“Socrates” to represent any individual member of the species “man,” as an illustration of how 
particulars relate to universals. This spread beyond the bounds of pure logic and started to be used 
to imply a differentiation within human nature. It became usual to pair Socrates with Thersites, 
representative of the out-group because he is the only non-noble to make a named appearance 
in Homer’s Iliad. So in the late sixteenth century we find the syllogistic pairing “Socrates is a 
philosopher, Socrates is a man, Some man is a philosopher,” and “Thersites is no philosopher, 
Thersites is a man, Some man is not a philosopher.” Half a century later, as the modes of honour 
and wit were bifurcating, Royal Society secretary John Wilkins would illustrate the basic principles 
of logical dichotomy with examples drawn from what by now were assumed to be separate 
approaches to human nature; he casts Socrates as the illustration of the “honourable” and Thersites 
as its privative, “dishonourable,” while “rational man” and its privative, “idiot,” come under a 
separate rubric.13 
As human reason and intelligence gradually prevailed over honour, rational consent theory did 
not moderate contempt for the out-group but did reduce its numbers. When Locke in the second 
of his Two Treatises says “We are born free as we are born rational” and goes on to mention 
“natural fools” as the exception to this rule, he sounds like Charron above. Charron’s remark that 
the masses are “minors and ignorants all their days … constantly kept under the tuition and care 
of others” is matched by Locke’s remark that “anyone [who] comes not to such a degree of reason 
wherein he might be supposed capable of knowing the law” is “never set free from the government 
of his parents.”14 Charron has a concept of universal man just as Locke has, it is simply that his 
exceptions seem to be a majority of the population and to represent various aspects of a general 
Adamite nature, whereas Locke’s are a minority “out of the ordinary course of nature.” It had 
previously been quite usual to lump together “mad folks, idiots and old men [grown] childish, 
bond-slaves, and villains” as being “excepted for giving evidence” in court, on the grounds that 
they are all non compotes mentis. Moreover, that was because they “must of necessity be liars” – a 
classic characteristic of the dishonourable – and are therefore “bond-slaves of the Devil, whose 
works they will do.”15 
In the mid-eighteenth century Samuel Johnson’s use of idiot terminology still mixes psychology 
and social class. James Boswell describes how Johnson would periodically desert “society” friends 
to consort with “unideaed” women; he spoke of an actress who was “in common life, a vulgar idiot; 
she would talk of her gownd but, when she appeared upon the stage, seemed to be inspired by 
gentility and understanding …. It is wonderful how little mind she had.” Common and vulgar here 
stand in opposition to gentility but also to understanding; idiot stands in opposition to understanding 
but also to gentility.16 The evidence for the actress’s idiotism is her failure to pronounce English in 
the way fixed for polite society by Dr Johnson, who was only at that moment inventing the very 
idea of a connection between fixed pronunciation and social rank; and as the reader will by now be 
expecting, he too was an upstart claiming higher social connections – in William Hogarth’s view 
“an idiot momentarily inspired.” 
13 An Essay towards a Real Character, and a Philosophical Language. 

14 Locke, Two Treatises of Civil Government, 145.
 
15 Nathaniel Wanley, The Wonders of the Little World, 66.
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Religion and race fed into these notions of class. The Jews were cited in debates about whether 
human souls differ or whether they are equal and only their “operations” different. Surely there 
had to be a difference between Christ’s soul and a Jew’s?17 This anxiety spread to debates about 
the newly enslaved population of the Americas. Whereas Albert had actually added to Aristotle’s 
list of the virtues of slaves, crediting them with the “civic intellect” (prudentia) denied them by 
his predecessor, some Spanish writers attributed to their subject peoples a permanent mindlessness 
(amentia).18 Amentia till then had been a passing moment in the acute phase of disease in an 
individual patient, rather than a permanent characteristic of groups. In its radicalized form, it 
contributed to the idea of the permanence of the disabled identity, covering all individuals in the 
group. Spanish elites before the crisis of the seventeenth century viewed their own peasant class 
similarly, in whom lack of honour was also lack of mind (mens).19 Later, the overlap between race 
and class came to be justified by interpretations of Genesis 9 which identified the three sons of 
Noah as the source for the first division of labour. The idea that “the descendants of Shem pray, the 
descendants of Japheth fight, and the descendants of Ham work” became the chief reference point 
for Southern whites in the nineteenth-century USA, where slaves were said to belong to the black 
or “Hamitic” race and their supposed psychological inferiority was still characterized primarily by 
an incapacity for honour.20 
Finally there is once again the insult and its links to modern parlance. An ill-informed peer or 
debating opponent was characteristically dubbed “Thersites.”21 The typical insult to someone’s 
honour, calculated to spark a duel, was to call him a villain, denying his group membership on 
the grounds of class (from “villein,” a feudal serf). Some sense of this carries over into the phrase 
“an insult to my intelligence.” The word “insult” here is more than mere metaphor. It does not 
say that you have insulted my intelligence as if it were my honour, or even my intelligence and 
therefore my honour; there has simply been a displacement of one term by the other. The structural 
continuity is provided by the extension of the honour society, within which (alone) there was 
a presumed equality of intellectual competences, into a modern, quasi-universal intelligence 
society. Conversely, “it’s a wise man that knows his own father.” In this phrase the priority 
seems to go to wit over honourable descent, even if the ironic implication is that such wisdom is
actually impossible. 
Effeminacy and mental torpor 
Not only female commoners but genteel wives and daughters lay outside the honour society. Their 
honour lay in their bodies, a fragile private reflection of the public honour of their men. Otherwise, 
gentlewomen had the same psychological deficiencies as the labouring multitude. The entire sex 
was the natural “slave of mankind … inferior almost in all things,” hence “not so ingenious” as 
men; in them, speed of wit was mere rashness and produced “instability of opinion.” They were 
advised to cultivate demureness rather than speed, and were thought incapable of abstract thinking. 
Writers on faculty psychology asserting that women have rational souls can seem under pressure to 
17 Ruvius, Commentarii, 92.
 
18 Albert, Commentarii politicorum, in Borgnet (ed.), Opera, viii, 77 ff.
 
19  Julio Caro Baroja, “Religion, world views, social classes, and honour,” in Pitt-Rivers (ed.), Honour 

and Grace in Anthropology. 
20 Bertram Wyatt-Brown, The Shaping of Southern Culture. 
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defend the point at length, though assertions to the contrary were perhaps rarely intended seriously.22 
It is true that with humanist learning dominating military valour as the mark of virtue, the way was 
open for some women to become participating members of “household academies” of husband­
and-wife or father-and-daughter partnerships that put forward proto-feminist ideas.23 However, 
this existed in very small doses. More often when women claimed a male type of honour, it was 
“rather some stupidity born of imitation, than true pride.”24 Huarte placed women quite outside 
his graded system of “callings” and its close relationship to faculty psychology: “God filling both 
[sexes] with wisdom, it is a verified conclusion, that he infused the lesser portion into her …. [She] 
is not capable of much wit,” and lacks “any profound judgement.”25 Women were not entitled to 
benefit of clergy, the law which exempted literate men from being tried for capital offences in 
secular courts. They were fools not just by insult but by positive classification, in which absence 
of wit, common ideas or honour constitutes a unitary deficiency. Female rulers were no exception. 
On Elizabeth I’s accession, John Knox warned that men’s “hearts [would be] changed from the 
wisdom, understanding and courage of men to the foolish fondness and cowardice of women.”26 
And when the Earl of Essex fell from her grace, he publicly complained about the “inconstancy” 
and “wavering opinion” that was due to her sex. 
The same went for female characteristics in men. When Locke describes his intellectually 
disabled changelings as “unmanned,” he is of course casting doubt on their species membership 
but gender is implicated too. Peacham warns “fond and foolish parents” against “indulgence to 
the corrupting of the minds of their children, disabling their wits, effeminating their bodies.”27 
Effeminacy was stupidity, because it entailed idleness; mental “torpor” was a sign of “the iniquities 
of Sodom” that were destructive of gentility.28 In everyday politics the masculinity of the honour 
elite was compromised by its members’ need to be submissive to their ruler, who in former times 
had been their hypothetical equal; in late sixteenth-century England this was doubly unmanning 
because that ruler, heading up a centralized honours system, was female. Castiglione’s advice was 
to treat honour in terms of Aquinas’s mean; accommodating manners would get you further up the 
ladder than macho self-assertiveness.29 
The epileptic fits of Shakespeare’s Julius Caesar reflect this anxiety about feminine intellectual 
weakness. They are signs of both a “womanish” and a “feeble temper,” at once detracting from 
his honour and disabling his intellect. Not just man but manliness defines reason. However, when 
Brutus justifies his own actions by appealing to manly honour, he has grasped only one side of 
a new political equation; the autonomy of the honourable male no longer consists of military 
valour and freedom from constraint but of a possibly hypocritical or Machiavellian reason.
In despising Caesar’s weakness, Brutus marks his own self-assertive honour, but he is defeated in 
turn by Antony’s self-seeking wit. It is appropriate that Brutus’s funeral oration should be in prose
while Antony’s is in verse; it is not just that prose is rhetorically weaker but that poetry is the higher 
form of reason. Antony inverts the relation between reason and honour: he convinces the mob that 
22 John Jonston, A History of the Wonderful Things of Nature, 329; Petrus Monedulatus Lascovius,
De Homine, 103. 
23 Sarah Gwyneth Ross, The Birth of Feminism. 
24 De Dryvere, Universae Medicinae Methodus, 44. 
25 Juan Huarte, The Examination of Mens Wits, second proeme. 
26 John Knox, The First Blast of the Trumpet against the Monstruous Regiment of Women, 13. 
27 Peacham, The Compleat Gentleman, 30. 
28 Jodocus Clichtovaeus, De Vera Nobilitate, 36r. 
29 See Jennifer Richards, “‘A wanton trade of living’? Rhetoric, effeminacy, and the early modern 
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Brutus’s talk of honour is mere policy and reasoned calculation, when it is Antony himself who is 
being calculating by talking to them in this way. 
In medical terms, too, reason was male. Galen’s account of brain anatomy had identified the 
parts of the brain by nicknames derived from their supposed visual resemblance to the reproductive 
and excretory organs. A sixteenth-century professor of anatomy at Padua, paraphrasing this passage, 
adds a term of his own which teases a near-anagram out of the pineal gland (glandula pinealis): “This 
gland is shaped like a pine cone [pinus] … and very prettily reflects the form of a penis [penis]: thus 
in the brain there is the form of testicles, buttocks, anus, vulva, but of the penis no less.”30 Various 
reasons have been offered as to why Descartes subsequently chose the pineal gland to be the place 
where soul and body interact: it was hard to locate anatomically, suggesting that something in the 
body had departed at the moment of death; it also seemed to stand at the centre of the brain, in
the middle ventricle and its reasoning faculty, rather than being duplicated in each hemisphere. 
Here we have one more possible reason: the appropriate gendering of the organ that houses the 
mind. Indeed, some Cartesian philosophers, given the problem of physical extension implicit in 
having the whole of Christ’s body in the communion bread, surmised that only his pineal gland was 
there.31 It is a modernist adaptation of the pre-Cartesian convention of “occult parallels,” such as 
Paracelsus’s selection of the phallic-shaped root Satyricon as a cure for impotence. 
Conversely, wisdom itself might be a sign if not of effeminacy then of a suitable bodily 
weakness and above all lack of sexual potentia. Intellectually able fathers were said to produce 
foolish children, for precise medical reasons we shall discuss in Chapter 14. By the same token, 
not only can fools produce wise offspring, the fools themselves are hugely endowed. In Richard 
Turner’s poem Nosce Te (“Know thyself,” the spoof of a genre of philosophical poetry that began 
around 1600), he says of a female aristocrat, 
Missa will needsly marry with a fool, 
her reason; 
O sir, because he hath an exlent— 
This convention continued into the eighteenth century, at least. Fanny Hill’s colleague Louisa 
has sex with an intellectually deficient “changeling” whose “tool” is similarly commendable. 
The inverse correlation between intellectual and sexual ability has its modern heirs; there is, for 
instance, the eminent psychologist who currently argues that black people possess smaller brains 
than whites but correspondingly larger penises and sexual potency (“it’s a trade-off”).32 Women’s 
supposedly smaller brains related likewise to their immoderate sexual appetites, which could only 
be kept under control by the imposition of a gendered honour consisting of obedience rather than 
autonomy, meekness not self-assertion. 
“Degenerated from his kind”: the honour-disabled 
So far we have looked at groups lacking ascribed status, those whose membership of the honour 
society was never on the cards in the first place. A further question then arises. Deficiency is not 
the same as degeneracy. Who were the “honour-disabled,” so to speak? Who were those belonging 
30 Galen, De Usu, in Kühn (ed.), Opera, iii, 493; Realdus Columbus, De Re Anatomica, 354. 
31 Nicolas Malebranche, “Mémoire: pour expliquer la possibilité de la transsubstantiation,” in Oeuvres, 
xvii, 497. 
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notionally within the honour society who nevertheless lost or failed to meet the behavioural criteria 
ascribed to them as its members? And what were these criteria, more specifically? 
Honour disability, even in its ancient form, had intellectual elements; Greek examples of the 
stupidity specific to the gentleman include not only wearing your cloak in the wrong fashion 
but Theophrastus’s example of passing your accounts to someone else to add up. Some early 
modern writers display awareness of the conceptual kinship between honour and intelligence, and 
develop their notions of deficiency or impotentia on this basis. The reference point here is the 
medieval philosophical dispute between nominalists and realists. Nominalists like Duns Scotus 
claimed that the only things we can really know are particulars. When we sort them into categories 
(“universals”), these latter are not themselves real; they “are mere names and titles.” The realist 
school, by contrast, claimed that the universal categories into which particulars are sorted have a 
real existence themselves, and as such are fully knowable. Robert Ashley, a late Tudor ideologue, 
applies this dispute to his discussion of honour: “I have heard some say sometimes that they could 
not skill of this thing called honour, and that they knew not what it meant because they thought 
that indeed there was no such thing but only a name and title which people had taken up.”33 Ashley 
attacks this nominalist view. His job, as a behavioural authority, is to prove that honour does have 
a real essence, since it was one of the official channels through which a centralized state resolved 
tensions over social status. However, Ashley is not a realist in the sense that he thinks honour can 
be reduced to concrete collateral. He denies that it consists in “external goods” and acknowledges 
that its reality lies precisely in its purely conceptual character, which plays a positive, mediating 
role in social action. Neither “riches” nor “wit” itself are “of themselves … good, but so termed 
either more or less according as they draw near or decline from virtue,” of which honour is the sign 
– “a certain testimony of virtue shining of itself.” True, the comparison with wealth here suggests 
that wit can be a form of concrete collateral. But wit is also the main decider as to “who are capable 
of honour and who are not,” and in this sense is conceptually compatible with the latter: 
Some [men] you shall see so heavy and dull spirited that they little differ from brute beasts.… 
[They] are wont to have least feeling of honour and to be least affected therewith because that the 
dullness of their wit depriving them of all sharpness of judgement, the worth and beauty of honour 
… is unknown to them …. Such a man may be truly taken and accounted as one void of sense [that 
is, of internal senses or intellectual faculties].34 
Such dullness, taken for granted in the masses, is equally threatening when it appears in a 
gentleman. Degeneracy is the psychological attribute of every villein, as the member of an entire 
degenerate social class; but when a noble bloodline “fall[s] upon a vicious, good-for-nothing, base 
person who is in himself [i.e., internally] really a villein,” it really spells trouble.35 The terms 
are naturalistic; these people are “brute beasts.” They lack a theoretical awareness of their own
honour – as gentlemen above other men or, in the case of villeins, as men above other animals. 
Not only is the desire for honour, to quote Ashley, “given us of nature, but … the same nature hath 
not bestowed any better or more necessary thing upon us.” Honour is not nominal but real: real, 
however, not as wealth is but as a “power of the mind.” This “mind” is not some self-standing 
ability that can be defined independently of honour as such. Accordingly slow soul spirits, dull 
wit and lack of the sense of honour are facets of a single organic state. Any conceptual divergence 
33 Ashley, Of Honour, 31.
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between honour and the understanding, if articulated, would have opened up social fissures by 
making explicit the prospect (and threat) of upward mobility. 
Men “extracted from noble blood” were “commonly more prone to shame from dishonest things 
than others.” The sense of shame was organically rooted, a “prophylactic which they carry with 
them from birth.”36 This explains how a gentleman who had lost his status for merely external
reasons, for example through taking up “low or mechanical exercise,” could regain it on leaving 
that occupation; the honour of inherited blood and its corresponding awareness of shame were
internal.37 It also explains why a degree of learning was important. Implicit in learning-based virtue 
is the notion that honour can be acquired, while implicit in the ancestral virtue of blood is the
notion that honour can be mislaid. Hence virtue and ancestry are conjoined twins. In “bringing up 
the child of a gentleman, which is to have authority in a public weal,” understanding and honour 
have to be combined. A child’s failure to become virtuously learned means he will turn out like
“the multitude” when it has “equal authority without any sovereign, never … certain nor stable”; he
will be “loathsome and monstrous,” threatening the social order as well as his own future stock.38 
A contemporary of Castiglione’s, widely read in English in the late sixteenth century, extends the
point. Virtue necessarily exists in a virtuous object, that is, in “a man well born, prudent and wise.”
Nobility, however, “may be in a most vile object.” When a son “capable of neither virtue nor reason”
is born to “the vulgar sort,” the condition is not noticed; when the son of a noble family is “out of 
his senses,” he has to be properly identified and labelled as such. And it is a mark of the vulgar sort’s
own deficient wits that they, “being deceived, do hold these children in the rank of noblemen.”39 
Degenerate gentry are fools in the same way that the lay idiots of the commons are; in both cases, 
what they lack is knowledge of their own essence. This ignorance is at once social and natural: it is 
the honour society that gets to define natural states of the degenerate and dishonourable, just as it
is the socially constituted group of rational choosers and consenters – the intelligence society – that 
gets to define the place in nature of the intellectually disabled. Doctors, with their image of the 
body as a microcosm of the political and social order, were on hand then as now to back up these 
definitions. The brain possesses honourable, “noble and princely properties” precisely because “it 
is the seat of the mind, endowed with the virtue of reason, which is the greatest sign indeed, to 
discern the difference between man and beast …. What great utility the brain proffereth, it is well 
to be perceived by [the existence of] idiots and foolish bodies, who having defect in this, are lame 
in all the rest.”40 These idiots, who do not know their own natural and social essence, are members 
of the doctor’s elite client group, with symptoms of sloth, idleness or melancholy. The stupid 
gentleman is the obverse of the “syllogizing villein,” each being a contradiction in terms.41 
“Gentleman” usually excluded “fool” by definition. In Thomas Middleton’s The Changeling, the
noble Antonio masquerades as a fool in order to seduce a married woman, saying to her: “Take no 
acquaintance / Of these outward follies, there is within / A gentleman that loves you.” Her husband 
is unsuspecting because he thinks Antonio is non-gentle (the woman who disguises her lover as a
fool in order to pass him off in front of her husband was a stock dramatic convention). The same
thing can be detected in passing uses of the word “idiot.” If a writer is not clearly using it to mean 
the unlearned and unwashed in general, readers are to suppose that he is talking about the odd one
or two of his social peers. He does not have to spell this out. For example “idiots, dolts, lunatics, 
36 Nicolas Coeffeteau, A Table of Humane Passions, 673.
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frantics, and blockheads can no more judge right from wrong, truth from falsehood, virtue from
vice, than the blind can try colours”; the result, says this author, is that they end up abusing their 
powers as magistrates. In other words, it is assumed they have such powers in the first place.42 
To think that “true and perfect nobility in man consisteth … in blood” and nothing else was 
itself “mere folly” and “brutal stupidity,” such was the accepted place of intellectual virtues: “if 
nought else renown him but his wormeaten stock … [he] is not to be reckoned amongst the noble
and honourable, but rather be deemed a fool.”43 Peacham wrote about noblemen who “flatter 
themselves with the favourable sunshine of their great estates and … are admired of idiots and the
vulgar from the outside, statues or huge colossuses full of lead and rubbish within.”44 The mutually 
reflecting deficiency of the universal idiotic labourer and the occasional idiotic noble – their internal
psychological rubbish – consists in their being interested only in externals. Faculty psychology 
enabled the point to be set in a naturalistic context. It distinguished between understanding and 
“apprehending,” and the latter, since it belongs in the imaginative faculty, is associated with surfaces 
and the corrupting potential of the external senses: “The greatest part of men … want that necessary 
degree of understanding which should enable them to reason as well as [they] apprehend. For 
reasoning and apprehending are far from being synonymous terms. They sometimes distinguish one
man from another … almost as much as they distinguish a man from a brute.”45 
Honourable status and failure to perform 
There are several recurring, specific markers of failure to perform the honourable status ascribed 
to an individual. The simplest is failure to defend assaults on one’s reputation, and particularly 
one’s masculinity. Again this is usually a matter of externals, of readable behaviour. In Samuel 
Rowland’s poem The Letting of Humours, the henpecked gentleman is recast as a “fool” for 
carrying his wife’s pet dog: “Thus goodman idiot thinks himself an earl / That he can please his 
wife.” “Goodman” means non-gentle; the word “idiot” plays on his betrayal of caste. Similarly, 
there is the nobleman who, having called in a tailor to measure his wife for a gown, asked him if he 
wanted to approach her from the front or from behind: “The tailor, who was more discreet than the 
nobleman, perceiving his foolish demand, said unto him: my Lord, I must begin to take measure 
on the sides.”46 This foolishness, a lack of awareness of his own (gendered) honour on the part of 
an ascribed member of the honour society, is offset by the manual tradesman’s own “discretion,” 
a faculty-psychology operation which by his social class he ought not to possess (the twist here 
being that women’s tailors were stereotypically lecherous). The point is summed up by Molière’s 
character in School for Wives who says, “The man of honour is he who is not cuckoo” – cocu
meaning either cuckold or out of one’s wits, but here both. 
Another characteristic performance failure is deviation from the mean: absence or excess of 
honour. Absence of a sense of honour went with idleness and “sluggish laziness of mind”; it was one 
of the chief features of what doctors call “stupidity” or “stolidity,” which if it prevails “destroys the 
powers of the mind.” At the opposite end was the frenetic and intemperate abuse of honour through 
ambition. “Dullness,” associated with melancholy, could straddle both extremes; it could take the 
form of slow, “stupid spirits,” or of the “fury” that comes with being “puffed up with the glory of
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his ancestors.”47 Reason is more than just instrumental to honour here; the two categories overlap:
“true honour consisteth … in the moderation of the mind” (emphasis added). Of course, to be
foolishly witted in the first of these senses might also mean to be holy. Yet even Aquinas had raised 
a caution about this. Although lack of concern about injury to one’s reputation may sometimes 
indicate that one is above worldly things, “sometimes it can be the result of being simply stupid 
about everything, as in unlearned people (idiotae) who do not discern what is injurious to them; this 
belongs to folly alone.”48 In the behaviour guides, idleness and lack of motivation for honour are at
once social and psychological, outer and inner. Gentlemen who “of negligence stop mustard pots 
with their fathers’ pedigrees” are displaying the public or external face of “unsound memory,” the
faculty-psychology characteristic of private “idiots.”49 The very first people Dante meets in hell are
those who have “lost the goods of intellect,” and that is because they have led their lives without
any self-awareness of shame or praise. Honour resides first in God, and there is no greater gift that
He passes on to us; in this sense it is no parody of divine grace but similar to it in value. “When he
maketh us blessed then are we also partakers both of his divinities,” of which the divine intellect 
is chief, “and of his honour.” Honour here is both an objective ranking system, created by God, 
and an internal property or “secret instinct of nature” that endows the individual with a motivating 
autonomy to try and match the necessary, predestined scheme. The corresponding disability is to be
ignorant of all this, to be “so simply and foolishly witted that [one has] no feeling of honour.”50 
A further performance failure in this respect is lack of expert knowledge of heraldic science. 
The herald assesses people by the criterion of his own expertise. If, as Peacham tells us, honour is 
a natural disposition of the soul and as precisely measurable as a triangle, then 
For these and other reasons, I desire that you would bestow some hours in the study of [Blazon]; for 
a gentleman honourably descended to be utterly ignorant herein, argueth in him either a disregard 
of his own worth, a weakness of conceit, or indisposition to arms and honourable action; sometimes 
mere idiotism, as Seigneur Gaulart, a great man of France (and none of the wisest), inviting on a 
time many great personages and honourable friends to his table, at the last service a marzipan was 
brought in, which being almost quite eaten, he bethought himself and said, it was told me, that 
mine arms were bravely set out in gold and colours upon this marzipan but I have looked round 
about it and cannot see them. ‘Your Lordship,’ said one of his men, ‘ate them up yourself but now.’
‘What a knave,’ quoth Monsieur Gaulart, ‘art thou? Thou didst not tell me before I ate them, that I 
might have seen what they had been’.51 
This gentleman has a coat of arms, but he does not know what that means or even what it might 
look like. His illiteracy in Blazon is what constitutes his “idiotism.” Of course it may also belong 
in some wider cognitive dysfunction (he is “none of the wisest”), but there was in any case no 
wisdom outside the honour society. The fact that he does not know his own status, as expressed 
in its insignia, is the primary evidence, and his eating of them expresses the symbolic confusion 
between outer and inner, body and mind. 
Others in the honour society are not so much ignorant of its insignia as provocatively devil-
may-care about its values. There is the nobleman reported as saying, “I don’t care about all these …
coats of arms, crested or otherwise: I would be happy to be a villein in all four quarterings as long 
as I still get my taxes …; I’ve read no books, histories or annals of France.” This “fool” is well able 
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to understand that honour and genealogical learning constitute status, but is too self-willed to attend 
to them.52 In an English context, such dismissive attitudes to heraldry were perceived as politically 
dangerous. The ideology of heraldic science demanded a mean between the extremes of Puritanism 
on the one hand and Catholicism on the other. The Puritan gentleman “loves no heraldry, / Crosses 
in arms, they hold idolatry”; the result is “shortly, no difference twixt the lord, and page.”53 The 
Catholic gentleman, by contrast, devalues heraldic signs by inflation so they become “idle shows”; 
the result is “plebeian baseness.” Both extremes are forms of honour foolishness. Puritans idealize 
the New Testament’s unlearned but pious idiota, thereby encouraging Anabaptist-style revolt; the 
creaturely equality of souls is foolishly read as political equality on earth. Catholics lack the Word 
and are therefore credulous about mere externals (one type of fool was the “gull” or credulous 
person); their foolishness is idolatry, which was, of all sins, the only one that could be defined as 
“intellectual.”54 As opposite deviations from the mean, they are both forms of politico-theological 
disability that taint the deviators by associating them with the lower orders, against whom the 
social order has to be defended. 
The prominence of the professional arriviste foregrounded another type of failure: someone 
who lacks the professional expertise he claims. The maverick medical authority Paracelsus refers 
to his predecessors as “idiots and infants”; orthodox Galenist doctors typically use the same 
idiot vocabulary to label the Paracelsians.55 In these examples “idiot” clearly means someone 
lacking medical knowledge rather than some generalized insult in the modern sense; although 
it has overtones of the unlearned commoner, it targets one’s fellow professionals in particular.56 
Elizabethan drama constantly plays with the conceit of the unprofessional or “idiot” actor. This 
is the immediate sense of the idiot tale teller in Macbeth; by fulfilling his ambitions, Macbeth 
has emptied his imaginative faculty, and the performance of this “life” is consequently void of 
anything except sound and fury. The idiot as professional failure is not derived metaphorically 
from some positively disabled person in the modern sense, since no such creature existed; idiocy is 
a psychological disqualification only in the sense of being a social or professional one. 
Failure to perform was also identified, in faculty psychology terms, with the countryside. 
Country people’s faculties were dull by nature. The village idiot was anyone who lived in a village, 
a maxim which by the end of the sixteenth century had come to encompass the country gentry. At 
first, it was the country gentry who “professed arms,” with honour stemming from military prowess; 
city gentry were stereotypically emasculated because they did not fight. Tudor governments, 
however, urged the gentry to get out of the country, where “great rudeness” was the rule, and 
into the towns, where they could adopt Castiglione’s ideal of a civic and professional elite.57 The 
relationship is finely balanced in Shakespeare’s As You Like It, where Corin and Touchstone, rustic 
fool and professional court jester respectively, debate the simple versus the sophisticated life. By 
the Restoration, the balance had tipped completely. One knows, said Dryden, the “fool of nature … 
by his clown-accent and his country-tone”; a few years later comes Squire Western in Fielding’s 
Tom Jones, who is gentleman and country clown simultaneously, with no sense of contradiction. 
Fools and idiots are by definition those distant from the centres of power and ability: economic, 
political, intellectual. Just living in the country sufficed to make you a villein in the eyes of many; 
52 Monsieur d’Aubray, Le Satyre Ménippée, G5r.
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the behavioural writers feel bound to insist that “if a gentleman do inhabit his village, he shall 
nevertheless continue noble.”58 Changed relations between town and country gentry took off from 
existing stereotypes of the villager “who busieth himself about his plough, and … hath his wits 
of no higher conceit”; the contagion of human geography had made the rural gentry “rustics” too, 
and all country dwellers “country clown[s].”59 The character type of “the upstart country knight” 
illustrates how the stereotype appeared to heraldic experts: 
His honour [is] somewhat preposterous, for he bare the King’s sword before he had arms to wield 
it; yet being once laid o’er the shoulder with a knighthood, he finds the herald his friend …. His 
father was a man of good stock, though but a tanner, or usurer; he purchased the land, and his son 
the title. He has doffed off the name of a clown, but the look not so easy, and his face bears still a 
relish of churn milk …. And commonly his race is quickly run, and his children’s children, though 
they scape hanging, return to the place from whence they came.60 
Indeed, fools and fields were already associated in the classical period, agriculture being the work 
culture that is always slowest to change – in relation to Rome’s sophistication of manners as well 
as to the administrative sophistication of Western Europe from the late Middle Ages onwards. 
Honour, wit and Shakespeare’s fools 
The examples above show both that the gentleman who fails to perform his ascribed honour is the 
disabled and degenerate person of his time, and that he is the modern intellectually disabled person 
in the making. Shakespeare makes the point dramatically halfway through King Lear, when – at 
the exact point where Lear is stripped of honourable status – his court jester inexplicably vanishes, 
to be replaced as companion by Poor Tom the beggar who is (it seems) genuinely rather than just 
professionally out of his wits. 
In Julius Caesar, Antony proposes to Octavius that they sideline Lepidus, the third member of 
their triumvirate. They have “laid honours” on him but he has no intellectual autonomy, inasmuch as 
he is oblivious to the new forms of self-assertion; he is “led or driven, as we point the way.” Once he
has lost his usefulness, they can strip him of his honours and send him away, “Like to the empty ass, 
to shake his ears, / And graze in commons.” He can go off to his appropriate social position amidst
the plebs – appropriate because he lacks the self-seeking wit of an Antony. Octavius mildly objects 
that Lepidus, being a “valiant soldier,” is their peer in terms of honour. But Antony sneers: 
So is my horse, Octavius, …
 
His corporal motion govern’d by my spirit.
 
And, in some taste, is Lepidus but so:
 
He must be taught, and train’d, and bid go forth:
 
A barren-spirited fellow; one that feeds
 
On objects, arts, and imitations
 




The ass lacks honour of any sort; the horse does not lack valour or the “vital spirits” which all 
animals have, but it does lack soul spirits, that physical medium of intelligence which exists in 
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humans alone. The horse is the paradigm of all non-reasoning beasts; in late classical Greek the 
word for horse is alogos, literally “non-reasoner” – hence the many satirical inversions of this 
theme, of which Swift’s Houhnyhms are the best known. (The Yahoos, meanwhile, were probably 
modelled on contemporary accounts of “Peter the Wild Man,” a feral outsider.) Lepidus’s way of 
bidding for status – martial prowess rather than wit – is outmoded, channelled through the wrong 
mode. He is another Brutus for the taking. Antony’s insult is no mere figure of speech; he does not 
say Lepidus is like a fool. Rather, Antony’s reconstruction of autonomy as politic wit is highlighted 
by genuine absence of the latter in Lepidus. Not only are the latter’s skills mere “imitations,” they 
are by the same token behind the times; he is unaware of the change of rules, of the new bidding 
game exemplified in Antony’s polished and cynical wit. 
In The Merry Wives of Windsor, Anne Page’s suitor Slender (“of slender wit” was a common 
epithet) is “well-landed but an idiot.” In what sense an idiot? The word’s association with commoners 
renders this phrase a contradiction in terms, which the audience would have grasped. The propertied 
but idiotic suitor is in fact a stock character in the drama: Middleton’s Women Beware Women
features one who is objectified as “The Ward” (his status makes him unworthy of a name), tied to 
the apron strings of an uncle whose given Christian name is Guardiano. This ward’s psychological
characteristics are a mix of jester-type foolery and an interest in the outmoded trappings of honour. 
Shakespeare’s Slender varies this image slightly. He is obsessed with heraldic science, nervously 
responding to other characters’ talk about “reason” as if it were a new fashion in hats which he is 
not sure about adopting. But his obsessive interest also exposes his entire ignorance of the science;
that is what constitutes his idiocy. He converses normally and gives off no signs of what a modern 
psychologist would call intellectual disability; however, he is deficient in the performance of his own 
gentle status. The bourgeois Mistress Page and her daughter are well off and have no need for his 
land, so his recommendation as a suitor would be a mature knowledge of the external insignia that
went with the landed estate and would raise mother and daughter above Windsor’s prosaic middle­
classness. Slender lacks such knowledge; he is a layman and hence an “idiot” in respect to the expert
language of heraldry essential to his class, and this is what places him with the out-group. 
In Much Ado about Nothing, Beatrice sets the scene for her first encounter with Benedick by 
way of a sarcastic pun on “difference” as a technical term in Blazon (a mark on a coat of arms) and 
“difference” as a term in logic and psychology (the differentia of rational man from other animals). 
In short, her witty values will prevail over his soldierly ones. And in All’s Well that Ends Well, the 
fool Parolles is identified as such by his obsession with honour’s external trappings; he is actually a 
coward who fakes retrieval of his regiment’s honour (its coat of arms has been captured), and lacks 
a courtier’s imitative grace. His friend Bertram, on the other hand, is a soldier with serious claims 
to valour-based honour; but he refuses to marry a woman who, despite her outstanding learning-
based virtue, is his mother’s ward and thus a social inferior. Just as Parolles’s foolishness is defined 
by his lack of honour as military valour, so Bertram’s is defined by his failure to recognize honour 
as virtuous learning. In the end he grudgingly accepts marriage, forced to admit that honour must 
be reconstituted as wisdom. 
Halfbreeds and unsuccessful interlopers 
So far we have encountered idiots and fools either as members of the out-group or as deficient, 
non-performing members of the in-group. There are in addition those whose original ascription 
to the in-group is ambiguous: for example, the offspring of class miscegenation between gentle 
and commoner, or those born out of wedlock to honourable fathers. Such status ambiguities were 
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ungentle,” since the issue of such a relationship “should seem but half noble, nay but half a man 
… monstrous and degenerated from his kind.” It is as if “to tie the bodies of the quick and the dead 
together.”61 The gentry had to be careful about marrying into non-gentle wealth for fear of producing 
“mongrels,” just as you would conserve the breed of your dogs or as today’s aspiring prospective 
mother is careful about the IQ and social pedigree of sperm donors. Behavioural writers cited in 
support Averroes’s theory of an “informative power” or ability which parents transmit to the souls 
of their offspring. According to this, “the memorable exploits of ancestors” could recur physically 
in the blood of descendants; hence the “seeds of good and evil germinate over time in our souls.”62 
Gentry were warned to choose wet nurses carefully; since breast milk was thought to consist of 
distilled blood, it could determine the child’s very identity and “make the mind more perfected.”63 
The consequences of misalliance are as much moral as intellectual. Offspring may have no 
generosity or kindness, but not “no wit”; Edmund, the bastard Machiavel of King Lear, shows that 
the opposite is the case. It was for their wit that aristocratic fathers such as Louis XIV often favoured 
illegitimate over legitimate sons, illustrating the strength of wit in its rivalry with bloodline. It 
forced the diehard supporters of legitimate bloodline to recast degeneracy itself in intellectual 
terms; Boulainvilliers, for example, remarked of Louis that to bypass his own lineage was itself a 
form of stupidity or “vanity” that would corrupt future generations. Intellectual ignorance of one’s 
own genealogy was “a perpetual forgetting of oneself which seems to amount to imbecility.”64 The 
cause of this imbecility (a term in which physical, moral and intellectual connotations are combined) 
was in Boulainvillier’s view the biological “mixing” of royal blood. The idea of imbecility as a 
natural ignorance of one’s own class culture, with dishonour as its central component, is still going 
strong in the nineteenth-century novel (Balzac’s The Black Sheep, for example), where people are 
labelled “idiot” or “degenerate” for no other reason than that they ignore their pedigrees.65 
Another ambiguous figure was the professional fool, who was often witty enough in faculty 
psychology terms. Touchstone, for example, knows enough about scholastic logic to send it up, 
though others like the court jester of Ferrara are said not to have any rationality at all (see Chapter 
13). Any supposed intellectual differences among professional fools would have been subordinate 
to a common element in their job description, namely their ability to mimic. Any ambiguity or threat 
lay rather in the fact that a gentleman born might then try to mimic the fools, thereby demeaning 
himself and his class. This was the original significance of the term “artificial fool”: not a clever 
man who acts the fool to gain advantage but, rather, a gentleman who enjoys imitating jesters, 
finds himself stuck in the persona and then becomes the real thing – like the nobles who mock Don 
Quixote, or like Sir Toby Belch and Sir Andrew Aguecheek in the company of the vocational fool 
Feste, who in any case is much wiser than they. 
Finally, there are people aspiring to cross over into the honour society: arrivistes on the threshold 
of arrival. The classic text is Le bourgeois gentilhomme. The very idea of a bourgeois gentleman is 
a comic contradiction in terms, like the mock politeness of “coloured gentleman.” When Monsieur 
Jourdain glows with pride to learn that he speaks prose, the joke is not just that he does not know 
that prose is a technical term for everyday speech, but that it is an inferior medium. Like him it is 
vulgar, and that is because it is not poetry. Jourdain is without rhyme or, therefore, reason. When 
Molière at the opening of the play lists the abilities of the elite to which Jourdain ludicrously 
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aspires, they are intellectual ones: “mind” (esprit) and “knowing how to reason.” Poetry was the 
language of reason and thereby of gentility. 
Peacham tells of a herald who visits a man claiming gentility on the basis of his newly acquired 
merchant wealth, and asks to see his coat. The man mistakes him to have expressed an interest in 
buying his overcoat. He says he can let the herald have it at a decent price with 50 percent down 
now. This in itself shows him to be an idiot. The lack of virtue in such “stubble curs” is their failure 
to understand the position in society to which they have mistakenly aspired, being “neither doers, 
sufferers, or well speakers of honour’s tokens.”66 Peacham seeks a genuine, because measurable 
(“demonstrable”) set of externals, those of heraldic science: “there being at this instant the world 
over such a medley (I had almost said motley) of coats … we should, I fear me, within these 
few years see yeomen as rare in England as they are in France.”67 Motley was the uniform of the 
professional fool; a “yeoman” was a wealthy farmer, immediately adjacent to the honour society 
in the countryside as burgesses were in the towns. The essential message of heraldic science, as of 
psychometric science, was: Repel all boarders. 
Fiscal idiots: how the law invented incompetence 
What do you take me for? Are you taking me for an idiot? These are strange phrases. The original 
phrase was to “beg” someone for an idiot, a legal expression. Guides to behaviour, nobility and 
heraldry were aimed at people who had studied at the Inns of Court (a frequent destination after 
university), and the Court of Wards was where you would “take” someone to adjudicate whether 
they were competent to manage their estate. 
We have seen above that the disability of the gentleman who was an idiot because he did not 
understand coats of arms was not clearly distinguishable from that of the one who was an idiot 
because he could not count up to 20. However, law supplies us with the one historical context that 
does seem pertinent to modern concepts of intellectual disability as a marker of legal incompetence. 
The Court of Wards was put on a permanent footing in 1540. This was roughly contemporary with 
the first Royal Commission on heraldry; their trajectories coincide, and in 1542 it became the 
Court of Wards “and Liveries,” responsible for sumptuary laws regulating the public significance 
of clothing as well as heraldic insignia (the two issues were thus closely linked). 
The wardship jurisdiction distinguished between people who were lunatic or mad and those 
born fools or idiots, and it issued writs on this basis. The Roman law of the Twelve Tables, used 
by medieval lawyers, had said explicitly that competence to plead must be assumed in those who 
are “stupid” (stulti) – whatever “stupid” means in this context – by contrast with those who are 
mad (furiosi).68 Their elaboration, which appears in both civil and canon law, that some people
are born stupid is therefore a crucial element in making the category firmer and more pejorative. 
It appears originally in a text from Edward I’s reign known as Prerogativa Regis. However, at this 
stage it seems not to have been a legal enactment but a private memo or plea; despite what has been 
written on this topic, the law had no standard writs of idiocy, much less separate ones for idiocy 
and lunacy, until Henry VIII set up the Court of Wards.69 In this respect, too, the wardship system 
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resembles heraldic rules: a contemporary invention dressed in feudal trappings, as if appealing to 
some ancient right. 
A sudden upsurge in the number of writs in the 1590s, when it became a bone of political 
contention, gave the idiot/lunatic distinction the oxygen of publicity. We can see this from 
comparing Spenser with writers of only a generation later. In Spenser’s depiction of the human 
soul in Book 2 of The Faerie Queene, deficiency originates in the imagination, represented here by 
the allegorical figure Phantastes 
That him full of melancholy did show; 
Bent hollow beetle brows, sharp staring eyes, 
That mad or foolish seemed: one by his view 
Mote deem him born with ill disposed skies. 
Here mad and foolish are synonymous; at most, any implied distinction would have been subordinate 
to the overarching paradigm of melancholy. By the 1590s, however, professional intellectuals 
around the Inns of Court were employing such a distinction extensively in their literary productions, 
as we shall see shortly, and in so doing they helped introduce it to a wider public. 
According to Richard Neugebauer, in his research into the records of the Court of Wards, the 
distinction between lunatics and idiots shows that professionals of the time already knew about 
the difference between the mentally ill and the “mentally retarded,” thereby demonstrating signs 
of a modern psychological expertise.70 However, there is little evidence for the “idiots” he cites 
from the records being mentally retarded as he, a modern neurologist, would recognize them. 
Conflating cause with effect, Neugebauer assumes that psychological conditions we now classify 
as intellectually disabled lay behind the idiot terminology used by those lawyers, when actually 
it was the sudden public currency of the legal terminology that fed (along with other things) into 
modern psychological conceptualizations of intellectual disability. Language was more fluid than 
now; the mutual resonances of related or even unrelated senses of one and the same word were 
heard more clearly than in modern English. Existing meanings for “idiot” or “fool” overlapped 
with those for “madman,” both being dispositional rather than deterministic in a biological sense 
and covering a huge range of behaviours. Nevertheless, some sort of difference was clearly being 
indicated. What was it? The term “lunacy” refers to phases of the moon, which gave the mad person 
lucid intervals. It signified impermanence, while idiocy thus became that which is not temporary. 
It is the negative reflection, in juridical terms, of the Puritan unification of the personality that 
was to achieve full expression in Locke’s theory of personal identity. There could be no modern 
idiot without the permanence of the modern “person” in this sense. However, it was only the very 
beginning of a process. Legal idiocy, as birth-to-death permanence, was not borrowed from some 
existing medical diagnosis, it came from the surface language of a professional elite, which had till 
now covered a broader range of oddities and social inferiors. 
We need to understand how wardship applied in general, across the board, in order to grasp fully 
how specifically psychological categories were built out of existing social ones. As Neugebauer 
suggests, behind the idiot/lunatic distinction lay a fiscal crisis. Given the assumed permanence 
of the idiot’s condition, guardians could assume greater control of his estate than of a lunatic’s. 
The state either found these guardians or assumed guardianship itself; the finger it had in this pie 
explains why legal authorities and historians of the time, notably under Charles I, dated the first 
issuing of idiocy writs as far back in time as possible.71 The Tudors and early Stuarts tried to finance 
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their state by resuscitating the minutest obligations which landholders, as “tenants in chief,” had 
to the monarch, to whom they should in principle be surrendering the profits – though in fact this 
relationship was already lost in the mists of time. If a tenant died while his heir was still legally a 
minor, the heir became the king’s ward. However, wardship rights had meanwhile become goods 
that could be sold on, thereby becoming the main source of royal income. This was even more the 
case when the first two Stuart monarchs found it hard to impose taxes. If, then, it could be proved 
that the heir was still incompetent after his minority ended, so much the better. The income of state 
and courtiers from this source increased fourfold between Elizabeth’s reign and the onset of the 
civil wars.72 That is how important the issue of idiocy was. An agreement not to reimpose the Court 
of Wards after its 1646 abolition was one of the chief conditions on which Charles II was permitted 
to reassume the monarchy. 
The wardship system had developed out of patrilinealism. It was not entirely age related. 
Unmarried women and younger sons, who remained in subordination to the senior member of the 
family, might be condemned to a prolonged “infancy” or “youth” (both terms denoted a person 
of any age who had not yet succeeded to property or title) as long as that member refused to 
marry them off.73 At first inheritance had been merely a frequent custom, the whim of a newly 
titled father, stemming from the prospective inheritor’s military prowess as much as his estate 
management skills, let alone order of birth; only later in the Middle Ages did a formal set of rules 
around primogeniture evolve. Neither wardship nor indeed formal tests of competence needed to 
exist until the principle of a right of succession arose, and until the required prowess – military 
or managerial – started to be ascribed to a specific “rightful” heir rather than to someone whose 
outstanding performances had simply caught the eye. 
Before the Tudor transformation of government, training of the elite frequently took place in 
great households, of which the royal court itself was simply the largest. Upbringing in these noble 
houses was “mainstream” education, as it were, for the wider family and other ascribed members of 
the honour society, plus selected children of commoners. In the late medieval period some children 
attended the cathedral schools, but otherwise wardship was the central pedagogical institution, a 
general social and educational phenomenon as well as a legal one. But when day schools in the 
towns became popular, those young people remaining under wardship found themselves to be a 
historical residue: they were a waning part of the honour society where a ward had been someone 
unable to succeed to his station as much as in it. Guardians controlled their estates, arranged their 
marriages and, in return, were supposed to educate them for their future social responsibilities; the 
age at which this wardship ended was a socially convenient but psychologically arbitrary point.
The ward’s personal and developmental maturity was neither here nor there: Shakespeare’s morally 
and intellectually mature Helena in All’s Well is an example, no less an inferior than Middleton’s 
“The Ward” with his court fool behaviour. The disabling effect of tutelage and minority on any 
individual’s sense of self-worth was as discernible in the gentry as it is in the “intellectually 
disabled” people created by today’s intelligence society. 
The governments of both Henry VIII and Elizabeth I tried to impose a centralized national 
curriculum (“common discipline and exercises”) on the residual institutions of state wardship, 
in order to police the borders of honour and wit alike.74 Archbishop Cranmer had already had to 
face irate gentry who, having removed their children from the educational environment of the 
household and set them to a humanist pedagogy in the cathedral school at Canterbury, objected to 
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commoners “meet for the plough” associating there with their own children and even being given 
preferment over them according to their talents.75 Cranmer compromised, saying he would favour 
the gentleman’s gifted son over the poor boy with “gifts of nature” by giving him an enriched 
curriculum involving lessons in how to govern, but that he would put the gifted poor ahead of the 
“very dull gentle-born.” The state, in its demand for professional virtues, had to overlook social 
differences of birth, and endeavoured to tailor the curriculum accordingly. Mulcaster recommended 
it as the basis on which “the common and the private concur …. Neither shall the private scholar 
go any faster on, nay perhaps not so fast.”76 All this began to create a new kind of out-group, 
defined more sharply in terms of learning and intellect, across the whole education system. Legal 
idiocy gained a sharper focus only within this more general push towards centralization and for 
professionally relevant assessment criteria. 
The legal idiots of the 1590s were the residue of a residue, leftovers from a once universal 
system. The few people who remained in wardship were those for whom the socially determined 
point of maturation never arrives. That is why Hooker describes his “idiots” as being in a condition 
that never ends. There were, nevertheless, contemporary writers who realized that it might be the 
system itself that created idiots. The unscrupulous guardian, it was said, would purposely “abase 
their [ward’s] minds” so that they would never develop the ability to stand up for their own material 
interests. Those who remained in the wardship system were those too weak to escape tutelage. (It 
might explain, for example, why Henry VI’s religiosity had led to his failure to assert his majority 
against fellow nobles, especially as he had acceded to the crown when only a few months old.) 
Only subsequently did they become, as in Hooker’s formula, those who needed tutelage – the 
source of the conservative gloss whereby, within a liberal polity, we feel happy about forcibly 
segregating some people for their own protection. “Idiots” were and are those who can be imposed 
upon, as a result of being left behind by shifting social conditions. 
Some legal experts of the time already detected a whiff of nonsense: “For the idiot, I had 
almost forgot him. Howsoever the matter is not great: for it is but a foolish business when all is 
done … Be assured that yourself is somewhat the wiser man, before you go about to beg him, 
or else never meddle with him at all.”77 Many of the Court’s own judgments failed to abide by 
the stipulated distinction, being indiscriminately entitled “Grant of Idiot or Lunatic.” Butler 
satirically depicts a money-grubbing couple who beg their child for an idiot while still in the womb 
(the converse, surely, of putting your unborn child’s name down for Eton).78 More specifically, 
the modern-sounding “idiot” label of the legal texts is at odds with the actual symptoms of idiocy 
(if any) described in the court records researched by Neugebauer. A legal compendium defined an 
“idiot” as someone “naturally born so weak of understanding, that he cannot govern or manage his 
inheritance”; assessors and/or a jury had to decide “whether he be sufficiently witted to dispose 
of his own lands with discretion or not,” or “naturally defective in [his] own discretion.”79 But 
that was all in theory. Mental illness, melancholy or mere failure to adapt to changing behavioural 
norms excited the predatory instincts of the state, guardians and close family members. These too 
were “idiocy.” 
Descriptions of behaviour or intellectual performance in the records are minimal. Neugebauer 
himself estimates that 80 per cent of idiot cases were not “mentally retarded” even by his own, 
modern criteria. Grace and honour, as well as wit, were at issue: the assessor would mix numeracy 
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tests with questions about the meaning of the communion service or who their parents were. 
Several texts refer to idiots with wives and children, even though inability to beget a child was 
a criterion of idiocy. Counting up to 20 was not an abstract arithmetical test, as it might be in a 
modern developmental assessment; the ability referred to in the legislation was vocational, namely 
to count 20 pence. Just one case of Neugebauer’s seems as if it might fit a retrospective diagnosis 
from today, which only highlights the general inappropriateness of the rest.80 To judge from the 
records, the sheer variety of grounds on which someone might be begged as an idiot sends us back 
instead to issues of social class raised earlier in this chapter. 
Nor did the sense of permanence in this legal definition have firm roots in nature. If the court 
found someone a natural idiot, it rendered null all the transactions he had previously entered into, 
which leads one to ask how he could have done business at all before; moreover, he was assumed 
competent enough to be able by himself to enter a writ directing his re-examination or an appeal.81 
And of course providence might at any time remove the deficiency. Phrases such as “naturally 
defective,” “naturals” or “natural fools” do not refer to notions of biological cause, but they are 
closely linked to those of lineage and honourable status. Nativi (“naturals”), for example, stood 
for anyone outside the honour society; it translates as “bondmen,” which some writers used not 
only for servants but for burgesses (on the assumption that they must have once been manual 
apprentices).82 The law did not stand over and above the honour society, handing out judgments 
of competence drawn from a universally agreed “nature” in accordance with some scientific, 
biological or psychological script; it simply advanced that society’s claims, just as the law today, 
in its interpretation of competence as rationality and intelligence, advances the claims of the 
intelligence society. 
A phrase frequently mentioned in behaviour guides is the “gentleman born.” From this it is 
self-evident that, if someone is innately gentle, his parents too are of gentle status. Not so obvious 
is the converse: that a “born” fool (idiota a nativitate, as the law termed it), being innately idiotic, 
is born to parents whose gentle status must therefore contradict his own. The term “idiot” could 
mean something precise only in relation to that social group in which it would be an anomaly (that 
is, in theory; in practice idiocy writs were served on non-gentry too). The peasant, by contrast, was 
already a born fool by social definition, and possibly by a religious one as well, since the Latin 
phrase evokes the state of “natural man.” He did not need a competence test to work in the fields. 
When in The Winter’s Tale Prince Florizel’s father scolds him for being “a royal fool,” it is not just 
because he is cavorting with country labourers but because labourers are fools by definition. The 
genuine anomaly is the eponymous “gentleman fool” addressed in Samuel Rowland’s poem, who 
Boasts of scutcheons, arms, and high descent
 
That on fool’s legs even from thy cradle went.
 
Fiscal necessity resulted in the sequestration of idiots’ estates as it did in the inflation of honourable 
titles. They peak in the same period. If the state could add honour to a commoner, it could subtract 
wit from a gentleman. They are complementary actions, enlarging the state’s coffers. The first is 
confirmation of an achieved status: the commoner achieves what the gentleman, with his ascribed 
ability, already has and knows. The second is removal of an ascribed status: the gentleman is 
assumed to have it, and its abilities, until the opposite is proven – and that was exactly the purpose 
80 “Mental handicap,” 29.
 
81 Bell, An Introduction, 127 ff.
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of idiocy writs. Both the granting and the withdrawal of the tokens of gentility expressed a balance 
of socio-economic power between monarch and subjects. 
In proving the heir’s idiocy – that is, his dishonourable status – a certain “intellectual” deficiency 
might be involved, but it was narrowly defined. It might mean simply illiteracy and innumeracy. 
In the quite recent past, the fathers of Hobbes and Lilburne – one a priest, the other a landowner 
– were said to have been illiterate, at least in writing, while many non-gentles would have been 
fully literate because their trades demanded it. The writs indicate the extent to which illiteracy had 
finally become unacceptable among gentry. The point was not literacy or numeracy in themselves 
but their importance for the maintenance of status. Being able to count money or remember 
the names of your father and mother was specific to the inheritance of landed property and the 
administration of its profits; without such skills, the estate might leave the family. Intellectual 
criteria for incompetence continued to coexist for some time with older criteria such as lack of a 
sense of one’s own honourable status. The latter remained a problem for the person’s immediate 
family because of the dishonour and shame the loss of an estate might bring; Gracián’s aphorism, 
“The lot of a fool, to fail in his calling,” means among other things his social calling, his rank.83 
Intellectual incompetence per se, by contrast, was not a matter of shame for family members 
until much later, the result rather than the cause of mass institutionalization. (Charles Darwin, 
for example, whose last child possibly had Down’s syndrome – he was born a few months before 
Down’s invention – wrote about him with none of the sense of shame or rejection that has later 
been exhibited by certain eminent scientists over their own children.)84 
Such elements as there are of a modern intellectual disability in the late Tudor and early Stuart 
concept of idiocy/lunacy came not so much directly from the Court of Wards itself as from men in 
and around the Inns of Court, the upcoming caste of professional intelligence men whose “whipping 
satires” and “fool sonnets” of the 1590s supplied images that entered both the seventeenth-century 
literary canon and the public discussion provoked by the machinations of the treasury. Henceforth 
the notionally deficient would routinely turn up as the pairing “idiots and lunatics” or “fools and 
madmen”; so too would one’s intellectual opponents, for whom the word “idiot” only now takes its 
place in the vocabulary of abuse alongside “dunce,” “shallow-brains” and so forth. When satirical 
poets in this period began using the word “idiot” as an insult, they were not referring to the existing 
psychological object “intellectual disability”; rather, they were instead helping to instigate it. A
literary or otherwise popularized version of the legal lunatic/idiot vocabulary used by professionals 
(often about each other) was one of the ingredients in the diagnostic foundation of intellectual 
disability in its modern scientific form. 
In this decade there is, in addition, a fashion for writing sonnets about unrequited love which 
identify love not just with absence of reason but more precisely with the lunacy/idiocy dyad. 
Lunacy is a metaphor for excess of passion, idiocy for its absence, or for lack of lovemaking 
expertise. Later in the decade, the fashion is for ridiculing the law, and the legal vocabulary itself 
as an affectation. A Gulling Sonnet by John Davies of Hereford, for example, represents the law in 
general as a “yoke of wardship” that “holds my wit now for an idiot.” In Vice’s Anotimie, Robert 
Anton warns against excessive study because it leads to recusancy in religion and discontent in 
politics, “Which if this be his wit to study ill, / Take my wits madman, leave me simple still” 
(“simple” indicating here idiocy). The very titles of Nicholas Breton’s paired poems, Pasquil’s 
Madcap and Pasquil’s Foolscap, indicate the fashion. He asks, 
83 Gracián, Oráculo, Aphorism 2.
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He, that of late was in a madding fit,
 
Doth from a frenzy to a folly fall:
 
And which is better, mad, or foolish wit?
 
I think as good, almost have none at all.
 
The satire reflects a more general attempt across the culture to regulate meanings and vocabulary. 
A servant in Middleton’s The Changeling says of the seducer Antonio, “’Tis but a fool that haunts 
the house and my mistress in the shape of an idiot”; hence an idiot is a particular type of fool, 
the natural one. (The servant’s cash-strapped master has already asked, “Hark, is there not one 
incurable fool / That might be begged?” [emphasis added].) Although “fool” comes more often to 
indicate the innate type, it is also still to be found as the generic category that covers both “idiot” 
and “lunatic” subdivisions: “Of idiot fools I sing,” writes John Marston in his Satyra Nova – that 
is, not of lunatic fools. Either way, it points towards a fixing of terms. 
It was at this point that idiocy had begun to rival melancholy as the paradigmatic deficiency 
or absence of mind. In the 1590s, melancholy became for a while the height of fashion among 
leisured gentlemen, rather than a maligned disability; in Essex’s verse prompted by his fall-out 
with Elizabeth, it expresses his emasculated impotentia before female power. Melancholy was 
an indulgence of free time, idiocy a waste of servile time. The two ran concurrently for decades. 
When in 1621 Robert Burton wrote his famous rejoinder to John Lyly’s Anatomy of Wit, he entitled 
it The Anatomy of Melancholy, not of idiocy, in which he expressed little interest despite the noise 
it was making around him in the legal and political spheres. On the other hand, idiocy of the 
legalistic type was beginning to acquire significance in the burgeoning genre of philosophical 
poetry. Here it starts to be inserted within the schema of faculty psychology. The purpose of these 
long didactic poems, their themes derived from De Mornay’s De la verité, was to equip the mind 
to know the mind in order to defend the soul’s immortality against notions of its materiality and 
corruptibility. They include Fulke Greville’s Treatie of Humane Learning (a title echoing Bacon 
and foreshadowing Locke) and Sir John Davies’s influential Nosce Teipsum (“Know thyself”). 
Both authors had been at the Inns of Court during the 1590s, and both use the idiot/lunatic dyad in 
support of religious and psychological argument. Davies, defending the purity of the rational soul, 
puts these words into a sceptical opponent’s mouth: 
What? Are not souls within themselves corrupted?
 
How can there idiots then by nature be?
 
How is it that some wits are interrupted,
 
That now they dazzled are, now clearly see?
 
Idiots and lunatics, in this dyadic form, are now starting to be the paradigmatic exception to the 
rule of “man is a rational animal.” De Mornay’s idea of possible exceptions had been “madmen,” 
“lunatics” and “melancholics,” but not any permanent category. Davies himself, elsewhere in
the poem, writes about an “idiot, which hath yet a mind, / Able to know the truth, and choose the
good.” Yet the above stanza citing the idiot from birth (“by nature”) marks a point at which
the language of wardship becomes involved with that of grace and reprobation – and it is to these 
topics that we now turn. 

PART 5  












Our examination of the relationship between grace and human reasoning will lead eventually 
to the examination of a different in-group/out-group division, this time between the elect and 
the reprobate, and of the ways in which modern notions of the intelligent and the intellectually 
disabled emerge from this distinction. Both themes can be traced through any number of religious 
texts whose concerns often overlap with those of the behaviour guides just discussed but which 
articulate a separate set of status anxieties relating chiefly to inner states, and initially to one’s 
status with God. 
The philosophical poem of Sir John Davies with which we ended the previous chapter is 
characteristic. In a section entitled “Of human knowledge,” he asks: 
Why did my parents send me to the Schools
 
That I with knowledge might enrich my mind?
 
Since the desire to know first made men fools,
 
And did corrupt the root of all mankind.
 
The Reformation’s insistence on the privacy of faith and its exposure of Christianity’s public, 
worldly failures brought the problem of intellectual curiosity to the forefront of discussion. 
Aristotle’s “desire to understand” was equally Adam’s disobedient curiosity. Davies’s reference 
to “fools” here suggests he disapproves of Aristotle’s desire, and of scholastic philosophy (“the 
Schools”) in general. Yet the poem’s very title exhorts us to know something: ourselves. A cure 
for Adamite corruption might be to make the individual himself the object of his own quest for 
knowledge. The empirical approach which anatomists had begun to apply to the human body might 
be applied also to the mind, and to one’s own soul in particular. And the most important thing to 
know in this respect was, am I saved? 
This question of status in the afterlife, of who was elect and who not, affected earthly behaviour. 
Huldrych Zwingli, who claimed political authority for religion, and the Anabaptists who revolted 
against him; Charles I who sought absolute rule, and Oliver Cromwell who had him beheaded: all 
did so secure in the knowledge that they were in receipt of divine grace. But this same doctrine also 
made for anxiety: Luther veering between self-transcendence and self-abasement, or Cromwell 
again, sure that his military victories were a sign of his election but plunging into gloom once his 
political leadership stalled. 
Reason, faith and the will: a shifting balance 
Grace, according to Marcel Mauss, belongs to that which lies beyond mere obligation and is 
therefore extraordinary or “sacred.”1 It retains, however, a sense of exchange. When Jesus took the 
punishment originally due to humans, he was giving his life in exchange for God’s gracious gift 
of salvation to us (or some of us). The gift comes through the sequential process of regeneration, 
Pitt-Rivers, “Postscript,” 217. 1 
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faith and justification (a quasi-legal pardon for Adam’s sin). Some saw the gift of grace as one-
sided and unmerited by humans; others saw it, once given, as enabling the individual to change his 
nature or disposition. This latter suggestion, that humans themselves have something to contribute, 
posed a problem about the will. Grace was the will of God. The human will could not by itself 
achieve salvation. But if individual wills are so insignificant, God’s will appears to be a kind of 
determinism; and if man is a sinner then God, in withholding grace from some, seems to be the 
determiner and author of sin – an evident absurdity. 
The elevated profile of wit and reason – a specifically human reasoning – partly arose from 
attempts to solve this conundrum, and the concept of disability was bound up with it from the 
beginning, as we shall see later. The individual’s ability to enter into a quasi-juridical act of 
exchange with God was expressed as His side of a legal contract. This “covenant theory,” initially 
a reaction against papal diktat, did not sit easily with the idea of God’s omnipotence. The parties 
were so unevenly matched. How could such a relationship be mutual? One answer was that the 
individual pays a “peppercorn rent” in return for his possible salvation. His side of the bargain is 
an effort of will, even the smallest effort being acceptable. By 1700 this had largely been replaced 
by an effort of reason, of which the smallest amount was not at all acceptable. “Ability” would 
no longer be the simple ability to be saved but the intellectual ability to understand that one was 
saved, and how. The principle of exchange in this form – of intelligence for salvation – is buried 
deep within the modern mind-set. 
How did human reasoning rise to this position? Our modern narrative tells us there was a battle 
between reason and faith, which reason won. However, in early Christianity human reasoning 
did not even occupy the same arena of discussion – not even by way of antagonism – as grace, or 
individual faith (the proxy for grace). They were brought together by late medieval philosophers 
who distinguished between what we can know by reason without faith and what we can know 
only by faith. Thus the two became strands in a single overall theme, if not yet oppositional. For 
Luther, human reason was a “stinking whore” when it broached things due to grace alone but “the 
great light of nature” in the everyday world, which was a “kingdom of reason” enabling humans 
to rule over beasts. For Calvin, “natural reason would never direct men to Christ”; it was not so 
much contrary to faith as secondary to it (“unless you have believed you shall not understand,” 
wrote Isaiah).2 In “studying to approach God,” reason is a hindrance or at best a by-product; it is 
only valuable because it deprives us of the excuse that we are ignorant of sin. On the Catholic side, 
Pascal would write that “reason’s last step is to see that an infinite number of things are beyond it,” 
natural as well as supernatural; and Vives had matched Calvin’s image of the mind as a labyrinth 
with his “man is a difficult animal,” “most arduous and difficult” to get to know.3 This launched a 
tradition of studying how to place human reasoning and emotions within nature that went through 
Huarte, Francisco Suárez and Hugo Grotius to Locke. Recognition of the mind’s complexity 
provoked investigations into how it worked, its operations and actions. Studying to approach God 
through the literal truth of the Bible led to studying God’s creation through the literal truth about 
nature on an inductive basis, and that included human nature. 
The first Reformers’ humanist interest in the law of nature increased with the second generation, 
and threatened to dilute the primacy of faith. In natural law theory, the complement to revelation, 
reason was a common thread uniting the realms of providence, human action and the workings 
of the external world. Heinrich Bullinger, Zwingli’s successor at Zürich, unwittingly endowed 
reason with its own discretely human dimension: “The law of nature is not called the law of nature 
because in the nature and disposition of man there is of or by itself that reason .… But because God 
2 Cited in W. Stevenson, Sovereign Grace, 15.
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hath imprinted or engraven in our minds some knowledge, and certain general principles … which, 
because they be grafted in us and born together with us, do therefore seem as if they are naturally 
in us.”4 The history of ideas is littered with cases where people have woken up one morning to find 
that “as if” is now the literal truth. The notion that divine reason occurs naturally within human 
beings was to blossom in later writers of broadly Calvinist persuasion, such as Baxter and Locke. It 
is not just that natural human reasoning is erected to a higher, less corrupt level; in their work, it has 
already, at its very root, an investment of divine light and of the “spiritual intelligence” of grace. 
The relationship between faith and reason, once established, was always more than one of 
simple antagonism. In any case, neither functioned independently of the will. Before the Fall, 
man’s reason had been compatible with his will; it was only his corruption that led to conflict 
between them. The English civil wars gave the will a bad name, following which the balance of 
power swung towards reason. Men like John Owen, Cromwell’s chaplain and later a friend of 
Locke, continued to assert that men would be judged for “the obstinacy of their wills,” not of their 
understandings; he was wary of any calibration of concepts in which “the natural man is allowed to 
be the rational man.”5 However, his contemporaries had already dispersed into sects, an “army of 
ten thousand wills” as Locke put it, with catastrophic results for society and religion. 
A plethora of attempts to cure this anarchy ensued, with constant fine-tuning of the necessary 
balance between reason and will, reason and faith. But human reasoning ran out the winner. The 
idea of instant regeneration through faith, in preparation for an expected imminent rule of the saints, 
gave way to policing the means to regeneration, within the individual. The Cromwellian regime’s 
political failures signalled postponement of that rule. The means would now primarily be reasoning 
ones, partly because they were optimistically thought to have a socially calming effect. Formerly the
word “means” denoted a single act of God, His pardon or “justification,” to which any effort of the
human will was purely reactive. Now that word began to denote the constant self-perfection of one’s
own understanding, offered as the human contribution in the act of exchange that was grace. Within 
the overall scheme of natural law, as refurbished by proto-Enlightenment humanists such as Grotius 
and Samuel Pufendorf, human reasoning began to acquire a more grown-up relationship with divine
reason, reserving for the latter the role of first cause. Among its products would be Newton’s theory 
of gravity. No such lasting success would attend human reason’s theory of itself, however. 
Predestination and grace 
Divine, saving grace is deterministic: it arrives of necessity. In our modern, nature-nurture pairing 
it is nature that is deterministic and necessary. We are never offered a rationale for there being only
nature and nurture. Why just two? Why these two, exactly? Who chose them? This pairing is not 
in fact a historical constant. It is the late nineteenth-century’s reduction of a previously tripartite 
formula. On one side stood nurture, covering also custom, convention or sheer hard work. On the 
other side stood necessity: “fate” in secular terms, “predestination” in religious ones. Nature stood 
somewhere in the middle, between nurture and necessity, somewhat overlapping both (but often 
closer to nurture): multifaceted, soft-edged, negotiable. 
If a time-travelling doctor from this period were to hear our cognitive geneticists talking about 
DNA as the cause of intelligence or disability, he would bracket them with the proponents of 
fate or predestination rather than nature. When Aristotle drew a distinction between natural and 
acquired intemperance, he meant by “natural” a disposition, not a determination; human character 
4 Heinrich Bullinger, Decades, i, 194.
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was not ultimately innate. It was subject to the necessities of fortune. Cicero and Alexander placed 
a clear boundary between fate and nature.6 In medieval philosophy, the nature in “natural law” was 
not infallible. According to Aquinas, natural causes in this world were “indeterminate”: subject 
to planetary influence or sheer luck.7 God could in any case suspend their operation, this being 
the point of the Old Testament story about the Israelites who did not burn when thrown into a 
fiery furnace. Human behaviour was a matter of disposition (habitus), which is in the last resort 
changeable; when changes in the individual are described as happening “by disposition and nature” 
(per habitum et naturam), these are complementary rather than opposite.8 Fate, providential decree 
and the predestination of souls, by contrast, were all forms of a necessity that was impenetrable 
to fallen man. Law was likewise a threefold system: unchangeable divine law at one end, the 
malleable positive law of the courtroom at the other and natural law in the middle. When we 
come across an apparently dyadic formula – Mulcaster, for example, writes about wit being “by 
nature implanted, for nurture to enlarge” – it is on the premise that some prior, necessary force has 
implanted nature in the first place.9 
Seventeenth-century theologians and natural philosophers continued to keep this soft, 
dispositional nature separate both from nurture and (more sharply) from the preordained necessity 
of the soul’s after-life destination. Salvation was possible only because “for his elect God hath 
altered the course of nature.” Anyone attributing necessity to nature was a Hobbesian atheist; in 
Hobbes’s state of nature, if the sequence of events in the external world follows an inevitable, 
determinate pattern as billiard balls do, then so may the inner nature of the human being. Opponents 
protested that “the world was not caused by the necessity of nature,” meaning that necessity lies 
somewhere other than in nature. The danger of Hobbes’s view, for this author, is that allocating 
the role of necessity to nature turns it into a form of blind chance, thereby denying its openness to 
divine intervention (as for example in the regeneration of the elect). Nature can never be a “first 
cause” or “sustain and direct” all second causes.10 The decline of the doctrine of election later in the 
century led to a more distanced perspective, in which fate and predestinarian grace came to be seen 
as subcategories of a single determinism. Whereas predestinarians had disliked “fate” because of its 
pagan, Stoic associations, the post-Calvinist religious establishment saw an equivalence between 
“fate [and] Calvinistic predestination as it is called.” So eventually no difference was perceived 
between the arbitrary fatalism of predestination (you are saved because of some unknowable 
divine necessity rather than your good behaviour) and Hobbesian natural fatalism (behaviour x
necessarily leads to behaviour y).11 
The tripartite formula withstood the decline in beliefs about election. One’s nature was still 
something one might acquire. Doctors saw bodily nature as changeable by nurture.12 Political 
theorists – even a seeming modernizer such as the Leveller Richard Overton, for whom equality of 
political rights was a “principle of nature” – nevertheless represented this nature as a midwife, her 
feminine pliability contrasting with the strictness of God, the necessary and all-determining father 
of that principle.13 In the eighteenth century, closer to modern life sciences, the Enlightenment 
6 Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, 7.5; Christopher Gill, “The question of character development,” 
Classical Quarterly, 33 (1983). 
7 Contra Gentiles, 92, cited in Pietro Palazzini, Dictionarum Morale et Canonicum, ii, 563. 
8 Da Thiene, Super Libros, D7v. 
9 Positions, 25. 
10 William Bates, The Whole Works, i, 20. 
11 Henry More, cited in Howard, The Life of the Pious and Learned Henry More, 59. 
12 For example Gian Filippo Ingrassia, In Galeni Librum de Ossibus, 61. 
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naturalist Buffon continued to think of nature in tripartite vein, quoting his predecessors with 
approval on this point: “‘Natural’ is spoken of in man concerning that which is not fixed, nor 
general, but which changes with temperament or education.”14 One might extend the tripartite 
framework as far forward as Freud, with biology as necessity, civilization as nurture and the 
unconscious as nature. 
God’s saving grace was deterministic and necessitarian, and precisely as such was distinct from 
nature. St Paul claimed that no two things were more opposed. Aquinas kept them separate, but 
added that nature could not attain its own ends without grace, while grace could not exist without 
natural matter for it to work on. Nature and the necessity of grace had been compatible before 
the Fall, it was said, and – here is the importance for us – they might be so again. From the mid-
seventeenth century onwards, the autonomy of nature came to be seen not so much as alien to grace 
but as something the free gift of grace could “reform and perfect.”15 A new optimism about nature 
extended across political and religious divides. The nonconformist Baxter attacked those who “can 
never speak bad enough of nature” just as his Catholic contemporaries were conceding that “grace 
acts according to nature and does not pervert its order.”16 
There was also a blurring of the originally sharp distinction between “special grace” – the grace 
that was divine and led to salvation – and “common” grace, which was shared out among everyone 
in the form of their individual “natural” graces. Everyone possessed these latter regardless of 
their elect or non-elect status, and human reasoning featured prominently among them; the first 
Reformers thought that these natural graces existed only to equip civic and religious authority with 
the ability to prevent civil society from descending into a chaos of sin. Over the next two centuries, 
their positive aspect was increasingly emphasized. The natural graces became constituent parts 
of honour and gentility, God-given powers which compelled the admiration and assent of social 
inferiors. Baxter noted with dismay how the idea was beginning to creep in that “saving grace 
differeth not specie [in kind] but gradu [by degrees]” from natural grace.17 But the horse had 
already bolted. In the political changes that provoked the elevation of human reason, the distinction 
between natural graces (earthly status) and special or saving grace (after-death status) risked being 
lost. The modern usage “a saving grace” is itself an example, since it has come to indicate some 
quality personal to the individual, a natural grace in someone who otherwise might be reprobate 
and lack divine, saving grace. The temptation is to think that modern psychology has universalized, 
as general intelligence, the individual and secular human reasoning formerly regarded as a natural 
grace. However, it could not have done so without universalizing, within this, some element of 
predestinate divine grace too. Grace, like honour, defines an in-group (the company of the elect) 
and an out-group; it has border controls, verification and assessment systems, and a protective 
apparatus against pollution. The faculty of “human understanding” rode to the rescue of grace 
when its immigration levels reached crisis point, and ended up entirely redrafting the policy. It 
extended the denomination of the in-group until they were a majority (the possessors first of a 
reasoned faith, then of reason without faith), thereby creating a new, much smaller out-group. 
The necessity of grace, in the form of predestination, had been invoked to explain both the 
causes of everyday behaviour here on earth and of status in the hereafter. In the case of earthly 
behaviour, such a strong degree of determinism would mean there was no rationale for civil 
government, when in fact we are constantly having to hold back a tide of social chaos. The very 
14 Antoine Furetière, cited in Michel Bouvier, “Le naturel,” XVIIe siècle, 39 (1987).
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idea of “human laws presupposes the lapse, or disablement of man.”18 Calvin had denied, on these 
grounds, that one’s earthly behaviours were predestined. However, he valued the fear this notion 
induced; it was a way of humbling people before earthly authority, showing that there was no 
point in taking one’s destiny into one’s own hands. This in turn gave rulers the idea that they might 
coerce certain behaviours, since they themselves were earthly transmitters of God’s grace. Henry 
VIII, for example, switched his favours from the previously dominant doctrine of free will to the 
predestinarian school because he identified the former with the personal autonomy of the honour 
society’s leading nobles whom he was trying to tame. 
In the case of the afterlife, strong predestination theory claimed that God had already determined, 
before the beginning of time, whether an individual soul was saved or damned, elect or reprobate. 
This rigidified existing notions of religious status. Honouring certain people for their worthy 
behaviour – and thereby preserving their memories, as the genealogies of the honour society did – 
had begun informally and was at first conducted by local Christian communities. It was then taken 
over by local bishops, and around 1200 came under the control of the papacy, which formalized it 
as sainthood and codified it as canonization. The Reformation replaced this posthumous sainthood 
with the living company of the elect, establishing the idea of a “rule of saints” that would prepare 
for the second coming. The doctrine of election, marginal before the Reformation, internalized 
sainthood and made the faith of the individual its supreme criterion, thereby opening up sainthood 
to ordinary believers. 
The central reference point for debates about predestination was the fifth-century quarrel between 
Augustine, who had emphasized the prior necessity of divine grace, and Pelagius, who credited 
individual human beings with their own abilities, chiefly those of the will. (Without free will, said 
some, it would be impossible to judge people for their actions.) The Reformation largely sided with 
Augustine. People were not free except to sin, so they were certainly not free to work at their own 
salvation. The Counter Reformation likewise anathematized Pelagius; some Catholics, notably 
the Jansenists, went on to agree about election and reprobation too. The notion of a predestined 
in-group matched state directiveness about honour; rulers saw the company of the elect forming 
a bulwark against factious nobles on the one hand and social inferiors on the other. With their 
enthusiasm for predestination theory, however, came the need to keep controversy on a tight leash. 
Even the Swiss Reform elites, whose brainchild the strong interpretation was, banned sermons on 
the topic. The Church of England, despite many opportunities, always avoided adopting any final 
position on such matters, from its 1553 Articles of Religion through to the political climax of the 
predestination dispute at the 1618 Synod of Dort. Rulers feared that over-insistence might rouse 
sleeping plebeian dogs. James I, banning preachers from raising the issue, said it should be left to 
“learned men, and that moderately and modestly”; an Italian visitor to London agreed, complaining 
that “here the very women and shopkeepers [are] able to judge of predestination.”19 
While every Calvinist was a predestinarian of sorts, the strong version of it had become 
increasingly popular and rigid after Calvin’s death, he himself having been unsystematic about 
it. “Double predestination” turned reprobates into a strictly defined group symmetrical with the 
elect. This rigidification and codification of grace came from Calvin’s Genevan successor Beza, 
the Dutchman Francis Gomarus and the Englishman William Perkins. What Calvin had called a 
mystery they turned into dogma and orthodoxy. Nevertheless, the idea that individual effort might 
count refused to go away. To the idea that the elect are robots who “of necessity” yield assent and 
obedience, the objection arose: “Whosoever holdeth man’s will and election to be subject to the 
necessities of destiny, destroyeth utterly … all that appertaineth to human prudence … for if it
18 W.M., The Middle Way, 40.
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were so, … what difference were there between the wise man and the fool?”20 Predestination is not 
false, says this author, but should not discourage us from reasoning as far as we can. 
The loudest opponents of double predestination were Jacob Arminius and his disciples. For 
them, salvation came from belief and, as it seemed therefore to their orthodox opponents, from a 
Pelagian-type effort of the will. Gomarus accused him of promoting the idea of a “universal grace.” 
Arminius appeared to suggest that salvation might be within reach of anyone who belonged to the 
Church: a meritocracy of the will. All humans can be saved, he said, by responding freely to the 
divine call, but only if they will it. In fact this was not a universalist position, since it still involved 
election secondarily, on the grounds of God’s prescience (“God foresaw what good courses I would 
take out of my free will, so did elect me”). God bestows a “sufficient grace” on everyone: sufficient, 
that is, to save anyone as long as they persevere. Special grace is not, as his orthodox opponents 
saw it, “effective,” that is, fixed absolutely from before the beginning of time for a limited number 
of individuals. For the Arminians, “to be able to believe is in nature, to believe is of grace.”21 In 
other words, anyone can progress from ability or potentiality to the actuality of belief, if he has 
the will. Human depravity only began at a certain historical point, with the Fall, and hence cannot 
have been preordained in some individuals before the world began. If God had ordained before 
the creation that certain individuals were not to be saved then He, not they, would apparently be 
author of their sin. 
The Arminians were ejected from the Reformed Church at the Synod of Dort. A watershed 
political event of the century (delegations attended from all over Europe), the Synod again 
illustrates the strong link between grace and honour. The dispute between Arminius and Gomarus 
had originated in the theology department at the University of Leiden where both men worked; 
each was engaged by rival factions in the Low Countries in a power struggle between pragmatic, 
decentralizing urban oligarchs who supported Arminius, and a nobility whose centralist, coercive 
policies were well suited to predestinarian doctrines like Gomarus’s. 
Give me a sign, Lord: grace and the assessment process 
The critical problem for the company of the elect, as for the honour society, was how to authenticate 
their membership. Am I saved? The answer was a sealed book which God does not permit us to 
open. Grace gave the elect regeneration (the start of a new life), justification (removal of guilt) and 
sanctification (sustainability). But were there signs of membership? Was there a religious version 
of heraldic science? The question was crucial in respect of oneself because one’s everlasting future 
was at stake, and crucial in respect of other people because they had to be made ready for the rule 
of the saints. Whereas Calvin’s remarks about predestination were merely a warning to everyone to 
pull their socks up, later divines could not escape the urge to probe their own and others’ individual 
status: this despite the maxim that in allocating grace God was not responding to “circumstances 
inherent in the person” (to use the modern phrase that derives from it, he was “no respecter of 
persons”).22 But divine arbitrariness only heightened the anxiety. The individual was unable to call 
upon anything within himself to alter his destiny, but this made signs more, not less, of an issue. 
After all, it was incontrovertible that some of us are elect. 
Any bid for membership of the company of the elect was more hope than claim. Because 
the decision was God’s alone, and mysterious, the very existence of signs was disputed. William 
20 Bryskett, A Discourse, 168.
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Tyndale warned against guilty speculation, against those “unquiet, busy, and high-climbing spirits” 
who “bring hither their high reasons and pregnant wits, and begin first from on high to search the 
bottomless secrets of God’s predestination, whether they be predestinate or not.” He contrasts such 
people’s quick, “fleshly wit” with Jesus’s “idiot” disciples, unlearned men whose modicum of 
understanding was nevertheless authentic. His criticism tars wit with the same brush as honour; it 
is a natural grace of the courtier, couched in terms of faculty psychology (“a sharp wit and a quick 
apprehension, a smooth speech, and a sound memory”). Later critics, in similar vein, identified 
these self-proclaimed elect who “exclude all others” with the episcopacy itself, which for them was 
just papal authority under another name.23 
Anxiety about membership, as with all self-referential status modes, was objectified in the 
detached, scientific form of statistics. This too had its medieval precedents. In the early fourteenth 
century William of Ockham had been prominent among a group of scientifically inclined Oxford 
philosophers, whose studies of extension and acceleration led them to draw an analogy from the 
primary qualities they were dealing with (light, heat, colour, etc.) to the growth of qualities such 
as grace and charity within individual human beings. Every continuum was divisible into parts 
and therefore ought to be measurable: why not grace? These speculations, cut short in any case 
by the plague, were confined to a minute avant-garde.24 The Reformation, on the other hand, led 
to grace becoming an obsession with the entire massed ranks of the literate, their anxiety all the 
greater because of the small number of the elect (the 144,000 mentioned in the Book of Revelation 
was a popular figure). According to the English church in 1595, the elect were “a determinate and 
certain number, which can neither be increased nor diminished,” a view echoed on the Counter 
Reformation side by the Council of Trent.25 The notion of a limited number then led to that of a 
predetermined Grace Quotient or order of precedence among them. Bishop Lancelot Andrewes 
attacked mere mortals who try to second-guess God; they think “they have sounded it to the bottom 
and … can tell you the number and order of them just[ified] with 1.2.3.4.5.”26 
Signs of grace had their own dialectic within the individual. This began with the sense of 
“assurance” said to accompany faith. There followed the thought: how do I know this is not mere 
smugness? As Perkins complained, “Many in their own thinking shall be predestinate, even though 
they can never be truly persuaded.” Self-knowledge had to be a genuine “inward testimony of the 
spirit … in the heart of everyone that believeth, that he is elected.” Some people, however, might 
reach this stage and then doubt their status. They would combat their doubts with strenuous piety. 
But then, this could not alter their fate; it might in fact be mere acting. So some of them went on to 
exhibit this internal wrestling externally, so that it was precisely lack of assurance that was the sign 
of being elect. Then again internal wrestling too might be counterfeited, by hypocrites or “wicked 
histrionical professors” who “tread those twisting paths so as to seem to approach the God from 
whom they flee.” The sign therefore had to be “doubt interspersed with momentary windows of 
overwhelming joy,” including visitations by the holy spirit and the power of prophecy.27 People 
began to record daily accounts, quantifying these inner signs of election. 
There was also the sign as it appeared to others. Anne Hutchinson was accused at her trial of 
terrorizing people, particularly pregnant women, by suggesting that they had fooled themselves 
23 Tyndale, Doctrinal Treatises, 505; Brooke, A Discourse, 13. 
24 J.A. Weisheipl, “Ockham and the Mertonians,” in J. Catto (ed.), The History of the University of 
Oxford, i, 639. 
25 Dudley Fenner, The Artes of Logike and Rethorike, C1v. 
26 Andrewes, XCVI Sermons, 548. 
27 Perkins, A Briefe Discourse, Taken out of the Writings of Her. Zanchius, 19; John Beverley, Unio 
Reformantium, 71; Jean Calvin, Institutes, 1.5.51. 
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into believing they were in grace when they were not and thus questioning the religious status of 
their unborn children (she duly received the divine punishment of miscarrying a physiological 
“monster” herself). She allegedly claimed that “if she had but one half hour’s talk with a man, 
she would tell whether he were elect or not,” volunteering her own spiritual state as the baseline 
assessment.28 More usually, though, the doctrine of divine inscrutability prevailed. Signs could 
only be indirect, “given off” by certain secular abilities in each individual. Hence the catechism. 
Invented by the early church fathers to screen out pollutant individuals from church ritual, the 
catechism subsequently developed into a measurable indicator of ability – part of a general tendency 
to reduce religion to whatever could be taught and learnt. The Reform theologian Jerome Zanchius 
wrote about the “deeper learning” that comes “by rehearsal and catechism, which is done by mutual 
questions and answers of the young beginner.” Although a “deeper divinity” still lay untouched 
beneath the catechism, questioning might at least elicit something. Even if we cannot “look into 
the rolls of eternity … election makes itself evident, and declares itself in our sanctification: for 
sanctification is, as it were, a temporal election.”29 Sanctification became for members of the 
company of the elect particularly important in this context. During the early Reformation it was 
very much the junior partner to regeneration and justification. These latter were complete and 
instantaneous, whereas sanctification, which would eventually come to dominate, had a temporal 
character; it was that aspect of grace which “once begun, daily increases” and “is continually at 
work in us.”30 It was therefore open to development, as well as to human intervention, in the form 
of training and curricula. It became an opportunity for members of the company of the elect, like 
those of the honour society, to know exactly who they were: a form of mutual recognition which 
doctrine had at first forbidden, and which was facilitated by its gradual transmutation into secular 
intelligence. In this way it acquired a “stereotyped, programmed corporateness,” helping the godly 
“to survive in the face of the reprobate.”31 
Correct answers to catechical questioning gave evidence of sanctification, in the form of a 
reasoned understanding of one’s religion, and could be taken as a proxy sign of election. The 
catechism was already a “science,” as people of the time understood the word.32 At some point 
the intellect, the psychological faculty of “human understanding,” would cease to be a proxy and 
became election’s substantive replacement, thus putting the cart before the Calvinist donkey. Grace 
might not be achievable through earthly merit or ability, but the search for signs of grace and 
election ushered human intelligence in by the back door, giving it room in which to grow and to 
become “effective” or determinate, like grace. The focus on signs helped to pin down the human 
understanding as a psychological object. Asking whether one was elect led to asking how one 
knew. By what experimental evidence did people obtain both psychological validation of their 
election and a sense of membership of a wider community?33 This question was the stimulus for 
the epistemological issues being raised in philosophy that culminated in Locke’s Essay concerning 
Human Understanding, replacing elect and reprobate with “moral man” (a regenerate universal 
reasoner) and “changeling” (a prototype of the modern intellectually disabled person). 
28 Winship, Making Heretics, 15.
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How faith became “an act of reason” 
Descartes wrote that human reasoning, in the form of the cogito, is itself a “permanent act of 
grace.” As such, it indicates a birth-to-death personhood rather than a one-off event. Spinoza, 
too, wrote that “reason is the saving grace” in human beings. But the great philosophers are not 
necessarily thereby the pioneers. Before Descartes or Spinoza, sixteenth-century religious texts 
foregrounding grace had already, if unwittingly, triggered a process that would elevate the status of 
human reasoning in relation to grace and faith, challenging the oft-cited injunction from the Book 
of Proverbs, “Lean not on thine own understanding.” 
To grasp this, we need first to analyze the terms involved. Reason (ratio) was at least three 
things: reason as the binding principle in the law of nature, an entire cosmological reference-frame 
with a divine core; “right reason” (recta ratio), that which human beings possessed before the 
Fall or will one day possess in their perfect regenerate state; and an everyday, practical human 
reasoning that is potentially corruptible. The understanding, on the other hand, was the intellectus
of faculty psychology: the divine intellectus itself and/or its human embodiment (“intelligence” 
too was sometimes used in this sense). Reason and the understanding were separate concepts. If 
a primary source makes them seem interchangeable to us, that is not because they were growing 
closer (though they were) but because writers simply assumed their readers knew the difference. 
Finally there was knowledge (scientia), which had objective and subjective forms, knowledge and 
knowing, the confusion between them in matters psychological being no less than it is now. The 
one clearly objective body of knowledge to which humans might aspire was “Godly learning,” 
which came from scripture rather than reason, and its Counter Reformation equivalent “Godly 
thinking.” There was also a Faustian “devilish learning,” and devilish thinking. What there could 
not be was neutral thinking of any kind. Even such a subordinate and apparently neutral concept 
such as “calculation,” when employed in the scientific study of nature by Bacon or the Royal 
Society, had a divine element inasmuch as its goal, like that of today’s geneticists, was “remaking 
Eden” (as in the title of Lee Silver’s well-known futurological/eschatological tract). 
Renaissance Christianity attempted to recuperate and turn the increasing elevation of specifically 
human reason and understanding to its own uses. The attempt was entangled in the much-debated 
issue of whether pagans could be elect. The elect experienced regeneration, justification and faith 
because at a certain point in history Christ had come along and died for them. So what about those 
ancient philosophers who had contributed so much to present knowledge (including theological 
knowledge), but who had predeceased him? Were their reasoning abilities no more than mundane 
natural graces? Erasmus tried to insist on the status of Aristotle, the epitome of this type. However, 
predestination seemed to rule out the very possibility of saving grace even for him, because he 
was already dead before the atonement took place. Calvin was said to have asked, “Shall we say 
that they had no wit, which by setting in order the art of speech, have taught us to speak with 
reason?”34 The answer was clearly no. Nevertheless, these learned pagans could not have been 
elect; God simply willed that “we should be holpen by the travail and service of the wicked in 
natural philosophy.” For Calvin it was self-evident that wit could be no sign of election. 
His doctrine was undermined by his successors. By the start of the seventeenth century, a 
substantial group of humanist theologians was trying to weave a way between the twin dogmas 
of orthodox predestination on the one hand (elect and reprobate are mere pawns) and Arminius’s 
disciples on the other (the elect are those with the will to persevere, already known as such to 
God). The first attempts at compromise arose in France, among students of De Mornay; his fame in 
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the history of political ideas as a pioneer of contract theory is significant, because the intellectual 
autonomy and ability he imputed to human beings as political subjects he imputed to them as 
religious and psychological subjects too. 
This group remained within the Reformed church after the Arminians were expelled, but 
between the alleged universalism of the latter and the “special” grace of the orthodox church 
leadership, the group forged a middle way, known as “hypothetical universalism.”35 This was not 
so much a separate doctrine as the orthodoxy of Dort with one crucial alteration. The Synod had 
agreed a five-point platform. Fallen man in his natural state lacks the ability (potentia) to believe; 
God has decided already which sinners he will elect, so they do not have to fulfill any subsequent 
conditions; grace, when it comes, is irresistible; once the elect believe, they remain in faith and 
grace without any lapse; and Christ came to earth to save the elect alone (“limited atonement”). 
The last of these was what the middle way found objectionable, because it was unjust. Christ’s 
love expressed through the atonement was surely universal; it went out to every individual human 
being, even though it was unrequited by many. Alongside this French attempt at a middle path, 
a comparable doctrine arose in the English church known as “conditional universalism,” which 
deemed that “rationality is a necessary condition always presupposed in the subject whether 
predestinate or reprobate.”36 To these we can add others who pursued a moderate line mainly out 
of political fear that debate might get out of hand. Richard Hooker, for example, mindful of the 
damage that competing dogmas had done to the church and to fellow churchmen’s necks since the 
Reformation, wove his way between the extremes by his frequent appeals to the socially calming 
effects of what he dubbed “sweet” reason. 
The French middle-way theologians were particularly disposed to place value in the human 
subject. Human beings were not just “blocks of wood” determined by the blind forces of 
predestination, any more than by arbitrary edict from an infallible Pope. This line, in the wake of 
Dort, provoked hostility from their own orthodox church leaders. It could be taken as implying, 
first, that reason and the will are free to do good independently of God’s grace (the Pelagian heresy), 
and secondly that salvation is achieved not through faith imputed in the elect alone but through 
meritorious works undertaken in this life (the Romanist heresy). In opposition to their orthodox 
colleagues, who believed that Christ died only for the elect, these middle-way compromisers 
argued that Christ’s act of atonement was a separate matter from God’s preordained choice of the 
elect. It was not paradoxical to think that Christ died on everyone’s behalf while election itself was 
limited to a few; his task had been to make salvation possible for all hypothetically, even if God had 
made it actually possible only for certain elect individuals. In opposition to the Arminians, on the 
other hand, the compromisers followed their orthodox colleagues’ line that salvation is conditional 
on faith, not on works. However, they did give this an unorthodox twist: faith required the prior 
co-operation and activity of the intellect here on earth. In other words, faith itself was a work. At 
the same time, human reason was repositioned within faith which, like the will, came to depend 
on prior intellectual components. Using human reason as a probe in groping their way through 
the dark of competing dogmatisms, the middle-way theologians triggered an erosion of category 
boundaries. The limited company of the elect, defined by their faith, would in a few generations 
become the near-universal company of the intelligent. 
In any case the Reformation, despite itself, had from the very start allowed human intellectual
ability to insinuate itself within faith, through its recommendation of personal gospel reading. Its 
insistence on the literal truth of the Bible turned literacy into the highest of the natural graces. 
Special, divine grace had become the fulcrum of religious debate and reached the common people 
35 See F. Laplanche, Orthodoxie et prédication; B. Armstrong, Calvinism and the Amyraut Heresy. 
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through the invention of printing, itself described by Luther as “God’s highest and extremest act of 
grace” and “the last flame before the extinction of the world.”37 This nexus between grammar and 
grace helped to enlarge the godly in-group, previously closed to lay, unlearned idiots. The arguments 
about grace had to be known by all, and one had to be literate in order to advance the correct line that
had been standardized by print – even if grace itself was unknowable and beyond reason. 
The middle-way theologians tried to free human reasoning of its corrupting taints. They 
tackled, for example, the orthodox dogma of a simple opposition between learning (“human”) and 
understanding (“spiritual”), like that expressed in the title of a widely disputed Baptist text of 1640: 
The Sufficiency of the Spirit’s Teaching without Human Learning. Or a treatise tending to prove 
human learning to be no help to the spiritual understanding of the word of God. A middle-way 
critic asks the author to “bewail your ignorance that you had no more of human learning, that you 
might have the more easily understood by the help of the holy spirit that divine learning which is 
revealed in the holy scripture.” In other words, human and divine learning can be compatible or 
even intermingle.38 
The question of whether pagan philosophers could be elect was revived for this purpose.
Pre-Christian Greeks with enough wit to know “necessary truths” (i.e., mathematical ones – those 
which even God cannot temporarily suspend) must surely have had some sort of uncorrupted 
knowledge of God too, since necessary truths are “sovereign and uncreated” aspects of the divinity 
himself. And even those writers who disapproved of Aristotle could always appeal instead to a 
Baconian concept of human reason as experimentally embedded in practical things; this could then 
be a bulwark against the wishy-washy, “corrupting philosophy” of Aristotle and the scholastics 
and therefore compatible with faith, even enhance it. Either way, it became possible to say that it 
was not human reasoning abilities in themselves that are corrupt, only how they are used. Sidney’s 
friend Fulke Greville, simultaneously a Baconian and a strict faith-based Calvinist, had already 
suggested that the status of our subjective reasoning abilities is guaranteed by the objective ones 
enshrined in experimental method; the latter “supply the natural defects” of “wit” in the former.39 
Godly learning, then, having begun as an objective body of biblical knowledge opposed to the 
corrupt human sort, expanded to become the basis for a scientific knowledge of the natural world, 
to which might be added a scientific knowledge of human nature and of the subjective processes 
of knowing. 
Baxter, a champion of the middle way, had been forced as a chaplain in Cromwell’s army to 
cope with in-fighting sectarians who believed the mere intensity of their faith meant they were 
elect. He warned such people, “If you overthrow your reason, you will be a reproach to religion …; 
it is an ill sign when your zeal is beyond the proportion of your understanding.”40 Baxter was trying 
to redress a balance that had tipped too far towards the will and instantaneous faith during the civil 
wars. In his baroque ramification of divisions and subdivisions between will, faith and reason, we 
can see a desperate attempt to maintain parity among them. But we can also see, with the benefit of 
hindsight, that the very need to maintain parity caused him unwittingly to highlight the autonomy 
and positive value of human reasoning in particular. 
Even the opposing orthodoxies on either side of the middle way, forced to engage with the 
centrality of reason, tacked towards it and were eventually forced to endorse it. Their new course 
then became permanent. Following the reshaping of the political landscape for Protestants in the 
mid-seventeenth century in both France and England, orthodox Calvinists came to look on the path 
37 Cited in Cummings, The Literary Culture, 50.
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to grace as “rational conviction of the mind,” while Arminians ceased locating the primary human 
ability in perseverance of the will and sought it instead in the reasoning faculties that differentiate 
one individual from the next.41 As one of them put it, “The divine essence or nature of God is one 
thing, and that virtue that he was pleased to put forth to give being to the reasonable soul of a man, 
are ever distinct …. The essence of God is one thing, and that radical virtue or potency is another 
thing” and varies in each of us.42 The very drawing of such a clear distinction between divine and 
human reason helped in this changed political context to promote the latter. By the 1670s it was 
clear that “the loud outcries … against reason” now only came from “sects” and “fanatics.” It was 
“sober use of our faculties,” by contrast, that should be the aim. Even if the premise remained 
that reason in humans was corrupt, sobriety would make up for its shortcomings. Hence “faith 
itself is an act of reason.” Moreover, “to disgrace reason, is to strike up religion by the roots, and 
prepare the world for atheism.”43 After 1660 it was usual to add “and reason” to any mention of 
revelation or scripture in support of a theological argument, where previously the author would 
either have omitted such a phrase or sounded defensive about it. Intelligence could only ever have 
come to dominate our views of human nature by being socialized in this way, and can only do so 
still: that is, by demonstrating a superior claim to divinity. Once human reasoning was identified 
as a positive means to divine grace, the way was open for that outcome which earlier disputants 
had explicitly warned against. Mundane “natural” grace no longer knew its place. Instead, it had 
absorbed elements of the “special” grace formerly confined to the elect. 
“Soul-experiments”: testing the rational conscience 
What, more exactly, was the relevant content of the knowledge that lay in the human intellect or 
understanding? Three interlinked components predominate, all of them pointing inwards: first, 
understanding of the understanding itself, in a theoretical sense; secondly, the practical aspect of 
self-understanding known as conscience; and finally, the concrete application of conscience by 
self-examination at holy communion. All three went with an extension of human reasoning (and 
its status) down the social scale. 
A thirteenth-century clerk, trader or peasant on the make might have been surprised to hear a 
present-day historian say, as many have, that “self” and “individual” are modern concepts. Their 
practical manifestation is well in evidence from the social history of the earlier period and has 
already been well covered in Alexander Murray’s Reason and Society in the Middle Ages. Our 
concern here, however, is with the value accorded to them at a doctrinal level, which grew in 
a rather piecemeal fashion. Godly learning was increasingly supplemented with “learning about 
humanity” (studia humanitatis). Calvin, for example, began his great work with the sentence, “The 
knowledge of God and that of ourselves are connected.” This led to attempts to know the mind, and 
later its perfectibility. The critique of this project, that it is circular, gradually emerged. Could the 
cure for a corrupt human understanding be effected by the understanding itself? “A disease in the 
body is perceived by the mind; but when the soul is the affected part, and the rectitude of reason is 
lost,” as it is in fallen man, then “there is no remaining principle to give notice of it.”44 To think that 
the understanding can understand the understanding, says this author, is to dream of union with the 
divine essence, just as an unreasonable enthusiast or sectarian does. One met this critique, then as 
41 Flavell, The Method, 71; 73.
 
42 Francis Duke, The Fulness and Freeness of Gods Grace, 105.
 
43 Glanvill, “Anti-fanatical Religion,” 17, in Essays.
 







164 A History of Intelligence and “Intellectual Disability” 
now, with studied avoidance. Baconian science’s attempt to clarify the relation between objects of 
knowledge and subjective abilities of knowing and understanding did not extend to that discipline 
in which the object of knowledge is the human understanding itself. 
The problem in religious terms was the Roman church’s admiration of surface images, perceived 
through the external senses and the faculty of imagination. One had to look inwards: “though … a 
man’s self be not the only object of his own care, yet himself … in the first place must be looked 
into. Our charity must begin at home.”45 The easy descent of the imagination had to be abandoned 
for the steep climb of introspection. How might one reach an understanding of the understanding? 
One option was Platonism. Its theory of the intellect encouraged circular thinking since it was 
premised on the compatibility or even, potentially, the unity between understanding as object and 
understanding as subject. For Greville’s adopted son Robert Brooke, this unity represented the 
perfect human reason of the afterlife, where “the understanding and the truth-understood are one.” 
The existing Aristotelian convention that drew distinctions between “a soul recipient, a being
[sc. a substantial truth] received, and a faculty which is the understanding,” was over-complicated 
nonsense. All three are the same thing, and comprise a single act of divine grace: “However the 
understanding be enriched with this treasure of truth … then is it, itself that truth, that light …. 
Thus the understanding and light are different in names, may be different in degrees but not in 
nature.” Such an ideal reasoning might even be possible on this earth. “Who shall tell us what is 
recta ratio [right reason]? I answer recta ratio,” he continues; any other answer would be “most 
papal.” The idea of “us” (the putatively elect) establishing human reason, in perfected form, as its 
own psychological object, came partly from the refusal to let popes, bishops and absolute rulers tell 
us and thus also, in Lord Brooke’s case, from his honourable status.46 
If a Platonist reduction of terms was one route towards understanding of the understanding, 
another was the proliferation of terms typical of middle-way doctrines. Baxter wrote to Boyle 
with proposals for another suitable piece of Royal Society research. The core ability of the human 
understanding was a “waking, working knowledge” of itself, and of the “faculties and capacities” 
distinguishing us from other animals. Boyle agreed: men must “make themselves part of their own 
study.”47 Where early modern wit starts to lift itself from the corrupting mire of original sin, its 
first topic for study is itself. Our knowledge of this reasoning human nature, writes Baxter, is like 
our knowledge of the existence of God or mathematical truths: human nature is itself demonstrable
a priori. Locke would a few years later call himself “bold” for saying that the place of the human 
understanding in the natural order is a universal truth as “capable of demonstration, as well as 
mathematics”; but Baxter had already submitted psychology’s bid for scientific status.48 He situates 
the understanding’s understanding of the understanding in the realm of natural history. Renaissance 
writers had wondered vaguely whether it might not form part of natural philosophy. Baxter goes 
further by proposing it as an exact, inductive science, which (as he wrote to Boyle) the Royal 
Society should position within “the alphabet of physics,” to be investigated by means of “soul­
experiments.”49 These latter were the direct descendants, in a new natural-philosophy context, of 
the “experimental predestinarianism” recommended by earlier Calvinists for assessing the signs 
of grace in oneself. 
45 Martin Blake, The Great Question, 88.
 
46 Brooke, The Nature of Truth, 53; 5; see also James, “English politics.”
 
47  Baxter, Letter to Robert Boyle, 14 June 1665; Boyle, cited in John Howe, The Reconcileableness of 

God’s Prescience, 7. 
48 Locke, An Essay, 43; 516. 








From Pilgrim’s Progress to Developmental Psychology 165 
Baxter’s circular definition of the understanding was linked to a circular definition of the species: 
to be human is to possess the intellectual ability to know what it is to be human, which is to possess 
the intellectual ability (to know what it is to be human, which is …), and so on. Yet it was still an 
understanding that knew its earthly place. It was the distinguishing mark of the human from other 
natural species: a preparation for the rule of the saints, but not the ensuing enlightenment itself. 
Adam before the Fall had this enlightenment. He knew the essence of the rational soul “far more 
then we do ours ….” However, “he knew it not by its effects”; he saw a unitary “selfness” in “the 
souls of all creatures with himself,” such that their “specificating forms” were to him invisible.50 
Once the “reasonable soul” is in its ultimately perfect state, any knowledge about the place of the 
human understanding in nature becomes redundant because it is no longer needed; the prelapsarian 
Adam’s participation in divine reason meant that he was “clouded to perceive his own nature.” 
Understanding of the understanding was therefore only an intermediary step, towards perfection. 
If we look more precisely at individual minds, of what did this understanding consist? Baxter, 
in the same year (1671) as Locke first conceived the need for the Essay concerning Human 
Understanding, gives us rare chapter and verse:51 
1. That you understand who Christ is, as in his person and his offices; 2. That you understand the 
reason of his undertaking; 3. That you understand, what it is that he hath done and suffered for us; 
4. That you understand the nature and worth of his benefits, and what he will do for you; 5. That 
you understand the terms on which he conveyeth these benefits to men; and what is the nature, 
extent, and condition of his promises; and 6. that you understand the certain truth of all this. 
[emphases in original] 
The model for this understanding, as Baxter makes clear, was reflexive: it was his own sense
of election. Discovery of one’s inner self complemented the external, objective workings of the 
transmission of grace. It was experimental, an application of Baconian science to the soul; in
the words of Baxter’s colleague Gabriel Firmin, “Great is the work of the spirit upon the 
understanding …. God hath given man a rational soul, set up his candle and light within him, made 
able to reflect upon it self, try and know what is in himself, it is able to draw conclusions from 
premises: hence when the Lord sets him upon examination, he sets him about a rational work, to 
which he hath fitted and enabled him.”52 
We find such increasingly detailed and systematized psychology in another of Baxter’s 
colleagues, a certain W.M. He ignores the formerly crucial question of how grace arrives in the 
elect, in favour of how one’s own mind works to combine with it. He writes about the importance 
to religion of “hav[ing] a right understanding and due conception in our mind, touching the notive 
power of man, in or unto the specifying and determining of his own acts or actions.”53 God does 
not determine the detail of individual human actions and is therefore not the author of sinful ones; 
the only thing he determines is the one-off act of conversion. This then stimulates the soul to 
regenerate its natural faculties by itself, “rendering them capable of taking in a new impression … 
to which the soul was disabled before.” If God works any other direct changes on the individual, 
it is “objectively, also by offering reason to it,” on the grounds that “faith [is] the most solid 
understanding.” Knowing the self and the mind thus involves both divine determination and human 
reasoning. On the one hand we are responsible for our own actions and God does not determine or 
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predestine them; on the other, there is His “offer” of right reason. To make the two work together, 
some third thing has to mediate between them: not intuited intellectual ability as such (“notive 
power,” nous) but a separate “understanding,” a conceptualization of that ability. The human mind 
has, of necessity, something in it that thinks about its own thinking. 
Whether this human nature was a universal one remained an open question. For the medieval 
philosophers, self-knowledge meant “Know your essence,” where “you” is the broad category 
“man.” For Protestant humanists, it increasingly meant “Know your individual self,” and again this 
raised the hypothesis not only of differences among individuals, but of a hierarchy of difference, and 
perhaps of exceptions to the entire rule. An exasperated pastor like Firmin thought the very category 
“man” was rendered unstable by the mass ignorance he encountered in “trying and knowing” his 
parishioners – that is, in assessing them with the catechism. Any hypothetically universal human 
category continued to exist in tension with the restricted one of the elect. Were reprobates really 
human? W.M.’s teasing out of the multidimensional workings of grace within individuals, in terms 
of their psychological faculties, was a fix for the problems grace was encountering in the political 
sphere. Authority, threatened by sectarian rashness and enthusiastic self-assertions of elect status, 
sought in active, reasoned and reflexive internal examination the kind of self-policing it would 
much prefer from its citizens. 
In medieval philosophy the faculty of understanding had been mainly static and meditative – 
with some significant exceptions. One can see small changes starting in the thirteenth century. For 
example, iconic church art previously designed to be adored, began to demand an active response. 
The Madonna now inclines her head as if to provoke thought in the onlooker, even among the 
illiterates in the nave. Subsequent humanist art poses its philosophers to point vaguely at their books, 
though Titian’s ecclesiastics still stare contemplatively into space even when they have books on 
their laps. It was only the debates about election that gave the human understanding its fully active 
profile. By the seventeenth century we find contemplation being redefined as “deliberate research” 
and contrasted with “those vulgar heads that rudely stare about, and with a gross rusticity admire 
[God’s] works” – admiration having formerly been contemplation’s main purpose.54 The evidence 
obtained from self-examination was self-knowledge in action, and ultimately a verification of the 
individual’s in-group membership. 
Aside from the immediate emotional signs of election mentioned above, evidence could be 
sought in two further aspects of this Christian self-understanding: conscience, and participation in 
the eucharist. Beza, a hardline codifier of predestination, acknowledged that all forms of evidence 
for one’s membership in the company of the elect had their limits. Revelation and visitations by the 
Holy Spirit had occurred only to a few prophets and saints; right reason, as a complete and accurate 
knowledge of the natural world, was only available to natural philosophers, and in any case its 
truths were not hard and fast since nature was incomplete without grace. Most ordinary human 
beings had no signs to go on but their own everyday wit, which operated by “practical syllogisms.” 
Beza took this form of second-order, a posteriori or evidence-based judgement, and applied 
it to personal conduct. From observing one’s own external behaviour, one could reach logical 
conclusions about one’s “sanctified” state; but one had to bear in mind that such conclusions did 
not necessarily reflect one’s afterlife status, which God kept hidden. Or, to reverse the emphasis, 
one could not know one was elect; but one could make a good stab at it by examining oneself for 
authentic signs of grace. And the supreme sign was conscience. Amidst the corruption of the Fall, 
just this one spark of divinity remained. 
For Calvin, conscience was pre-rational; it was distinct from the understanding and from the 
will, though it coloured both by enabling them to distinguish between good and evil. But Perkins, 
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widely read across Europe’s Protestant communities and another hardliner on predestination, went 
much further. For him conscience was the “essence” of the human soul, primary evidence for 
its immortality. It was the one trait that differentiated humans from other animals. Unlike his 
predecessors, he found a place for conscience, this one fragment of the divine image, within the 
individual’s faculty psychology; it was “part of the understanding in all reasonable creatures, 
determining of their particular actions …. Conscience is not placed in the affections nor will, but 
in the understanding: because the actions thereof stands in the use of reason” (emphasis added).55 
Here we see the start of an unwitting demotion of the will in definitions of what it is to be human; 
not just conscience but faith too was in the “mind of man, not the will.” This was a crucial move. 
It was impossible, said Perkins, for conscience to be “partly in the mind and partly in the will,” 
because the grace from which it derives is “single” and therefore cannot “be seated in diverse 
parts of faculties.” Grace, when it arrives, lodges in the understanding. Conscience, as one of 
its components, is “a supernatural gift of God in the mind.” The mind, however, has two parts, 
“theoretical” and “practical.” The theoretical part goes no further than contemplation. Conscience 
is essentially practical understanding, actively seeking to know the goodness or badness of a 
particular action. As conscience is located in the understanding, so, too is the emotional assurance of 
election; feel-good conscience authenticates membership of the in-group. Perkins takes something 
which is (thus far Calvin would have agreed) “of a divine nature … placed of God in the midst 
between him and man,” but places it categorically within the sphere of everyday human reasoning, 
as part of a “natural faculty.” It is not quite true then to say, as some have, that with the decline 
of religion intelligence has replaced conscience as the defining property of the human species.56 
Rather it was the fact that reasoned conscience was the membership qualification for the company 
of the elect that opened the way for intelligence to become the qualification. 
The conscience’s decisions, said Perkins, proceed by practical syllogism. The “property” of 
conscience is to take the “conclusions of the mind and apply them, and by applying them either to 
accuse or excuse.” The terms are at once psychological and juridical. The “two assistants” of this 
logical reasoning are “mind and memory”; the mind keeps the “rules and principles” like a law 
book, presenting to conscience the rules of divine law “whereby it is to give judgement,” while the 
memory brings to mind “the particular actions which a man hath done or not done, that conscience 
may determine of them.” Enter syllogistic reasoning: “Every murderer is cursed, saith the mind. 
Thou art a murderer, saith conscience assisted by memory. Ergo, thou art cursed, saith conscience, 
and giveth here sentence.” Conscience is also consciousness; they have a common basis in self-
examination and reflection. It is the job of conscience not to conceive a thing in itself but to 
reflect on what has been conceived: to “know what I know” (emphasis added). Perkins agrees with 
Calvin that man’s reason is corrupt, owing to worldly temptation. Nevertheless, his novel focus on 
conscience highlights man’s unique place in the scale of nature because this essential, uncorrupted 
spark of divinity is now something specific to him, the core of his own individual reason. (God and 
the angels have reason but not conscience, having no need of it.) 
This intellectualization of elect status can be seen not only in the position of conscience 
within faculty psychology but in self-examination at the eucharist. Although Reformers such as 
Zanchius denied that the bread and wine were Christ’s body and blood, this did not mean they were 
“simple marks, or bare signs.” Rather, they were “instruments,” by which Christ’s atonement is 
“called to our remembrance, his promises are sealed, and our faith stirred up.” The ritual was not 
empty. On the contrary, it was even more intense, since it required the communicant to knuckle 
down to intellectual labour. The basic principle was that “Every man descending into himself do 
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prove himself, that he eat not and drink not thereof unworthily unto his condemnation.” Now the 
average Catholic’s understanding was not taxed by his asking himself whether he had fornicated 
that week, and he could grasp in some vague mystical way that Jesus’s body actually is the bread 
and wine. To grasp the ritual as metaphor, however, or by any other of the contortions whereby 
the Reformers distanced themselves from Rome, was another matter. It required and generated a 
complex cognitive act. 
Reformers wrote about the need for communicants to “understand what is signified and offered 
to us … to be understood in the mind, and received by faith.”57 Zwingli called the relation of 
sign to signified an “analogy.” This doctrine, held also by Baxter, was the hardest of all to grasp 
intellectually because it relied on a series of inferences occurring within the communicant’s mind. 
It was in exactly this context that Zwingli complained about lack of ability in “the feeble multitude, 
which is … in general pretty stupid.”58 Here the modes of grace, honour and intelligence are one. 
Zwingli’s view of the eucharist as something to be grasped cognitively arose at the height of his 
rift with the working-class Anabaptists in the 1520s. Having led these apprentices and idiotae of 
the urban commons into battle against the Roman church and its learned doctores, once in power 
he sought to civilize them and make them see reason. Not all of them appreciated his efforts. So 
they had to be reprobate. Not members of the honour society, they formed an out-group in terms 
of election too, and the combination of these elements led to their being recast in terms of their 
intellectual stupidity – in spite of the fact that they were literate and could read all the arguments. 
Grace remained the centrepiece. “Come warm your hearts all intellectual capacities, at this fire,” 
was the call.59 Nevertheless the intellect was developing a presumptuous autonomy and giving out 
some heat of its own. This was happening across doctrines. Some Counter Reformationists were 
now saying that the supernatural grace of the eucharist has to be accompanied by the individual’s 
own “congruous” reasoning processes.60 While both Protestant and Catholic churches continued to 
emphasize the corruption of natural man and his reason, certain theologians of both stripes were 
trying to detoxify not only human reason but also the human nature in which it was lodged. 
This sprang from their criticism of the orthodox Calvinist doctrine that grace was irresistible and 
human beings completely determined. Surely the individual must have some degree of autonomy 
in his contract with God, and if so, it must be of an intellectual kind. “No grace that any man hath, 
but it passeth in through the understanding,” said Firmin. Understanding had primacy over the will: 
“God in conversion or drawing to Christ, works upon a rational creature .… He calls the will and 
affections off from the objects to which they are glued, to close with other objects: a reason for 
that, saith the will, … therefore doth the spirit set up this light in the understanding first.”61 And that 
was because “in order of nature, the work upon the understanding precedeth, which agreeth with a 
reasonable creature” (emphasis added). Now there may be less to this than meets the eye. There is 
the usual nod towards the old universal category of man as rational animal (“reasonable creature”) 
but the restricted category of the elect was the more important one, and nature was still subordinate 
to it. As he goes on to say, “The light depends not upon the strength of men’s natural parts …. 
We shall observe among Christians, that are weak in understanding compared with others, yet the 
notions of God, of sin, and creature, which they have, are more clear … than are the notions of 
other Christians (really such I mean) that have greater parts and natural abilities.” Nevertheless the 
outlines of a natural science of the mind are already visible, adapted to the framework of election. 
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They pose the very question which Firmin simultaneously tries to close down: might not the human 
understanding or even just plain “learning” be signs of grace? 
The idea of a natural history of man, fusing divine with natural grace and spiritual with
natural intelligence, created a more fundamental role for the contrasting category of emotion, 
with which intelligence is often paired. A seminal eighteenth-century educator like the American 
Jonathan Edwards placed great value on “the affections” because he had noted a feedback loop 
in his concern for reason, which excluded many of the population. Understanding leads to 
regeneration, and regeneration in turn produces understanding and the capability for “abstraction”; 
hence “the more rational any gracious person is, by so much more is he fixed … and satisfied in 
the grounds of religion.” While only God knows for sure about my salvation, I can observe my 
own behaviour and form practical syllogisms about it, on a rational basis. Emotion was in some 
sense an afterthought. Practical syllogizing could not be the sole basis for convincing oneself of 
one’s elect status, because it was not available to uneducated, i.e., non-syllogizing Christians. 
How might they too have conviction? Since the view now prevailed that rational conviction was 
a continuous internal state rather than a single act of regeneration, it followed that this conviction 
had parallel bodily states, “motion[s] of the blood and animal [soul] spirits.” These congregate 
especially round the heart and arouse affection, which can “effectively” stimulate a blessed state 
in the uneducated.62 Affection enabled anyone, by “various degrees” from “babes in Christ” to the 
most godly, to receive special, saving grace, and allowed the “use of means” to be proportionate 
to one’s intellectual abilities. In short, Edwards inserts election fully within a natural history of 
the individual mind, even though mind is differentiated across a spectrum of those individuals’
abilities. “There is no distinguishing,” he concludes, “between the influences of the spirit of God, 
and the natural operations of the faculties of our own minds.” 
“The economy of human nature”: early notions of psychological development 
We have already noted the growing tendency for grace to be seen as a continuous process rather 
than a lightning bolt, and the consequence which writers like Baxter drew from this, that grace is 
a coalescence of ends with means: not the longed-for gift alone but the continuous working of a 
reasoned faith towards it. “Wit’s pilgrimage” – the satirical title of John Davies of Hereford’s 1605 
poem attacking just such tendencies – now became the central preoccupation, in all seriousness. 
This turned reasoning into something temporal, a series of moves from a to b to c, etc., out of which 
came what modern psychology calls developmental (dis)ability: “growth of grace” or “growth in 
grace,” to use the terms of the era. The modern concept can be traced back to those attempts to 
rescue predestination from its own excessive rigidity. The idea of process was common enough 
among non-Calvinists, but only in a very broad sense; it was rather from Calvinist writers who had 
once insisted so much on the suddenness of grace that a more exact description of process grew, 
mainly because for them it was tied to self-examination and self-development. 
In medieval philosophy, the terms ability and ability – potentia and impotentia – were applied 
across a huge referential range, from the cosmos to the individual soul. They could also apply 
to individuals in a legal sense; a villein was disabled from pursuing his landlord in the courts, 
a penniless tenant was disabled from paying rent. Theologians adapted this legalistic language 
to the subject’s relationship with God, creating an interplay between religion and jurisprudence 
in which ability was individualized, and intellectualized, as “competence.” The rigidly Calvinist 
view, however, had been that when God justifies the elect, it is not because of anything they have 
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done to deserve it; faith precludes ability and competence. “God made man with abilities to fulfill 
his commands,” and that was it. Ability therefore consists in “obedience to his law … not by 
setting himself upon the exact fulfilling of it by his own feeble strength but upon considering the 
impossibility of the thing.”63 Just as Hegel (in Bertrand Russell’s paraphrase) defined freedom as 
freedom to obey the police, so Calvin defined ability as the ability to be determined by God. Natural 
ability amounts only to that. The elect may indeed be “able to all things,” as the above author puts 
it – but only because theirs are spiritual abilities. The abilities possessed by the regenerate man just 
so happen to be those of the holy spirit regenerating him. In that case how could man have abilities 
of his own at all? One solution was to differentiate more carefully among different categories of 
ability. According to Wilkins there were “spiritual abilities … infused from above,” a form
of necessity, and “artificial abilities … acquired by our own industry.”64 Writing in the 1640s, he 
would now have associated reliance on spiritual abilities alone with the sectarian enthusiasm and 
rashness of the commons. Nor, of course, were artificial abilities enough on their own. Room had 
therefore opened up for natural ability, situated between the spiritual and the artificial. Its status 
was raised. There were even rarefied instances where a man “could turn nature into grace,” if only 
by means of being able to keep his soul spirits in his brain and to prevent them from abandoning it 
for his genitals – this was said of the reputedly virginal Boyle, for example.65 
In fact natural ability very much resembled a non-instantaneous and therefore politically 
acceptable version of spiritual ability (one that could be predicted and monitored). As we have 
already noted, the compatibility between spiritual and natural grace which is at the root of modern 
psychology arose in part from the need to resolve corresponding tensions between the honour of 
gentility and the honesty of the bourgeois. Being drawn out gave it a flexibility which emerges in 
the doctrine of “preparedness.” For orthodox Calvinists, the prepared state of an elect individual 
was not a result of his own intellectual striving but something God had already done to him in 
advance, and in any case it amounted to no more than an acknowledgement of his own wickedness. 
For the Arminians, preparedness did come by individual effort, but the effort was one of belief 
rather than reason. The middle-way authors redesignated preparedness as a state of constant stand­
by for the receipt of grace, in which everyone was to be primed for an impending rule of the saints. 
After the waning of these millenarian hopes in England in the 1650s, and with reason seeming less 
dangerous than the plethora of wills that had proved so unruly during the revolution, preparedness 
began to be seen more often in terms of natural intellectual merit. And because it was now clear 
that glory was further off than expected, room opened up for further observation, nurturing and 
continuous assessment of the individual’s inner intellectual state. “There is a husbandry of the 
soul, as of the estate, and the end of the one, as of the other, is the increasing and improving of its 
riches,” wrote the Anglican Richard Allestree in the 1680s. “Now the riches of the soul are either 
natural, or divine. By the natural I mean its faculties of reason, wit, memory, and the like; by the 
divine I mean the graces [which] are given immediately by God, and both these we are to take care 
to improve.”66 Or more starkly: “It is said the elect of God … are passed from the state of nature 
into a state of grace: and what difference is there between the two? Are they not both one and the 
same thing?”67 
In England the trigger for this shift was the desperate dissolution of the Barebones parliament at 
the end of 1653, which dispelled hopes for an imminent godly political regime that might prepare 
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for the second coming. A new way of talking about reason took hold across the politico-theological 
spectrum from this point onwards. If at the Restoration bishop and king went back in the bottle, the 
old reservations about human reason did not. As well as the Anglican Bishop Henry Hammond, 
who wrote of “the reasonableness of Christian religion” as the resolver of “doubts of all sorts … 
by the dictates of nature,” the Congregationalist Owen, the Platonist Glanvill and the maverick 
(because moderate) Baxter were all caught up in this shift.68 The common ideas were coming to be 
seen as the outcome of prior, micro-mechanical reasoning operations, the “aids and assistances” of 
ability which Locke would further expound in the Essay, as part of an ever more complex timetable 
for the kingdom of heaven on earth. The dystopian fantasy consequently arose of certain people 
who might lack these natural developmental abilities and disrupt the schedule. The fantasy gained 
ground in proportion to the fading of utopian visions of a rule of the saints. Preparation was clearly 
going to be a longer, harder haul than had so far been envisaged. 
The idea of development also sprang from the much-debated distinction between moral and 
physical ability. The “moral” was the domain in which God has a continuing, malleable relationship 
with man; the “physical” was the domain he has already irrevocably ordained. The categorization 
of people into elect and reprobate, for instance, was physical. The eucharist on the other hand 
was moral, a conversation with God. (That was precisely the papists’ error: they thought it was 
physical, conveying grace into anyone receiving the sacraments.) Baxter complicated matters as 
usual. Defending himself against the charge that his middle way was not in the middle at all but just 
another name for universalism, he begins by protesting that “for predestination I go higher than the 
Synod of Dort,” in other words that he is more Calvinist than Calvin. But, he continues, suddenly 
switching to an Arminian vocabulary: “As for that point of [all men being capable of] moral
suasion …. I know God useth external suasion, and whether he so manage not objects as thereby 
he may be said internally to persuade I know not well: but I think he doth.”69 That is, Baxter posits 
a dynamic interactivity between the physical and the moral. God has created a world where our 
ability for “internal” moral persuasion, for a flexibility of regeneration and inner development, also 
contains mechanisms (“managed objects”) that have the same determinate character as external, 
one-off “physical” causation and the predestined gift of effective grace. 
This is not the old, vague talk of God combining external “means” of grace with “inward 
enlightenment.”70 Nor is Baxter talking about the predestination of individual behaviours. Rather, 
he imports a deterministic element into the detailed workings of the individual mind that lead to
those behaviours. This seems to interpolate a fresh tier of causation; the detailed workings are 
located in the intellect, as the condition sine qua non of moral ability, urging the will too in the 
right direction. He equates the physical with the natural (“not nature as corrupt” but “nature as 
nature”)71. The physical, necessary force of predestination thereby comes to have its own embedded 
components within the subject himself, and particularly within what Baxter calls elsewhere his 
“natural intellectual ability.” God has created a situation where the individual’s moral ability,
his ability to be internally influenced by sound arguments, belongs at the same time to an external, 
preordained and objective system. As a colleague of Baxter’s put it, “God knoweth how to reach 
the reason, and elective faculty, the main springs of the soul, and how to fasten a nail there.”72 
Human reasoning, while it is the individual’s responsibility, has a quasi-divine mechanism within 
it. “Physical determination,” formerly the antithesis of the “convincing reason” that may or may 
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not persuade, inserts within that reason certain processes with a life of their own. The defensive 
loquacity of middle-way authors such as Baxter against the doctrinaires on either side thus threw 
up a modern hypothesis: the existence of a specifically human intelligence as a natural phenomenon 
controlled by necessary laws which operate on a person-by-person basis. 
The notion that physical and moral abilities might be interactive raised a further possibility: 
they might be susceptible to ongoing improvement. Baxter’s friend Howe, another of Cromwell’s 
chaplains, wrote to Boyle claiming that although God intervenes providentially through regeneration 
to determine a person’s understanding and behaviour, his intervention has to be already “agreeable 
enough to the nature” of that person.73 It was unreasonable to suppose that the inner nature of 
“intelligent creatures” was dictated entirely by external, automatic “impulses,” or that they were 
incapable of “motions” of their own; this would mean that God’s precepts “whereof their nature 
is capable” would all be irrelevant, “and that [men] should be tempted to expect, to be constantly 
managed as mere machines that know not their own use.” Howe’s insistence on the relative 
flexibility of the individual psychology is a conscious echoing of Boyle’s denial that chemistry 
was a mere machine (Newton made a similar denial about physics). Nevertheless, it was equally 
unreasonable “to suppose that God should have barred out himself, from all inward access to the 
spirits of men.” Instead, “divine government, over man, should be (as it is) mixed or composed 
of an external frame of laws … and an internal effusion of power [sc. ability] … which might 
animate the whole, and use it, as instrumental, to the begetting of correspondent impressions on 
men’s [soul] spirits,” thereby influencing physical motion and behaviour. Moreover, the necessity 
of God’s grace is not instantaneous. It acts “gradually, and with an apt contemperation to the 
subject upon which it is designed to have its operations”; moreover it is “constantly put forth … 
upon all, to that degree” (emphases in original), echoing Boyle’s principle of constancy in nature. 
The topic is still, palpably, God’s favour to the elect and their steady, ongoing sanctification. But 
as Flavell’s self-conscious book title of 1681 shows, grace now has, or even is, a “method.”74 
And what were once providential instants (regeneration, justification) in the life of the elect have 
become developmentally progressive phases. 
Development in the elect soul aimed at an eventual perfection, at “being with Christ,” as Howe 
puts it; and our present understanding of our own natures is that of an embryo by comparison with 
what it will be when we join the elect in heaven. This suggests a change of relation between ends 
and means. When means consisted in an entirely external or “effectual calling,” as it did in the core 
texts of high Calvinist orthodoxy such as Perkins’s, even infants dying at birth could be “inwardly, 
in a certain peculiar manner … called, and justified, and glorified,” as long as they were already 
elect.75 Perkins too, though, had come to believe that there were “some certain means annexed” to 
this effectual calling, “which albeit they have no place in infants, by reason of their age, yet they 
belong to all other elect, howsoever they are found in some [adults] more plenteous and lively, and 
other some more slender and weak.” In a sense, he was positing the idea of gradations within the 
elect state. A specifically intellectual gradation and development were subsequently inserted in this 
template (Calvin, and Perkins himself, would have been horrified). Moreover, space was created 
not only for individual differences but also for the concept of someone in whom “annexed” means 
never arrived: an infantile adult. Once means became defined mainly by the individual’s reason 
later in the seventeenth century, a context arose in which the end is not to be with Christ but to be 
with Intelligence – an end achievable on this earth, following a process of intellectual maturation. 
In Richard Fenn’s words, “If the Puritans had disenchanted the spiritual world of the medieval 
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church, divines like Baxter [and Howe] re-enchanted this world with the residues of heaven.”76 
Modern intelligence as conceived by cognitive psychology and transhumanism is just such a
re-enchantment – a spiritualized natural grace – and these divines were their direct ancestors. 
We can trace the roots of this developmentalist tendency at least as far back as the educational 
policy recommendations of Lodowick Bryskett, a member of the Sidney circle. He calls human 
reason “the means to perfection,” a temporal process in our life on earth; perfection is “so peculiar 
to reason, that not only unreasonable creatures can be no partakers thereof, but young children 
[and] … the young man … are excluded from the same.” Adopting the terms of faculty psychology, 
he associates the vegetative soul with infancy, the sensitive soul with the concupiscence and 
irascibility of youth and with maturity the intellective soul “whereby we understand and make 
choice rather of one course of life than of another.”77 Catholicism had apportioned means to this 
life and ends to the next. The first Reformers brought ends and means closer: if the end of election 
is to be with Christ, the means of it is Christ within us. By 1660, the downturn in prospects for 
a Calvinist political establishment and the accompanying postponement of the kingdom of the 
saints had led to a renewed separation between means and ends, but with the ends now situated 
partly on this earth. And so middle-way preachers would write, in a way largely novel for the 
period, about a “transition [emphasis added] from the infant state to the age of discerning .… 
The first step to our cure is begun in the knowledge of our disease, and this discovery is made by 
the understanding when it is seeing and vigilant, not when it is blind” as it is in childhood.78 The 
rational soul’s supreme virtue, contemplatio, is no longer static and timeless but has become itself 
part of a veritable “economy of human nature,” as Glanvill called it, a household management of 
the mind. It follows an inner journey, progressive and measurable (in this sense replacing Catholic 
doctrine about the stages of purgatory), as well as a physiological path around the body via the soul 
spirits and the circulation of the blood.79 
The increased importance of human reasoning as intrinsic to faith and as a manifestation of 
grace was not merely the triumph of one particular doctrine. Many orthodox diehards had by now 
capitulated, accepting as fait accompli the elevation of reason and the upgrading of human nature. 
The fact that it found its way into the rival orthodoxies as well as the middle way points to a deeper 
cultural shift. The physical element of special or effective grace is now said to act “gradually 
with several steps,” and by degrees that vary from one individual to another in proportion to the 
need to supplement their natural graces. The Calvinist notion of an individual response to grace 
has become “a real internal efficiency” (emphasis added), a necessity within the human subject 
himself.80 William Lamont’s Richard Baxter of the Millennium has shown us how after the decline 
of millenarian aspirations, in which the perfection of the elect was regarded as imminent, writers 
like Baxter channelled their energies into supervising the means to perfection instead, foreseeing 
a whole period in which people would need to continue developing their intellectual abilities.
Locke’s Essay continued this task, but with more focus on the concrete detail of the means. If Baxter 
and Locke differ, it is in their estimate of the pace at which perfection would arrive. Both held
a doctrine of postponed intellectual perfection (which in some sense is what modern psychology’s 
doctrine of child development is too). Neither envisaged the postponement as being that long. 
Howe, too, wrote on the assumption that “this world shall continue but a little while.” 
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By the eighteenth century, predestination, espoused by Priestley as “necessitarianism,” had 
made its peace with gradualist notions of progress. The arrival of a concept of psychological 
development coincides with the arrival of concepts of social and economic development. They all 
share a new emphasis on time over space, illustrated by their transformation of two core themes in 
metaphysics: microcosm and macrocosm, and potential and actual. 
In medieval cosmology, the macrocosm-microcosm relationship between individual and society 
was spatial and static. There was debate about the development of the rational soul, but only in the 
foetus; once born, the soul was already complete. The concretization of purgatory as a space in
the cosmos around 1200 had from the beginning contained a crude temporal element, as demonstrated 
by the selling of indulgences to reduce one’s time there.81 From the mid-seventeenth century 
onwards, macrocosm-microcosm turned into a relationship between individual development and 
societal progress; that is, it became temporal and progressive. Jacob’s Ladder gave way to Pilgrim’s 
Progress: to give it its full title, The Pilgrim’s Progress from This World to That Which Is to Come. 
This temporal model creates the cut-off point we have already noted between cognitively complete 
human beings (“adults”) and cognitively incomplete ones (“children”), and hence between proper 
adults and childlike (because cognitively incomplete) adults. A type is created who is unredeemable 
because he plateaus at a certain developmental point, provoking a social anxiety for which the old 
spatial model had not possessed any conceptual basis. The Puritan notion of “backwardness” is 
likewise transposed into a secular educational psychology.82 
Secondly, and similarly, the key medieval distinction between “potential” and “actual” (active) 
human intellect was spatial: the latter had closer proximity to the divine intellect than the former. 
This has since given way to a temporal distinction, in which potential intellect precedes its actual 
performance. In this model the child has potential, the completed adult human has potential and
actual intellect (the distinction between these two having been elided). And the childlike adult lacks 
both: if you cannot actually perform the extended catechism or its descendant, the developmental 
test, you obviously do not have potential in the first place. 
“Trains of ideas”: the intelligence gym 
Time, once cyclical, now became linear and irreversible. The tempo of individual intellectual 
preparedness and development had to be calibrated with the tempi of everyday life, where rhythm 
(natural, fluctuating) was being replaced by pulse (calculated, regular) along with new practices 
in the division of labour.83 Psychological and socio-economic development depend alike on the 
maturation of the individual’s natural faculties. Bunyan’s Pilgrim frets endlessly about making up 
for time lost on his journey. Regular development of the human understanding is a social obligation, 
says Baxter. And so, in the words of a fellow nonconformist around 1670, one has to “set a just value 
upon time, and consecrate it to those things that are preparatory for the future state of blessedness.…
How should we redeem every hour, and live for heaven? …. The neglect of it for a day, is of infinite 
hazard.”84 Everybody, says Baxter, should set aside time each day for “heavenly thoughts.” This 
was more than the standard daily self-contemplation recommended by earlier Puritans. The very 
idea of compartmentalizing time, its measurability and its commodification, belongs (as Weber 
pointed out in a related context) to a market culture. It is socially structured: meditation “will not 
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prove every man’s duty” because “all cannot allow it the same time …. Such are most servants …
and many are so poor that the necessities of their families will deny them this freedom. I do not 
think it the duty of such, to leave their labours for this work, just at certain set times.” Locke 
similarly developed the convention of exempting certain people in whom “the croaking of their 
own bellies” denies them the time to develop definitively human “abstract thoughts.” 
At the same time, what Baxter means by meditation reveals a shift from scholastic 
contemplativeness to something more like the “trains of ideas” which were the basis for Locke’s 
model of logical reasoning and human identity. These basic units of rationality consist not in single 
syllogisms, where one or at most two mental leaps need to be made, but in whole sequences, 
extended in time and divisible into phases. Descartes had written of a chain or “order of cogitations,” 
but its temporal aspect was concealed by the person’s apparently intuiting the whole chain at once. 
Hobbes wrote about “trains of thought,” importing from physics into psychology his billiard-ball 
analogies about the causes of movement. Baxter’s preferred term was “methodical meditations,” 
which should be in “right order, not wrong.”85 The 1670 Conventicles Act, banning even the smallest 
congregations of Nonconformists, was the last nail in the coffin of a church unity which both they 
and the Anglican hierarchy, each on their own terms, had continued to try and re-establish because 
without it a stable social order was inconceivable; it was a sign of final breakdown that the goal of 
“order” as previously conceived, now an impossibility for the nonconformists, became displaced 
from the ecclesiastical realm to the minds of individuals, and to the micro-processes of intellectual 
ability which Locke was to catalogue in the Essay concerning Human Understanding. “It is every 
man’s duty,” said Baxter, “to exercise his thoughts or meditations in the most clear, methodical, 
practical way that his abilities and opportunities … will reach to.” The psychological and socio­
economic aspects of ability – development and opportunity – are not fully separable here. Both 
extend downwards through a class-based hierarchy of the cogitations (diluted as one descends) 
required for certain social and religious duties. 
Even Baxter’s friends baulked at the idea of a set, timed duty. It seemed to point reason in the 
direction of Hobbesian calculation, emphasizing achievable and assessable merit at the expense 
of the divine grace that comes only by visitation and “without measure,” as Milton had put it 
in Paradise Lost. It also looked suspiciously like the Romanist idea of counting the hours in 
purgatory. (Baxter’s reply was a typical shuffle: “We wait for his grace in the use of those means, 
which tend to prepare us.”) Firmin had warned Baxter, as one might warn the IQ tester, “Let
that which measures be able to contain the thing measured”; methodical meditations implied 
something like a Grace Quotient and smacked of the “spreading heresy” of Socinianism, which 
claimed there was nothing in religion that could not be understood by reason. He pointed out to 
Baxter the existence of “gifted” children, whose gifts of grace and regeneration have been bestowed 
on them regardless of any need for chronological maturity or systematic reasoned preparation. 
Baxter replies that although such children learn their catechism quickly, they do so by the same 
suspect skill of mimicry that reprobate hypocrites use: “They scarce understand the sense and 
matter of any of the plainest words which they have uttered. And we find it is just so with too many 
of the aged [sc. adult] also.”86 As with Locke, a reconstruction of childhood is implicated in the 
reconstruction of the adult out-group. 
Preparedness as measured intellectual exercise was the curriculum path to salvation. It expanded 
to fill the time available, in proportion as immediate prospects for a rule of the saints receded. 
Baxter’s first text focusing on “rule and pattern,” a methodological concomitant to Locke’s “trains 
of ideas,” appeared in 1671 at the point where Locke was embarking upon the Essay. Both men 
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link order, uncorrupted human nature and understanding of the understanding in a novel relation 
dominated now by sequences and allocations of time. Many religious writers by this stage would 
have agreed with Baxter that “the light of nature is not contemptible,” but he adds here the more 
radical claim that “if scripture had never spoke it, yet by the law of nature it had been a duty to do all 
things in order and to edifying.” This model of orderly thinking “requireth that the understanding go 
first.” In making personal destiny and perfectibility depend on method and intellectual preparation 
rather than instantly bestowed light, Baxter was putting nature (disposition and habit) at par with 
election (necessity and permanence) in estimating human value. Method and preparation belonged 
to a theory of identity based on the whole life rather than on a single instant of regeneration: “Men 
are to be judged godly or ungodly according to the … operation of their souls, and the bent and 
courses of their lives, and not by a particular act: because no act will prove us holy indeed, but what 
proveth a habit; and a predominant habit.”87 
Alongside his repeated formula concerning the “time and labour … necessary to maturity of 
knowledge” (emphasis in original), Baxter claims that religious knowledge can be acquired in 
the same way as mathematical or medical knowledge – except that it is not a training for some 
particular profession or calling but incumbent on everyone.88 In this quasi-egalitarian shift, what 
has happened to election and reprobation? After the waning of millennial hopes in the 1650s, 
Baxter does reassess the doctrine, but in a quantitative rather than qualitative sense. Early on, 
Puritans such as Baxter assumed the elect to be very few. This was partly because they realized 
that a large number of the population resented them, with their snooping on everyday behaviour 
and their apparent harshness towards children, which lay people found shocking.89 By the 1670s, 
Baxter’s receding optimism about an immediate rule of the saints correlated with an increasing 
optimism about the numbers of the elect, so that he could write: “It’s very probable that … the 
number of the damned will be very small in comparison of the blessed.” He hoped this might 
persuade melancholics to shed their despair, since it pointed to the falsity of claims that “God 
condemneth the great part of his intellectual creatures.”90 
The external, public face of internal trains of thought was their performance via the catechism. 
We have already discussed the changing role of the catechism, from a mere prompt to the means 
of verifying the evidence for election in this or that individual, and its extension down the social 
scale. Thus in some sense it was also a framework for assessing intellectual ability. As the role 
model for an entire generation of pastors, Baxter during the critical period of the 1650s is known to 
have gone systematically through his parish spending an hour with each family; he was also (like 
Locke) a physician, ministering to their integrated bodily and intellectual states. Anxious about 
families too poor to buy books, he solicited the charity of the local elite, as illustrated by the full 
title of his 1684 text The Poor Man’s Family Book: Teaching him How to Become a True Christian 
… with a request to landlords and rich men to give to their tenants and poor neighbours either this 
or some fitter book. This shelf-busting primer of daily religion is a one-sided dialogue between the 
effusive, regenerate Paul and the tongue-tied, struggling Saul. Poor Saul is already complaining on 
page 62 – he has another four hundred to go – “Alas, sir, when shall I ever be able to understand 
and remember all this?” Paul, alias Baxter, replies: “It is all but your common catechism … a little 
opened,” a crammer to test worthiness for membership of the company of the elect. 
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Trains of ideas became staple fare both in the philosophical psychology of David Hume and 
Thomas Reid and in the everyday culture. Popular religious writers like Watts, Edwards and John 
Wesley grasped the value of method. Watts, like the psychometricians, thought that any programme 
of preparation and training for the receipt of grace should consist mainly of mathematics, this being 
the best and most abstract example of “a perpetual chain of connected reasonings, wherein the 
following parts of the discourse are naturally and easily derived from those which go before.”91 
Edwards recommended accountancy ledgers as a model for making lists and enumerations of 
“arguments,” “evidences” and “proofs,” which he calls the “practice” and “exercise of grace.” 
The very act of practicing is itself “a sign of grace.” If people do not do their daily practice, it is a 
sign they are reprobate; conversely, it is a work that is necessary even if we are already in receipt 
of grace. Grace itself was now, at least in part, experientally learnt; in this sense, one sanctified 
oneself. Calvin would not have been amused. 
In the “exercise” of grace we find one of the deep roots of the modern psychology of intelligence. 
Much of the early state education curriculum in England has its origins in models provided by the 
Dissenting Academies, which provided men such as Watts and Priestley with their schooling. In 
this curriculum “your common catechism,” designed to verify your sanctified state, opened wide 
enough to become a complex assessment of all things intellectual, secular as well as religious. 
It was meant to be extended to the lowest social classes, and to servants whose catechism had 
previously been “answered for” by their masters. It played a large part in the moral revolution of 
respectability in early Victorian Britain; a similar language appears in Walt Whitman’s famous 
picture of American presidential democracy (“What Best I See in Thee”), in which the masses 
“were all so justified” as to be equal with Europe’s feudal monarchs. The idea of grace as belonging 
to the elect alone was not jettisoned, it merely became politically incorrect. Election was sublimated 
within the idea that grace could exist in anyone, the price for this concession being to exclude from 
“anyone” those whose deficiency was reinterpreted along intellectual lines. The only proviso was 
that one worked at one’s state of grace, with order and method. 
In charity schools, teaching not just of morals but of literacy and the general curriculum was 
often done directly through the catechism, typically using The ABC with the Catechism which 
sold at least 25,000 copies per decade from the 1560s until the early eighteenth century.92 Then 
came the famous New England Primer, launched in the year of Locke’s Essay and at the core 
of the American school curriculum for the next two centuries, which bears a remarkably close 
resemblance to Baxter’s Poor Man’s Family Book. The first school inspectors emerged, around 
1700, in the person of the local clergyman who would observe the teacher or do his own assessments 
of the children. The word became a general term for any short textbook or crammer, as in the 
nineteenth-century set of mass publications “Pinnock’s Catechisms,” which included A Catechism 
of Arithmetic, A Catechism of Geometry and so on, not to mention A Catechism of Heraldry. 
The first professionally administered psychological assessments and prototype intelligence tests in 
schools were not imported from some separate, already existing clinical setting or from beyond the 
educational sphere at all, but devised on the basis of early psychologists’ observation of existing 
methods of classroom assessment, themselves derived from catechical routines. The practice of 
psychology thus precedes its pure theory.93 And from very beginning there was a considerable 
focus on tackling the moral/intellectual degradation of those repeatedly described as having the 
“weakest” and “meanest capacities” or, if you prefer, on disciplining the underclass. 
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In France, similarly, a line extends from the Jansenists’ doctrine of election and reprobation 
through to the deified reason of the Jacobins and to the psychiatry of Philippe Pinel and Jean-
Etienne Esquirol, who were major contributors to nineteenth-century theories of idiotism.
The Jesuits too wrote of the “sacred science of the catechism,” though in an inclusive way that 
covered “those that do not have the use of reason,” and tried to replace imitation and memorizing 
with a technique that might “instill intelligence” (intelligence).94 Revolutionaries rewrote the 
catechism to suit a quasi-egalitarian national honour (for example “What is baptism?” “It is 
the regeneration of the entire French people begun on July 14, 1789”), and to inculcate civic 
duty.95 Condorcet, tasked by the revolution with setting up a state education system, insisted that 
catechical routines should also be used to inform a secular and neutral intellectual training. In fact 
a “catechism of human reason” had already been employed for some while in the primary school 
curriculum generally, and during the revolution it was central to the setting up of the Lockean­
inspired écoles normales.96 It is in this national context that we need to situate Binet’s mental age 
tests, which arose from the needs of the French state education system as it closed the church 
schools a century later. Further investigation might well be able to track a continuity, via a change 
of terms, from reprobation to mental defectiveness. 
The Calvinists above all among Protestants discovered in the catechism a substitute for the 
Catholic mass as the way of identifying value within the individual, and of enhancing that value 
with intellectual means. At least it seemed an improvement on mumbling some uncomprehended 
Latin.97 But it also assumed a different kind of human personality: one that can develop towards a 
goal of perfection in this world, religious at first and then (from the mid-nineteenth century onwards) 
secular. Our prospective intelligence is there, just ahead of us, to hold our hands in the dark night of 
the soul. The catechism and its successors reconfigured the out-group too. “Intellectual disability” 
can be seen as an adaptation of testing and segregating practices that date from as far back as the 
early church, which feared its holy ritual being polluted by incompetent catechumens. But while 
this points to a historical continuity of method, there have been major discontinuities in the way we 
conceive who is to be kept out. As one seventeenth-century theologian put it, what defines certain 
people as “ignorant” is that “they do not in a due manner understand and comprehend the doctrines 
of the gospel; and so perish for want of knowledge.”98 Who more precisely the ignorant may 
have been, and the manner of their perishing – soteriological and social – are questions to which
we now turn. 
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Chapter 11  

The Science of Damnation: 

from Reprobate to Idiot
 
Claims to grace, like those to honour or intelligence, depend on the existence of an out-group. There 
must be some people not qualified even to advance a claim in the first place. In respect of grace it 
is the reprobate who fill this role, and we examine now the historical transition from concepts of 
reprobation to modern ones of intellectual disability. The characteristics of grace do not at first sight 
overlap with those of honour and social rank. For one thing, all the divisive talk about election and 
reprobation sits side-by-side with an equally fundamental hypothesis of creaturely equality. In the 
honour mode, the idea that everyone of whatever social rank has his own smattering of honour was 
either a routine piety, easily ignored or more often flatly denied. But the idea that God created each 
individual human soul, and that – since He could not be the author of imperfection – all souls were 
equally divine, ran throughout Christianity, Calvinist and Jansenist included. Sir Thomas Browne, 
writing in the early 1640s, thought the difference between himself and a beggar was “accidental.” 
He could not “forget that common and untouched part of us both: there is under these … miserable 
outsides … a soul of the same alloy with our own … and in as fair a way to salvation as our selves.” 
And conversely, the Fall affects everyone: “We all are monsters.”1 Counterbalancing this sense of
equality, however, the elect-reprobate divide rested on a decision made before the beginning
of human history or time itself. God, the great cognitive geneticist in the sky, has already decided 
who is to be saved and who not. 
“The natural weakness of their brains”: labourers, women, melancholics 
One dealt with this contradiction by studied avoidance. It was, said Browne, “folly in man … to 
pry into the maze of [God’s] counsels.” Even angels were not allowed to know. Nevertheless, the 
curiosity of pastors, those psychotherapist-guardians of private behaviour, led them to suspect 
they knew who were the “visible saints” and who not. And there was a tendency, if no more than 
that, to demonize as reprobate the usual crowd: labourers, servants, women. The revolutionary 
ferment of the 1640s in England spawned increasing horror at the multitude’s “grace-destroying 
and land-destroying opinions.”2 Correspondingly, the fit between the company of the elect and 
the honour society could often be seamless. The Anglican church, even when it inclined towards 
Calvinism, was also the honour society in one of the latter’s particular manifestations. Usually 
doctrinal contradiction was avoided by restating it as a mere contrast, between the posthumous 
equality of souls and the earthly social divide, so that the same Browne who put his own rational 
soul at par with a beggar’s continued in the same breath: 
If there be any among those common objects of hatred I do condemn and laugh at, it is that great 
enemy of reason, virtue and religion, the multitude …. One great beast, and a monstrosity more 
prodigious than Hydra. It is no breach of charity to call these fools. 
1 Browne, Religio, 81; 67.
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Admittedly, he qualifies this by saying that he does not mean here “only … the base and minor sort 
of people,” and that conversely there may even be “a nobility without heraldry, a natural dignity.” 
Yet the masses set the tone. The “rabble [that is] even amongst the gentry” have an over-active 
imaginative faculty that puts them at “the same level with mechanics.”3 
In terms of establishing an out-group, then, reprobation broadened the criteria of disgust but 
did not always denote a different class profile. Early sixteenth-century Reformers like Zwingli, 
especially in the humanist urban milieux in which they operated, routinely despised the stupidity 
of the countryside they had left, either as sons of peasants themselves or of undistinguished country 
gentry tainted by proximity to the soil; their own bids for religious status relied directly on their 
contempt for the residual poor peasant and his absence of both grace and intellect. The low-born 
Bunyan’s autodidactic search for a higher “calling,” at once social and religious, led him in Grace 
Abounding and The Pilgrim’s Progress to chart the path to self-improvement. Conversely, those 
born to high social status whom economic chaos had forced downwards doubted and despaired of 
their elect status. If the world was against you, so was God: hence the search for a religious calling 
to validate your status, in place of the social one from which you had fallen.4 
Prior to the 1590s the word “idiot” applied to grace similarly as to honour: it signified a lay 
person, inexpert in the knowledge appropriate to that mode. According to Bullinger, God “did 
not choose learned men but simple and idiots to be his apostles.” He feels bound to add that by 
this he does not mean “fools and dizzards, which be indeed ignorant in all manner of things …. 
He is called a simple man, not he that is without wit, without reason and wisdom, but he which 
is plain and sincere … else it would come to pass, that every man should defend his error by 
ignorance” (the “ignorance” of the fool suggests Romanism).5 The decisive distance of both
the fool/dizzard and the plain or simple idiot from our modern disabled person is clear. In any 
case, the labels were multivocal for contemporaries too, since “idiot” could also sometimes be 
used to denote the Catholic idolater.6 And even where it does signify the virtuously unlearned, 
its negative psychological connotations in respect of the person’s social class remain clear. For 
example, Bullinger says he wants his thoughts “to be perceived [not] only by the wit and true 
judgment of learned heads, but also to be seen as it were with the eyes, and handled as it were 
with the hands, of very idiots and unlearned hearers.”7 The superior, internal senses – wit and the 
faculty of judgement – belong with the common ideas and therefore with the honour society, while 
the inferior, external senses – the eyes (proxy for the imaginative faculty) and the hands that do 
manual labour – are associated with idiots, however virtuous. Catholic idiocy was the abuse of an 
education, class idiocy the lack of it. 
The inferior social ranks were considered particularly prone to melancholy, a symptom of mental 
weakness (“imbecility”) especially when manifested in a lack of assurance about one’s salvation. 
The same was true of women of whatever rank. Melancholia, the paradigm of problematic mental 
states, is depicted in art sometimes as menial, sometimes as female (often a witch). Initially it was 
fast or slow, clever or foolish, restless or pensive. Then in Protestantism, where faith was seen as 
a mental activity, pensiveness came to suggest salaciousness (Cranach’s Allegory of Melancholy
depicts her as the tempted Eve), and melancholia acquired the sense of sloth as opposed to mania –
a position later to be occupied by idiocy as opposed to madness. When Baxter describes labourers 
and idiots as being at the bottom end of his hierarchy of “ability and opportunity,” he illustrates this 
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with characteristics of the old melancholia paradigm. To lack the ability to form trains of thought, 
he said, is to be “disabled by melancholy and other weakness of brain.” Such people should avoid 
overzealous mental training regimes. He urges “most women and all melancholy persons, to 
take up more with shorter and occasional meditations … and not to over-stretch their brains, by 
striving to do more than they are able, and so disable themselves yet more.” Women, because of 
the “natural weakness of their brains, and the strength of their passions, are unable to endure … 
serious deep affecting apprehensions.” Royal Society members such as Glanvill recommended 
“real, experimental philosophy” as the cure for “effeminate fears” and for developing a “strong 
and manly temperament.”8 
Order had always, since Plato, been the supreme value in intellectual activity. The classic 
image is Dürer’s 1514 St Jerome in his Study, whose ordered state is neither laborious nor fast but 
contemplative and timeless; Melencolia, in the engraving usually paired with it, is a slothful female 
figure sprawled amidst a chaos of unrelated activities. Baxter’s order, however, is now temporal 
rather than spatial. Timed regularity was a therapy for the universal disability of the Fall, a cure 
(in Baxter’s medical language) for the “lazy humour.” The profitable suspension of time which 
medieval psychology sought in human reason, re-emerged in the Protestant ethic as profitable use
of time. The contemplation that by definition was timeless might now be criticized as slothful and 
lazy. It led melancholics to excesses of repentance, to despair of their elect status and as a result 
to become “unreasonable, and useless.” When Baxter says “to be deprived of the use of reason, is
a … dishonour to the Gospel,” it is melancholy he is talking about. The cure is for people to be up 
and doing, in “a lawful calling” – though this advice was somewhat rich coming from a writer who 
had spent a lifetime dabbling in “furious curiosity, needless speculation, fruitless meditation about 
election, reprobation, free will, grace,” and thereby helping to stoke up more melancholy.9 
Children and childlike adults 
The reconstruction of childhood, along with the invention of the childlike adult discussed earlier, 
is a prominent feature of the disputes about grace. One might think that the idea of a childlike adult 
came from the Anabaptists. After all, it was they who made competence an age-related issue by 
insisting that only adults be baptized: “Infants do not have the ability to hear, they cannot believe, 
and because they do not believe, they cannot be born again.”10 Nevertheless, the Anabaptists did 
not ask whether there might be adults who lack this ability. That is because the ability they had in 
mind was not a development at all, but an instantaneous regeneration; it was this that could not 
occur in childhood. Moreover the anomalous adult was not an intellectual defective but one who 
“walks still in the unclean, ungodly lusts of the flesh.… Where there is no renewing, regenerating 
faith … there is no baptism.” Anabaptists, unlike the modern psychologist, were still at the stage 
where, as they put it, “What is meant by ‘children’?” was an open-ended question. The Bible, they 
said, speaks of children in many different ways.11 
Baxter on the other hand, to be followed by Locke, defined adults in this context as “Men 
of years that be not idiots.” He has to create the disabled identity (men of years that be idiots) 
in order to set a boundary to the category of those able to “grow in grace,” their understanding 
8 Baxter, Directions and Perswasions, 161; Glanvill, “The usefulness of real philosophy to religion,” 
14, in Essays. 
9 Baxter, Gods Goodness, 7; Burton, The Anatomy, iii, 421. 
10 Menno Simons, The Complete Writings, 131. 
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being something that grows in the process. With Baxter, the term “idiot” thereby came to denote 
childhood extended beyond a chronologically inappropriate age. The concept of a retarded
adult cannot exist without that of psychological development; it is what allows the World Health 
Organization, for example, to define mental retardation as “a state of arrested or incomplete 
development of mind.” But also, without the childlike adult, the real man of modern intelligence 
and rational autonomy could not exist. Furthermore, we cannot have childlike adults without first 
having modern “children.” Youth had formerly been a loose category, defining anyone who had not 
yet inherited his father’s property. Conversely, creaturely equality was often attributed to children; 
“the circumstance of age is a thing altogether impertinent,” since the spark of regeneration could 
come at any point in life.12 But the Puritan notion that the human personality is a unity formed over 
a whole lifetime, together with that of “preparedness,” gradually helped to turn religious status
into a matter of chronological age and maturity. Some writers could see where all this was heading, 
like the critic of Baxter who complained that he “seems to make infants a distinct species.”13 
Deficiencies of grace in adults had always been described as a form of childhood: “naturally 
we are all children of darkness,” just as spiritually we are children of the “immortal God” and 
politically of what Hobbes called the “mortal God,” the state. If only in this very broad sense 
“children of years” often had “children of understanding” bracketed with them.14 But the gradually 
sharper conceptual separation of the child, and of pathologically conceived childlike adults, were to 
play formative roles in the creation of modern intelligence. In this separation, not only is an idiot a 
chronologically inappropriate child, a child is a chronologically provisional idiot. (Piaget’s “mental 
logic,” for example, seems to be defined as whatever does not occur in children.) Anabaptists were 
accused of asking, “How can infants get good by baptism, when they have not the use of reason?” 
and although these were in fact straw Anabaptists (real ones were interested in children’s faith, not 
their reason), we can detect here a growing general anxiety.15 The old defining property “man is a 
rational animal” was at crisis point. The new reason was more a property of aggregated individuals 
than of some overall species entity. The disappearance of the ancient formula’s protective shield 
over deviations and deficiencies, which were mere “accidents” of matter and did not detract from 
the form or essence of being human, opened the way to comparing and ranking those individuals 
by a developmental principle: how far (if at all) along the road to perfection is this one as opposed 
to that? Anxiety on this score affected children and childlike adults in the same way. 
With these chronological approaches to personality there came also a complete reworking of 
the idea of the capable subject. In Aristotle there was a huge metaphysical gulf between having
a capability like reason and using it; the first of these was ascribed to the human subject qua
human and implicitly included children, while the latter related to one’s social function. Theories 
of development have muscled aside this distinction between having and using. Use now results 
directly from and indicates possession; hence the often-heard parental desire for children to 
“fulfill their potential.” Reformation theology took the old capable subject, which had notionally 
covered the whole species, and restricted it to the elect, to “subjects capable of glory.” At the same 
time, the distinction between spiritual and natural intelligence was starting to evaporate, with the 
capable subject being redesignated as capable not only of glory but also of reason, and moreover 
of developing that reason as the means to glory. These shifts rendered the formula less universal 
than Aristotle’s. 
12 Womock, Arcana, 405.
 
13 John Tombes, Anti-paedobaptism, 199.
 
14 Pemble, Workes, 529; Green, The Christian’s ABC, 255.
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They also cast doubt on the religious status of children. When the blessed Governor of 
Connecticut in the 1640s included “both men of years and children” under the heading of “subjects 
capable” of his godly commonwealth, by the very act of putting them on the same developmental 
plane he was emphasizing the contrast between them. “Children are capable of baptism, men of 
years of the supper …. To make a person capable of the supper of the Lord, a man must be able 
to examine himself; he must not only have grace, but growth of grace: he must have so much 
perfection in grace, as to search his own heart” (emphasis added). What is required is a developed 
intellectual grasp of eucharistic metaphor, as opposed to a static and idolatrous gawping.16 
Furthermore “growth,” as a drawn-out internal and rational process, has the potential to solve the 
problem of whether pagans can be elect. By “subjects capable” of profiting from communion, says 
the Governor, “I speak of men of years; because if any blackamoors, or of other nations should 
come and offer themselves, they must be thus admitted.” In short, they should be assumed to be 
already hypothetically regenerate – unlike children. 
In this proto-developmentalist doctrine, the child – half-capable and incomplete, just like 
the individual adult who constantly grows in grace – was a microcosm of the wider society that 
was just then emerging from “the infancy of the world itself.”17 Reprobates are those who fail to 
participate in this otherwise universally human development. They too are a type of childlike adult. 
The idiots Locke cites in his second Treatise of Civil Government are, like reprobates, in a state of 
permanent infancy. They are disabled from joining the next stage of universal human history that 
Locke was projecting out of biblical history here, or – which amounts to the same thing – from 
contributing to the progressive accumulation of knowledge. If the political part of Locke’s script 
was already suggested by the Levellers, its psychological part was suggested by the altogether 
more establishment figure of Hooker, who in the 1590s had envisaged that in future “if there might 
be added the right helps of true art and learning … there would undoubtedly be almost as much 
difference in maturity of judgement between men therewith inured, and that which now men are, as 
between men that are now, and innocents” (“innocence” implying both childhood and disability). 
So too Bacon, who had made Kantian predictions about “the understanding [being] emancipated –
having come, so to speak, of age.”18 
Could children, then, belong to the company of the elect? Regardless of whether grace were 
instantaneous or developmental, the question remained: what happens to people who die before 
their religious status is confirmed? The problem was that although status is determined before birth,
regeneration and the infusion of God-given grace can only occur at some point in the actual life 
of an individual. There were several possible answers. One was to assume, as Zwingli did, that 
all children who die in infancy, pagan or Christian, go to heaven. Anything else would be unfair: 
“children because they are children” are elect. That is because they have not yet had a chance to sin, 
or to reason about “eternal rewards and punishments.”19 For the stronger predestinarian, it was the 
other way round. Having no faith, children are saved only if elect. “They must be capable of grace, 
or they are not elected” (emphasis added).20 The language is deterministic and psychogenetic: 
“some infants have faith and repentance seminally” while others have “unbelief and impenitency 
seminally.”21 It was also possible that no infant dying before baptism is saved. Gomarus, whose 
doctrinal duel with Arminius had provoked the split at the Synod of Dort, claimed that all such 
16 Ibid., 21.
 
17 John Cotton, The Grounds and Ends of the Baptisme of the Children of the Faithfull, 13.
 
18 Richard Hooker, The Lawes of Ecclesiastical Politie, 4.17; Bacon, Works, iv, 247.
 
19 Owen, Of Infant Baptism and Dipping, 8.
 
20 Spilsbery, cited in Thomas Hooker, The Covenant, 24.
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children are dead in hell because they have not had access to the means to grace, earning him the 
sobriquet “Dr Fry-Babe.” 
It was the middle-way writers who once again came up with the necessary ramifications. One of 
their answers was that as long as the child is elect in the first place, God performs the appropriate 
subjective and internal operations on the child’s behalf, since “infants do not … nor cannot exercise 
their understanding, … therefore all such power upon their actual apprehensions, signification, 
taking, and working, of abilities of their own, it is only to men of years, it is beyond the rank and 
order of infants, and the means cannot work in this regard.”22 The author does not say that children 
do not possess understanding, only that they cannot exercise it: its objective foundation is already 
imputed to them. If they die early, the requirement for them to grow is waived. At death, God 
puts into elect infants, directly, the faith and spirit which the living and regenerate only acquire as 
adults. Another answer was to consider parents as proxies for their children – a kind of religious 
genealogy, in imitation of the honour mode: “as the children are brought into covenant by a parental 
right and not a personal, so … all infants, may be imputatively called believers.”23 Their parents 
had to be “visible church-members,” i.e., those whom one could at least guess might be elect. 
The problem of whether idiots are among the elect first arises out of this controversy about 
whether children are. Catholic doctrine consigned dead infants to limbo. The limbus infantium at 
some stage became an entire limbus fatuorum (the original of our “fools’ paradise”). Arminians, 
using Noah’s Ark as their allegory, pointed out that not everyone who drowned would yet have 
sinned, and so “all in this flood who perished being infants or in childhood or natural idiots or the
like, passed through … to eternal felicity.”24 Idiots and children here are default members of
the elect. However, the increasing status of human reasoning required more elaborate explanations. 
The widely read middle-way theologian William Pemble claimed that adults are “called both 
inwardly by the work of the spirit, and outwardly by the voice of the word …. Now a voice 
presupposing ears to hear, and an understanding to perceive, infants cannot properly be said to be 
called by any such voice.” In children, God bypasses the need for faith, and “this which hath been 
said of infants may be also applied to … deaf or fools, having such natural defects as make them 
uncapable.” If infants sometimes prove to be elect, so then may idiots.25 
But Pemble also thinks that individuals vary in the ability of their understandings to respond 
to grace. This differentiation by degree starts to compromise the stark black-and-white necessities 
of predestination. It interpolates faculty psychology into the mode of grace, attributing to the 
corruptible, “sensitive” soul and its faculties a role in the achievement of perfection that had 
previously belonged only to the soul’s immortal part: 
You must put a difference between men’s abilities …. All men are not alike qualified with inward 
abilities; there is not the same fastness of memory, quickness of apprehension, soundness of 
judgement in one, that is in another, nor have all the like benefit of outward helps in their education, 
for the perfecting of such good parts as nature hath lent them …. Where [God] gives little, there 
he requires but little. He that naturally is slow of wit, dull of concept, short of memory, weak in 
judgement, such a one would be pitied and lovingly helped forward, so far in knowledge as his 
weakness will give leave. 
And so, in exactly this context, Pemble recommends barring from the eucharist “all such as through 
natural or casual impotency are not able to examine themselves: as children, fools, madmen,” 
22 Thomas Hooker, The Covenant, 26.
 
23 Baxter, The Duty of Heavenly Meditation, 240.
 
24 Duke, The Fulness, 55.
 
25 Pemble, Workes, 34.
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regardless of whether they are elect. It is characteristic of such doctrines, as indeed it is of modern 
intelligence measurement, that difference by degree (the “slow” and “dull”) and a hypothetical 
difference in kind (the “idiot”) are co-dependent. 
In Pemble’s “idiots” and “fools” we should note the continuing dominance of the melancholia 
paradigm, in which a central symptom is the doubt of the “weak Christian” about his elect status. 
Moreover there are “many a hundred [who] can show wit enough in other matters, and have all 
abilities of mind to serve their turn in inferior employments, to apprehend, discourse, plot and 
contrive matters as they list,” yet who in religious matters are “as much the better for all, as the 
pillars of the church against which they lean … [and] very children in all Godly knowledge.” There 
is no clear category boundary between these people and those “born stark naturals or idiots,” and 
the association between the two categories carries no satirical undertones. 
Intellectual disability and the psychology of reprobation 
Reprobation was defined as a “disability to supernatural good.”26 Did this mean that all the non-
elect were bound for hell as surely as the elect for heaven? The harsh logic was often fudged. 
“Single” predestinarianism, in which election was sure but reprobation unsure, was widespread. 
When Baxter expressed anxiety about non-elect souls, it was because he thought he could improve 
them. Fudging had in fact been the norm among the doctrine’s originators. Augustine had simply 
said of the non-elect that God abandons them, leaving them to experience the consequences of their 
own sin. Calvin went further and said, if only in passing, that “God has once for all determined both 
whom he would admit to salvation and whom he would condemn to destruction.” Christ’s atoning 
sacrifice was “sufficient” for all, but “efficient” or “effective” only for the elect.27 Reprobation was 
chiefly a useful scare story designed to humble believers and remind them of the limitations of their 
own reasoning abilities, but it was not central even for Calvin. 
It was certain second- and third-generation Reformers who asserted that anyone not bound 
for heaven was bound, by an equally determinate decree, for the other place: that election and 
reprobation were symmetrical. Even then, they often distinguished between those who are called 
but relapse and those not called in the first place. By Perkins’s time the doctrine had become a 
systematic “double” predestination, supported by the rise of new forms of logic that had strictly 
dichotomous approaches to classification. It was as fierce a science of damnation as modern 
psychology’s doctrine of intellectual disability. Many preachers felt uneasy about making 
reprobation as certain as election, but few denied reprobation as such. Just as the honour elite did 
not stand in simple opposition to the undifferentiated whole of the communitas but rose organically 
within it like cream to the top of the milk, so the elect belonged to a whole reprobate species and 
were simply the ones who had been let off. Single predestinarians assumed that once baptized,
you were also elect; only if you rejected the covenant later or failed to stick to its conditions might 
your essential reprobation be revealed. They allowed room for dealings between man and God 
and for the individual to connive somehow at his own destiny. Double predestination, on the other 
hand, was unchangeable. 
Short of obvious external signs such as sleeping through a sermon, what was the reprobate’s 
internal psychology? The central ingredient of reprobation is hypocrisy, and its companion mimicry. 
A hypocrite is someone who repeats the words of the ritual but does not feel or understand them. 
Parrots are the recurring image of repetition, while the garrulousness is borrowed from the social 
26 Bates, The Whole Works, i, 226.
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role of the occupational jester: “The prating parrot that licentiously thus speaketh … is always like 
the fool, a consonant when he should be a mute: and a mute when he should be a consonant.”28 
Pastors wanted to know whether Christ was present, if not in the bread and wine, then in those 
at the altar rail. If they were secretly leading wicked lives, they were to avoid communing. The 
scrutiny of such people exhibits a balance and interpenetration between moral and intellectual 
elements. The Westminster Assembly, which the English parliament convened in 1643 to plan a role 
in government for the church, allowed people to be excluded for pure “brutal ignorance” as well 
as their sins, though the relationship between ignorance and hypocrisy was close and sometimes 
the former is a secondary aspect of the latter.29 One of the Assembly’s core tasks was to establish 
strict criteria for the public identification of those to be excluded from communion. People who 
see in grace, honour or indeed intelligence the one lifeboat that can rescue them from drowning 
in a sea of nonentity will do their utmost to beat off those clutching at the sides. Guarding against 
pollution from reprobates was, explicitly, more important than reassuring the elect: “We say that 
the elect alone may be, and indeed are, sure of election, that so we may exclude the reprobate 
hypocrites,” as Perkins had put it.30 “Reprobate” translated a New Testament word (adokimos) that 
meant not just unworthy but unexamined. The disability entailed in hypocrisy, therefore, was lack 
of sound examination of the inner self, as much as conscious pretence. As one of the Westminster 
divines put it, “Let King Solomon be the interpreter, who, everywhere, by a fool, understands a 
wicked and reprobate person” in communication with Satan (emphasis in original).31 He also had 
pre-natal diagnosis up his sleeve: the reprobate foetus could sin in the womb like Esau, Jacob’s 
reprobate twin who “unreasonably kicked and punched in the womb of his mother, beyond the rate 
of ordinary infants.” 
Calvin had originally said that all human minds are in a state of “dullness …, sunk in stupidity 
and destitute of understanding.” Human reasoning is itself a disability, and “it is not merely 
from the intrinsic insufficiency of wealth, honours, or pleasures to confer true happiness that the 
psalmist proves the misery of worldly men, but from their manifest and total incapacity of forming 
a correct judgement of such possessions.” Disablement from grace manifests itself in an excess 
pride, deviating from the mean just as it does in the honour mode: “we are erected into a stupid and 
empty confidence” about our ability to achieve immortality by pulling on our own boot-straps.32 
The specific characteristics of the reprobate’s disability show it to be part of a long-term history of 
practices surrounding defilement and pollution, social segregation and incurability, that overlap with 
modern eugenic ones about intelligence. According to the character type of the reprobate, “His wit 
is always in a maze, for his courses are ever out of order; and while his will stands for his wisdom, 
the best that falls out of him is a fool.” Like Galton’s feeble-minded who cause general regression to 
the mean, he is dangerous because “he marreth the wits of the wise, and is hateful to the souls of the
gracious …. He is an inhuman creature, a fearful companion, a man-monster.” Not only is he “born 
for the service of the devil,” he is “a devil incarnate” himself.33 The solution is obvious: “They 
which being taught and admonished will not amend: to let them be made known to the whole 
congregation openly, and separated from the holy assemblies and from conversation with the other 
faithful, least by their contagion others should also be infected.”34 
28 Thomas Walkington, The Optick Glasse of Humors, Foreword.
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The fact that the human understanding was assuming a more active role in grace might seem to 
exclude most plebeians from the company of the elect, since they lacked the common ideas and so 
any ability for abstraction or logical reasoning (which in any case, as psychological phenomena, 
were largely restricted to religious matters). The political movements of commoners grasped this; 
it led them either to interpret their lack of social status in this life as a sure sign of their elect status 
in the next (the Anabaptists), or to reject predestination outright and espouse Pelagian-style free 
will and social mobility (the Levellers). In theory, however, reprobation was classless. Creaturely 
equality was equality of sinfulness. God “estated all mankind alike” with its original damnation, 
as “a company of lost men.” Just as he is not the author of the sins of this or that individual, so in 
the act of justification he removes a “general, imputed guilt” rather than actual sins. Everyone is 
born reprobate, but anyone can be earmarked for salvation. God has singled out a few; for example, 
He gives faith, in the form of an ability to perform miracles or “the gift of prophecy, [to] some 
doctors.”35 But these special cases are a mere token, to demonstrate the existence of grace; he does 
not elect learned men especially. 
Special, token cases can be found at the bottom end of the scale too, in the form of a divinely and 
purposely created deficiency. A good example is the moriones mentioned by Augustine. I leave the 
word in Latin to highlight the foreignness of the concept, since it has sometimes been mistakenly 
used as evidence for the existence of a modern type of intellectually disabled person in ancient 
history. (Paul Cranefield’s standard English translation of the relevant text entitles it “The case of 
certain idiots and simpletons,” but this mock-archaic heading is Cranefield’s own.)36 Augustine 
describes moriones as “fatuous,” “little different from beasts.” Again, we have to ascertain what 
exactly the fatuity consists of, their actual psychological characteristics. They display nothing like 
a modern, “intellectual” disability. In fact Augustine explicitly says that he is not talking here about 
those who are “stupid” (stulti) or slow of wit: “that is said of others.” Their chief psychological 
characteristics are inappropriate social behaviour and a penchant for dressing up, both of which are 
drawn from the household jester whose deliberate foolery enhanced the honour of his supposedly 
wise master because of its entertainment value for guests. In Augustine’s Rome that was what the 
word morio meant, its normal usage. 
Augustine’s moriones too have a “vocation,” albeit a “wondrous” one: they are here for the 
higher purposes of assisting in doctrinal dispute. One such purpose is to refute the transmigration 
of souls: the idea that human intellects vary because of sins committed in a previous life was 
nonsense, since no one can have behaved so badly as to end up being a morio. A second is to 
challenge the Pelagian view that earthly abilities improve one’s chances of salvation: if that were 
true, one would not come across moriones who, though lacking abilities, seem as if they might be 
elect, such as the one Augustine knew who could not bear hearing Christ’s name abused. A third 
purpose is to rebut the doctrine that children are innocent: they are not, and so we should not laugh 
at childish misbehaviour any more than we should at the behaviour of moriones. Finally, he uses 
moriones to assert the spuriousness of all claims to infallibility: Cicero, for example, claimed never 
to have said anything in his life to cause him shame or dishonour, and if it would be absurd to hear 
a morio say such a thing, how much more absurd a supposedly wise man. 
Calvin took up Augustine’s moriones in this general sense, as an instructive and divinely 
appointed special case. However, he recast them as people lacking natural graces of any kind. Each 
natural grace corresponds with an earthly vocation; moriones lack any vocation, even Augustine’s 
“wondrous” one. Instead, as Watts was later to put it, God has created them to remind the rest of 
us “to derive lessons of thankfulness to God” for our own natural graces: there but for the grace of 
35 Duke, The Fulness, 47; Flavell, The Method, 568.
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God go I.37 Calvin’s creatures are deficient in morals and manners, but they are not reprobate. They 
may lack natural graces, but what reprobates lack is special, saving grace. Indeed, one clear sign of 
reprobation is the claim to be above moriones, to which one must reply “Whosoever shall say thou 
fool, shall be in danger of hellfire.” To claim superiority is to express a total confidence in one’s own 
state of grace and understanding, and this is not only a moral error but an intellectual one, stemming 
as it does from “Adam’s tree of knowledge” which “made him and his posterity fools.”38 
Ambivalence about the relationship between election/reprobation and human reasoning occurs 
also in covenant theology, which was popular across doctrines. Borrowed from jurisprudence and 
the law of contract, the idea of a covenant between God and man threw up ideas that were compatible 
both with the emerging value placed on human reasoning and with a strongly necessitarian position 
on grace. In The Pilgrim’s Progress Mr Feeble-Mind (the name is significant, though the substance 
not at all modern) “was true of heart, though weak in grace”: his initial gift of grace is small, but 
he works at his side of the bargain. According to Bunyan, 
Eternal reprobation makes no man a sinner …. Not God but sin hath made him unreasonable; 
without which, reasonable terms had done his work for him: for reasonable terms are the most 
equal and righteous terms that can be propounded between parties at difference; yea, the terms that 
most suiteth and agreeth with a reasonable creature, such as man …. Here lieth the point between 
God and the reprobate …. God is willing to save him upon reasonable terms, but not upon terms 
above reason; but no reasonable terms will [go] down with the reprobate, therefore he must perish 
for his unreasonableness.39 
Although reason and lack of it are still expressed here in terms of a universal contract rather than of 
individual psychology, the latter nevertheless plays a part. Grace does not originate from individual 
abilities (hence the possibility that an idiot may be elect), but the insertion of legal terms helps to 
introduce an element of non compos mentis into reprobation. 
This threatening, psychological-cum-legal unreason of the individual reprobate was part of a 
tighter classification of reprobate types, which encouraged the infiltration of elements of necessity 
into the individual’s nature. A reprobate, for example a covert Romanist whose “stupidity lies 
in titles and images,” may have a recidivist “nature” or “disposition” which is set and cannot 
be “forced” to change.40 To begin with there had simply been “resistance to grace.” Middle-way 
theologians then began to insert a quasi-necessitarian component within what they still viewed as 
natural, that is dispositional, characteristics. At the root of this increasing rigidity of definition lay 
anxiety about pollution of the in-group and its rituals by people who “dote upon carnal outward 
ceremoniousness.”41 Pemble divides “the stupidity of [the] many” into “either popish or clownish.” 
In the latter case, there was an enemy within: “ignorant Protestants, of whom there be thousands 
that understand nothing at all.” What they do not understand is the complex symbolism of the 
eucharist. They come to communion “because they are now at years of discretion and must do as 
others do. But … examine them, they cannot tell you what a sacrament is, what the outward signs 
are, what the graces thereby signified are …. They understand you no more than if you spoke 
in an unknown language.” They think themselves capable of grace, since “they will scorn to be 
questioned” – a characteristic, noted in Chapter 5, of all three of our self-referential in-groups. 
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However, they have “a disability in [the] understanding.” Just ask them about “common points in 
catechism and mark their answers; you shall see them … so hack and hew at it, that you may almost 
swear they speak they know not what … though they be the wisest and craftiest headed men in a 
parish … in other matters.” What partly defines hypocrisy is thinking that the outward behaviour 
is enough, without “due examination of one’s self.” Hypocrisy, the chief pollutant of communion 
and community, thus shares a metaphysical basis with the new idiotism of wardship law: a sense of 
absence. Hypocrisy of the deliberate as well as of the ignorant type led in the same direction: “an 
hypocrite, or dissembler, or double-hearted man, though he may shuffle it out for a while, yet at the 
long run he is discovered … and betrays very much folly.”42 
As I suggested in Chapter 5, the change from one bidding mode to another is the unwitting 
outcome of attempts to stipulate more exactly the terms of the original mode. The importance of 
a specifically human reasoning in election, and of unreason in reprobation, arose from the need 
to devise a tighter authentification system. The problem had always been that while it would be 
presumptuous to try and know who is and is not in grace, we desperately need to know in order 
to avoid pollution. Covenant theology, with its part reliance on jurisprudential reasoning, held out 
the promise of an improved positive method for sizing up the aspiring communicant. Among other 
things, it contributed to the fusion between the legal language of idiotism and the religious one of 
reprobation, playing a direct part in early modern psychology’s reconstitution of human difference 
along intellectual lines. 
“Natural intellectual disability”: France, phase one 
The orthodox Calvinist story of limited atonement, in which Christ died only for the elect, was 
harsh. The opposing Arminian story did not credit human beings with much intelligence, only 
with stubborn perseverance. The seeds of these respective doctrines hibernate in the mainstream of 
modern culture, whence they can be translated into our attitudes to the people we call intellectually 
disabled. In that Calvinistic fable The Lion, the Witch and the Wardrobe, the children are advised 
(oddly enough, by a faun) “When you meet anything that ought to be human and isn’t, you keep 
your eyes on it and feel for your hatchet,” whereas in Lord of the Rings Frodo Baggins agrees to 
save the whole of humanity “even though most of them are completely dull and stupid.” In this 
context the middle-way story, in which Christ died for everyone but only the elect are actually 
saved, looks a lot closer to the orthodox doctrine in its harshness. Nevertheless, it was out of 
the narrow negotiating space between these two doctrines that the idea of a “natural intellectual 
disability” sprang. 
The middle way was represented in this debate by John Cameron, Moise Amyraut and other 
members of the French Reformed Church who influenced Baxter. Dates of the important texts are 
clustered around major political events: the 1618 Synod of Dort, the 1629 annulment of French 
Protestant political rights, the failure of republican government in early 1650s England and the 
attempt in 1670 to suppress the Dissenters. The idea leads us through to Locke’s account of
the changeling, who is the clearest precursor of the modern intellectually disabled person. While the 
names of Cameron and Amyraut will be obscure to historians of psychology, they are only too well 
known to today’s surviving double predestinarians, since they are the answer to the disappointed 
utopian’s question “Who has betrayed us?” The regrettable dominance of universalism today 
(everyone is saved if they try hard enough) is directly due to these fifth columnists; it was they 
who stripped grace of its discriminatory force, by confusing it with the earthly merits derived from 
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reason. This paranoid expression of what is actually a historical truth misses the essential point: 
that at the core of this “betrayal” lay a novel concept of disability. 
“Natural intellectual disability” came from the middle-way theologians’ attempt to refute 
the orthodox doctrine of limited atonement while making tactical concessions to it. Cameron, a 
Scot, was professor of divinity at Bordeaux during the Synod of Dort and later at Saumur, where 
Amyraut worked. To avoid implicating God as the author of man’s sin, Cameron maintained that 
the unregenerate have rejected God of their own free will. This indicated that there had to be a 
contractual element in regeneration. At the same time, however, they are precisely those people whom 
God has himself already chosen to reject. So predestination is determinate as well as contractual: 
the determinism consists in God’s foreknowledge of who these people rejecting the contract will 
turn out to be. Letting God off the hook created room for an element of human responsibility and 
free will that looked to Cameron’s orthodox critics suspiciously Pelagian. In order to develop a 
reply, Cameron probed the question of what went on within the individual, elect and reprobate, 
in more detail. How did God move him? “Physically,” that is deterministically? Or “morally,” 
by interacting with him in a mutuality that required the individual to fulfill certain obligations? 
Cameron’s answer was both. He applied metaphysical concepts of ability and disability (potentia, 
impotentia) to the question. He drew these from scholasticism, but he also applied a new and anti-
scholastic form of logic, Ramism (invented by Pierre de la Ramée, who had taught Cameron’s 
own teacher Johannes Piscator). This simplified system, in contrast to Aristotle’s, consisted in a 
continuously proliferating subdivision of terms which was perfect for sidestepping criticism; the 
tactic was, roughly, “When I said x just now, I meant x1 rather than x2.” This procedure was said to 
obtain ever closer approximations to the truth. And that is how, with Cameron, disability came to 
be first “natural disability” (subdivided from moral disability) and then “natural disability of the 
intellect” (subdivided from natural disability of the will). 
Cameron’s orthodox opponents were always under pressure to say how they could square the
gloomy divisiveness of their double predestination doctrine with the idea of an all-loving God. How 
can he be loving or just, if he demands belief from all humans when he has already determined 
most of them will not believe? And how is the irresistibility of God’s grace compatible with the 
idea of personal responsibility? If humans are unwilling and unable to cast aside their unbelief 
other than by receiving God’s grace, how can the reprobate non-receiver be personally to blame?
Cameron recognized both the validity of the charge that double predestination assumed a malignant
God, and the inadequacy of the usual orthodox response, which was that the distinction between
elect and reprobate is beyond our knowing. At the same time he had to avoid the charge of 
Arminianism, which the orthodox school in France saw as politically dangerous because its supposed 
universalism might have weakened the defensive ghetto which the company of the elect had built 
up in their semi-autonomous Reform communities; it pointed in an ecumenical direction at the very 
moment when the Catholic French state was threatening to gobble those communities up. 
Cameron steered through the middle. The orthodox position was that reprobates lack grace 
“not because they cannot (though they cannot) but because they will not …. Your cannots are 
your willnots”; readers familiar with behavioural disorders as described in educational psychology 
textbooks, or old enough to have been weaned on Charles Kingsley’s The Water Babies, will 
recognize such language.43 Against this, Cameron promotes the individual’s possession of an active 
reason that might respond to grace. The Arminian line, on the other hand, was that everyone is 
able to be saved “if they will.” Against this, Cameron insists that the case has been altered by 
the Fall: “by nature man is able but because corrupt he will not.”44 His route through the middle 
43 William Fenner, Wilfull Impenitency the Grossest Selfe-Murder, 4.
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then proceeds as follows. It is true that our wills are determined by God’s special grace, but once 
inside us the motions of this grace are “moral” (negotiable and contractual) rather than “physical” 
(determinate). He immediately qualifies this by saying that the motions are nevertheless “as if
physical.” This quasi-physicality of grace he calls “intelligence” (intelligentia). Intelligence is a 
force that enables faith to “travel around” the body, instructing it how to behave and instilling the 
“demonstrable” truth of the common ideas. But in the last resort intelligence is still only quasi-
physical; it operates not by coercion but by “persuasion,” convincing us that scripture is true. This 
is a delicate balancing act. Intelligence is not some blind predestinate force activating the elect 
alone (as it would be if it were merely physical). Nor, however, is it a Pelagian-type ability equally 
possessed by all. It still sorts sheep from goats. 
Since these intelligent motions of grace are in the last resort moral, their absence too is a moral 
disability, making the individual responsible for his own fallen state. However, this does not in 
itself absolve God of some responsibility, since the moral relationship between man and God is 
a continuing and interactive one. The Arminians’ charge about turning God into the author of sin 
would not have been solved, merely displaced from the physical to the moral realm. Cameron’s 
typically Ramist way out of this dilemma was to subdivide his terms. Disability, he said, is dual 
(duplex impotentia). One type is the moral disability we have just mentioned, a culpable one. 
A clue to the second type of disability comes with that idea that the motions of intelligence are 
“as if” physical. Cameron modelled his idea of these motions on the soul spirits, the highly 
rarefied material substance said by physicians to ferry the soul around the body. The “physical” –
in theological terms, that which is necessarily predetermined by God – overlaps in this medical 
analogy with the “natural.” Nature itself thereby takes on a certain determinism. In this realm 
of deterministic nature there may be a non-culpable disability, distinguishable from the culpable 
“moral” disability of hardened unbelief which is mere second nature. Humanists had traditionally 
distinguished “essential,” a priori nature from an “accidental,” a posteriori one, but Cameron 
takes a further step and identifies the first of these with physical necessity. If moral disability 
is a posteriori, a second nature which the hardened unbeliever has a personal responsibility for 
changing, then space remains for a more fundamental disability, existing a priori and – this was 
the novelty – unchangeable, even by providence. Unlike reprobation it is caused “by infirmity, not 
by malignity.” Like bodily impairments it deserves pity, not blame. 
Cameron then maps this duality of natural disability/moral disability on to that of intellect/will. 
Taking the first term from each pairing yields a “natural disability of the intellect.” This was an 
entirely novel category. All he was trying to say was that unbelievers do not inhabit this realm 
of natural disability, and thus have moral responsibility for their own depravity. But in saying 
this, he raised the possibility that such a realm might exist. What kind of creature would inhabit 
this so far empirically empty category? He was not under pressure to reply. His followers at the 
Saumur Academy however, under fire from the orthodox leadership for their allegedly universalist
tendencies, were provoked into attempting a concrete illustration of who these naturally intellectually 
disabled people might be. Orthodox church leaders thought that this shifted attention away from 
the division between elect and reprobate and towards something monstrous.
 “Natural intellectual disability”: France, phase two 
Amyraut, coiner of the phrase “hypothetical universalism,” took Cameron’s thoughts a stage further, 
in an uncertain political atmosphere. The 1620s saw much conversion to and from Protestantism 
among the French nobility. In 1629 the Peace of Alès withdrew the clauses in the Edict of Nantes 
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not to the Academy but in the vernacular, to a Protestant aristocrat whose convert husband was 
threatening to reconvert to Catholicism because he could not stomach the gloominess of double 
predestination.45 Some people, Amyraut told her, were different because their place in a priori
nature made them incapable of any moral or contractual relationship with God; therefore they were 
excused from fulfilling the obligations entailed on them by Christ’s act of atonement. 
This inevitably provoked questions. How are you defining these people? What is the specific 
make-up of the naturally disabled intellect? Another of Cameron’s Saumur pupils, Paul Testard, 
probed the issue in more detail. “Moral disability,” he said, is like natural disability in that it is 
an “error of the mind” and “a disability of the intelligence and judgement,” but it differs from 
natural disability in being “pragmatic, deliberate, voluntary” and therefore inexcusable.46 The 
hardened impenitence of the morally disabled – the reprobate – has not been created in a priori
nature, they have simply failed to fulfill their side of the covenant. God is not therefore to blame 
for having created them. Testard, steering between the rigidity of orthodox Calvinist doctrine 
and the Arminian principle of “everyone can be saved if they will,” says instead that everyone is 
hypothetically capable of benefiting from Christ’s atonement if they can. This is a crucial move. 
The universal applicability of the atonement now becomes conditional upon that word “can.” 
Beyond that disability which is merely moral and in some sense willed, there is one that consists 
in “deprivation of the natural faculty of intellect.” Out of Cameron’s hints emerges a natural 
psychological phenomenon unconnected with original sin. Earlier accounts of faculty psychology 
had speculated that in some individuals an injury to a particular faculty might incapacitate the 
whole, but not permanently – whereas the absence of a whole “faculty of intellect” is clearly more 
than temporary or accidental. 
The element of determinism and permanence in reprobation, which Calvinism had located 
beyond time, in a metaphysical realm, was thereby shifted into the realm of nature. Calvin’s own 
historical scheme had been simple and twofold: first there was the covenant of grace, then the
covenant of nature. In any case, the latter simply referred to man’s obedient state before the Fall. 
Cameron subsequently divided the covenant of nature itself into two: first Adam’s prelapsarian state, 
but then a second, postlapsarian one in which everyone was obliged to continue keeping its promises, 
as a means to their redemption. In short, the idea of predestination was not incompatible with that of 
mutuality between man and God. By locating the covenant and its promises in a historically evolving 
nature, Cameron had created the conceptual space for a type naturally incapable of promising in the 
first place because they lacked a whole “natural faculty,” as Testard put it. 
Amyraut began to ask what were the concrete symptoms by which they should be excused, or 
indeed excluded. He found an analogy in physical and sensory deprivation. His orthodox critics like 
Pierre du Moulin, a leading figure in the French Reformed church, and André Rivet and Friedrich 
Spanheim at Leiden, had no time for such analogies. Blindness was not a fault, since “no man is by 
natural obligation bound to see,” whereas “impotency and disability of believing … is voluntary.”47 
If a purely “intellectual” disability really existed, it could not be analogous with sensory or bodily 
disability because, in a Galenist view, intellect and body were just two facets of the same thing.48 
Amyraut replied that the natural intellectual faculty is itself “physical,” in the sense that is created 
once and for all in an objective realm. Having a defective intellect is “like” physical disability 
inasmuch as both are “a defect of the faculty,” but the two kinds of faculty are entirely different. 
(His analogy here rests on the a priori character of each, rather than on Cartesian dualism.) 
45 Laplanche, Orthodoxie et prédication, 89.
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So where might Amyraut go to borrow a descriptive framework for this natural intellectual
disability? In the embryonic anthropology of the time, the French Protestant Isaac la Peyrère was 
shortly to publish his proposal that the Jews be classified by their separate origin in nature. (He
was also interested in Spanish doctrine on the permanent mindlessness of first nation Americans.) 
Consequently a crude idea of natural divisions among the human race may have been at least
conceivable for Amyraut. However, his inductive approach led him to think about nature in causal
terms. Existing legal and medical frameworks he found inadequate. Although deprivation of a
faculty might excuse someone from fulfilling legal obligations, legal “categories of impediment” 
did not explain the “constitution of the faculty.”49 Incompetence might exist in infants, adults 
“driven out of their minds” by some accident, or old people. These, says Amyraut, are not examples 
of mindlessness (amentia) as such but merely resemble it; someone in this state does not use his 
mind, so “it is as if he did not possess one” (emphasis added). What would be real mindlessness, 
then, where lack of use really does imply lack of possession? (We should note here that any such 
implication would have been unusual for the time.) It would certainly be a deprivation “in the
natural make-up of the organs.” In this sense it would resemble defects in bodily organs: Lazarus’s
paralysis, the Ethiopian’s skin colour, or madness and “the melancholic humour,” this too being an 
organic condition of bodily elements. Amyraut would also have entertained the influential proposal
of De Mornay, a former mentor, that the new anatomy described by physicians should be used as a
model for dissecting also the faults of the mind. But if the legal categories were inadequate, so too 
were medical ones. To fit the criteria of Amyraut’s natural disability, amentia had to be not merely 
organic and temporary, like madness, but to circumscribe the whole person by being both congenital
and incurable, beyond providence. “Whoever really is by nature destitute of mind because of the 
unfortunate make-up of their organs, is never in control of himself” (emphasis added). 
The idea of a human difference marked by the permanent, non-accidental absence of the 
whole intellectual faculty and therefore exempt from natural law solved one problem but raised 
another. If God cannot be responsible for imperfections, how can we include such people in the 
category “man”? Pressure for an answer came from the orthodox leadership. Amyraut claimed he 
was furnishing them with better and more robust arguments against their Romanist and Arminian 
opponents, who complained that the God of the Calvinists seemed to have given human beings a 
law they were unable to obey while still demanding perfect obedience. Amyraut’s argument was 
that inability to obey was “moral” and inexcusable only when it was an abuse of the appropriate 
faculty; natural intellectual disability was not abuse but absence.50 Du Moulin accused Amyraut 
of challenging the fixity of species: creatures in whom the intellectual faculty was absent, in this 
natural, a priori sense, would by definition be non-human.51 Amyraut would then have to say where 
in species terms he would categorize them. Moreover, said Du Moulin, it was pagan (that is, Stoic) 
to imply that nature might have physical or deterministic properties, equivalent to fate. 
Friedrich Spanheim, another orthodox critic, said that Amyraut’s distinction between a priori
natural ability and a posteriori moral ability led to the Pelagian heresy; if moral ability, the source of 
faith, is a posteriori, then surely Amyraut must be saying that faith is dispositional, thus changeable 
and unstable. Amyraut denied the charge. It is true, he concedes, that in one sense bad moral habits 
are so ingrained as to be effectively incurable; and where moral disability is incurable it just is a
natural disability, as Spanheim asserted.52 However, the converse does not follow. Natural disability 
cannot be fully assimilated with moral disability. People naturally disabled by intellect are different 
49 Amyraut, Fidei circa Errores Arminianorum, 55 ff.
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from others at an a priori level, just as the absence of limbs or senses is a priori. Spanheim teased 
out the implications. If absence of the intellectual faculty sums up the whole person from birth to 
death and is more than accidental, and if there is a subtype of such precariously human creatures 
incapable of using their intellects, then God’s authorship of imperfection is back in the frame. On 
this account not just moral vices but “defects of the intellect,” says Spanheim, would have to be due 
to God withholding grace, just as in the case of the reprobate – for surely he would have created 
“no one in such a bad condition as to have no intellect or will at all by nature.” For Amyraut, the 
creature whose congenital nature is defined by incurable permanence and total absence is still 
a man. Spanheim tried to force the issue: “If natural disability is a privation of the intellect qua
intellect, then he is deprived of that with which he was made a man …. Whoever is a man who does 
not possess intellect?”53A creature disabled in this sense, lacking the essential core of his humanity, 
is inconceivable. For Amyraut, those whose humanity by this criterion is open to challenge are not 
beasts but excused humans. His opponents nevertheless pointed out the alternative and heretical 
consequence of his position: that it might allow for a separate species in natural history between
beast and man. Locke was to seize on this opportunity. 
Over time, Amyraut wavered between the position described above and a more conventional 
one in which natural disability is merely a difference of degree within the universal disability 
created by the Fall. Perhaps the strong concept only applied to defective members of his own 
social class; he was also the author of works on honour and genealogy, and may well have taken 
lack of a natural intellectual faculty in labourers for granted.54 Be that as it may, the idea that 
natural intellectual disability rendered people different in kind rather than in degree only came up 
when his orthodox critics pressed him for clarification. The quarrel was a temporary by-product 
of the crisis in the French Reformed church provoked by the restrictions placed on them in 1629.
The pathological type that Amyraut describes was the upshot of his attempt to break out of the 
politically unviable narrowness of Reform orthodoxy while avoiding assimilation into a state 
doctrine of universalism and free will. Once that crisis temporarily subsided, in the late 1640s, 
Amyraut’s references to natural intellectual disability revert to impermanent or non-congenital 
examples, such as “phrenitis” or “wounds to the head.”55 During the crisis period, however, he 
unwittingly invented new terms of natural classification for human difference, which were to 
influence English writers. His orthodox colleagues actually challenged him to do so, because that 
was their only way of forcing him on to a terrain where they could point to the absurdity of such 
a position; it meant they could reaffirm election-reprobation as the dominant and determining 
classificatory difference among human beings, over and above differences in their intellectual 
nature. In fact Amyraut never arrived at the Lockean paradigm of a separate, natural realm of 
human intellectual ability. However, it is easy to see why his critics thought he was heading in 
some such direction, since he certainly sought to classify a natural intellectual disability. 
“Natural disability of the intellect”: England, phase one 
English theologians dealt with Amyraut’s startling doctrine of natural intellectual disability by 
adapting it to their own purposes. Some took the phrase “natural disability” or “impotency” and 
began using it as a synonym for the lapsarian “weakness of mind” in reprobates, thereby reinvesting 
53 Ibid., 58.
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it with traditional orthodox resonances.56 Others did identify natural disability with “stupidity,” 
“distractedness” and that “peculiar sin” which is a “disease of the body” or the phlegmatic bodily 
temperament, different from the general moral disability which is “disease of the soul” in all of us; 
but this natural type too remains merely unamenable, not actually incurable.57 
Whereas the French synods ended up charging Amyraut with heresy, the Westminster 
Assembly, which was in a much stronger political position, could afford to be more tolerant of 
its own Amyraldian faction. The Assembly’s first Speaker, William Twisse, conceded that there 
might indeed be a natural intellectual ability, separable from the moral. However, he said, in the 
end it was just verbal acrobatics. Things impossible by nature, as for example intellectual ability 
in disabled individuals, are possible by God’s grace; unlike the amputee’s limb, natural intellectual 
ability can be restored, at least in the elect, because it partakes of divine influence.58 The conflation 
between the natural and the moral makes up what Twisse terms “moral man” (homo morale). There 
was an ambivalence to this phrase. In secular terms it denoted Aristotelian virtue, the ability to 
restrain one’s desires; in religious ones, it denoted Adamite moral weakness. Twisse’s moral man 
is an elision of this ambiguity: he is both someone “who can discharge his [moral] duty to God by 
the proper use of the faculty of will” and a being “created by God in nature,” hence morally weak. 
By the time Locke came to use the same phrase in the Essay concerning Human Understanding, 
his more optimistic conflation of the natural with the moral would amount to a psychological 
definition of the human species. 
From the mid-1650s, Baxter introduced natural intellectual disability into his discussions 
of election and reprobation. Cameron and Amyraut topped his list of recommended authors for 
students; this was significant in view of his huge and lasting influence on popular Christian literature 
in Britain and New England.59 As we have seen, Baxter was full of protestations that he was ultra-
orthodox about election. But he also set great importance on natural ability. It could seem, then, as 
if his claim to believe in election is just a way of covering his exit; he senses that it is on the way out 
and has covertly abandoned it for the proto-scientific idea of an intellectual ability whose detailed 
workings, following implantation by the Almighty, are thereafter the responsibility of individuals. 
However, this presupposes that the doctrine of predestination had begun at its dogmatic “height” 
with Calvin and was in decline in Baxter’s time. In fact the reverse is true. Calvin had been uncertain 
about it. It became a dogma only with time, in reaction to the rise of Arminianism; even the Synod 
of Dort avoided being too strict about it, for fear of alienating waverers. It reached maximum 
rigour only just before its rigor mortis. Already sidelined from public debate in the late 1650s, its 
most dogmatic English text, Owen’s The Death of Death in the Death of Christ, dates from as late 
as 1648. When Baxter toed the line on predestination, he was sincere; this classification of human 
types was no less fundamental to him than that of ability and disability. When he started to call 
election and reprobation “these dangerous doctrines,” it was not because he opposed them but 
because they threatened to provoke social unrest from lumpen religious sectarians claiming to be 
elect. He neither sought to replace election and reprobation with intellectual ability and disability, 
nor saw the two pairings as mutually contradictory. Eventually, however, the first was to become 
sublimated within the second. 
The invention of natural intellectual disability saved Baxter, like his French predecessors, 
from the charge that he was an Arminian who imputed ability (i.e., the ability to be saved) to 
absolutely everyone. Accused of being “Amyraldus’ proselyte,” he was more original than the
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label suggests.60 However, we also know that in the mid-1650s he was halted halfway through his 
writing of The Universal Redemption of Mankind either by a Damascene encounter with Amyraut’s
most radical work, the 1646 Specimen, or simply by the discovery that Amyraut had already said 
there what Baxter himself was going to say. In this and concurrent texts, Baxter probes the moral/ 
natural distinction. Moral ability is a “disposition” or habit, he says, second rather than first nature;
therefore something more fundamental is needed to set it going. A separate space thus exists for some
prior, purely natural ability: “infused habits … are not of the same quality as the potentia naturalis” 
or natural ability. By way of illustration Baxter criticizes the stock Calvinist view of the unregenerate
sinner as being “dead in Christ.” An illiterate man, says Baxter, can no more read the Bible than a 
corpse can; but while illiterates lack the disposition or habit, a corpse lacks not only the habit but also 
the natural ability or faculty. Sinners are like illiterates; their moral disability makes them unable to 
change their spots, but not to the extent of being “equally distant from an actual change as a dead 
man.” Therefore “morals [pre]suppose naturals, and constitute them not.” There are many morally 
disabled, “dull Christians, ignorant and injudicious,” like Baxter’s own “silly chambermaid,” about
whom one is pessimistic but whose corrupt human nature is ultimately ameliorable. They should be
distinguished from naturally disabled people, whose incurability somehow helps along the thought
that everyone else may be improved and illustrates the importance of reasoning to that improvement:
“We do not use to reason men out of a natural impotency, nor to persuade them to do that, for which 
they have no faculties or object; but it is the very means of overcoming a moral impotency,” and of 
“making men willing of the good which they rejected.” Natural disability is not coterminous with 
moral disability, or with a mere lack of natural graces as exhibited by Calvin’s moriones. It is a lack 
of the intellect’s “working, waking knowledge.” Since this knowledge was constitutive of faith, the
lack of it, in Baxter’s terms, might mean not to be human.61 Who is not just “dead in Christ,” abusing 
his second-nature moral disposition, but in addition lacks the natural faculty that instigates such 
dispositions in the first place? Who are the living dead? 
The answer, specifically, is the legally non compotes mentis: “infants and idiots.” They 
are naturally disabled in terms of faith because they lack its reasoned substructure and their 
redeemability is therefore questionable. In infants the disability is temporary; in some adults, 
though, it is permanent. They continue to experience the infantile state. Amyraut had already dealt 
with this point. Asked how new-born infants still unaware of sin could be responsible for their own 
moral disability, he had replied that their “disability of believing” was dual even at this early stage, 
since some infants might have “a natural, already existing imperfection of the organs” that would 
extend right through their lives. Baxter, instead of using these medical terms, reaches for the legal 
“idiot” vocabulary of wardship law. He wavers about whether idiotism is difference of degree or 
difference in kind. True, he says, there is some overlap between the moral and the natural, and in 
this sense the “moral difference [among men is] grounded but in a gradual natural difference.”62 
But sometimes they do not overlap. In that case, i.e., where the disability is purely natural, does it 
imply that such creatures are a different natural species? 
Baxter hesitates. On the one hand “God can … save men … without letting them once know 
that Christ satisfied for them, else he cannot save an infant or an idiot.”63 This thought is compatible 
with hypothetical universalism: everyone (even idiots, whoever these are) can expect that Christ’s 
60 Cited in Baxter, Certain Disputations of Right to Sacraments, Preface. 
61 Baxter, Apology, 128; Of Saving Faith, 39; Apology, 291; Anon., An Antidote against Mr Baxter’s 
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atonement applies to them, that they may be saved. True, it is on condition that they have the 
natural intellectual ability to understand this; but if they do not have that ability, they are excused. 
Excusal suggests they do not need an intellectually structured faith; hence some “idiots” may even 
be elect. This was certainly the implication, as we have seen, in other middle-way writings; it 
occurs also in the more orthodox Twisse, who wrote that if “as a result of some natural disability 
a man’s abilities do not correspond to his will,” this does not diminish his status with God.64 But 
on the other hand, Baxter’s wariness about trying to guess whom God has chosen to exclude 
sometimes gives way to a more decisive tone when the topic is idiots. It may be that “universal 
redemption is not to be tried thereby,” because “it hath pleased God” to leave it uncertain, but there 
is nevertheless a slippery slope. Could you be elect if you had heard only two or three sermons, or 
how many? Could you be a lifelong sinner, converting only at the moment before death, and still 
reach salvation? Idiotism is a category even further down this slope, threatening to fall off the edge. 
The doctrine of hypothetical universalism inevitably led probing minds to ask whether there might 
not be individuals who are not even hypothetically redeemable, and by what criteria. 
The concrete examples suggested by this legalistic “idiot” language are the people Baxter would 
have encountered in his pastoral office as administrator of the local poor law. His anxiety about 
incurables sprang from their unproductive state of idleness and their being “kept without parts and 
gifts, next to useless, if not burdensome.”65 Flesh appears on the theological bones when fiscal 
concerns are uppermost. These concerns reflect the Reformation’s insistence on the industrious 
pursuit of an earthly vocation. All such vocations were particular examples of a “general calling” 
that corresponded to common grace, “a necessity of vocation enjoined of all, of what rank or 
degree soever.” Lack of a calling of any kind put one entirely outside the social order; since it must 
entail idleness, it “maketh of men, women, of women, beasts, of beasts, monsters.”66 Baxter’s idiot 
belonged in this latter group. Moreover, while one’s calling was a rank in a vertical, hierarchical 
order in which one was assumed to remain for life, the idea of a general calling had a horizontal 
dimension (it justified the adoption of coats of arms by the guilds, for example). The Levellers 
took this to its logical conclusion, transforming the idea of the general calling into something like 
a universal, abstract human right in a more modern sense. 
Baxter did not like this, and used his “idiots” to attack its appearance in James Harrington’s 
quasi-democratic utopia of 1656, The Commonwealth of Oceana. He accuses Harrington of 
advocating “the ploughmen’s vote.” In so doing, Baxter gives us a prime example of the necessary 
interdependence between concepts of pathological absence beyond the law of nature (“as a man 
is not man without an intellect and will”), and those of inferior reasoning within the band of 
normal. There are, says Baxter, “gradual” natural differences in active intellectual ability, which 
warn us against extending the franchise below a certain point; it is the existence of a species in 
whom there is no ability at all (the new, legal idiots) that best illustrates the absurdity of giving a 
parliamentary vote to labourers (idiots in the old sense), or even to the “majority, who are … scarce 
able to talk reason about common things.”67 Indeed, it may have been the latter anxiety above 
all, a political one, that finally provoked from him these hints about idiots’ difference in kind, in 
which “species” of human society are differentiated “analogically, even no more than an idiot is a 
reasonable man.” 
64 Twisse, De Praedestinatione, Gratia & Libero Arbitrio, 37b; see also James Ussher, The Power 
Commanded by God, Preface. 
65 Baxter, The Universal Redemption, 427. 
66 Brathwait, The English Gentleman, 31. 
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It should be added that similar anxieties existed in Catholic cultures. More than a century 
earlier Vives, a pioneer of welfarism, had complained about the many people whose disability 
forced them to live by begging, “regardless of where or when, even during celebration of the 
mass.” Such people, subdivided between the furious (furiosi) and the stupid (stupidi), polluted 
the sacraments. Their proper place was in hospital, since “this is the way it is done by the human 
body …. All filthy matter is collected in a sewer so that it will not harm the rest of the body.” Fear 
of pollution is displaced from reprobates to a new category of person and a new model of social 
segregation. As ever, we do not know exactly who it is that the author has in mind by “stupid.” His 
general disability heading of impotentia, as a category of public administration, makes no clear 
distinction between impairment and poverty. A single entity, the “lost and useless” alike, are the 
supreme threat to the “purity and honour [dignitas] of knowledge.”68 
“Natural disability of the intellect”: England, phase two 
The first historiographers of the Amyraut dispute are the English Dissenters following the 
Restoration of the monarchy in 1660, to whom we now turn. This was a period of decline in 
religious optimism and consequently in the disputes about grace, election and reprobation – if 
not necessarily a decline in their tacit importance. The Restoration bishops held a new variant of 
Arminian universalism that promoted reason alongside belief and endowed the monarchy with
“a monopoly of reason as well as honour.”69 They claimed that the Dissenters lacked reason, with the
result that the latter were forced to insist on its place in their own doctrines and the absence of it 
among the bishops. Thus the reasoning human subject became the focus of religious dispute. 
In 1671 Baxter’s protégé Joseph Truman weighed in against the church establishment on this 
issue, in his A Discourse of Natural and Moral Impotency. Truman defends the middle way not 
so much against the old Calvinist orthodoxy as against the opposite flank, the universalism of the 
“Protestant papists” in the Anglican hierarchy. Truman’s book, attacked for being “taken from
the writings of Amyraldus and supported by Baxter’s authority,” continues the intellectualist trend 
we have already noted.70 The “understanding” is now unproblematically compatible with faith. It is 
“irradiat[ed] with reasons as to cause [the] choice” between good and evil; the will makes its moral 
choices only after considering “suitable objective evidence” obtained via the prior workings of this 
“intellectual medium.”71 Truman “dare not yet say … how” this medium works in detail, but it was 
beginning to become obvious that the “how” was exactly what the Dissenters needed to specify, 
in order to defend the reasonableness of their own position. The bishops had called their bluff. 
Truman’s book was published in the same year as Locke committed himself to detailing the “how” 
in his proposal for what would become the Essay concerning Human Understanding. Anglicans 
and Dissenters alike were by now comfortable with the notion that reason was intrinsic to faith. 
But for the Anglicans reason was absolute, its ideas innate; its specific content was whatever the 
bishops, as the mediators of God’s will, said it was. The Restoration meant that “we are now rasa 
tabula and your honours may write what you please upon us.”72 For the Dissenters, reason was the 
act of intellectual labour in each individual by which he responded to Christ’s atoning sacrifice; 
therefore it could not be politically dictated by others. In their attempt to answer the Anglican 
68 Vives, De Subventione Pauperum, 59 f.
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charge that this labouring intellect, being individual, was Antinomian, self-willed and incapable 
of reaching the absolute truths of the “common ideas,” some of them tried to relocate the absolute 
away from the ideas and towards what they thought might be quasi-deterministic, innate working 
mechanisms of the “intellectual medium” itself. 
Disability was crucial to the dispute. According to Truman’s Anglican detractors like George 
Bull, hypothetical universalism was not universal at all but a disguised version of the old sheep­
and-goats orthodoxy of double predestination. In fact, everyone is disabled by the Fall, and
equally. Anglicans like Bull redefined “natural disability” as this universal inability to obey; the 
universal grace that cures it comes from the church hierarchy’s own ability to obtain “universal 
submission,” religious and political. Truman, coached in hair-splitting by Baxter, responds by
subdividing natural intellectual disability into three types: not knowing what is required of you, as
in pagans; external hindrances to religious observance, as for example poverty, blindness, deafness,
or “a body [not] rightly disposed”; and total absence of “the natural faculties of understanding and
willing,” as in “natural fools.”73 Truman only invents these natural fools in order to depict what 
we might all be like if we were naturally disabled as Bull says we are, and hence the absurdity of
his position. 
At the same time, however, Truman’s idea of natural intellectual disability and natural fools 
is more discrete and specific than Baxter’s. So much so, that it is only a short step from here back 
to the original orthodox dogma that the moral and the natural are the same thing – but with the 
new proviso that humanity contains some unnatural exceptions, even to this rule. Where Bull calls 
“natural impotency” a universal characteristic caused by sin, Truman makes the cause specific 
to certain individuals and groups. Sin causes “natural dullness of understanding and blindness, 
and lameness of body.”74 The idea of disability being a result of sin was not in Amyraut or even 
Baxter. It invokes the guilt-ridden divisiveness of election and reprobation, under a new guise. It 
focuses sharply on the question of whether people with a natural intellectual disability differ from 
the rest of us in kind or by degree. Where Baxter had at least hesitated, Truman turns “kind” and 
“degree” into a positive distinction that foreshadows the one made between “idiot” and “imbecile” 
categories by Edouard Séguin and John Connolly in the nineteenth century and between “severe” 
and “moderate” in modern psychology. “Total natural impotency” is one thing, he says, but “degree 
of it” another: 
If a man be … blockish, something dull, it is some excuse for his not understanding difficulties 
in religion which he might yet possibly, with great difficulty, understand; but if quite a fool, so 
as to have no more use of reason than a beast, it is a total excuse from any command to learn or 
understand … for, he cannot if he would. 
The “excuse” for total fools is no longer benevolent, as it had been in Amyraut. They are in a 
limbo created by Truman’s shrinking of the circumference of the human species to what he calls 
the “moral man,” which he defines in opposition to the Arminians’ “whole lump of mankind.” 
Where Twisse had effectively restricted his concept of “moral man” to the putatively elect, Truman 
conflates it with that of “man the rational animal,” so that it becomes the logical essence of
the species. Neither phrase, says Truman, adequately defines us without the other. But the whole
species? Whoever lacks “natural power” or ability is “no rational creature,” because rationality 
consists in the individual’s “power and knowledge to choose” good over bad. The identification of 
moral ability as something natural, implicit in his “moral man,” may paint a veneer of humanist 
73 Truman, A Discourse, 6; 47.
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optimism, but only by excluding a natural intellectual idiot who lacks rational choice and without 
whose separate classification moral man could not exist. 
Truman resumes the scientific aspirations of Baxter’s psychology. The fusion between moral 
man and rational animal, says Truman, can refresh the old formula of the “capable subject” with 
a new content. Whereas for earlier Calvinists it had meant a subject capable of passive receipt of 
the holy spirit, here it signifies his active ability to reason about truth and falsehood. The causes
of this ability, and of its absence, now lie in human nature.75 His Dissenter contemporary John Ray 
was just then reinforcing the definition of biological species in natural history; the difference of 
Truman’s natural fool lies not only in kind, in the old sense, but more precisely in natural species, 
in Ray’s sense. 
As for the doctrine of election, this had finally become, if not redundant, an embarrassment. Bull 
asserted that “God doth love and will the conversion of everyone.” Truman’s entire background 
would have led him to object that God willed conversion only for the elect. Instead he simply says 
that God wills conversion for some more than for others, “and take notice once for all that I exclude 
the case of infants and idiots out of this discourse, as being alien and of less concernment in 
religion, and also difficult.”76 Whereas Baxter saw no contradiction between ability/disability and 
election/reprobation as criteria of differentiation, Truman senses that there might indeed be one. 
While no doubt sticking to the “dismal … fierce and churlish reprobatarian doctrines” increasingly 
dismissed by contemporaries, he sounds palpably evasive.77 Tacit hints of election remain lodged 
within “moral man,” however. 
There are similar strands in the historical treatment of the Amyraut dispute by Robert Ferguson, 
Truman’s Dissenter contemporary and politically close to Locke at the 1671 gestation point of the 
Essay concerning Human Understanding. Ferguson published several texts in this period which 
discuss “rational choice,” then (it seems) a neologism – though at this stage a choice between 
heaven and hell rather than Coke and Pepsi. The Lutherans had foregrounded choice, starkly 
represented in paintings of the crucifixion that divide the people at the foot of the cross into 
mourners on one side and dice players on the other. “Reason is but choosing,” says Milton in the 
Areopagitica. Baxter situated choice at the juncture between the two main subdivisions within 
human nature, natural intellectual ability and natural free will: “It is as natural to a man to be a 
free agent as to be reasonable …. The gain or loss must be their own.”78 At the hands of Ferguson 
and others, “rational” choice became the sine qua non of faith. As he put it, “there can be no act 
of faith without a previous exercise of our intellects about the things to be believed.”79 And it was 
the necessary detail of this previous exercise that Locke had in mind when he offered himself as 
an “under-labourer” to “examine our own abilities.”80 Rational choice, linked to free will, was 
still compatible with election. The elect made use of their labouring intellects, rationally weighing 
evidence and probability; they could not fail to do so, since any failure would defy the intentions 
of their creator. According to self-styled “politico-theologians” such as Ferguson, the Calvinist 
law of perfect obedience that unites religion and government was now, in this current and final 
stage of Biblical history, a “law of rational subjection” (an adequate description, one might think, 
75 A Discourse, 39; 43; Truman, The Great Propitiation, 20. 
76 A Discourse, 115. 
77 Glanvill, “Anti-fanatical Religion,” 22, in Essays. 
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79 Ferguson, A Sober Enquiry into the Nature, Measure and Principle of Moral Virtue, Epistle; The 
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of the link between psychology and the political and social order today).81 The supreme model of 
regeneration and grace offered here, as one might expect, is Ferguson himself. 
His comments on Amyraut’s doctrine of disability reveal the same reductionism as Truman’s. 
“Moral impotency,” he says, is not “a deprivation of any essential power or faculty of our rational 
being; this Spanhemius as well as Amyrald, Twisse as well as Truman, are at an accord in …. 
So that whether it ought to be styled a moral or natural impotency is for the most part but a strife 
about words.” For Ferguson, moral disability is not “as if” natural, as it had been for Amyraut; 
they are downright identical. Disability is “natural” because “entailed on us by the Fall,” “moral” 
because it is redeemable through “industrious improvement” of the individual intellect, without a 
need for the mediation of bishops. This is a disability that reveals the fallen humanity of everyone. 
But that is because we are already led to understand that in “mere idiots,” who are “under no 
sanction,” not only ability but even the disability naturally specific to fallen man is absent.82 These 
exclusions belong in an implicitly non-human natural realm, since absence of intellect is absence of 
something essential to “being.” Idiots, like reprobates, have a “physical disproportion” as deep and 
determinate between them and the rest of us as between the rest of us and God. Thus Ferguson’s 
concept of disability, far from being Amyraut’s, reverts to crude orthodox Calvinism, inasmuch as 
it denies Amyraut’s partial disjunction between “moral” and “natural.” At the same time, though, 
it introduces a category that is morphologically human but entirely lacks a reasoning faculty – a 
move against which the orthodox had explicitly warned. Ferguson has cut his idiots off from his 
hypothetically universal humanity far more decisively than Amyraut or Baxter did theirs. 
Idiots and access to holy communion 
The categorization of idiots in a realm of intellectual nature was aided both by developments in 
the doctrine of election and by the increasingly strict gatekeeping that accompanied it. Aquinas 
had laid down rules of competence for participation in church ritual and the ability to examine 
oneself, and these did indeed include a category lacking the use of reason from birth, one which 
he associates implicitly with the category of people “possessed by unclean spirits.”83 However, 
this was set at an abstract level, and it is more likely that the people whom the Dominican Aquinas 
has in mind are atheists, heretics and those exhibiting disruptive behaviour. The reassertion of the
exclusionary principle in the mid-seventeenth century draws more concretely on concepts of 
reprobation. Bunyan’s identification of reprobation with lack of reason is a case in point. It is tied to 
the power of local ecclesiastics: a form of exclusion responding to a more marked and immediate 
urgency (social as well as doctrinal) than the pontificating of scholastic theologians. It therefore 
focuses concretely on the individual, and on the detailed condition of his intellectual operations. 
Reformers of a few decades earlier had in fact maintained that at communion “the hypocrite 
hurteth himself and not others.” Even the double predestinarian Perkins wrote that “every man 
of years … is bound in conscience by God’s commandment to use the Lord’s supper”; only self-
doubters were a problem, or those already publicly excommunicated for scandalous sins.84 Divines 
around the Westminster Assembly deemed that “that ordinance which is profaned by admitting 
infants and idiots, who can make no good use of it, is much more profaned by admitting abominable 
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and known profane persons, who make a very bad use of it.”85 And on a wider scale, well into 
the seventeenth century, the problem might be tackled by programmes of positive discrimination. 
There were idiots, of “crass wit and dull intellect” (the author also includes deaf people here), who 
were to be lovingly helped through the practice of communion. Who exactly were they? These 
were of course the “stupid serfs,” “peasants” and “rustics, … more suitable for perceiving the 
spiritual gifts of God than those who are puffed up with knowledge, swollen with honours.” God 
does not require more from anyone than they are capable of. Even this Catholic author, though, 
seems on the defensive by now.86 
Meanwhile Joseph Mede, an early figure in the secularization of the Devil, drew on the 
legal distinction between “him that is mad but by fits and hath his lucid intervals” and “him 
that is continually and always mad,” like the idiot, who might “by his indecent actions and foul
miscarriages of his own, or by his daemoniacal clamours disturb the people of God and the 
church service,” though again it may well be that we are meant to understand this latter group as 
“melancholics.”87 It was the question of power, of who controlled the service and in particular the 
altar rail, that led to increasingly strict assessments of ability and preparedness for grace, and so 
to keeping certain people out on a permanent basis. In England it was the loudest ecclesiastical 
dispute of the mid-seventeenth century, threatening the church’s political unity. The emphasis on 
assessment, in face of the dangers of pollution by an out-group, went with the view “that one 
unworthy receiver being admitted to the sacrament would draw down damnation on all the rest.”88 
In the dispute about open versus restricted access to communion, the sides did not correspond 
exactly to those taken in the dispute about universal grace versus limited atonement. Rather, they 
corresponded to a dispute about church government between Erastianism (control by the civil 
authority) and strict Presbyterianism (control by church elders). The first wave of this dispute came 
in the 1640s. At this point the Erastian view was that only those unable to examine themselves –
children and “idiots” (here, the unlearned and illiterates) should be barred – while Presbyterians 
were mainly concerned about abuse of the intellectual faculties rather than their absence. Although 
texts about ability to receive the sacrament deal massively with “ignorance,” this bears no relation 
to modern intellectual disability. 
The administrative dispute flared up again a decade later, during the republic. One side was led 
by John Humfrey. Humfrey thought one should admit all communicants without assessment, since 
God alone knew who was elect or reprobate. Only infants and mad people should be excluded, chiefly 
because of the pollutant effects of their disruptive behaviour; their religious status nevertheless 
remained unknown. Opposing him were mainstream Presbyterians such as Roger Drake, who 
agreed that only God knew but who thought the pastor could at least guess which individuals 
were not regenerate and could therefore screen them out.89 Anticipating those psychologists who 
were to prioritize measurement of intelligence over its actual definition, Drake and his colleagues 
maintained here that “the judgement may be false, but the rule of judging infallible.” They accused 
Humfrey of contradicting his own principle of open admission by excluding infants and mad 
people. Humfrey’s reply was that their conditions are not permanent; infants grow up, mad people 
(subsuming “fools”) have lucid intervals. Excluding them therefore did not contravene open 
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admission in principle. They were temporarily excused from self-examination. Drake countered 
that by invoking non-permanence, Humfrey was implicitly overriding the distinction between 
elect and reprobate, these being by definition permanent and predetermined states. So through 
the dialectic of debate and, it seems, on Baxter’s advice, Humfrey was forced into specifying in 
subsequent texts a disqualification that would be permanent but would not contradict his own 
doctrine of open admission. In order to be permanent it had therefore to be a category which 
(a) exists in nature, and (b) encompasses the whole creature from birth to death. This category 
Humfrey calls “idiots,” a term not discussed in either side’s original position. And it seems to 
involve him and his accomplices acknowledging what they would otherwise like to deny to their 
Presbyterian opponents, namely a right “to determine of the lowest degree of what is necessary to 
receiving or excluding in respect of every member” (emphasis added), and to make discriminations 
among “different subjects” a matter of “church administration” rather than leaving it up to God.90 
There was an element of anxious complicity here. Surely there was some category of person 
who, we would all agree, will never be admitted to communion? Surely, it is asked today, there 
must be some category of disability so severe that the person cannot be part of mainstream life: 
school, workplace, social relationships? The exclusionary principle, emanating from fear of 
pollution, precedes any concrete historical content such categories may have. This tacit agreement 
among ecclesiastical adversaries sprang from the need for a united front against an encroaching 
tide of doctrinal relativities exacerbated by civil war. The underlying need for all sides to maintain 
church unity preceded and actually created the thing itself, a common and absolute exclusion. 
Excommunicates, like mad people, are still technically “church members,” albeit “under cure”; 
pagans, like infants, are capable of being baptized and eventually of taking communion; even 
reprobate hypocrites, the initial source of anxiety, merely exhibit a difference between inner and 
“outward man.” Beneath any such concrete distinctions lies the underlying metaphysic of a level of 
absolute exclusion. Who or what exactly constitutes it? Disputants in the gatekeeping debate were 
driven to conceive a creature that has neither curability nor potential, nor even any “inner” man: a 
last-resort exceptional case. 
The debate about who was in charge of exclusion also involved practical problems at parish 
level, concerning the administrative duties of churchwardens and clerical deacons. These experts 
in the minutiae of discrimination, who had the job of ensuring that certain people did not physically 
get beyond the chancel screen, were also social security officers whose job was to apply the Poor 
Law, and it may well be that the new ecclesiastical category of idiots still encompassed the labouring 
poor. Daniel Defoe’s 1697 Essay on Projects contains a passage often cited as prefiguring later 
efforts to make a clear institutional division between mad people and idiots. A great plagiarizer, 
he took most of these projects from pamphlets of the early 1650s, and this one may well come 
from the same period as the pastoral debates discussed above. Defoe wanted to prove that having a 
clearly separate institution for “natural fools” would reduce the fiscal burden of relieving poverty. 
One had to discriminate in order to prevent “idle drones,” beggars and scroungers, from milking 
the system; genuine idiocy, properly assessed, was “natural” and so could not be counterfeited, 
whereas madness could. 
The element of permanence in this ecclesiastical concept of idiocy corresponds with the 
Puritan unification of the personality. It has two ingredients: congenital incurability, drawn from 
legal accounts of wardship, and determinism, drawn from religious accounts of election and 
reprobation. Humfrey’s opponents claimed that by positing idiocy as the one fundamental category 
90 Baxter, Letter to John Humfrey, 20 June 1654; Humfrey, A Second Vindication of a Disciplinary, 
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of exclusion, he was elevating “natural intelligence” over “spiritual intelligence.”91 In fact the two 
were merging, and any opposition between them was secondary to the need to authenticate and 
exclude. Admission to Presbyterian communion was based on a close assessment by the pastor, on 
the evidence of which he would issue the aspiring communicant with a ticket. We have detailed 
records of Baxter’s examination of his parishioners’ catechism, which show us how complex and 
“intellectual” an exercise it had become, in a recognizably modern sense.92 Until now long and 
detailed catechisms were the preserve of ecclesiastical elites; all the masses had needed were 
easy-access idiot’s guides. Humfrey, in drastically reducing the numbers of people he excluded, 
also pathologizes them. John Collinges, one of Drake’s allies, warned him that by pressing the 
“Amyraldian” Humfrey too hard to concede that some category at least should be barred from 
communion, Drake was unwittingly “creating monsters”: “I remember the ill influence learned 
Spanhemius [in] his answer to Amyraldus had upon him to this purpose,” meaning that it seemed 
to posit some separate, non-human species.93 Collinges knew that theoretical disputes like that 
between Amyraut and Spanheim could produce real-life problems. In debating these conceptual 
categories, Drake was playing with fire. 
Humfrey’s goal was church unity and thus the maintenance of social order. Drake, he said, 
risked driving the many people he excluded on “spiritual” grounds into separate congregations. 
Even worse, people denied a ticket would react by withholding their tithes.94 Humfrey sought 
to minimize this potential for social disintegration by maximizing the pathology of the few he 
did exclude; idiots may have been non homo legalis, as he calls them here, but their shift from 
the courtroom into nature and natural law made them seem simply non homo. No longer were 
idiots with “natural disabilities” merely “suspended” as before, they were assumed to be “as much 
delivered over to Satan as any scandalous persons” – and permanently so.95 
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The Long Historical Context of Cognitive Genetics
 
Our object of study, as we perceive it today, rests on a scientific and more particularly a medical 
description of human types. This medical model of “intellectual disability” draws its validation 
from a wider and specifically modern mélange of biology, psychology and ethics (to be examined in 
Part 7). In narrower, diagnostic terms, it is validated by empirical evidence. Without such evidence, 
all talk of intelligence or disability and its identification of in-group and out-group remain stuck 
in the realm of mere values. In modern society there is only one social institution that might be 
able to recognize this dependence on values, and to adhere instead to a principle of unconditional 
acceptance, and that is the family. Beyond the family are mainstream social institutions – school, 
workplace, everyday social life – entitled, often by law and certainly by moral consensus, to say 
Keep Out, while pre-natal testing means that families’ own values are themselves sometimes 
eroded by medical ones. The medical profession, once the very lowest rank of the honour society, 
has risen to become the arbiter of what it is and is not to be fully human, acting on behalf of other 
professions and social institutions in this respect. To use a phrase of Baxter’s, it is Keeper of the 
Keys of the House of the Lord. For the medical profession, therefore, unconditional acceptance 
is not so much an alternative set of values as a doctrinal heresy. In the face of heresy, the separate 
identity of the pollutant out-group must be secured all the more tightly, by a system of external 
verification and the re-education of waverers (especially families) which forces them to internalize 
the medical profession’s own systemic bias as to the value of certain people. 
The medical history of intelligence: absolute presuppositions 
In order to uncover the historical connections and disconnections in the medical model of intellectual 
disability (which are entirely distinct from those of the physical model that dominates “disability 
studies”), we need to look first at its most deeply rooted assumptions, at the various bits of the 
modern conceptual apparatus that inform it and act as obstacles to our understanding. Earlier we 
saw that honour and grace were given facts of the era to which they belonged. They were, to use 
historian R.G. Collingwood’s phrase, “absolute presuppositions,” constituting the farthest horizons 
of that era’s world-view. It is our job as historians to get round the back of our primary sources’
presuppositions. Otherwise we have no hope of understanding them. Intelligence is as absolute in 
our own era as honour and grace once were. How did it become not only a given fact of nature but 
so firmly embedded in medical science? How do we stand outside it? 
The first barrier to understanding, dominating the rest, is mind-body dualism. In the pre-modern 
era, no separately “intellectual” form of ability existed. Identifying Greek psyche with the Christian 
“soul” or the modern “mind” can lead to gross misinterpretation of the texts. Psyche was, rather, 
the principle of growth and movement in all living things, animating their material existence. 
In early Christianity this role was partly taken over by the understanding (intellectus), with soul 
(anima) being reduced to something less active. As categories broke down and re-formed, the 
Latin “mind” (mens) came to be synonymous with both, and completely separated from the body.1 
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Yet even among the pioneering scientists of the Royal Society, who knew their Descartes, the old 
conceptual schema hung on. Alongside dualism a distinction continued to be made within the 
disembodied soul itself, between a spiritual and immortal super-nature and the mortal faculties and 
their operations. Ordinary doctors hung on to this picture well into the eighteenth century. 
As for the body, the assumption was that it would be reborn at the Last Judgement, in as perfect 
a condition as the soul; after all, they were inseparable aspects (matter and form) of a single entity. 
Michelangelo’s fresco depicts bodies that are sublime in their own right; they are not just tokens 
of the soul’s perfection. Only later was the body excluded from personal identity and relegated to 
an anonymous agglomeration of matter. One does not need a body in order to be resurrected, says 
Boyle; correspondingly, the “person” was now distinct from the physical “man,” and described 
mind alone. The person became that part of us which, when judged, expects the good or bad deeds 
performed over a whole lifetime to be tallied up. Separation of the person from the body turned it 
into a potential object of pathology in its own right. In this Cartesian sense, the mind is a solipsistic 
self “sitting at its console in its windowless tower communicating with other, similarly secluded 
diamonds by signals run up between towers and relayed to these beings by a perpetual miracle.”2 
And this creates room for the idea that there might be some towers that fail to send or receive 
signals, in a way that could not previously have been imagined. Dualism led to the quasi-biological 
notion of what the preacher Jonathan Edwards termed “a natural history of the mental world,” 
which fed into modern medical classifications of disability.3 
A second barrier is the idea that there are laws of human nature. Like mind-body dualism, this 
is of fairly recent origin. For the Greeks, law (nomos) was simply a set of conventions invented 
by human beings themselves for their own daily affairs; they would have been baffled by the 
idea that there are “laws” of nature of any kind, let alone human ones, and even more puzzled 
by the idea that there are laws of the mind with uniform external descriptors indicating the same 
thing to everyone. Medieval philosophers subsequently attributed law to nature, but only in a 
very broad sense. According to Aquinas, natural law has three strands: God’s providence, the 
external world and the human understanding. Yet each was inseparable from the other, since there 
was a divine element connecting them all, and only on the threshold of the modern period did 
the connections begin to loosen. The idea of a discrete set of laws pertaining to a specifically 
human nature first arose, controversially, in the seventeenth century. It was founded on the belief 
that our world originates in a steady “state” of nature and functions by laws we can discover for 
ourselves. According to Hobbes in Chapter 14 of Leviathan, nature can be divided between an
external nature – verifiable by the size, shape and velocity of measurable, material things – and
an internal nature within human beings consisting of that which occurs in our own minds as a result 
of our cognitive grasp of external nature. Human reasoning in this sense is a mundane “calculation”; 
it reflects the arithmetically ordered external nature from which it has been separated, and operates 
by correspondingly mechanical rules. 
This repositioning of our place in nature had a partly political motive. It meant our behaviour 
was predictable. Hobbes’s vision of human nature as a set of ordered stimulus-and-response 
mechanisms matched the perceived need for a renewal of absolute authority over a society that 
had disintegrated into a factious pit of “masterless men” and their competing individual wills. 
His contemporary Grotius, followed by Pufendorf, asserted by contrast that human beings are 
naturally capable of governing themselves, even in situations where the “positive,” everyday law 
of the state has broken down. Locke then claimed that human nature is a state of liberty where 
individuals are untrammelled by the will of others: the source of political liberalism. These highly 
2 Mary Midgley, Science and Poetry, 86.
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disparate state-of-nature arguments sprang from a shared recognition that the idea of natural law 
as a divine force had lost its political clout, its ability to coerce from without. New forms of 
coercion had to be sought within the individual. Specifically human nature, separated from its 
previous interconnectedness with divine nature, now had cognitive operations at its core. Thus 
the underlying properties of the human intellect came to match those of the world outside it
and the study of both to resemble each other. Now that human behaviour was, like external nature, 
predictable and therefore governable, there was no longer a need to insist that humans answer for 
it directly to an omnipotent God. An earthly authority might assess and manage it instead, whether 
directly as in the absolutist conception or indirectly as in the liberal one. 
Thirdly, the idea of laws of human nature has led to our modern emphasis on the minutiae 
of internal psychological operations. “Intellect” (dianoia) for the Greeks was a succession of 
temporary states, not a stable psychological object open to detailed investigation. For medieval and 
Renaissance writers, the intellectus was structured by soul into its various faculties; the analytic 
focus was on these broad, static entities, and any sense of operational detail was to be found rather 
in the soul’s bodily matter such as the “soul spirits.” Only subsequently was this sense of detail 
transferred to the mind, as a separate entity. This shift coincided politically with the loss of power 
of kings and ecclesiastical authority to dictate a uniform political and religious doctrine. Since the 
supposedly universal “common ideas” had in fact been the property of an elite with the authority to 
prescribe them, typically human psychological operations such as abstraction or logical reasoning 
occurred only in such people. But the civic disorder of the mid-seventeenth century, especially 
in England, was an omen: the lower orders were “getting ideas,” of their own and on their own. 
When Locke recommended toleration for this diversity of political and religious views among the 
general population, he was not indulging in relativism. Quite the contrary: he threw the principle 
of uniformity a lifeline, by disengaging it from the innate ideas prescribed externally by church 
and state doctrine and applying it instead to the micro-mechanical internal operations of the mind. 
He did not so much get rid of uniformity and absolutism as re-establish them somewhere else, in 
a discipline where the out-group no longer consisted of labourers or heretics but of people with 
faulty operations: a near-seamless transition from religious uniformity to psychological uniformity. 
The problem of intellectual heterodoxy now lay not in the common ideas themselves but rather 
in the mechanisms by which one reached them. And this has been the founding metaphysic of
modern psychology. 
Fourthly, there is the modern habit of separating cognitive states from moral ones. This was 
not fully achieved until the late nineteenth century; and if today it is still possible to talk about 
“wisdom” as combining moral with intellectual judgement, this does not occur within psychology. 
The Greek philosophers seemingly subdivided the four cardinal virtues into moral ones (bravery, 
justice, temperance) and an intellectual one (civic intellect), but the core principle was that 
none of these could exist without the others. Aristotle appears to draw some sort of distinction: 
for example, the person at the bottom of the scale in his Ethics (someone lacking moderation) 
bears little resemblance to the slave at the bottom of the scale in Politics (lacking deliberation 
and forethought). However, this difference is not fundamental, since ethics and politics were for 
Aristotle the same area of enquiry; it simply reflects different social functions. The first person is 
someone who ought to be honourable because of his social station but is not; the second is engaged 
in manual work. Aristotle’s underlying criteria for what it is to be human are multifaceted; they are 
not either moral or intellectual. This held good beyond the onset of Christianity. When the early 
church fathers call man “rational” on the grounds that “he is discerning about the true and the false, 
the good and the bad,” these phrases are in apposition, not opposition; Aquinas’s principle that “the 
good and true each include the other” echoes through the Middle Ages and Renaissance, accepted 
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by theologians and medical humanists alike.4 Conversely there are “fools,” intellectually limited, 
who for that very reason are wicked, like Cloten in Shakespeare’s Cymbeline; and there are clever 
people, like Edmund in King Lear, whose cleverness entails wickedness and so leads them to a 
sticky, unclever end. 
In the proto-psychiatric texts of this period, carnal sin is synonymous both with atheism and 
with the general intellectual disability of the masses, who are “so weak and ignorant touching the 
faculties of nature” that they “little differ from brute beasts …. Divers men (or rather monsters) are 
of the same condition with those, whereof the prophet David speaketh, saying, the fool hath said in 
his heart, there is no God.”5 The atheist, in his cleverness, is vulgar, plebeian and beastlike because 
he only follows his pleasures. The label “Epicurean” was frequently used for this condition; it was 
a characteristic insult, employed to describe both his doctrine and his appetites, as well as his urge 
(like the Greek idiotes with whom he was associated) to seek happiness in a purely private sphere 
and avoid his public responsibilities for ruling over the masses. Typically, “stupidity” is a “spiritual 
lethargy” or “insensibility of mind” both to moral feelings and to understanding. It might also be 
a defence against wisdom’s own enemy, “passion,” but more often it meant “not having the body 
at [the soul’s] command.”6 First Locke and then Kant with his “moral imperative” subsequently 
set such a priority on rational processes that anyone who never refers his passions and appetites to 
his reason was not so much a bad person as not a person at all. Only in the late nineteenth century 
did science finally separate the moral from the cognitive. However, they have been separated only 
to reconnect as a pair of opposites. Langdon Down already seems to have been on the defensive 
when he insisted that the “mongols” he identified were fully ethical beings despite their intellectual 
primitivity. In the age of amniocentesis, any suggestion to the biotechnology industry about the 
moral (let alone cognitive) worth of someone with “intellectual disability” goes against an even 
stronger tide: it is at most a private choice, and more often a doctrinal heresy. 
Fifth comes the notion that intelligence and its disabilities are specifically human properties. 
Some account of previous applications of the word “intelligence” will be useful here. Central to 
intelligentia was always a sense of activity or transmission. Medieval philosophers conceived of 
a cosmos ruled by nine intelligences, each of which was a function of its first cause, the divine 
intellectus; angels were also, as their Greek etymology implies, messengers or “intelligencers.” 
Humanist discussions of faculty psychology used intelligentia for the movement of the rational soul 
around the body; the soul was “entirely perfect” and “freed from the body” but had to communicate 
to it somehow.7 If “intelligence” could be still used in the larger cosmic sense, so too could 
disability; universal disabling forces passed through the individual – melancholy, for example, 
was represented in this way.8 We can also find intelligentia used in a prototypically modern sense. 
Already in the mid-sixteenth century complaints were voiced about its misuse as a synonym for 
intellectus, the “understanding.”9 Medical textbooks, tending to overlook philosophical niceties, 
often use the two interchangeably.10 Intelligence was also sometimes conflated with mind (mens), 
which itself could cover a multitude of things: from “a general faculty in the universe as a whole” 
to the human individual’s organic, “sensitive” soul, the one that remained in everyday contact with 
4 John Damascenus, De Fide Orthodoxa, cited by Albert in Summa de Creaturis, 516; Aquinas, cited in 
Voak, Richard Hooker, 62. 
5 De la Primaudaye, Académie, 869; 427. 
6 Charron, Of Wisdom, ii, 8; Thomas Milles, The Treasurie, 898. 
7 Bryskett, A Discourse, 274. 
8 Michael Schoenfeldt, Bodies and Selves in Early Modern England, 11. 
9 Elyot, The Governour, 239r. 
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the material world. Baconian experimentalists used intelligentia to denote the specific knowledge 
content of intellectus, the latter being a mere shell. The seventeenth-century genre of psychological 
poetry discussed in Chapter 10 throws up examples such as “Intelligence (supreme pow’r of the 
soul) / wherein alone w’are like the deity”; in this sense it has become an elevated version of 
“wit,” a specifically human reason that in its own modest way can be compared with divine reason, 
rather than being suspect as in Augustine or Calvin.11 Locke reproduces this range of meanings, 
transmitting it to his eighteenth-century followers. At times intelligence is for him something 
merely human: “intelligent Americans,” he says, are the Englishman’s equals in their cognitive 
ability. At other times he uses the phrase “intelligent being[s]” in the Platonist sense, to cover the 
whole spectrum from humans to angels and God.12 Behind these many adventures of the term, then, 
the axiom largely held that intelligence was attributable to divine as well as human beings. If by the 
early twentieth century Pearson and Spearman had transformed intelligence into a possession of 
the mass individual, as if it were a material property like height or eye colour, beneath this runs a 
deeper historical continuity with respect to the goals of intelligence: the aspiration to a transhuman 
perfection, whether divine or earthly. 
Sixth is the cast-iron scientificity provided by statistical method. The scientific accreditation
and social power of the dyad “normal/abnormal” was reinforced in some cases by evident 
physiological difference, which suggested an empirical verifiability for a cognitive difference 
akin to racial difference. In the mid-nineteenth century, Britain built its first large segregating 
long-stay institution (the Royal Earlswood), whose chief physician from 1858 to 1868 was
Dr Langdon Down himself. Asked to come up with some system for classifying the unwieldy 
numbers of inmates, his intuition was to separate them by physical appearance. Physiognomics 
was already popular among “mad doctors.”13 The upshot was “mongols.” The visible difference 
between mongol and non-mongol was only evident because the mass scale of the new social 
incarceration made numbers important. Statistics spread as a way of looking at the social world; 
they were “state” numbers, devised to serve administrative purposes. And the result of looking at 
people in the mass was that where difference was observed, the question of the numbers in each 
group suddenly struck the observer as never before. In Langdon Down’s case, the fact that 599 out 
of every 600 people belonged in one group and only 1 in 600 in the other suddenly became, in itself, 
significant. “Normal” was originally, and for the pure statistician remains, a scientifically neutral 
term. But in human terms, something about the numerical disproportion of that 599 as against
the 1 adds or subtracts social value and promotes labelling of the 1. And that something is, in the 
first instance, an artefact of institutionalization. 
Langdon Down borrowed the mongol label from his contemporary James Hunt, whose 
“recapitulation” theory stated that each (white) human embryo individually recapitulates the 
development of the human race from primitive to civilized. Non-white groups were relics stuck at 
more primitive levels of intelligence; consequently a mongol born to white parents was a throwback 
to an earlier stage of species development. Hunt’s theory seems drawn in part from earlier faculty 
psychology, with its theory that the vegetative, animal and rational souls arrive at successive 
stages in the growth of the foetus which correspond with infancy, youth and maturity in the living 
individual. But whereas faculty psychologists had denied that the foetus could already have “an 
intelligent or stupid mind,” Down’s 1 in 600 was already an intellectually inferior subspecies at 
some point of arrestation in the womb.14 This enhanced the racial and cognitive superiority of
11 John Davies of Hereford, Mirum in Modum.
 
12 An Essay, 265. 

13 Sharrona Pearl, About Faces. 
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the 599, and drove the notion of cause further back into a deterministic “nature” of the individual. 
It is a prime example of how, in the human sciences, “normal” has come to connote value, and of 
how from being a neutral term it has come to be an everyday term signifying “good.” 
Last but not least of our absolute presuppostions is the importance we place upon cause. This 
all-pervading and (in the case of disability) thoroughly modern obsession derives from our desire 
to root out “intellectual” monstrosity; the fact that it also leads to a scientific knowledge of that 
monstrosity is secondary. True, as far back as the ancient Greek physician Hierophilos there is 
evidence of an interest in causes; it led him to vivisect slaves, and for this reason he is said to 
have “hated men so that he might know.” Nevertheless, he vivisected them in order to learn about 
human anatomy in general and because their social status allowed him to, not because he thought 
the inferior intellectual features of this group were biologically caused by the peculiar formation 
of their bodily material. Far from it: Greek doctors explicitly denied that intellectual inferiority 
was the province of medicine; their mythical patron Asclepios made the blind see and the lame 
walk but, it was said, could not make a fool wise. In Aristotelian and scholastic accounts of nature, 
causes were inseparable from “goals.” In the explanatory apparatus of Galenist medicine, causes 
were subordinate to a more general of theory of “signs,” from which they were not always distinct. 
Bacon’s natural philosophy was the turning point. His inductive method, proceeding from empirical 
observation to general truths, led to a focus on the underlying causes of the detailed processes of 
knowing, which became the stuff of modern psychology. The mind was not to be left to take its 
own course but “must be guided at every step; and the business done as if by machinery.”15 By 
the eighteenth century, it was a type of mechanical and irremediable deficiency the physiognomist 
Johannes Caspar Lavater would have in mind when he modernized the Asclepios reference into 
his widely quoted saw, “The idiot born can never without a miracle become a philosopher.”16 
The equation which modern medicine draws between explanation and cause is thus historically 
specific. Physicians, concerned as they normally are with cure, have developed a strong interest 
in that which is defined by its incurability, perhaps not so much because cures are in prospect (the 
track record is negligible), but because it affords them a fundamental social role, one might say a 
priestly or “necessitarian” role, in the verification and ostentation of difference. 
Whereas modern medicine divides causes into two, normal and abnormal, early modern writers 
divided them into three: natural, unnatural and praeternatural. The unnatural was simply the 
unusual, an exotic manifestation of the natural itself; monstrous births involving (say) androgyny or 
conjoined twins, though unnatural, did not thereby contradict the natural. “There are no grotesques 
in nature,” says Browne.17 A praeternatural cause, on the other hand, was one that lay outside the 
patient. For Greek and Roman doctors this meant things in the external environment. In early 
modern medicine, external explanations usually boiled down to God or, more often, the devil. In 
the latter case the praeternatural cause was not only outside but against nature. Modern concepts of 
disability were born partly out of the collapse of the distinction between the merely unnatural and 
the demonically praeternatural within an originally tripartite conceptual framework. It was reduced 
to a dyad, natural/unnatural, which merged with that of normal/abnormal under the influence of 
statistics and nineteenth-century social policy. Behind this displacement of monstrosity from 
exotic nature to anxious pathology lay the threat which the cognitive monster posed to religious 
doctrine, and subsequently to secular development and progress. The preferred proof of God’s 
existence during the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries was the Argument from Design; a 
natural world whose operations dovetailed so perfectly had to have been created by a supremely 
15 Cited in Shapin, The Scientific Revolution, 90.
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intelligent being, and to be progressing towards a divinely ordained goal. Idiots appear to be a 
design fault in this picture, an obstacle to progress. Their existence might be used to disprove that 
of God, or alternatively as a sign of the reality of the devil in people’s lives. Either way, it was the 
same problem: as Diderot, Kant and Darwin were all to ask in their various ways, how could such 
creatures contribute to God’s purposes for the world?18 
And so the fear associated with praeternatural causes was attached to the monstrous human 
consequence as well; the term “abnormal” to describe the statistical incidence of disability carries 
subliminally these demonic overtones. People bearing labels of intellectual monstrosity cease to 
be merely an unusual or alternative expression of the natural and become instead objects of a 
utilitarian anxiety about consequences. Eugenics is in this sense merely a secular expression of the 
Argument from (Intelligent) Design. Abnormality and intellectual disability are thus not so much 
the motive for eugenics, as is usually supposed, but its conceptual product. “Abnormality” is the 
kind of thing that happens when fear of pollution, at a certain historical stage and in a fresh social 
and economic context, reconceptualizes its target population. It expresses in a social form (fear of 
the representative other) what psychiatry’s Diagnostic and Statistical Manual lists as a specific 
phobia. In this phobia about dirt and pollution we at last find our genuinely long-term mental 
disorder, whose symptoms are, if perhaps not transhistorical, then visible across much of recorded 
history: far longer lasting than the short- and medium-term disabilities we have so far discussed. 
Most research is effectively focused on expanding and exacerbating a negative image of these 
historically provisional kinds of difference, when it could instead be focusing on enabling people 
who are “intellectually” disabled by the modern era to be part of ordinary life. A successful cure 
would be one that touched the deepest root, the long-term phobic disorder, and thus would operate 
on the principle “Physician, heal thyself.” 
Behaviourist, behave yourself: the behavioural phenotype and its inventors 
Having examined the largely unchallenged value presuppositions that lie behind the modern 
medical model of intellectual disability, we need now to define that model more sharply. With the 
entry of mind-body dualism into medicine, a philosophical conundrum about how mind intersects 
with body became a practical one. Adjectives from two entirely separate realms of nature, 
“intellectual” and “physical,” were attached to one and the same noun, “disability.” In intellectual 
disability, today’s primary research focus is on the behavioural phenotype, which scientists define 
as a pattern of somatic and psychological characteristics with a corresponding pattern of genes. In 
reducing the body to certain ultimate entities in this way, they are following age-old convention. 
Skull shape, soul spirits, “elements,” humours and genes have all filled this slot over the centuries. 
But whereas in Galenist medicine “stupidity” consisted simultaneously in slow soul spirits, slow 
somatic features (the muscles, for example) and slow psychological and behavioural ones, with no 
clear separation among these various categories, in modern medicine genes run a quite separate, 
if parallel, course with the mind. The problem of dualism is that whereas DNA exists in material 
nature, changing at the pace of biological evolution, intelligence and disability are purely conceptual 
and can therefore change with great rapidity. To try and map one on to the other creates muddle. It 
is as if a cartographer were to confuse lines formed by political entities, which change every few 
years, with those formed by physical geography, which change at the pace of continental drift. 
18 Denis Diderot, Letter on the Blind, 68; Immanuel Kant, Critique of Teleological Judgement, 84; 
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In defining cognitive or behavioural characteristics, let alone classifying them, what is our 
starting point? We begin inside our own heads. Psychological phenotypes consist of views we human 
beings have of each other; they originate in the realm of appearances. Of course appearances are in 
their own way real, and from Aristotle onwards have been regarded as the proper point of departure 
for scientific investigation. For this reason too, it may be proper in a medical context to speak of 
“cognitive impairments,” to the limited extent that they relate to the particular historical and social 
conditions that render them impairments in the first place. Nevertheless a psychological phenotype –
not just the concept but the actual stuff of which it is made – has its roots in human consensus alone. 
Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder (ADHD), for example, exists because in the 1980s the 
American Psychiatric Association disputed and then elected a list of symptoms, eventually agreeing 
– it went to a second vote – to abide by the result. The selection of symptoms of autism was through 
a similar process. Private thinking, lack of empathy, monotropism, lack of eye contact, oppositional 
defiance, repetitive behaviours, flat intonation, a triad of impairments: any of these? All? Which 
ones? How many? Who decided? One can shuffle the pack, remove or add certain cards, even 
invent new and more sophisticated suits, but some common denominator is always presupposed; 
the existence of autism is something that everyone just knows, just as once upon a time the existence 
of the devil was something that everyone just knew. The stuff of every psychological phenotype 
originates in a social consensus reflecting the values of a particular time and place. It consists of 
behaviours which contemporaries – parents, social institutions, professionals – find problematical. 
The stuff of genes, by contrast, originates in the material realm, which exists irrespective of what 
people of any time or place might think. Although a consensus has to be reached among human 
beings working in laboratories about where to partition DNA sequences and thus about what is 
called a gene and how it is separate from some other gene, the basic stuff, DNA, is not something 
that only goes on in our heads. 
Genotype and psychological phenotype belong to realms of existence so unalike that
something freakish, and historically specific, is bound to happen when we try to link them. It is
not just that genetic causes are by and large “not known” (fragile X) but simply “being sought”
(autism), or “thought to exist” by some psychiatrists while flatly ruled out by others (ADHD);
nor is the simplistic notion of “a gene for x” improved by that of “a complex cluster of genes
for x.” Even in the commonest assumed link of all, between sex chromosomes and gendered
human behaviour, a pathway from one to the other eludes researchers once they get beyond
broad-brush statistical correspondences and reach the laboratory stage. Hopes are then scaled
down, and redirected to male and female transgenic mice. The supposition here, that there is
no essential distinction between human and other animals, points to one possible solution to
dualism: behaviourism. Typically, behaviourists deny experimental usefulness to the notion of
mind and analyze the directly observable entity, behaviour, alone; mind, unlike behaviour, is not
an observable phenomenon. But behavioural phenotype theory does not describe human subjects
in general, only those deemed to be disordered. Knowledge of their behaviour is a substitute
for the knowledge normally available from subjective communication, knowledge which one
can experimentally obtain from most individual human minds but which is lacking in disabled
ones. Behavioural phenotypes presuppose the existence of an invisible but normally observable
cognitive ability which lies deeper than behaviour, and whose resistance to observation is mere
pathology in certain individuals. Today’s theory is as uninterested in distinguishing between
the cognitive and the behavioural as it is between ability and performance. Does intellectual
disability exert such “a profound influence on … psychiatric and behavioural disorders” that
this disability should be seen as prior? Or is it that intellectual disability is equal with motor,
linguistic and social abnormality under a “behavioural” heading? Or is it simply that intellectual
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disability is behaviour, and hence subsumed under the latter?19  The question is not thought to 
be worth pursuing. 
Unlike pre- and early modern medical theory, which explained the relationship between mind 
and body as an organic interaction, today’s doctrine is nothing but causal. In the relationship 
between genes and psychological characteristics, genes are prior. True, the environment may act 
back on them, somatic entities such as enzymes may work backwards to influence gene expression, 
and natural selection makes behaviour ultimately responsible for genetic change. And one can 
retreat when under attack into modest disclaimers about a multiplicity of risk factors, only to 
sally forth once again with a deterministic claim once the coast is clear. But in the behavioural 
phenotype, causes are ultimately one way. And the long historical perspective teaches us that this 
preoccupation with cause is itself a cultural bias. Causes only matter where elimination is needed 
or enhancement sought. 
Furthermore, the association between genotype and psychological phenotype lends the latter 
an air of stability when actually it belongs to the unstable realm of consensual appearances 
and values. Its stability is established purely by association. The language used suggests that 
psychological phenotypes are the same order of things as somatic phenotypes. Nevertheless, this 
is mere wordplay. In earlier textbook biology, a phenotype simply is, by definition, somatic. 
Things such as size or eye colour have no trouble corresponding with a genotype. But to expand 
the range of the noun “phenotype” by replacing the adjective “somatic” with “psychological” is 
to smuggle in a metaphor. 
We owe the genotype/phenotype formula to the botanist Wilhelm Johannsen, who also coined 
the word “gene.” From around 1900 onwards he conducted experiments that matched the somatic 
appearance or “phenotype” of peas to their genotype. In the 1930s, the term started being used to 
describe behaviour in animals. Psychiatrists subsequently applied it to humans, following a much-
referenced 1972 article by William Nyhan.20 Biologists, in a pincer movement, have extended the 
“somatic phenotype” to cover psychological categories.21 But mere metaphor is not sufficient to 
manoeuvre the psychological into the same realm of being as the somatic. From peas to minds is a 
big jump. The strictness of the mind-body divide is belied by the ease with which experts traverse 
the disciplinary boundaries. Nyhan, for example, despite his espousal of psychiatric terminology, 
was a geneticist. Johannsen too was a double agent, who built his theory of the somatic phenotype 
upon notions covertly supplied by psychology. As the “pathbreaking” inspiration for his formula 
“phenotype = genotype + environment,” he cites not Mendel’s work on botany but Galton’s on 
human genius. He was seeking, he said, a verification of Galton’s nature-nurture idea from the 
biologist’s perspective. Statistical representations of “environment” had so far been speculative, 
but now its relationship to genes could be made concrete. A pure line of peas resembled a racially 
white and thus intellectually pure human population; it had its own “racial hygiene.”22 Historically, 
then, human differences in intelligence – a cultural matter of status differences – have gone into the 
very making of statistical biology, as well as the latter finding explanations for the former. 
Johannsen’s Reformed church background, like Galton’s nonconformist one, may well have 
subliminally predisposed him to rethink the divine predestination of souls as the biological 
determination of intelligence. There is nevertheless one point on which modern psychiatry can 
19  G. O’Brien and W. Yule, “Why behavioural phenotypes?” in O’Brien and Yule (eds), Behavioural 
Phenotypes; J. Flint and W. Yule, “Behavioural phenotypes,” in M. Rutter et al., Child and Adolescent 
Psychiatry; R. Plomin, “Behavioural genetics,” in P. McHugh et al., Genes, Brains and Behavior. 
20  Nyhan, “Behavioural phenotypes,” Pediatric Research, 6/1 (1972). 
21 Richard Dawkins, The Extended Phenotype. 
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claim to be more robust than its pre-modern ancestor. Galenist medicine attributed the soul spirits’
invisibility to the ultra-refined material of which they were composed, but actually they were a 
figment of the Galenist imagination. Soul spirits did not exist. DNA strings do. Modern psychiatry 
presents itself as an exact science because it deals with things that really are there to be measured. 
This is an inadequate claim, however. It was skull-measuring phrenologists who first advanced 
it, from whom there is a historical link through to genetics and psychology. Galton tried out 
physiognomics and phrenology as a young man, while Binet’s first, unsuccessful experimental 
attempts to measure intelligence involved craniometry; conversely, nascent ideas about inheritance 
and eugenics flourished first among phrenologists.23 The ultimate bodily entities in phrenology 
were the parts of the skull; the size of these, an indicator of the cerebral mass they contained, was 
correlated with degrees of ability or “mental power.”24 The intuition, then as now, was entirely 
fortuitous: that the bodily entity we are capable of measuring (formerly skulls, now genes) just 
happens to be that which can be correlated with whatever psychological feature we (one society in 
one era) decide is important to measure – and that therefore we can infer intellectual abilities from 
bodily ones. 
Nyhan’s article highlights this weakness. Despite his reputation as the pioneer of the behavioural 
phenotype, he makes not a single mention of this phrase in his paper. It only occurs in the title. 
The paper itself discusses not phenotypes but something far more mundane, namely stereotypy, 
or repetitive behaviour. Nyhan’s point, his actual “first,” was that stereotypies enable us to look 
at behaviour “in a quantitative sense.” The title phrase was a mere verbal flourish, expressing his 
optimism that this fresh quantitative approach would at last make psychiatry a genuine science. 
What was more, scientific status would mean that behavioural disorder would have its own 
“specificity” and thereby cease to be just some sub-specialism under mental retardation. Indeed, it 
would replace the latter as the main area of study. And it is true that a stereotypy can be counted, 
measured and chi-squared. Take hand flapping: interested researchers find statistical significance 
in its “bout frequency,” “mean bout length” and “bout length variability.”25 But interest in hand 
flapping comes only from the realm of our views of each other, from human consensus. There are 
many possible motives for isolating a particular behaviour. An experimental researcher thinks that 
because it is countable, therefore it is interesting. A teacher may dislike teaching a certain child, 
so Oppositional Defiant Disorder is diagnosed and the child removed from class. Parents in need 
of practical support with a family member might need a label that points to a genetic cause, thus 
triggering an allocation of funds. Admittedly Nyhan himself was more person centred, since his 
main concern was self-injury. But this is an exception. In most behaviours linked to disability, the 
suffering is not physical and so is usually imputed and/or value laden. 
When Nyhan egged his study of stereotypy with its grand new “behavioural phenotype” heading, 
he was making a power bid. He wanted to give behaviour at least equal status with intelligence 
and retardation, an equal claim to be an exact (measurable) science. Of course, empire building 
does not in itself make the science questionable. The real problem is that two and two cannot 
make four if the first “two” exist in a different ontological realm from the second. Just because 
repetitive behaviours and DNA strings are both measurable, it does not mean they can be correlated.
23 Fancher, “Francis Galton and phrenology,” in Proceedings of Tennet IV; V. Hilts, “Obeying the 
laws of hereditary descent: phrenological views on inheritance and eugenics,” Journal of the History of the 
Behavioral Sciences, 18/1 (2006). 
24 G. Combe, Elements of Phrenology, 21. 
25 S. Hall et al., “Structural and environmental characteristics of stereotyped behaviors,” American 
Journal of Mental Retardation, 108 (2003); M. Lewis, “Ultradian rhythms in stereotyped and self-injurious 
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This fallacy has been compounded as the psychological phenotype expands to cover such things 
as “social cognition” or “flexibility and responsiveness in social interactions.”26 The very existence 
of the idea of correlation rushes researchers into assuming that collecting evidence about genes 
is the same kind of activity as collecting evidence about social interactions, even though one is 
done in a laboratory, using pipettes, and the other in a social and verbal intercourse with human 
beings, using questionnaires. Genes that impair social cognition and responsive interactions in 
Turner’s Syndrome, it is claimed, are expressed only from the paternal X chromosome; yet the 
evidence of impairment comes from interviews with people already imbued from their child’s early 
infancy onwards with the idea that Turner’s syndrome has a genotype impairing social cognition 
and responsive interactions – which may well have affected their upbringing of the child and fed 
back into the parental responses. And that is before we have all debated what “social interaction” is 
and submitted to the provisional consensus of the times we live in, and to the more powerful among 
the debaters. Hacking has noted such feedback loops in the conceptualization of autism, though he 
clings to the thought that they do not necessarily compromise its underlying reality.27 
Because psychological phenotypes originate in the unstable realm of social consensus and 
anxiety, their boundaries cannot be drawn with the quasi-logical precision of biology. Once a 
pathological phenotype has been suggested, ever milder forms of it are observable, to the point 
where these forms cease and merge into the normal; and since the decision about where that point 
lies is likewise consensual, it too is arbitrary. Or a phenotype may sprout near-replications of 
itself with infinitesimal degrees of difference; the shading of specific psychological features is then 
thought to mirror the shading of specific genetic ones, and “shading” to be therefore the same kind 
of thing in both cases. It is not. It cannot be, because the assumed link is between unconnected 
orders of reality. There is also blurring between a phenotype and merely analogous behaviours or 
“behavioural phenocopies.”28 All this leads to phenotypic borders expanding to cover more and 
more individuals. ADHD, with no known genotype, is only the most startling example of this. 
Autism, where studies of dizygotic twins show that one of them can have certain distinctive genetic 
and behavioural traits while the overall category to which he or she belongs remains soft-edged, is 
another phenotype in the middle of a diagnostic epidemic.29 
It is not only the phenotypes themselves but the theory as such that has these imperialist 
tendencies. There are people (with Down’s syndrome, for example) whose distinctive biology has 
been in no doubt for a century and a half and who are now said to “have” a behavioural phenotype; 
or even, the syndrome just “is” a behavioural phenotype.30 This pulls the rug from under the theory 
by eliding any distinction between known and assumed cause. Once the behavioural phenotype 
becomes a routine category, one can say that not only Down’s syndrome but autism or attention 
deficit “is” a behavioural phenotype, regardless of whether or not a corresponding genotype in 
these latter cases has been or will ever be found. “Behavioural phenotype” then becomes so loose 
as to mean just unusual or worrying behaviour. And that is how one society will find itself justifying 
practices which another finds abhorrent. Take drapetomania for example, first diagnosed by the 
nineteenth-century American physician Samuel Cartwright, which undoubtedly would have been 
marked as a “behavioural phenotype” had such a phrase been around then. Its symptoms consisted, 
26 D. Skuse et al., “Evidence from Turner’s syndrome of an imprinted X-linked locus affecting cognitive 
function,” Nature, 387 (1997). 
27 The Social Construction, 119. 
28 Berrios and I. Markova, “Conceptual issues,” in H. D’haenen et al., Biological Psychiatry. 
29 Morton Ann Gernsbacher, “Three reasons not to believe in an autism epidemic,” Current Directions 
in Psychological Science, 14/2 (2005). 
30 Berney, “Behavioural phenotypes.” 
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exclusively, in the urge to escape; its victims consisted, exclusively, in black slaves. Is/was this 
objectionable? If drapetomania, why not oppositional defiance? Or private thinking? Both of these, 
under some name or other, have likewise been pathologies with respect to the maintenance of 
social order. Kanner’s 1943 reinvention of autism was conjured up at a major turning point in 
the world development of techniques of mass coercion over private thinkers in general; and his 
particular, autistic types do more than oppose or defy Big Brother (d.o.b. 1948), they are innately 
and genetically incapable of responding to him. 
All the above exposes how indissoluble the behavioural phenotype is from social stereotypes 
and from its own underlying eugenic motives. At the same time, our knowledge of the biochemistry 
has outstripped our knowledge about what it is we are trying to eliminate. Henry Goddard invented 
“morons” a century ago as a way of demonstrating that the destitution and fiscal burden of certain 
families was due to (or simply was) an inherited psychiatric disability. In so doing he launched 
a generation of moral panic about racial hygiene; moronism was the core myth of first-wave 
eugenics. Goddard felt a need to nail a social anxiety to the reality of material facts, demonstrable 
by an exact science, so that the anxiety could be eliminated. Once a rule of correlation has been 
established, one can then go out and search for people who will fit it. A consensually reached 
psychological category generates a social identity, a receptacle into which the observer already 
primed with knowledge about the relevant phenotypic features can place individuals. The key 
point about morons was that they could not be distinguished by their appearance, pointing to the 
panic about imitators – people who may look normal but are not (a modern variant of the reprobate 
hypocrite). Similarly, coinciding with second-wave eugenics, today’s cognitive geneticists have 
revived concern about “low intelligence within the band of normal” or “mild mental retardation,” 
a category that had become almost obsolete between the two waves.31 
In seeking a genetic basis for psychological categories, one may be aiming at cure, although 
this is plausible only in a tiny number of much-touted cases such as phenylketonuria (one in 15,000 
births). And one may be aiming to alleviate the distress of parents, although the distress is imparted 
by the values of the medical model itself and the social institutions it inspires. Early modern 
doctors, too, held ambitions about cure, achievable by diet and training, for the plebeian intellectual 
deficiencies they detected in families of the gentry. But prevention has been and remains the far 
more frequent aim; and the result of attempts to explain psychological patterns by ultimate bodily 
entities – whether genes, skull shapes or soul spirits – has tended to be the denigration, segregation 
or elimination of some aspect of our common humanity. Good faith is not usually in doubt, but 
good faith for a scientist also involves going back and rechecking one’s premises. 
31 For example Michael Rutter, “Genetic influences on mild mental retardation,” Journal of Biosocial 




The Brain of a Fool 
The idea of a behavioural phenotype sets off in two diametrically opposing directions at once. In 
terms of pure theory it starts from the natural phenomenon of genes, which give rise to psychological 
classifications that in turn give rise to a social phenomenon, anxiety. The investigative sequence 
is the reverse. It starts from a social phenomenon, anxiety, which gives rise to psychological 
classifications that in turn give rise to the discovery of the natural phenomenon of genes. The 
doctrinal basis of cognitive genetics and behavioural phenotypes is unidirectional, seeking precise 
causal links from genes to intelligence when in fact intelligence is an artefact that covertly imports 
(social) causes of its own into the calculation. 
In this broad sense, Renaissance medicine and behavioural phenotype theory are alike, even if 
their respective biological and social components differ. Where we place genes, our predecessors 
placed soul spirits, humours and qualities of elements. The social group to which they attributed 
the familiar modern characteristics of disability – inability to think abstractly, reason logically, 
process information or maintain attention – was not our small pathological one but a huge section 
of the population: the lower social orders, women and ethnic or religious minorities. What these 
doctrines share is that a given feature of the social world, the inferiority of certain population 
groups as perceived and feared by their betters, has been converted into a feature of the natural 
world. The social inferiority of these population groups is then represented as a consequence of 
their natural inferiority. 
Despite these shared long-term characteristics, we cannot disregard the medium-term but deep 
conceptual differences. Medieval and early modern medicine invoked a general “foolishness” 
which it described in very disparate terms of Adamite degeneracy, infancy, old age, bodily disease, 
deaf mutism, eccentricity, drunkenness, the simulated foolishness of the jester, mental illness, 
melancholy. Most of these were seen as dispositional rather than a personal possession, none with 
a clear separation between the psychological and the physiological. A reader who searches the 
index of a Renaissance medical compendium for the various Latin terms translatable as foolishness 
(stultitia, stoliditas, stupiditas, fatuitas) and then looks up the referenced passages to check the 
corresponding symptoms will mostly find things quite unfamiliar to modern medicine – unlike 
historians of madness, who will often find symptoms that resemble a modern condition when 
looking up terms such as mania, phrenesis and similar designations. Modern, Renaissance and 
Hippocratic doctors might agree, if only in the broadest terms, on something we now call bipolar 
disorder, as they certainly might on physical disability. One has to draw the methodological 
consequences. Even the most radical historians have only ever treated “intellectual disability” 
either as a footnote to the history of mental pathology dominated by mental illness, or of disability
dominated by the physical disability. But as J.L. Austin warns us in Sense and Sensibilia: whenever 
we see the first concept in an antithetical pair crumbling beneath our critical gaze (in our case, 
madness versus intellectual disability), be sure the other will be crumbling too, but that this will 
have escaped our notice. 
Another significant historical difference lies in the doctor’s relationship to his patients. In 
order to find a long-term theoretical context for the medical model, we need to study up, as the 
anthropologists say: to assess the minds of doctors as well as the disabled. For any doctor, thinking 
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disability, even though it follows a disease model, the doctor’s diagnostic approach does not start
from imagining him- or herself in this state. Modern doctors cannot vicariously experience the
intellectual state of a creature they deem innately and incurably incapable of the abstract thinking 
and logical reasoning which is the premise of their own intelligence and expertise. Foolishness, 
however, was something a Renaissance doctor could and did empathize with. If he could perceive 
certain brain states in himself – “dullness,” “excessive languor” and “sluggishness of the internal
senses,” to be found in stolidity, lethargy, drunkenness, the after-effects of intense emotion, the
curable “stupidity” of melancholy, the “stupor” or “mindlessness” that heralds the resolution of 
a bodily illness or for five minutes after a nap (all these examples are drawn from contemporary 
medical accounts of foolishness) – then he could know such things in his patient.1 The empathy of 
such learned doctors extended to a “foolishness” that was in some sense general and (as it were) 
normal. 
A third historical shift is from slowness to absence as the dominant model. In this sense medicine 
was no doubt influenced by the legal model described in Chapter 9, which highlighted absence and 
removal. The fool’s intellect is (so to speak) sequestered, like his property, in perpetuity. This is 
a key moment. The Renaissance model of intellectual health as a mean (either between slow and 
furious melancholy, or between melancholy defined as slow and other mental states defined as 
furious) began to absorb the legal and fiscal controversies over idiocy and lunacy of the 1590s. 
Absence, in addition to slowness, came to characterize the legally incurable idiot, in contrast to 
the excess activity and speed of the lunatic with lucid intervals. John Donne’s Elegy: the Dream
demonstrates this when he debates with himself whether it is better for his lover to be present in 
reality or only in his imagination. His final couplet resolves in favour of the first: “Filled with 
her love, may I be rather grown / Mad with much heart, than idiot with none.” Donne’s language 
fuses a medical explanation (excess/deficient mental activity) with a jurisprudential one (curable/ 
incurable absence); lunacy takes over the first characteristic in each pair, idiocy the second. 
Specifically medico-psychological usages of the latter word had till now been very rare. One 
general guide to health of 1579 places idiots under the heading of “defect” and absence, alongside 
mania under the heading of temporary “sickness,” but it does not present a clear dyad since other 
headings are involved.2 James I’s physician Helkiah Crooke writes in 1615 about people who 
lack certain parts of the brain and its corresponding faculties, and who are “esteemed foolish
idiots … even by the common people,” that is, by those who simply by virtue of being common 
would usually be termed idiots themselves. Crooke was also Keeper of Bedlam, which would have 
placed him at the centre of legal controversy over the sequestration of incompetents’ estates, and 
the hospital’s records show that its governors were taking increasing care to weed out “idiots” 
because they were not deemed to be curable.3 It took another two centuries for the medico-legal 
brew to be fully digested, however. 
Physiognomics 
The advanced medical teaching centres of the Renaissance at Padova, Leiden and Paris eventually 
located intellectual problems in the head and the brain. The importance of the brain depended 
on the activity of certain ultimate atomistic components of matter. These medical men shared 
1 Felix Platter, Praxeos Medicae, 2; Girolamo Cardano, Opera Omnia, ii, 265.
 
2 Jones, The Arte, 93.
 
3 Helkiah Crooke, Microcosmographia, 505; Patricia Allderidge, “Management and mismanagement in 
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with their modern successors the urge to break the important physiological features of intellectual 
difference down into its smallest entities. Whereas today the features consist chiefly of genes, in 
pre- and early modern medicine they consisted of the soul spirits, the four humours (blood, yellow 
bile, black bile, phlegm) and the balance of qualities (wet, dry, cold, hot) associated with the four 
elements (water, fire, earth, air). 
However, there was nothing like the modern neurologist’s assumption that your brain is who 
you are, that death is brain death.4 The ancients had located thought in the heart or diaphragm 
rather than the head. Renaissance doctors admitted, like Shakespeare, that they could not tell where 
“fancy” – the imagination, the entry point into the reasoning faculty – was bred: in the heart or in 
the head? Donne’s idiot has no “heart.” Theologians tended to think of the heart as the source of 
our intellects, the evidence being that the latter are dominated by our private passions. “The fool 
hath said in his heart, there is no God” meant “said to himself” – that is, in secret, in the privacy of 
his own body. William Harvey at times locates the soul in the blood, and in dedicating his book on 
the circulation of the blood to Charles I, he refers to the heart as the place whence, in addition, “all 
power and grace flow[s].”5 But in the main text he demotes it, both socially and physiologically. 
“Blood is not the natural vehicle of honour,” he writes. “Nobility … civil and political” belongs 
to the organ at the top of the body, and of the body politic. The head stands above and separate 
from blood and the passions, and is the vehicle for both honour and wit. Brain theory emerges with 
a new theory of public reason, though with competing emphases on brain structure (its division 
into ventricles, their corresponding psychological faculties and operations) and brain function (the 
motion of soul spirits around the brain, and their animation of the rest of the body). 
While physical medicine was going through these realignments, the very premise of faculty 
psychology was the existence of a link between the human intellect and cerebral anatomy. Now 
the idea that such a link is possible suggests (a) a clear conceptual distinction between thinking 
states and their bodily organ, and (b) some degree of causality in their relationship. Furthermore, 
an impaired brain is surely the one organ that might be thought to fix a permanent psychological 
identity. Perhaps, then, a Renaissance doctor might have recognized something like a modern 
disability of the intellect? His source texts would have come from physiognomics, the reading of 
character from the body and especially the head – an ancient body of knowledge that had found its 
way piecemeal into Roman medical textbooks, Galen’s among them. Early modern writers therefore 
had two separate textual traditions to draw on: one a “pure” physiognomics in its own right, the other 
strictly medical and Galenist with embedded physiognomic elements. Physiognomics provided a 
theoretical link from the realm of nature to that of intellect and behaviour, and a practical guide for 
policing them. Roman social elites used it to appoint new colleagues to public office and private 
salons, to prove the stupidity of opponents and to select wives, servants and wet nurses.6 
A formal branch of the curriculum in the first universities at Bologna and Paris, physiognomics 
was viewed as the bridge between the study of nature (libri naturales) and morals (libri morales), 
in which role modern psychology has replaced it. As a diagnostic instrument, it was employed to 
accredit the professional and administrative skills necessary to the expansion of papal and state 
power. Its chief scholastic advocates such as Michael Scotus and Jean of Jandun saw physiognomics 
as the branch of knowledge that would at last enable philosophers to integrate with society, because 
it gave them a practical role in supplying the elite with reliable recruitment tools. The humanists 
likewise saw it as a form of sophistic or “useful” knowledge that would help civic leaders assess 
4 See Michael Gazzaniga, The Ethical Brain.
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the citizens in their charge.7 Countless physiognomic textbooks were published, often laid out 
in tabular form as briefing notes, supplying shortcuts to certainty about people in public life and 
raising the social status of their authors by associating them with the civic intellect or prudentia of 
ruling elites. Its scientific method paralleled the methods used in heraldic science to assess honour. 
Children were said to resemble their parents physiognomically for three or four generations, the 
same requirement as for the authentification of a family’s gentility.8 Biological and social concepts 
of group continuity modelled each other. 
Pure physiognomics drew inferences directly from the morphology of the head to human 
character and behaviour; medicalized physiognomics dealt also with what was going on inside the 
head. A certain shape might be an external sign of “stupidity,” a condition at once physical and
behavioural, reducible to laziness and inertia. It was on this basis, for example, that Erasmus
and a fellow countryman, the popular medical writer Levine Lemnius, attributed stupidity en masse 
to the peasants of Batavia in the Rhine delta, whose external environment and inner constitutions 
were excessively wet (this led to “Boeotians,” as the classical exemplars of stupidity, being replaced 
in medical textbooks by “Batavians”). Stupidity led to melancholia, unbelief and ultimately 
mindlessness (amentia), whose symptoms these authors listed as hypocrisy and an incapacity for 
sincere faith.9 Both writers had been born in Batavia, and were thereby distancing themselves 
intellectually and socially from its generally boorish reputation – though far from attacking the 
folly of honourless peasants, Erasmus’s actual target was his peers in the local ecclesiastical elite, 
for their arrogant intellectualism and lack of understanding of the egalitarian quality of grace.10 
Physiognomic signs referred primarily to actions. Lazy or stupid behaviour was a source of 
anxiety because it impacted on the person’s allotted social calling. In this sense physiognomics 
was the external form of what later became, as psychology, an internal science of control. From 
its very debut in the curriculum, well before the rise of humanism or the Reformation, it alerted 
medical observers to the possibility of a creaturely equality among princes, citizens and servants, 
since physiognomic and anatomical types palpably did not always correlate with social roles. 
However, in the texts on physiognomics these egalitarian hints are mere rhetoric, a safety valve 
allowing room for any renegotiation of status boundaries that might be demanded by political 
pressures. Physiognomics remained hierarchical in the sense that it created a scientific typology of 
physical appearances and gave them appropriate labels as Adam had done for the beasts, and one 
of which, of course, displayed the morphological difference between “philosophers” – experts on 
physiognomics, for example – and “bestial men.” 
Despite this, physiognomics was by no means deterministic. In interactions between body and 
mind, the body too was changeable. Physiognomic signs loosely indicated material conditions in 
the important somatic sites, among which the brain was merely one among several, and particularly 
the balance or “complexion” there of the four elements and their qualities, and the four humours. 
(Some of our present-day usages hark back to this: both “crass stupidity” and “coarse wit,” crassum 
ingenium, originally referred to a coarseness of the brain’s material constituents.) In Galenist 
textbooks, an imbalance of material qualities in the brain is as such a cognitive impairment. In a 
classic passage, at the core of the medical curriculum for centuries via its reproduction in Avicenna’s 
Canon, Galen itemizes the intellectual impairments: coma, apoplexy, paralysis, catalepsy, vertigo, 
7 Voula Tsouna, “Doubts about other minds and the science of physiognomics,” Classical Quarterly, 48 
(1998). 
8 Devyver, Le sang, 167. 
9 Levine Lemnius, De Habitu et Constitutione Corporis, 17; Thomas Willis, De Anima Brutorum, 506. 
10 Erasmus, Familiarum Colloquiorum, 245; In Praise of Folly, 100; see also Erika Rummel, The 
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lethargy, fainting, melancholy, epilepsy and phrenitis.11 Thinking states (dianoia), cerebral matter 
and the size and shape of the skull are all taken together in this passage as signs of a patient’s 
health and particularly of the physical health of the brain, where “health” carries a moral inflection. 
It consisted in temperament and balance, and “balance” may seem to imply fluctuation: transience 
rather than permanence. True, a defective mixture of elements might not be of short duration as in 
fevers, but something much longer term; nevertheless, tenacious as the mixture may have been, 
the imbalance was ultimately just dispositional. Explanations of a chronic condition did not differ 
essentially from those of an acute one, and this held true even for the structure of the skull. Now 
while common sense says that imbalance may be transient, to say that anatomical structure is 
transient seems curious, at least to us. What could be more permanent about our bodies than the 
shape and size of our heads? But pre- and early modern doctors saw things otherwise. 
First, as we have already noted, the fact that a human characteristic is permanent, even if it
belongs to each and every species member, is not enough to qualify it as an essential property
of that species, since the very notion of permanence suggests a need to keep checking that
the characteristic is still there. As Aristotle put it, the “essential property” of what it is to be
human must a priori lack any incompatible elements and therefore does not require checking.12 
Moreover, divine acts of grace and regeneration affect not only the soul and its faculties but
“must as well reach the body too, the ministerial and organical parts, which are also said to
be sanctified”; conversely, “to be deprived of the use of reason, is one of the greatest corporal
calamities in this life” (emphasis added).13 Neither in Galen’s Rome nor in early modern Europe
did permanence indicate identity, as it does for us. Despite a gradually increasing interest in
certain causal aspects of behaviour and intelligence, no theory of medical necessity arose that
could rival the religious one of predestination. In fact determinism of a biological or natural type
was explicitly refuted: 
The reasonable part of man … depends, in all its ordinary and natural operations, upon the happy 
or disordered temperature of those vital qualities out of whose apt and regular commixion the good 
estate of the body is framed …. Yet this dependence on the body is not so necessary and immutable 
but that it may admit of variation …. The toughest and most unbended natures by early and prudent 
discipline may be much rectified.14 
For doctor as well as theologian, necessity could be nothing other than divine; it transcended any 
medical nature. The “unbended natures” here are still within the sphere of nature – not within that of 
reprobation, which was indeed determinate and unbendable. Conversely, predestination theologians 
themselves distinguished between the “medicinal [sc. therapeutic] excommunication” of waverers 
and the “exterminative excommunication” of reprobates; in this we can see foreshadowed the 
terms of nineteenth-century debates about the curability or incurability of various types of idiot.15 
Secondly, physiology and psychology were not simply juxtaposed; they jointly inhabited the 
same explanatory realm. Body and soul interact, so the body too undergoes change. As a widely 
read textbook put it, “When there is a change in the disposition of the soul, it simultaneously 
changes the shape of the body; conversely when there is a change in the shape of the body, it 
11 Galen, De Locis Affectis, 3.5, in Kühn (ed.), Opera, viii, 76. 
12 Aristotle, Topics, 482a. 
13 W.M., The Middle Way, 8; Baxter, Directions and Perswasions, 161. 
14 Edward Reynolds, A Treatise of the Passions and Faculties of the Soule of Man, 4. 
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changes the disposition of the soul.”16 Admittedly, this writer confines his examples to “grieving 
people with gloomy faces and happy people with cheerful ones.” But he was not making the point 
that grief causes a certain facial expression. Rather, he was demonstrating their synchronicity, as 
evidence of sympathetic interaction between soul and body. In Renaissance medicine, intellect and 
head shape both belonged on the same side of the signifier/signified divide; what they signified, 
jointly, was the material (im)balance or temperament of a bodily organ, the brain. 
Cranial sutures and their psychological symptoms 
Such were the founding principles of physiognomics. We now need to look at some of its recurring 
themes. First of all the individual’s physiognomy was linked to his cranial sutures, the cracks 
along which separate sections of the skull are aligned. Aristotle claims that humans have more 
sutures than other animals, his absolute presupposition being that more “parts” means better.17 
One Hippocratic author writes similarly that four sutures are healthier than three, without saying 
why. A second author describes a variety of arrangements of sutures.18 Neither Aristotle nor the 
Hippocratics discuss thinking states, behaviour or character in this context. In The Art of Medicine
Galen proposes a “suitable” shape for the healthy brain: it is an elongated sphere “slightly depressed 
at the sides.”19 There are also unsuitable shapes, he said, associated with sutural deficiencies (in this 
sense it is a discussion about values). 
The second Hippocratic author had depicted each sutural arrangement as a letter of the alphabet, 
and Galen, followed by dozens of Renaissance Galenists, adopted this schema. The healthy brain, 
he wrote, sits in a skull where one suture (the coronal) runs across the front of the skull from one 
side to the other, down to just in front of the ears; another suture (the lambdoid) runs parallel to it 
across the back; and the third (the sagittal) runs down the middle of the skull from front to back, 
joining the other two sutures at their respective midpoints. Viewed from above, this arrangement 
of sutures resembles an H (capital η). In one type of unsuitable skull the coronal suture is missing, 
and so too the skull’s frontal projection; the resulting arrangement is a T-shape. In another type, the 
lambdoid suture and thus the skull’s rear projection are missing, in which case the arrangement is
T again. In a further unsuitable type, both the front and rear projections are missing; the sagittal 
suture is in place, but is intersected by a single transverse suture running across the middle of the 
skull. Viewed diagonally, this arrangement resembles X (capital χ).20 Galen labels these unsuitable 
types “pointy heads” because of the appearance created by the missing projections, though he 
mentions no intellectual impairment in this context. He then adds: 
It is possible for a fourth type of pointy head to be imagined, albeit not to exist, which measures 
longer from ear to ear than from front to back. If this type were to exist, it would not accord with 
nature and would be the opposite of spherical: its length would become its depth. Now so great 
a deviation from the natural could not exist; it would be a monstrosity rather than just a pointy 
head, and would not be capable of life …. Either the front or the rear eminence might be absent, or 
indeed both at the same time, but not to such an extent that some of the brain itself is missing. 
16 Aristotle (attrib.), Physiognomics, 808b.
 
17 On the Parts of Animals, 653a. 
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Galen criticizes his Hippocratic predecessor for not mentioning this other type, even though it is 
merely hypothetical (“missing some of the brain” meant it was unviable). This monstrosity is again 
purely anatomical; thinking states are not mentioned. He does, however, refer here to the pointy head 
of Thersites, Homer’s “private” soldier who steps out from the ranks to attack the warmongering 
nobles. Like a medieval jester-fool, Thersites speaks truth to power. His physical deformity (he 
has bandy legs) is therefore a sign of his oppositional politics, and his other characteristics too are 
external and behavioural, rather than intellectual; he merely “plays” the fool. 
Pointy heads and head shape turn up in two further Galen passages. One of these, which remained 
unknown to most Renaissance readers, does link head size to intellect: “Thinking states (dianoia) 
are clearly impaired in those whose head is too large or too small.”21 In a large head, thinking
states are usually but not always faulty; Pericles, despite his famously large head, was “an extremely 
alert thinker.” In a small head, thinking states are defective without exception. At the same time 
they are merely one sign among others (for example, “small eyes, stuttering and irascibility”) of 
the main medical concern: the overall physical health of the brain and its proportionality to the rest 
of the body. A large head means a weak neck, so the upper and lower jaws do not fit: “Such people 
have constant headaches and ears that weep with a thin and watery or purulent and stinking matter 
producing much evil superfluity,” the function of sutures being to evacuate fluids from the brain. 
The difference between excessively large or small heads was that in a large head “the brain and 
medulla being bigger, there is a larger flow of spirit (pneuma) and room for it; the opposite is the 
case with small brains.” 
Here as elsewhere Galen had been reticent about the neurology. Thinking states were affected 
by the quality and mixture of “spirit” (pneuma), but only in very general terms.22 He was interested
in the health of each main bodily organ; thinking states were important only as a secondary 
indicator of the health of this particular organ, the brain. In early modern medicine physiognomics 
became more closely involved with intellectual states, mainly via the numerous commentaries on 
The Art of Medicine. Actually, of the four texts of Galen’s quoted above, this has the least to say
on head shape; but the commentators tended to bring in elements from the other texts. Although 
these commentaries arrived in distinct historical waves, I deal with them here as a whole, since 
they do not differ essentially in their approach to our topic. 
Size was as important for these writers as shape. The optimum size was usually a mean. 
Aristotle was quoted as saying that small heads were intellectually superior, but in fact he had 
merely been talking about dwarfism, where the head seems too large for the rest of the body.23 
And whereas Galen, who wrote about small heads being invariably defective, had not done so in 
terms of their relationship to thinking states (apart from one or two vague mentions of “spirit”), 
later Galenists speculated more about the links between head size, the condition of the soul spirits 
and the cerebral material through which these spirits move. Ibn Ridwan in the tenth century wrote 
that “smallness is the essential sign of a bad brain composition” because it “constricts the channels 
and ventricles … [and] the soul spirits do not have enough space in the brain to let them move on 
freely to complete their operations.” Avicenna’s ubiquitously read Canon repeats the point. The 
spirits get compressed, so they dry out and “burn up.” Conversely, large heads are excessively 
moist. In a small head there is “smallness in the nerves connecting to the [external] senses; all the 
senses are weak and the operations of motion are weak.” The problem of constriction is insoluble. 
A large brain, by contrast, is not necessarily faulty; it “has the merit of good composition, with 
open channels in which clear spirits pass freely without much confusion of images.” The problem 
21 Galen, Commentary on the Epidemics 6 of Hippocrates, in Opera, xvii, 818.
 
22 Julius Rocca, “Galen and the ventricular system,” Journal of the History of the Neurosciences, 227.
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is that “it is far from well-tempered, because it accommodates an over-abundance of material.”
It may well signify “disability [impotentia] of nature, which cannot produce material” because it 
has so much room that the soul spirits get lost.24 
Faculty psychology played a part in these discussions. In Fuller’s character type of the “natural 
fool,” for example, “their heads sometimes [are] so little that there is no room for wit; sometimes 
so long, that there is no wit for so much room.”25 The cerebral substance was said to contain 
certain chambers or “ventricles” that housed each of the faculties separately. The allocation of 
separate cognitive functions to specific parts of the brain helped reinforce the idea of “intellect” 
as a psychological object, something more than just a passing series of thinking states. Galen had 
made occasional reference to imagination, judgement/reasoning and memory, but nowhere did he 
match these particular faculties to particular ventricles. He merely said that a general psychic spirit 
is stored in the ventricles as a whole, whence it is distributed through the brain and the rest of the 
body. The identification of specific faculties with specific ventricles had to wait for the fifth-century 
Galenist Nemesius, a Christian writer whose account of the soul was the chief source text of early 
modern faculty psychology.26 From this account arose the idea both that variations in ventricular 
capacity could be externally verified by the shape of the individual’s head and that there must be 
an association between shape (together with the consequent state of the cerebral substance) and the 
intellectual faculties. 
This idea, first elaborated by Ibn Ridwan and Avicenna, then by Renaissance doctors, gave 
rise to various disputes. One was about whether it was the size of the head or its shape that should 
take priority as an indicator of the condition of the faculty. Some thought size was more important 
because it had to be proportionate to the size of the other bodily organs; others thought it was 
better for the head to be perfectly shaped but on the small or large side than to be proportionately 
sized but imperfectly shaped. For example, although imagination is housed in the front ventricle, 
a large frontal eminence would not necessarily indicate greater powers of imagination; in fact, the 
opposite might be true.27 
A second dispute concerned whether the functioning and cerebral substance of the brain, or 
its shape and size taken together (“structure rather than temperament”) were primary. One school 
claimed that “the cause of [differences in] civic intellect (prudentia) is a variety in the structure 
of the brain,” while another claimed that, on the contrary, balance is prior: “the bad structure 
and pointy head … have their origin in a bad mixture” of soul spirits, “narrowness of the brain” 
being merely a trigger or “proximate” cause. Even though the head “must have symmetry with the 
rest of the body,” this external structure may not be decisive: “brain substance [in a small head] 
is necessarily very little, the ventricles narrow and the soul spirits few and insufficient for their 
functions … [but] while [the functions] are imperfect, they are not necessarily faulty, as long as 
the soul can properly apprehend and render intelligible the images of things and pay attention.” 
It is just that where “cogitations are long and drawn out, more spirits are expended than the brain 
ventricles can supply,” and so the faculty gets tired more quickly.28 
Another frequent dispute was about whether an injury to one ventricle affects the rest 
of the mind, or only the faculty corresponding to that ventricle. If injury did affect the whole 
cognitive process, did that mean it impaired the rational soul, which links the individual to divine
24 Ibn Ridwan, Galeni Liber, unpaginated; Argenterio, In Artem, 215; Oddi, In Librum, 118; Galeazzo di 
Santa Sofia, Libellus … in Artem Parvam Galeni, 102; Riolan, In Artem, 41. 
25 Fuller, The Holy and the Profane, 4.12.1. 
26 Moreno Morani, Nemesii Emeseni De Natura Hominis, 68. 
27 Giovanni Sermoneta, Quaestiones Subtilissimae, 53. 
28 Argenterio, In Artem, 219; Santorio, Commentaria, 214; Akakia, Claudii Galeni, 101. 
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reason – and could it do so without making it seem as if the Almighty himself were responsible 
for creating impairments? (This question, as we have seen, was also central to theological disputes 
about reprobation.) Moreover, the lack of an eminence, caused by lack of one of the cranial sutures, 
might create the same impairment as an injury to it. Some claimed that the absence of one or another 
eminence, or of a section of it, did not necessarily indicate “weakness” of brain matter. Others 
assumed it did. For the advocates of size, small-headed people were dispositionally “foolish and 
inattentive,” “inconstant” and also “fearful” (a reference to the melancholia paradigm). Big heads, 
being humid, were “foolish,” an indicator of the “leaden wit (ingenium)” of “the lazy, somnolent 
man.” They were also colder, “thus actions are blunted …. Big heads are dull (hebetes), mindless 
(amentes) and full of catarrh.”29 
The word for “dull” here originally signified a defect in the five external senses, its intellectual 
significance coming only with the arrival of the intellect as a separate psychological object. We 
need to keep asking: what was the actual content of all this stupidity and foolishness? An extra-
large forehead, for example, “indicates a ponderousness extending to foolishness, and when it is 
broad, paucity of discretion,” but the illustration here is “the pointy head of Thersites the fool”: the 
reference is to commoners in general. Furthermore, doctors do not distinguish between cognitive 
failings that are cognitive per se (a distinction that can only be modern) and those that accompany 
physical disease. Imperfect shape points to a general impairment “in all the principal actions of 
reason such as imagination, reasoning and memory,” but the concrete illustrations then tend to be 
things like apoplexy or epilepsy.30 Medical writers claiming that “people who are fatuous, stolid 
or mindless have a deficient head structure” reach by way of illustration for Galen’s list of coma, 
apoplexy, lethargy and the rest. Either fatuity, stupidity, mindlessness, etc., are mere “symptoms 
and effects” of these, or there is no clear distinction between physical and mental (“this apoplexy is, 
as I take it, a kind of lethargy, … a kind of sleeping in the blood,” says Falstaff). Their moral aspect 
is exemplified again by the lazy, “ridiculous behaviour” of Thersites, evoking the occupational 
behaviours of the jester.31 
We today may see the physical and the mental as self-evidently distinct dimensions of the human 
person, but Renaissance writers drew their distinctions elsewhere. External behaviour and cognitive 
operations, and internal (material) mechanisms such as the soul spirits, complemented each another. 
Or intellectual rubrics might actually be subordinate to physiological ones; “learning difficulty” 
(dusmathia) is important chiefly as the sign of a cold brain, and “stupid spirits” as the sign of a wet 
one. A phrase such as “too much stupid, or stirred” (failure to keep to the mean) might refer without 
distinction to cognitive and moral faculties, soul spirits and the movement of the muscles, in respect 
of one and the same human activity. The terms translatable as “stupid” or “foolish” (stultus, stupidus, 
stolidus) describe a moral type – in this case, the lazy person.32 Descartes used stupidus to describe 
exactly that characteristic which marks the body off from the mind. Often it is also an expression, 
not just a metaphor, for spiritless atheism.33 Moreover, unlike modern intellectual disability, all the 
impairments were treatable. The Stoics had the idea of a “medicine of the mind.” Once Galenism 
became Christianized, divine providence was another possible cure. And if temperament and 
complexion could influence morphology, then even something as seemingly determinate as head 
shape might be rectified. One Hippocratic author, much cited in the Renaissance, mentions a tribe 
29 Ugo Benzi, Expositio super Libros Tegni Galeni, 21; Riolan, In Artem, 41; Da Monte, In Artem, 132.
 
30 Sermoneta, Quaestiones, 53; Oddi, In Librum, 118. 

31 Argenterio, In Artem, 218.
 
32 Franciscus de le Boe, The Practice of Physick, 373; Dryvere, In Τεχνην, 108; Giovanni Manardi, 

Annotationes in Artis Medicinalis Galeni, 195; Riolan, In Artem, 41, 54; D’Abano, Conciliator, 119. 
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of macrocephali (“bigheads”) who customarily performed cranioplasty on their infants because 
elongated heads were valued more highly. Ali ibn Abbas recommended the binding of malformed 
heads. In this therapeutic sense, custom or nurture could become nature, it was said. Even the 
monstrous sutureless skull could be cured, if “with great difficulty.”34 Such ideas contrast with
the determinism and incurability that dominate our own notions of disability. 
Collectively, to the extent that they can be separated from the body at all, these “foolish” states 
tend to be secondary symptoms of melancholia. Pieter van Foreest, founder of the medical school 
at Leiden, noted two diametrically opposite constituents of foolishness (stultitia). One was excess 
phlegm, his example being a young boy whose symptoms consisted of stammering and dressing 
up; the other was an excessively dry brain, the example here being goitrous Alpine peasants.35 
According to Van Foreest, whereas foolishness can be either wet or dry, melancholy is only dry. 
The dryness of the Alpine peasants shows that foolishness can be confused with melancholia, and 
that only a clever doctor like Van Foreest can tell them apart. In short, foolishness was only worth 
discussing to the extent that it said something about melancholy. 
We occasionally come across a description of symptoms that does not relate back to
melancholy but sounds more modern, such as the inability to think abstractly; however, this
latter will probably have strayed into medical texts from its more usual place in theology, and
in any case it will have been used to describe an entirely different population. Luis Mercado,
for example, claimed that congenitally deaf people cannot grasp essences, that is, the kind of
knowledge that comes from sorting concepts and the ability to abstract. That was because the
images that stimulate wit (ingenium) can only be aroused by the spoken word. People who cannot
hear perceive the world as a mass of unsorted “accidents,” because they are unable to gather
concepts, let alone knowledge, from words. (In the Spain of Mercado’s day, a deaf son could not
inherit his father’s estate unless he could speak.) Where he does mention foolishness (stultitia, 
fatuitas), on the other hand, it is dispositional, rather than developmental as in the case of the
incurably deaf.36 
Instability of opinion and attention deficit 
Out of Galen’s brief comments on physiognomy in The Art of Medicine, Renaissance doctors 
teased another wide-ranging condition which is almost as important as melancholy: “mobility” 
or “instability of opinion” (mobilitas opinionum). People with this condition were unable to make 
firm judgements or concentrate on one thing at a time. It touched a raw social nerve similar to 
attention deficit today. Giambattista da Monte, professor of medicine at Padova, noted that there 
are people who “persist sometimes in one thing, then another and then another.”37 Vives remarked 
on the rapidity and infinity of mutable particulars to which our attention is constantly drawn, 
which constitutes an “obstacle to the intelligence.”38 The original condition was a wavering about 
religious and moral beliefs, rather than (as for us) about morally neutral objects of attention – 
though people of the time would not have made any such distinction. Its moral focus, and its link 
34 Hippocrates, Airs, Waters, Places, Hippocrates I, 110; J. Wiberg, “The anatomy of the brain in the 
works of Galen and Ali Abbas,” Islamic Medicine, 40 (1914/1996); Ingrassia, In Galeni, 61; G. Aranzi, 
Hippocratis Librum de Vulneribus Capitis, 15. 
35 Observationum et Curationum Medicinalium ac Chirurgicarum, i, 354a. 
36 Opera Omnia, 164; 172. 
37 In Artem, 135v. 
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to questions of social and religious status, can be seen in the 1631 trial of the Earl of Castlehaven, 
who had handed control of his purse to a male household menial with whom he was having sex. 
Apart from erasing “the difference between a servant and a son” and thereby disturbing a political 
order based on lineage, an important symptom of his libertinism was the fact that “in the morning 
[he] would be a papist and in the afternoon a protestant.”39 
Unstable opinion was a defect of the will. The will, like reason, affected the body via the 
strength and supply of soul spirits to and from the brain.40 If a patient’s opinion simply followed
his appetites, it showed that his will was divorced from his reason. Constancy and steadfastness of
the will were characteristic of the social elite, of the man of honour who remained faithful to his
freely given promise; this in turn was a worldly equivalent of the grace obtainable by the Christian
for whom, in the words of Bunyan’s hymn, “There’s one will constant be.” The paradigmatic 
mind changer was Eve, when she listened to the serpent. It went with her gullibility, a frequently
cited medical symptom of unstable opinion. Instability undermined the patient’s knowledge of
what was true and (the same thing) what was good for him: “People who keep changing their
opinion not only go from true to false and vice-versa, but change their minds about what they 
want and don’t want.”41 
Mutability was an ever-present theme in the behaviour guides too. Stability meant being
“armed … against the change of times, and mutability of fortune, for nothing in this life is steadfast 
and permanent.”42 Mutability was a threatening feature of the external world, and one had to
guard against its invasion of the self. To become “profitable members of the commonwealth,” it 
was necessary “to leave these wandering wits (which are constant in nothing but uncertainty).” 
In the early seventeenth-century’s moral panics about inconstant behaviour, people with unstable 
opinions were labelled “changelings” – probably by extension from “worldlings,” those seduced
by earthly rewards. In 1650 John Bulwer, author of what historians have seen as pioneering 
texts on psychiatry and deaf education, published a long poem, Anthropometamorphosis: Man 
Transformed; or, the Artificial Changeling, which satirized religious and political waverers. He 
likens them to people who frequently change their style of clothing in order to conceal their
reprobate character or their social inferiority (class cross-dressing was still technically illegal),
or who cosmetically “alter [their] bodies from the mould intended by nature.” Civil war sermons
warned the worshipper how easy it was to become a “changeling” with a fickle will, a credulous
“weather-cock, carried up and down with every wind.”43 Reason was a constant. It came from God,
not from individuals who might each arbitrarily will their own separate, shifting beliefs. English
congregations would have experienced the effects of intellectual and behavioural instability at first 
hand, in the social and doctrinal disintegration around them. Bunyan uses the word “changelings” 
to attack time-servers in the priesthood (Baxter calls them “opinionists”).44 Within a few years
the psychological resonances of the word were to coalesce with its other existing meaning (till 
then quite separate) of a child exchanged in the cradle for another; the upshot was a concept much
closer to modern intellectual disability, as we shall see in Chapter 16. 
39 Cited in Rictor Norton, The Homosexual Literary Tradition.
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Social biases in the medical model of intellectual disability 
The soul spirits consisted of a material so refined that no anatomist could claim actually to have 
seen them. But they had to exist. How else could one explain the varieties of human behaviour? 
(Their behavioural role survives in everyday expressions such as “Keep your spirits up” and “In 
good spirits.”) Any specific cognitive or moral dysfunction simply was in the last resort the specific 
material fault and vice-versa: an excess mobility or sluggishness in the patient’s soul spirits. But who, 
more precisely, were the stereotypical groups thus impaired? The social dangers they represented 
can be put under three headings: melancholy (thinking slothfully or despairingly), changeableness 
(thinking rashly or variably) and heterodoxy (thinking for oneself). These cognitive impairments, 
and the respective condition of the soul spirits, typified certain populations who corresponded 
closely to those excluded from the honour society and from the company of the elect. They are the 
usual suspects: women, children, racial or religious minorities and the lower social orders. There 
was only one Reason, consisting of the common ideas fixed for all time by God and expounded by 
bishops and gentry – just as now there is only one set of normal cognitive operations, fixed for all 
time by a determinate genetic “nature” and expounded by psychologists, psychiatrists and doctors. 
Beyond the category of fee-paying gentry, who ideally if not exclusively formed his client group, 
the doctor saw foolishness and instability of opinion not merely as the psychological symptoms but 
as the very identity of his social and religious inferiors en masse. “Difficulties in learning” were 
simply their everyday condition, since it was well known that their soul spirits were made of a 
less refined matter.45 Medical writers were not greatly interested in them. Torrigiano, for example, 
mentions them only inasmuch as they throw the normative characteristics of the elite into relief: 
“He who exhibits instability of opinion and rapid changes of plans and desires is like a child,” and 
thus like a woman, Ethiopian or labourer.46 In other words, an elite male patient in this condition 
bore a merely temporary resemblance to such groups, whose fixed degenerate identity was a 
reminder of the Fall. 
According to Ali ibn Abbas, women kept their hair as they got older because their brains were 
excessively humid, which impaired their intellectual functions; their cranial sutures were narrower 
than men’s and so had poorer drainage. Renaissance medical writers followed him, commenting 
that “people who have narrow sutures, women for example, are somewhat crazy.” Noting Aristotle’s 
remark that women not only have smaller brains than men but fewer sutures, the author claimed 
that this deficiency gave women harder skulls, though there were also writers who insisted that
they were no different from men’s.47 As for size, unnamed (and possibly nonexistent) ancient authors 
were cited as saying that women were “wiser and more prudent than men” and that since women 
also had smaller heads, smallness could therefore not be a defect. This gave the commentator the 
opportunity to establish the opposite point: that women’s “wisdom” and “prudence” are just a 
devious, imitative cunning, not the real male thing. And if (as Aquinas had said) small-headed men 
are impetuous and aggressive, then the smallness of the female’s clinched the point.48 
Instability of opinion, in a male patient of social standing, was not the sign of degeneracy it was 
in his social inferior. Medical writers have in mind someone who, when healthy, reaches an opinion, 
turns it into a judgment, then enforces it on the rest of the population; instability of opinion in other 
social groups refers to people whose job is to follow judgements handed out by their superiors. 
45 Akakia, Claudii Galeni, 105. 
46 Torrigiano, Plusquam, 46v. 
47 Ali ibn Abbas, Liber Totius Medicinae, 12; Oddi, In Librum, 122; Aristotle, On the Parts, 653a; 
Aurelius Celsus, De Re Medica, 468; Andreas Vesalius, De Humani, 15. 
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This was particularly true of women, universally regarded as fickle and mobile. A typical Dutch 
portrait shows the astronomer Huygens with a female companion; both have their hands on a sheet
of music, but while it induces him to contemplate the music of the spheres, her inquisitive glance
strays sideways towards the viewer and is distracted from the main business, the common ideas.49 
There are the inevitable sartorial references: “’Tis strange, that women being so mutable, will never 
change in changing their apparel.”50 Being a male of rank, in itself, constituted privilege, of which 
the making and enforcing of firm judgements was one particular expression. If an eighteenth-century 
bluestocking had asked whether a woman might not claim the same privilege, the answer would 
have been no: a woman’s privilege is to change her mind. This familiar saying may well have started 
life as an ironic inversion of elite male norms of intellectual and behavioural constancy. 
As one physician put it, “women are somewhat unstable when it comes to taking advice: they 
waver between this and that, as if navigating without oars or sails. Being stupid, they find it hard 
to recognize what is advisable and profitable.”51 A man displays the symptoms differently. Being a 
man – that is, a gentleman – he makes up his mind quickly. His job is to give advice, not take it. If 
his opinion turns out to be wrong, says this author, he swaps it immediately for the right one. He 
is not like the stereotypical woman, it is just that he has jumped to his first conclusion too quickly; 
he then stands his ground before belatedly arriving at the one and only true conclusion. This view 
of women proved adaptable to Cartesian dualism. A late commentary on Galen’s Art of Medicine, 
in which the mind is now seen as a domain for analysis in its own right and detachable from the 
material make-up of the brain, discusses these same cognitive impairments and criticizes earlier 
texts for explaining women’s unstable opinions by the unbalanced temperament of the female 
brain. The real cause was not material or organic, but the fact that women are intellectually null:
“It is women’s ignorance that endows them with the utmost credulity, hence they are easily 
persuaded about whatever is put in front of their minds, and they turn out to be unstable and 
changeable” (emphasis in original).52 
With religious and racial minorities, the stereotyping is less obvious in this period. Polygenism, 
the theory of the separate natural origins of races, mainly concerned bodily difference, and in 
any case (the notorious case of La Peyrère aside) was not in evidence before the late seventeenth 
century. The fully “scientific racism” which held that black people’s inferior intellects resembled 
those of intellectually disabled white people did not flourish until the early nineteenth. Previously 
there was a less systematic view of ethnic difference, both in medical and in broader cultural terms. 
Renaissance painters intentionally positioned black people among the travellers on the way of the 
cross, highlighting their creaturely equality. The initial discriminatory model was that of the Jews, 
who had demonstrated their changeableness by deviating from the New Testament path. Jewish 
intellectuals were barred from office in many of the first universities, not because of religious 
affiliation alone but specifically because they were incapable of grasping abstract and thus stable 
truths.53 “Ethiopians” (black Africans in general) were sometimes said to exhibit violent changes of 
mood and thought. A sixteenth-century Galen commentator, writing about unstable opinion, gives 
as an example their characteristic “rashness of counsel”; they were prone to hasty judgements. In 
Spain after the reconquest, original Christians were repackaged as typically calm people, those with 
Jewish or Moorish blood as “unquiet and turbulent.”54 Shakespeare reaches for the same stereotype. 
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When Iago’s companion Roderigo doubts their chances of provoking Othello to jealousy, Iago 
reassures him that “these Moors are changeable in their wills.” Shakespeare links this changeability, 
and its associated credulity, to Othello’s outmoded sense of self-assertive honour. When Othello 
says he murdered “all in honour,” it sounds not so much like a self-justification as a belated 
realization that the honour mode is itself foolishness when confronted with the Machiavellian wit 
of an Iago; the latter, like Falstaff, knows that “honesty’s a fool.” Othello himself, once he learns 
the truth, concurs that he is a fool because he has been “rash.” 
The Roman medical authority Aurelius Cornelius Celsus had claimed that monstrous crania, 
lacking sutures and hence abnormally shaped, occur oftener in hot climates; Ethiopians showed 
the same tendency to impetuosity as women, and the same hardness of the cranium. Celsus’s 
suggestion was taken up by Renaissance anatomists who sought to establish that the “impossible” 
type of sutural deformity might really exist, and located it in places where the inhabitants were 
exotic and different, such as the Indies.55 Nineteenth- and early twentieth-century anatomists 
still noted that in “Negroes and the lower races of mankind” sutural closure occurs earlier. (The 
street myth that black people have hard skulls survived to the twentieth century and may still be 
circulating today.)56 
Links between unusual physiognomy and impaired cognitive faculties were drawn most 
starkly in terms of social class. The masses were the touchstone of deformity, physical, intellectual 
and moral. The Galenists’ most frequent illustration in this respect was again Thersites, whose 
foolishness was identified directly with the shape of his skull: “In Homer the head of Thersites, 
because it is pointed and badly shaped, is called fatuus.”57 He could also be described as having 
a small head, indicating “rash and heedless judgement, on account of the paucity of spirits,” or 
as having a skull of Galen’s unsuitably sutured X type which led to him being “not so much 
stupid as useless in all things, having neither an anterior nor a posterior eminence.”58 Da Monte 
added several more skull types to Galen’s list, linking them to various types of imbalance among 
the elemental qualities and soul spirits that occurred in certain social groups. One was typical of 
labourers, in whom the rear eminence may be present but some or all of the frontal one missing. 
This damages the psychological faculty belonging to the front ventricle, the imagination, whose 
task is to “apprehend” the information that comes from the five external senses and to combine 
particulars into universals. Lack of the frontal eminence and its corresponding faculty impair in 
turn the middle ventricle’s operations of discursus and “reasoning.” Another of Da Monte’s types 
is the slave. Aesop, for example, had the rear eminence missing entirely, but the frontal eminence 
only partly. Hence he was “lazy and of weak motion” but at the same time “clever and very astute” 
(ingeniosus et prudentissimus). Then there was the jester, whose cognitive and moral characteristics 
induce a tone of disgust: 
The ninth [and lowest] grade has a small head, misshapen on both sides, lacking any eminence, 
and so in all operations they are the worst; foul and deformed, they are the most disproportional, 
and have bad inclinations [mores]. Of these Ianelus, the Cardinal of Ferrara’s fool, had less wisdom 
than a dog. He was a mimic, with a crippled hand and a large head resembling a vegetable. He was 
quick to anger and always looking for a fight, now with one person, now with another. He did not 
55 Celsus, De Re Medica, 468; Ingrassia, In Galeni, 65; Alessandro Benedetti, Historia Corporis Humani, 
242; Caspar Hofmann, Commentarii in Galeni de Usu Partium, 216. 
56 In Todd and Lyons, “Endocranial suture closure,” American Journal of Physical Anthropology, 7 
(1924). 
57 Santorio, Commentaria, 191. 
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know anyone’s name or anything at all, and I think he did not have a rational soul, since all his 
operations were like a dog’s. 
People like Ianelus (“Little Johnny,” a historically documented figure whom Da Monte would 
probably have known) had a formal slot in the landed household economy, probably from the 
same entertainment budget that paid painters, musicians and actors, alongside whom jesters
honed their skills. Little Johnny was presupposed to have the characteristics appropriate to his
jester’s occupation. 
As for instability (mobilitas) of opinion, the masses were “in all things mutable, but mutability.”59 
Shakespeare gives us a classic description of the lower ranks as a changeable, unreasoning mob. 
In Julius Caesar, when the plebeians are easily convinced of Caesar’s guilt by Brutus and then 
equally quickly convinced of Brutus’s by Antony, the intellectual instability of the crowd provokes 
social instability and civil war. The word “mob” was a recent coining, an abbreviation of the Latin 
phrase mobile vulgus (“the seething crowd”). The common herd was fluid intellectually as well 
as physically. Elyot describes his much-cited “monster with many heads” as “never certain nor 
stable.” In the Galenist tradition, instability of opinion in a gentleman was due to excess heat, 
but in male commoners and all women to an excess of damp; it was the “phlegmatic” type, with 
their moist brains, among whom one found a large concentration of “such as have had … no 
better education than their trades.”60 Da Monte on the other hand remarks that in the brains of 
labourers, the soul spirits and consequently the opinions are hyper-mobile, so that they overheat 
and “burn up”: this, he says, is the chief reason why people of this class are incapable of meaningful 
intellectual activity. 
59 I.M., A Health to the Gentlemenly Profession of Serving-Men, K1r. 





A First Diagnosis? The Problem with Pioneers
 
Historians of our topic tend to start by searching for a “first.” Who, for example, made the first 
scientific diagnosis of intellectual disability? The very question makes the mistake of supposing 
that there is such a condition (under whatever name), with an objective, permanent and cross-
historical existence just waiting to be discovered. The label of pioneer has been pinned notably 
on Paracelsus, Felix Platter and Thomas Willis, but can only be justified if the symptoms of 
“foolishness” and “stupidity” in their work bear some relation to those of modern “intellectual 
disability.” And they do not. Nevertheless, close examination of the symptoms these doctors wrote 
about reveals something further about the wider social and religious questions raised above, and 
about the groups of people that the symptoms describe. 
Foolishness, medicine and theology: Paracelsus 
“Alternative medicine,” for any Renaissance doctor, would have meant Paracelsus, the Swiss 
polymath who represented the main alternative to Galenism. Paul Cranefield calls his On the 
Generating of Fools “one of the most remarkable documents” in the history of “mental deficiency,” 
and sees it as the start of a modern diagnosis.1 But Paracelsus’s medicine is intricately bound up 
with his theology, and it is the latter that dominates this text. He “greatly wonders” at the fact that 
fools are redeemable. Why, he asks, “when God has redeemed man supremely and so dearly by his 
death and blood, does he allow him to be born unwise?” Foolishness here is obviously the general 
human condition, a consequence of original sin: “medicine has nothing to do with it.” Hence 
it is incurable in nature, that is to say by doctors, even if it can be cured by divine providence. 
The mad and “possessed,” however, are curable in nature. In other words, the medical or disease 
model is appropriate to madness (a minority condition) but not to foolishness (a ubiquitous one). 
Paracelsus’s wonder is not therefore, as Cranefield suggests, that fools are redeemable in spite of 
their disability, but that we are all redeemable despite the fact that we are all fools simply in view 
of our humanity. 
Paracelsus does, however, go on to single out some more restricted characteristics. The first is 
“inability to recognize or understand religion.” This might have covered the newly encountered 
peoples of the New World, or virtuous pagans such as Aristotle. The universal possibility of 
redemption shows us that God is even-handed towards people who “cannot recognize or understand 
his name, his death, his law, his signs, his work, his goodness shown towards man.” They cannot 
be held responsible for their own ignorance, and so surely cannot be predestined for hell. Inability 
to understand religion is also characteristic of the Christian laity in general, inasmuch as their faith 
has to be prescribed for them by a learned elite. 
Paracelsus’s foolishness is so far of the allegorical type, influenced by Erasmus’s In Praise of 
Folly and Sebastian Brant’s Ship of Fools. Erasmus, who spoke for many with his belief in the 
salvation of virtuous pagans, was attacking supposedly Christian elites foolishly seduced by power 
and worldliness. As for Brant, historians of psychiatry have debated whether fools at that time were 
Paracelsus, De Generatione Stultorum (translated by Cranefield and Federn as “The begetting of 
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really cast adrift on boats, when their question should be whether we ourselves would recognize 
any of them as fools. Brant’s passenger list includes most members of the human race; none
of the 110 types listed in his table of contents remotely indicates our own disability model. A
trompe l’oeil effect in Bosch’s painting of the same name encapsulates the point, since what looks 
at first like the ship’s mast turns out to be rooted on the bank, with apples growing on it: it is the tree 
of knowledge of good and evil.2 All this begs a question, however. Even if Paracelsian foolishness 
were in some way universal and allegorical, a metaphor for the human condition, surely metaphor 
only works by pointing us to some positive referent that already exists in the real world – to some 
small, pathological intellectually disabled group, for example? Paracelsus does go on to discuss
a small group which is, if not pathological, then odd, as we shall see. But the intellect and behaviour 
even of this group bear no resemblance to the modern disability model; they are a metonymic 
expression of the more general human folly. Metaphor in ancient and early modern literature can 
be explanatory, not just a literary device; the narrative slips from universal foolishness to more 
specific states and back without any sense that somewhere reality ends and metaphor begins. 
In his preamble Paracelsus hints at some such smaller group when he separates certain types 
of fool from “wise” men, albeit only to emphasize that they are “brothers … before God.” After 
discussing pagans, he gives a long list of types of natural corruption: “fornicators, gamblers, 
robbers, crippled children, the blind, the deaf, the mute, the lame, the timorous [sc. melancholic], 
fools, monsters, the malformed.” It is tempting to assume that these fools correspond with our 
“intellectual disabled.” However, the premise underlying the list as a whole is that man no longer 
reflects the divine image; there are no grounds for supposing that “fool” refers here to some 
distinctly cognitive impairment in a modern sense. In order to suppose so, one has to read what is 
not there. 
Cranefield also claims that Paracelsus “discovered” a connection between goitre and intellectual 
disability in Alpine peasants; he calls this “the earliest mention of cretinism,” though Paracelsus 
himself does not use the term. Modern medicine found a link between intellectual disability, thyroid 
hormone deficiency and the iodine deficiency of Alpine spring waters; sixteenth-century medicine, 
on the other hand, placed goitrous deformity in an organic domain where no clear line is drawn 
between the physiological, the cognitive and the behavioural. Paracelsus himself observes that 
goitre is not a propertium or defining element of foolishness, since not all goitrous people are fools. 
Modern medicine too came to acknowledge the unreliability of the links between goitre and the 
mind. But for Paracelsus even this representation of foolishness was designed to show simply that 
“we are no longer in the image of God but have had it taken away”: a general Adamite incurability 
in which neither goitre nor foolishness are separate from universal human corruption. 
On the Generating of Fools has undercurrents of the scholastic philosophical doctrines from 
which this self-proclaimed rebel had ostensibly distanced himself, and which would have been as 
familiar to his readers as his biblical references. Writing about the defectiveness of the “internal 
instruments” in foolishness, he comments that although there are conditions which deprive people 
of some faculty or other (that is, some organic impairment means that they do not seem to be 
operating rationally), the rational soul nevertheless remains present throughout. However, he 
also refers here to a contrasting, theological doctrine of St Paul’s, which defined the highest part 
of man as “spirit” rather than any philosophical abilities. Like Luther, Paracelsus was wary of 
“fleshly” or “animal reason,” the corrupt reasoning of fallen man. True reason was inspired, not 
rationally worked out. So philosophers, too, were a type of fool, “stuck in their own wisdom and 
not progressing to God’s.” 
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But if there are no elements of modern psychological characteristics of disability in Paracelsus’s 
fools, not even in those who might be of a discrete type, then what exactly is the precise content 
of their foolishness? Two characteristics are mentioned. One of these consists in being holy. Here 
the familiar notion of the holy fool needs closer examination. The original narrative said that if 
you are supremely contemplative, a “prophet,” then other people, who are mostly corrupted by 
earthly desires, will think you foolish; your foolishness is precisely your lack of such desires, not 
some transhistorical pathology. The Islamic sources of the narrative bear this out.3 The original 
representation of the contemplative prophet as a fool was later employed in the invention of the holy 
fool as akin to a modern, intellectually disabled type, albeit in one of its more optimistic variants. 
A narrative that described intuiters of divine reason as fools turned into a narrative that described 
fools as intuiters of divine reason. The medieval prophet was a philosopher whose contemplations 
were occasionally so perfect that he accessed the divine intellect directly rather than by a laborious 
apprehension of the connecting terms of syllogisms. The more usual philosopher reasoner, who 
had to labour at his syllogistic expertise, was only one rung below this ideal state. Paracelsus, 
however, ranked him near the bottom, because earthly reason was suspect. He values his own 
“fools” precisely because they do not deliberate in this way. Syllogisms lie in the temporal realm 
and so have time to be “fashioned,” using “lies and deceit.” 
The other symptom of Paracelsian foolishness is playfulness and tricks, evoking the social 
occupation of the jester. In the popular drama which featured prominently in the didactic literature of 
the Reformation, various kinds of foolishness can be distinguished: fool as intellectually deficient, 
fool as morally deficient, fool as unbeliever, wise fool, pure fool, fool as man in general, all of 
them overlapping to a considerable extent.4 The main symptoms of “intellectual” deficiency are 
laughter-inducing tricks and an eccentric loquaciousness which nevertheless uses normal syntax 
and grammar. Audiences laughed not at any disability we might ourselves recognize as such but at 
the characters’ uninhibited speech and behaviour, which Paracelsus associates with children and 
drunks. This image is a relic of the medieval Feast of Fools, which earlier ecclesiastical authorities 
had only partly succeeded in reining in, and in which foolishness cannot be distinguished from 
general unruliness. Any “intellectual” deficiency is more or less indistinguishable from a lack of 
socially appropriate inhibition, whose modern form as a psychological category is, as Roger Smith 
has shown, a socially and historically contingent phenomenon.5 
The uninhibitedness of licensed fools and jesters who tell home truths to their master is a 
constant literary theme. In Paracelsus’s time, jesters still had paid employment in noble households. 
The literary and socio-historical sources are Roman; moriones, as we have seen, tended to be kept
fools, with behaviours that corresponded to the jester’s job description. They had, as Langland put 
it, the “wit to work.”6 Don Francesillo de Zúñiga, for example, jester to Charles V of Spain, was 
a hereditary gentleman who wrote his memoirs in perfect Spanish and was competent to leave his 
estate to his family.7 When Fuller defines the jester’s “office” as one “which not but he that hath wit 
can perform, and none but he that wants wit will perform,” it is easy to overlook the first of these 
two clauses. Some jesters did come to the job possessing some natural difference as their prior 
qualification: short stature, spinal curvature, or unusual physiognomy. Peasants, too, were recruited 
3 See Dols, Majnun.
 
4 Heinz Wyss, Der Narr im Schweizerischen Drama des 16.Jahrhunderts.
 
5 Roger Smith, Inhibition: History and Meaning in the Sciences of Mind and Brain.
 
6 Piers Plowman, Prologue.
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as professional fools simply because of their rustic personae. Otherwise, and irrespective of any 
natural differences, fools learned and acquired their prescribed behaviours.8 
To sum up, Paracelsian foolishness is sometimes the fallen human condition in general, and 
sometimes an eccentric but positive condition marked by the overlapping behaviours of holy 
or intuitive insight and of the jester’s licensed truth telling – positive because it bypasses the 
hypocritical deliberations of human reasoning. The closing paragraph of On the Generating of 
Fools returns to an interweaving of the two, within a single image. Paracelsus’s aims in this text 
are thus instructive ones, about all of us. This is clear from his successor in the German mystical 
tradition, Valentin Weigel, who begins the key section of his book Know Thyself with a similar 
description of foolishness; only from this starting point, he says, can one proceed to establish what 
human wisdom is. 
Foolishness and brain substance: Felix Platter 
Another medical authority often held up as a pioneer of psychiatry is Felix Platter. Scheerenberger, 
for example, places him among “the first to offer a multi-level description of mental retardation.”9 
And certainly Platter deals with impairments of the faculties, among them “foolishness,” on the 
very first page of his compendium of medical practice. He was also one of the first physicians 
to examine disease in terms of its “syndromes,” or sets of related symptoms. Like the Galenists, 
Platter still sees cognitive impairment as a subset of bodily injury; but the syndromic approach 
means that he describes and classifies such impairments in relation to each other first, only later 
relating them to their organic, material aspects. 
This distances them relatively from the body. It also leaves the door open for praeternatural 
causes. If Platter is a pioneer of modern psychiatry it is partly because of, not despite, the reality he 
allots to the devil. Historians who think they have found a “first” modern psychiatrist have tried, in 
defiance of the texts, to ignore the presence of the devil in Platter’s aetiology of mental states, but 
it is there for all to see.10 Moreover, he passed it on to his successors. Caspar Bauhin for example, 
Platter’s heir as head of the medical faculty in Basle, was (as we shall see) a contributor to the 
theory of demonically conceived, mindless “changelings” that would feed into modern accounts of 
intellectual disability via Locke’s Essay. 
Platter puts cognitive symptoms under four headings: consternation, defatigation, weakness and 
alienation.11 “Consternation” is about absence, but he makes no mention of foolishness of any sort 
under this heading. “Defatigation” is about sleep. The third heading, “weakness” (imbecillitas), 
describes a generic “dullness (hebetudo) of mind” and impairment of the faculties: “slowness 
of wit (ingenium)” in the imagination, “imprudence” in the faculty of judgement and “memory 
loss.” Weakness and dullness, however, are facets of bodily disease and sensory impairment; they 
are not distinctly intellectual in a Cartesian sense. While slowness of wit may seem to relate to 
a modern model of disability, Platter’s specific examples are old age, concussion, loss of blood, 
injuries to the sense organs, under- or over-use of the faculties, and melancholy. There is a 
8 Thomas Fuller, The Holy and the Profane, 182; see also Beatrice Otto, Fools are Everywhere: the 
Court Jester around the World. 
9 A History, 29. 
10 For example Raymond Battegay, “Felix Platter und die Psychiatrie,” in U. Tröhler (ed.), Felix 
Platter in seiner Zeit; Heinrich Buess, “Basler Mediziner der Barockzeit,” in Beiträge zur Geschichte der 
Naturwissenschaften. 
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brief reference to hereditary conditions; but his examples (“clever and industrious people have 
children like themselves,” while “the ignorant beget the torpid”) evoke a Reformation concern 
with spiritual self-development rather than intellect per se. Also under the heading of weakness 
comes a reference to people who “barely learn how to speak, and apprehend letters and skills with 
difficulty.” The Latin phrase here (discunt literas) is a conventional phrase that refers to the formal 
school curriculum; we should infer “barely learning to speak” as describing the unschooled and 
the lower social classes in general. The cause of slowness is “imperfection of the instrument,” and 
above all of the cerebral substance (an over-moist texture, for example); even if inherited, it can be 
improved upon by industrious “exercise,” a form of nurture that can become “second” nature. 
It is only under the fourth heading, of “alienation,” that the vocabulary of foolishness appears 
(variously stultitia, fatuitas, moria). This embraces drunkenness, hypochondria, melancholy 
(again), mania, devil possession, hydrophobia and frenzy – a taxonomy of conditions that would 
hold no coherence for today’s psychiatrist. All of them are equivalent examples of an overarching 
“alienation or hallucination” that consists of “judging and remembering things which are not, as 
if they were; or things which are, wrongly and irrationally.” And this latter is simply the Galenist 
description of delirium. The symptoms of the alienated mind occur across a wide range of human 
types, all of whom come under the one heading of “foolish” (here, stulti): infants, old people, 
“all men in every age inasmuch as all their actions seem to be foolish as Erasmus and Brant have 
elegantly shown” (that is, virtually the whole human race), “fantastics” who excel in wit (ingenium) 
but whose attention-seeking turns them into buffoons with asses’ ears, and people seized by strong 
emotions. Halfway through this (to us) highly disparate list come people “born” foolish: 
They show signs of foolishness straight away as infants, by a habit of mimicry exceeding that of 
other infants; they are not submissive or amenable, so that often they do not learn to speak, much 
less to take on functions requiring industriousness. This evil is frequent in particular regions, as 
cited … in the Valesian village of Bremis where I have seen it myself, and in the Pinzgau valley 
of Carinthia; many tend to have, as well as foolishness, a poorly shaped head and a goitre, are 
dumb, with a huge swollen tongue, and present a deformed sight sitting in the streets gazing at the 
sun, putting sticks between their fingers, writhing about, mouths wide open, moving passers-by to 
laughter and amazement. 
Goitre had been associated with poor head shape and dwarfism long before this, as the iconographic 
record shows. The sticks between their fingers seem to invoke a pre-existing convention about 
melancholics idly building models out of sticks and clay, while their lack of industriousness points 
us again towards the Reformation’s urban values. These Alpine peasants turn up again in Platter’s
account of deafness, where alongside the elderly they illustrate the cognitive element involved in 
an excess of humours and catarrhs.12 
To the reader who may be looking for a juicy primary source, please note: any supposed intellectual 
disability in the above is not conceptually separate from the other items on the list. Cranefield 
describes it as a pioneering diagnosis of cretinism; but this label arrived only in eighteenth-century 
medicine, which regarded Alpine peasants in their entirety as “little better than senseless beasts.”13 
The symptoms Platter lists are physical and behavioural as much as intellectual. What unites the 
seemingly disparate list of people in which these people “born foolish” are embedded is the arousal 
of wonder in the onlooker. The category is therefore religious and symbolic, like Augustine’s 
moriones. Paracelsus, too, who had seen goitrous peasants drinking the “metallic and mineral 
12 Véronique Dasen, Dwarfs in Ancient Egypt and Greece, 247; Henri Beek, De Geestesgestoorde in de 
Middeleeuwen, 113; 96; Platter, Praxeos, 250. 
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waters” of the Pinzgau, focused in this context on their bodily symptoms, bar a passing comment 
that people with goitre tend “more towards foolishness than to skilfulness.” The symptoms belong 
to an indivisible physical-intellectual-behavioural-moral defect marking fallen man as a whole.14 
Platter’s comment that he had seen these peasants himself refers to the visit he made when 
young to the Valais with his father Thomas, who had grown up there. A shepherd born to poor
peasants, Thomas Platter had learned to read and write only as an adult, while running 
dispatches for the Zwinglian reformers. He eventually became a teacher of classical languages 
and the printer-publisher of Galen, Calvin and Vesalius. As an autodidact, he viewed his own 
intellectual development in terms of an escape from the ignorance of the countryside and its 
people, who Zwingli had said were fit only for herding cows. In this sense Thomas was following 
a common humanist tradition, like Erasmus when he promoted the public image of himself
as a refugee from the notably stupid Batavia of his birthplace. In insisting that their yokels were 
more stupid than anyone else’s, the intellectuals of Basle and Leiden were advertising their own
intellectual superiority. 
Thomas’s suppression of his own social and, as it were, unintellectual self was essential to 
his Christian rebirth, and this helps perhaps to explain his son’s horror stories about the stupidity 
of the local population. The Alpine foolishness described by Felix was the polar opposite of the 
new urban Jerusalem of the humanist academy, and his portrayal of it was tinged by a vicarious 
recollection of his father’s great escape. The idea that slowness (tarditas) of wit and the peasant 
condition (rusticitas) were synonymous was in any case already a stock convention of classical 
Latin literature.15 The Valesians with sticks between their fingers were a social and intellectual 
distillation of the poor peasantry in general, who subsisted within the father and threw into relief 
the son’s identity as a great professor of medicine. Paracelsus, too, had grown up in an Alpine 
valley where there were silver mines; goitre was to be found, he said, wherever mining went on, 
and his own birthplace was another region whose peasants were deemed exceptionally foolish 
(perhaps because they were mostly Slavs). In Paracelsus’s idiosyncratic Christianity, just as in 
the Platters’ Swiss Protestantism, knowledge came through spiritual self-development, for which 
landless peasants lacked even a potential. In both, the medical foolishness of the goitrous is the 
wider social idiocy of the village. Research would later reveal in fact that iodine deficiency was 
no greater in the Alps than in many other regions of the world where no prevalence of mental 
deficiencies has been noted. 
Platter divides the causes of general “alienation” of the mind into internal and external, or natural 
and praeternatural.16 Head size and shape are not necessary causes or even signs of impairment, 
because sometimes a fault in the brain is only detectable within: ideally one should “open it up after 
death” and inspect its internal nature. Even then one may not arrive at any ultimate, fixed cause 
of cognitive symptoms. Although Platter does talk about some things as “incurable,” he also says 
that “custom changes nature.” Nature is the acquired as well as the innate, the imitative as well as 
the original. The “imitative” type is drawn from the Roman jester model; men from noble families 
grow up enjoying the antics of professional fools, “acquiring a habit in it which later becomes 
irremovable, so that they become permanent and genuine fools themselves.” The “original” type, 
by contrast, exists from birth, and is due to “the seed of the parents.” Platter subdivides this latter, 
original type between parents whose seed is defective because they themselves are foolish, and 
parents who are not foolish but whose “seed has acquired some fault.” Whatever it is that has caused 
14 Cranefield, “The discovery,” 489; “Paracelsus on goiter,” 463; Paracelsus, Von Apostemen … am Leib, 
in Werke, iv, 222. 
15 Platter, Observationum in Hominis Affectibus, 1. 
16 Platter, Praxeos, 89; 98; 105. 
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the foolishness causes the soul spirits too (which it must be remembered are material entities) to be 
impaired, in which case people may be born “deaf, or dumb, or crookbacked, or with goitre.” All 
these causes are secondary, however. The paramount type of cause is praeternatural – from God or 
the Devil – and so not a suitable topic of study for the physician. 
Foolishness and brain function: Thomas Willis 
Willis was founder in the 1650s of the Oxford Anatomical Club, its lectures attended by medical 
innovators such as Thomas Sydenham and his future collaborator, the young Dr John Locke. 
Whereas Willis’s predecessors had written about the structure or substance of the brain, he himself 
placed greater emphasis on its function and on the activity of the soul spirits within it. He thus gives 
greater centrality and power to the invisible. It is this aspect of his work that has led to his being 
seen as a precursor of modern medical thinking on our topic. Cranefield calls Willis’s account 
of foolishness in De Anima Brutorum (“On the soul of animals”) “not the earliest systematic 
discussion of mental deficiency known, but … an early one”; his psychology is “primitive” but 
“far more subtle … than Descartes.”17 Now it is true that Willis was influenced by Descartes, as 
well as by other radicals of that generation, notably Gassendi (hence his inclusion of human beings 
and their souls under the heading of “animals”). Yet he retained in many respects an organic,
pre-Cartesian mind-set. The soul, or its rational part, is an incorruptible substance, the body alone 
is capable of defect, and the brain is the material domicile of the soul: “the health of the soul begins 
with the health of the body.”18 He brings in a range of unreferenced sources from the previous 
century (Platter among them). Samuel Pordage’s 1683 English translation, on which historians 
have based their interpretations, obscures this strong element of conservatism in the texts. Willis 
did not provide a precise terminology for foolishness, and Pordage interpolated his own as we 
shall see in Chapter 16. Furthermore, whenever Willis writes about foolishness (stupiditas) in his 
other works, it is clearly a symptom of melancholia. These things must be borne in mind when 
examining De Anima Brutorum. 
Located in the imagination, foolishness impairs the “corporeal” soul (Gassendi’s refurbishment 
of the “sensitive” soul of faculty psychology). This impairment “eclipses” the non-corporeal 
faculty of intellect and the rational soul. Willis’s analytic procedure follows the traditional pattern 
of his predecessors. He starts with immediate causes (brain size, shape and substance and the 
quality, amount and activity of soul spirits), proceeding thence to antecedent causes, and ends 
with cure. Immediate causes are of the conventional Galenist type: the “natural and optimum” 
state of the brain is medium size, spherical shape and balanced temperament. These are important 
because they affect the brain’s task of producing soul spirits. Deviations from this morphological 
ideal are a “natural” cause of foolishness but not a necessary one: “although not always the case, 
that is very often the way it turns out.” Antecedent causes, meanwhile, are of two types (in this 
he follows Platter). Either they are “original … hereditary … as when fools give birth to fools” 
and thus “connate”: the product of an ancestrally foolish line. Or they are “congenite”: caused by 
poor sexual performance at conception, and thus “accidental and individual.” That is, born fools 
are either hereditary or non-hereditary. Each of these two types of antecedent cause comes with a 
corresponding social stereotype. 
17 Cranefield, “A seventeenth-century view,” Willis, De Anima, 357 ff.; Willis (trs. Samuel Pordage), 
Two Discourses on the Soul of Brutes. 
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Original, “connate” foolishness (stultitia) is typical of the “offspring of village and country 
people frequently liable to poor brain texture, [in whose] families we may trace back many 
generations and find scarcely one bright or clever person.” Their internal nature is an indicator 
of their class stupidity, that of country people beyond the honour society and the learned doctor’s 
professional remit. The model for this is biblical: original foolishness (stultitia) is a reflection, 
socially differentiated, of original sin. 
By contrast, the individual, “congenite” foolishness (stupiditas) caused at conception is typical 
of the offspring of Willis’s client group. It is a defect of brain function rather than of original brain 
texture. It is an accident, occurring not as the result of some hereditary class taint but precisely 
because the father is wise and has “a supreme wit” (ingenium). One may also infer that he is at 
some remove from original sin and in a state of grace. His state of constant contemplation causes 
his blood to keep back too many soul spirits in the brain, so that at the moment of conception not 
enough of them are available to ferry his “spermatic bodies” from this usual holding place to the 
appropriate point of delivery. When “the rational soul is concentrating to the utmost on giving birth 
to its intellectual offspring … the corporeal soul becomes weaker and less fertile,” so his physical 
offspring turn out correspondingly “slow.” This politely distances him from his social inferiors’
rampant sex drives. Later examples of this same mind-set appear in the Victorian era, when Herbert 
Spencer and others lobbied against allowing women access to higher education on the grounds 
that excessive study would lead them to have feeble-minded offspring. Later still, Kanner would 
proclaim that autistic children tend to issue from “highly intelligent parents” who are “strongly 
occupied with abstractions.”19 And it may well turn out that in our time the arrival and expansion 
of Asperger’s syndrome as an intellectual disability has occurred not in spite of but because of 
its accompanying paradox of high IQ, with which parents may enhance their social-intellectual
self-representation. 
Some historians have tried to say that this second, “accidental” type of Willis’s was a modernizing 
move, because it removed blame from parents. However, blamelessness was a priori in parents of 
the doctor’s own social class. And more importantly, this type can be traced at least as far back as 
Alexander of Aphrodisias, whose work was being revived and popularized at the time. Alexander 
had originally said: 
Why do many foolish men (moroi) generate clever children and many clever men generate children 
who are stupid? Because when the stupider ones have sex, being fully overcome by pleasure their 
soul is immersed in the body, and so the sperm, with its greater ability both rational and physical, 
produces cleverer children. However, in the case of clever, educated men, they are always exercising 
their thoughts and when they have sex they are reasoning about something else.20 
He was spawning a rich textual tradition. Albert followed up by saying that “wise men mostly 
produce defective, foolish (fatui) children … because he who is good at study is bad at sex (malus 
in venereo acto),” since “sex is the most foolish act a wise man commits in all his life” – which 
is why “simple men” have wise offspring. Some writers used this to argue for celibacy in priests. 
Others describe how the man with intellectual preoccupations cannot procreate properly because 
the humours in him, being particularly thick, lead to melancholy. The word they use for thick 
(pinguis) can also be translated as “dull” or “doltish”: the humours and their corresponding brain 
functions and states can thus be similar in both the father’s excessively pursued wisdom and the 
19 Kanner, “Infantile autism and schizophrenia,” Behavioural Science, 10 (1965).
 
20 Alexander, “Problems,” in The Problems of Aristotle; with Other Philosophers and Physicians, G7r; 





A First Diagnosis? The Problem with Pioneers 243 
son’s fleshly unwisdom. Both are defined by “melancholy,” albeit of different types.21 It shows just 
how carefully one has to read these texts. 
So when in Twelfth Night the melancholy fool Feste sings “Journeys end in lovers meeting / 
Every wise man’s son doth know,” what he means is: “Any fool knows that.” Willis knew relevant 
cases among his contemporaries. The wise, ingenious and childless William Harvey had a ward, 
his orphaned nephew, whom historians have retrospectively diagnosed as “mentally retarded.” 
Harvey’s material body was responsible in loco parentis for the impairment; but this also meant that 
his immaterial, rational soul was free to be acknowledged as the intellectual and “spiritual father” 
to Willis’s anatomical club.22 (Harvey seems a particularly severe case: one of those intellectual 
offspring of his was the theory that sexual conception consists in the spermatic fertilization of 
an incorporeal “idea” in the womb.)23 Similarly the “spermatic bodies” of Sir Christopher Wren, 
another club member, produced a son, “poor Billy,” whom biographers have decided was mentally 
retarded also. Like Harvey, Wren had exhausted his soul spirits on intellectual pursuits. One such 
was the illustrations he drew for Willis’s great anatomy textbook, among which, ironically, was a 
drawing of “the brain of a foolish youth” – a “changeling,” as Pordage’s translation has it – that 
Willis had dissected according to Platter’s suggestion.24 
Medical guides to sex therapy taught that orgasm requires the closest simultaneous attention 
from both partners, so that the soul spirits can transport the psychological faculties – the “seminal” 
or “spermatic logos” – down into the semen and thereby maximize the child’s reasoning abilities. 
This explains how the life of Laurence Sterne’s Tristram Shandy, Gentleman gets off to such a bad 
start, on the very first page. The social status ascribed to him in the title is belied by his personal and 
intellectual flaws, which are the result of his mother’s attention deficit at the moment of conception. 
Later in the novel, a parodic and this time successful stimulation of the same body parts occurs 
when a piping hot chestnut falls off the dinner table and down into a learned philosopher’s open 
fly. “Attention, imagination, judgment, resolution, deliberation, ratiocination, memory, fancy” rush 
down from his brain to his testicles along with “ten battalions” of soul spirits. 
Willis’s distinction between two types of antecedent cause, original and accidental, explains 
in one fell swoop both the Adamite degeneracy of the servile classes and the wisdom and virtue 
of his own elite patients. It enables him to explain foolish traits in the families of his social peers 
which might otherwise be embarrassing, especially in view of the increasing status of wit and 
learning in the honour society. He describes other accidental causes within the same client group, 
which are likewise linked to the soul spirits and the act of conception but whose symptoms are 
not a cue for mutual admiration and are cautionary instead: for example, a father’s ignoble lack 
of temperance (Shakespeare’s “expense of spirit in a waste of shame”), or his effeminacy. Such 
characteristics damage the soul spirits, which consequently generate offspring who lack “great 
and liberal wit” and threaten the future ancestral line with class degeneracy and the taint of the 
“original foolishness” of the masses. 
When Willis says that the foolishness of the ingenious gentleman’s son is an “accident,” he 
is using the old Aristotelian language; he means that foolishness does not affect the son’s prior 
membership of the essence “rational being.” It implies, further, that the foolishness of the foolish 
21 Albert, Quaestiones super De Animalibus, in Geyer (ed.), Opera, xii, 299; Lemnius, Occulta Naturae
Miracula, 11, translated as The Secret Miracles of Nature, 18; Hieronymus Mercurialis, Medicina Practica, 
Chapter 6; Paracelsus, De Generatione, 79; Alessandro Tassoni, Dieci Libri, Book 6; Tommaso Campanella, 
De Sensu Rerum et Magia, 202; Cardano, Opera, iii, 558; Browne, Religio, 79; Burton, The Anatomy, i, 213. 
22 Neugebauer, “A doctor’s dilemma: the case of William Harvey’s mentally retarded nephew,” 569. 
23 Cited in Thomas Laqueur, Making Sex, 144. 
24 Adrian Tinniswood, His Invention so Fertile, 240; Willis, De Cerebri Anatome, 51. 
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peasant’s son is his essence. Accident goes with disease, essence with the degeneracy of the Fall, 
which the labouring masses embody. In accidental foolishness the soul spirits are blunt and slow. 
In original foolishness they are sharp, rapid and unstable, producing behaviour that is “absurd, 
perverse, ridiculous and inappropriate,” the “laughter-provoking … nonsense and mimicry” we 
already noted in the jester model. Rather than being what Cranefield calls an “early description of 
schizophrenia” distinct from “mental deficiency,” Willis is simply readjusting, as he says himself, 
certain “conventional” (vulgo) distinctions. When he writes about rustic masses or degenerate 
gentry, he uses the word stultitia, and the symptoms are similar in both. He uses a different term 
(stupiditas) for the wise man’s “accidental” son, and it is the one that elsewhere he uses exclusively 
for melancholia. 
Although this stupiditas may have a dispositional tendency to permanence, the prognosis is 
relatively optimistic. Grades of foolishness correspond with grades of educability. The ideal is a 
knowledge of “literature and liberal sciences”: that is, the educational curriculum of a gentleman. 
The members of Willis’s client group are fit subjects for anatomy in general and for the anatomy 
of the soul in particular because of this normative excellence of their intellects. Immediately 
below them are people “skilful in the mechanical arts,” a routine formula of the time whose 
social significance is obvious (for example, Mercado’s congenitally deaf people were fit only “for 
mechanical matters and what they can make with their hands”).25 At the next level down are those 
unfit for mechanical skills who nevertheless “understand country matters.” Further down come 
people “unfit for almost any calling” who can nevertheless learn basic life-skills; and finally there 
are people who “scarcely understand anything at all or know what they are about [scienter agunt].” 
All grades below the top one are read as grades of foolishness; the criterion by which they are all 
excluded is the ability to “recognize the common ideas.” 
Such people need to be schooled in the ideas by an “indefatigable trainer.” We are probably 
meant to take it as read that Willis is concerned about backward members of his own client group. 
After all, the declared aim of his book is to promote the health of the soul as the route to “the 
communion of saints and to societas,” in other words the elect and the honourable, whom Willis in 
typical Restoration and indeed modern fashion sees as one and the same entity. The only people who 
need to be trained to have the common ideas are those who by virtue of their ancestral line ought 
to have them in the first place but by some accident do not. Everyone else is a fool anyway. Even 
at the lowest grade where people scarcely understand anything, training can change their nature: 
“However coarse and dense the [soul] spirits may be, they will nevertheless forge some tracks or 
channels, albeit imperfect ones, in which they can expand.” And even when absence of thought 
(amentia) and movement (stoliditas) frustrate attempts at training, there remains the possibility of 
providential transformation. Epileptics, whose condition is characterized by stupiditas, are curable 
by prayer, as the Bible shows. Dull-brained children can later become capable and teachable. A hot 
fever can suddenly cure adults previously assumed to be foolish. Willis gives specific examples, 
including the cure of a “fatuous” court jester and an elderly amnesiac. 
Willis’s terminology for the grades of foolishness above is borrowed from the Bacchae of the 
Roman satirical playwright Plautus in which there is a single line, used by many Renaissance 
writers for a description of slaves, that consists solely of five cognate terms for “foolish.” The 
papal physician Paolo Zacchia had used it earlier in the century, in his account of ignorance and 
melancholic foolishness.26 Willis is tapping here into the same literary sources as his friend Dryden, 
who was Poet Laureate while Willis was Royal Physician and in whose satires against his fellow 
poets “stupidity” is the core concept. Willis deploys these terms loosely in order to describe a 
25 Mercado, Opera, 172.
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continuum of deficiency; there is ultimately no separate pathological niche of the type that his 
translator Pordage would create. 
As for the brain deficiency of country labourers, this does not fall within the disease model 
at all; it is an “original” non-accidental structure and substance. Treatment would therefore be 
wasted on them. In such people, says Willis, the soul spirits consist of a gross matter rather than 
their normative fineness. In this precise context it is worth noting one more link between Willis 
and Platter; of the scores of scientific virtuosi who claimed the spiritual paternity of Harvey,
Willis alone came from parents who were both non-gentle and rural.27 
How the praeternatural becomes the abnormal 
In “foolishness,” then, doctors, like the rest of the honour society, saw the intellectual disabilities of 
a majority: everyone except males of a certain social standing. Only later was a category invented 
whose degree of pathology in respect of those intellectual disabilities was inversely proportional to 
its size. “Later” has been a drawn-out process, in the medical model as elsewhere. In the nineteenth 
century, when painters such as Millet began making peasants the subjects of elevated portraiture, 
disapproving critics wrote of them as “types of cretins.”28 In the twentieth, Dr F.G. Crookshank’s 
theory of “homologies” – an amalgam of social stereotypes with somatic and psychological 
characteristics – classified “mongoloid imbeciles” under the same species heading as the inhabitants 
of Mongolia, orang-utans and the English working classes.29 Anecdote and inference might well 
reveal residues of this attitude among today’s practitioners. It would hardly be surprising, given 
how all the historical evidence shows that the psychological characteristics of modern intellectual 
disability are a distillation of former social, racial and class stereotypes. 
The question arises, however: did the medical mind-set merely extract modern intellectual 
disability from the legal, political and theological matrix described in earlier sections, after the 
event? Or were there elements already within medicine itself that positively contributed to it? 
Answers can be found in the changing relationship between the natural, the unnatural and the 
praeternatural, and in the rise of new notions of personhood. In early modern faculty psychology, 
cognitive impairments were not objects of pathology in the same way that “intellectual disability” 
now is. They were just unusual, at least among the doctor’s elite clients: “unnatural” in the limited 
Aristotelian sense, a special manifestation of the natural. As for physical monsters, they might even 
be thought of as perfectly formed; in the theory known as preformationism, which maintained that 
the sperm or the egg is the person in miniature, “the laws of nature are not different from the will 
of God,” and so “God is obliged to produce monsters to satisfy those laws.”30 Both monstrosity and 
the unnatural remained within the realm of nature, and were quite distinct from things that were 
praeternatural and ran counter to nature. However, the fusion that eventually occurred between the 
unnatural and the praeternatural was to lead to new connections being made between an unusual 
structure of head and brain and their accompanying cognitive faculties. 
Physiognomists wondered “whether the internal faculty may be known by the external 
physiognomy and visage,” for instance in the facial deformity of “dizzards” and jesters.31 When 
Galen had dismissed the possibility of a sutural layout in which “the length of the head becomes 
27 Robert Frank, Harvey and the Oxford Physiologists, 64.
 
28 Millet, “Bringing Home the New-Born Calf,” Art Institute of Chicago.
 
29 The Mongol in our Midst, 329.
 
30 Pierre-Sylvain Régis, Cours entier de philosophie, ii, 29.
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its depth” (the extreme X-shape), it meant that some brain material generally might be missing, 
in which case the creature could not live; but later Galenists, in allocating the internal senses more 
precisely to specific cerebral ventricles, raised the possibility that some particular part of the brain 
might be missing. The injury might be limited to that part, and therefore would not preclude the 
possibility of life. Some of them claimed to have observed Galen’s “impossible” type of skull in 
living individuals. Pietro d’Abano said it might exist “in some monstrous dwarf”; such beings 
were “more or less unviable,” but it was not downright impossible for them to exist. Ugo Benzi 
subsequently claimed not only to have observed this type in an actual four-year-old but also to have 
measured the child’s skull.32 
The impossible became possible chiefly through Andreas Vesalius, whose school of anatomy 
was more or less the first to use empirical observation of the body as a way of checking out 
received Galenist wisdom. He claimed to have seen “a beggar going around Bologna with a square 
head somewhat broader than it is long, [and] in Genoa … a boy of about three whose head sticks 
out on either side.”33 A child with a similarly shaped head could be observed in Venice. More 
significantly for us, Vesalius calls this latter child amens, “mindless,” though the precise content 
of this concept can only be guessed at; one of his followers, paraphrasing this passage, lists its 
symptoms only in physiological terms (“catarrh and apoplexy”).34 Vesalius himself denied that the 
cognitive faculties were linked to specific cerebral ventricles; and since he must have consequently 
thought that damage to a part caused damage to the whole, there has to be some other reason why 
he thought such a child might live. As someone open to the ideas of the Reformation, he may 
simply have been trying to indicate that a variety of types and individuals exists, reflecting the 
individuality of their relationship to God. 
Several authors repeated the story. The symptoms were usually anatomical, but a couple of them 
reiterate Vesalius’s psychological embellishment. Gabriele Falloppio (of the eponymous tubes) 
replaced amens with stolidus, “foolish.”35 Johannes Schenk extracted the story from its anatomical 
context and placed it instead in the already existing genre of monstrosity literature. Here it sits 
alongside the standard list of physical monsters derived from Pliny, familiar to the readers of 
his time.36 To the usual accounts of two-headed monsters, conjoined twins and tribes with their 
faces in their chests he adds “skulls without sutures or with the sutures obliterated,” including the 
“completely mindless” Venetian child who was “without sutures” entirely. (Vesalius had described 
him as the extreme X-type, not as lacking sutures. Schenk’s was a frequent over-egging of the 
source; another author, for example, noted seeing “at a public dissection a solid, seamless cranium: 
such heads are known a dog’s heads … and are said to be very hard and pain-resistant.”)37 None of 
the other creatures on Schenk’s list of monstrosities has any psychological attributes, nor did those 
mentioned in the monstrosity literature in general; and they all belong in the category of unnatural, 
rather than diabolically praeternatural. 
Renaissance authors rephrased Galen’s “suitable,” H-shaped sutural arrangement as the “natural” 
one. The corresponding idea of an “unnatural” shape still carried no overtones of determinism 
or permanence – Vesalius noted that everyone’s sutures disappear as they get older – but it did 
allow monstrosity to enter the discussion. The boundary between unnatural and praeternatural, 
previously so clear, was becoming blurred. When Vesalian anatomists announced that even the 
32 D’Abano, Conciliator Controversiarum, 120; Benzi, Expositio, 20r.
 
33 Vesalius, De Humani, 16.
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“unviable” X-shape occurred in the real world, it was not (and this is the important point) as a one-
off, but with a degree of regularity. How then should it be categorized in relation to nature? Schenk, 
as we have seen, still placed it in the realm of the merely unnatural. Another writer, though, calls it 
“as if [tamquam] praeternatural,” bringing in the ever-flexible pointy-headed Thersites to illustrate 
its “uncertain” status.38 Vesalius himself had wavered between the two: 
Unnatural head shapes can sometimes be seen even among perfectly respectable citizens, though 
one rarely finds them in cemeteries. However, they would be seen to occur often if we could open 
up the cemeteries of people in the Styrian Alps, since these people’s heads are deformed not only 
in this way but also in further ways that are more outlandish.39 
“Unnatural” here means the T and X shapes. But his train of thought seems to carry him 
uninterruptedly along a continuum from these shapes, observed in some of his respectable peers, 
to something more extreme, exemplified by the oafish monstrosity of Alpine peasants. 
Once again, it seems to drive home a Lutheran point about the variety among human individuals 
and their relationships with God. It also returns us to the point made above (see Chapter 12) about 
causes, and the collapse of the conventional tripartite division between natural, unnatural and 
praeternatural ones. For the time being it was accepted that providence and “the almighty power of 
God may overcome … violent and praeternatural” defects of the “few” who are “so monstrously 
dull and sottish.”40 Nevertheless, a polarization had begun. The fusion between unnatural and 
praeternatural is so complete in modern medicine as to be unrecognizable as such; they form a 
single category, the “abnormal.” This coincides with the rise of modern biology, which sprang 
partly from a drive for tighter definitions of species. The praeternatural, with its intimation of 
origins beyond nature, was imported into natural history, with the result that certain human-looking 
creatures became increasingly seen as classifiable in some non-human or interstitial category. 
Growing anxiety about the borderline between humans and the other animals marks the general 
passage from Renaissance to Enlightenment accounts of the scale of nature. It was no antiquarian 
whim that led the great Enlightenment (and Calvinist) medical authority Herman Boerhaave 
to republish the anatomical works of the school of Vesalius from two centuries earlier. One of 
Vesalius’s disciples, Bartolomeus Eustachius, began his textbook on cerebral anatomy with an 
attack on previous writers who had maliciously confused the cranial sutures of humans with 
those of apes.41 What else but an atheistic ill will could explain their blurring of the line between 
humans and other animals? Although the Vesalian anatomists still defended Galenist theory in 
broad principle, they chose the evidence of their own eyes whenever their dissections contradicted 
it. Eustachius could therefore cast his opponents as anti-Galenists who perversely followed the 
ancient master without empirical justification, precisely where the poor man had been wrong. 
It was well known, said Eustachius, that Galen only ever dissected non-human animals, so his 
description of the sutures must have been inaccurate. In humans, the sutures “as drawn on the page 
most elegantly imitate the multiform lines of the geographer,” whereas in apes “they are obscure, 
so that for the most part they deserve the name of sutures scarcely or not at all.” Galen’s description 
fitted the simplicity of the simian skull. In the human skull, by contrast, the sutures vary from one 
individual to the next; and the two arms of the lambdoid suture will often be of unequal length. 
Eustachius’s urge to keep humans separate from apes, on the grounds of their anatomical diversity, 
38 Ingrassia, In Galeni Librum de Ossibus, 64.
 
39 De Humani, 16.
 
40 Samuel Parker, A Demonstration, 10.
 











248 A History of Intelligence and “Intellectual Disability” 
led him to insist on the viability of Galen’s “impossible” type: “I publicly dissected fifteen [human]
skulls in one day where the coronal suture was absent,” he says. Monkeys were emblematic of the
devil, and the deceptive similarity of their sutural layout to the human skull was in fact merely a crude
and ridiculous imitation. In short, Eustachius was expressing moral difference in anatomical terms. 
Locke, another medical man, expressed this moral difference in terms of a natural history of the 
mind. When Da Monte in the Renaissance had observed Little Johnny, he was not trying to answer 
the question “What does an intellectual disability look like?” Rather, he was asking, “What does 
it mean for an apparently human creature not to have a rational soul?” When Locke at the start of 
the Enlightenment observed a permanent, birth-to-death absence of reason in his “changelings,” 
he was still asking the same question, as in some sense is today’s psychologist. However, he was 
doing so now in a context where the soul or mind was a separate, autonomous realm of nature. 
Thus it is not models of a transhistorical cognitive impairment that follow a diagnostic continuity 
to modern from pre-modern; it is doctors’ attitudes to monstrosity and, more generally, our social 
phobia about contamination, that do so. The continuity is an anthropological one. 
It is true that some of the old diagnostic criteria did carry on. Physiognomists were still around in 
the nineteenth century, conducting blindfold tests on skulls to see whether they belonged to peasants 
or geniuses (such was the antithesis), and contributing to phrenology and eventually to intelligence 
testing.42 Locke’s account of the changeling, however, had been a refutation of physiognomics. A
deformed body was precisely not a sign of deformed personality or intellect; the mind was quite 
capable of being deformed by itself. Nevertheless, Locke’s new model of permanent disability of 
a strictly intellectual kind emerged partly with the aid of the old physiognomics, which succeeded 
in adapting to mind-body dualism and became a commonplace of eighteenth- and nineteenth-
century explanations of behaviour. The transfer across to the realm of the mind was just one stage 
in the unceasing medical construction and reconstruction of monsters. The “darkness” and “blind 
ignorance” brought about by deprivation of a faculty could now be detected by what Locke called 
“the physiognomy of the mind.”43 
Some reflection of these changes in the wider culture can be seen in the iconography of 
dwarfism. Typically employed as court fools, Renaissance dwarfs like those sitting underneath 
Veronese’s banqueting tables display no facial signs of an inferior intellectual status. But by the 
1630s, when Velázquez depicted the Crown Prince of Spain alongside his dwarf, he was clearly 
setting off the moral and intellectual (as well as physical) perfections of the one against their 
assumed absence in the other. In another portrait, the short person’s expression is a vacant stupor, 
drawn from physiognomic convention.44 Medically, stupor was temporary or at most dispositional, 
but by attaching it to a permanently monstrous body Velázquez is making the expression itself, and 
the inner state it denotes, monstrous too. It is a foretaste of those nineteenth-century photographs 
depicting the gaze of the feeble-minded, the Jew, the Negro, etc. Like the supposed “vacant look” 
attributed to the intellectually disabled today, or the “lack of eye contact” in autism, what this 
stupor actually tells us about is a vacancy in the social relationship that does not (but, given other 
circumstances, might) come into play between them and us, as we gaze back at them. 
Another vanguard text to infiltrate traditional accounts of physical monstrosity into burgeoning 
ones of cognitive impairment is Nicholas Culpeper’s English translation, with commentary, of 
42 See G. Shuttleworth, Some of the Cranial Characteristics of Idiocy, 241; Michael Hagner, “Prolegomena 
to a history of radical brains,” Physis, 36/2 (1999); G. Lanteri-Laura, Histoire de la phrénologie; Robert 
Young, Mind, Brain and Adaptation in the Nineteenth Century. 
43 Some Thoughts, 6.94. 
44 Velázquez, “Prince Baltasar Carlos with a Dwarf,” Museum of Fine Arts, Boston; “Portrait of 
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Galen’s Art of Medicine. Its year of publication, 1652, coincides with the English translation of 
Luther’s seminal story about demonic changeling children (see Chapter 16), and the banning
of “idiots” of the juridical type from communion (see Chapter 11). Culpeper several times 
interpolates “fools” into Galen’s text. To take one example, Galen had simply said: 
A small head is the proper indication of a poor brain condition. A large head, however, does not 
necessarily indicate a good condition. But if it has become strong because the power residing in 
it has created matter that is useful as well as abundant, that is a good sign; if however because of 
abundance alone, that is not a good sign. 
Culpeper’s translation runs: 
A very small head is a proper indication of a vicious brain, and yet a great head doth not necessarily 
declare a strong brain; if there be not capacity enough in the skull to hold the brain, or a sufficient 
quantity of brain, the man must needs be a fool.45 
Slack adjectives yield to the firm smack of nouns. Likewise, in their translation of Platter, Culpeper 
(or more probably an associate) replaces Platter’s “the ignorant beget the torpid” with “drones 
beget drones.”46 We cannot tell whether the symptoms which Culpeper saw in his fools had much 
in common with those we identify in today’s disabled. The novelty was rather the emergence within 
medicine of a substantive medical type, involving natural causes that are also, like reprobation, 
necessary (they “must needs be”). 
In the mind-set of the doctor where the image of disability is moulded and remoulded, a longer-
term pattern can be seen. The Hippocratics had merely talked about four kinds of arrangement 
of the sutures. Galen added a hierarchy of values; one kind is “suitable” or ideal, three are 
progressively defective and he criticizes his predecessors for not describing a further type that 
would be monstrous. Even so, he said, this type can only exist in the imagination. Renaissance 
Galenists amplified the picture with an example of this further type which they claimed to have 
actually seen, even if it did not live for long: the type can exist in reality. Someone who says “It 
doesn’t exist” is followed by someone else who feels bound to say, “Yes it does.” So too with 
the historiography: Benzi cited his predecessor D’Abano as saying that he had seen one when in 
fact D’Abano had only said that it might exist. This ever-recurring exhaustion of doctors’ state 
of wonder at the separateness of monsters from the rest of nature has its own dialectic, always 
creating a new space in which to seek out ever more outlandish discoveries. The absence of sutures 
is inconceivable (Hippocrates); the inconceivable becomes conceivable but unviable (Galen); the 
conceivable but unviable becomes the viable but wondrous (Benzi). And once late nineteenth-
century physicians claimed to see sutural anomalies in the skulls of people with Down’s syndrome, 
the viable but wondrous becomes the abnormal but mundane; an 1881 medical photograph 
depicts the skull of “an idiot of the mongoloid type,” probably intended to show that it had only
one suture.47 In this passage from inconceivable to pathological, the wonder of nature is constantly 
lost and then rediscovered in precisely the form that was the previous limiting case. The limiting 
case would be a wonder if it could exist: then, hey presto, it does. 
As an apothecary, that is, a professional medic serving the lower and middling sort, Culpeper 
was as great an influence on the everyday practice of medicine for the next hundred years as 
45 Culpeper, Galens Art of Physick, 11.
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Sydenham and Locke were on its diagnostic method.48 The very act of translating a major teaching 
tool such as Galen’s Ars Medica into English was an act of political radicalism. In his preface 
Culpeper castigates the elite College of Physicians then in control of the profession, complains 
about their insistence on Latin to preserve their social and professional positions, and scoffs at their 
calculated esotericism. He applies the metaphor of monstrosity and species exclusion precisely to 
this professional elite and their reactionary defence of “that monster tradition, who seldom begets 
any children but they prove either fools or knaves, and this makes them so brutish.” One of their 
obscurantist tricks was the custom of putting a deformed skeleton on show in their surgeries to 
impress new patients, “a monster in the first room.”49 But Culpeper himself, when he inserted his 
“fool” into Galen’s text, was doing something similar. He helped to bring about a monstrosity 
which belonged in a separate and strictly intellectual sphere, and which had a much more rigorously 
determinate and excluded identity than previous kinds of monstrosity such as that in the doctor’s 
waiting room. Far from being, as the deformed skeleton had been, a demonstration of God’s 
power to create a rich tapestry of natural wonders (monstrare means to show or reveal), monsters 
permanently disabled from the newly prized forms of human reasoning demonstrated now, in the 
1650s, the praeternatural power of the devil. In this lies the modernity of intellectual disability. 
48 F.N.L. Poynter, “Nicholas Culpeper and his books,” Journal of the History of Medicine, 152. 
49 Culpeper, A Key to Galens Method, 139. 
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Philosophy, the Devil and “Special People”
 
The conceptual basis of our natural classifications of intellectual disability spans a whole complex 
of biology, psychology and ethics. The modern medical model and its concept of abnormality 
arose within this broader context of the life sciences, their approaches to the classification and 
subclassification of human nature and concomitant criteria of acceptance and rejection. In this first 
section we deal with issues which in earlier times were seen as metaphysical, lying further back
than nature – cause, identity, permanence – but which today are seen as belonging to nature, and 
form the starting point of scientific knowledge about our topic. We then progress to the question of 
how, in this natural realm, intellectually abnormal creatures appear. How are they generated: God’s 
work? The Devil’s? The parents’? These questions were being asked throughout the early modern 
period, and have been formative of the representation of intellectual disability prevalent today. 
Finally, we look at biological nature as a hierarchical scale. Where, objectively, does the possession 
of intellectual abilities situate human beings on this scale, and what subjective intellectual abilities 
of our own do we employ in assigning them there? Is there a link between these two questions? 
It may be a long time since any respectable biologist positioned human beings at the summit of 
all forms of life like a fairy on a Christmas tree, but human intelligence is another matter. Self-
regarding illusions about it are rife, and it certainly remains the case that those deemed to be 
exceptionally unintelligent have remained on the lowest branches. 
The ethics of indifference versus the ethics of exceptionalism 
Accounts of intelligence and disability as aspects of a specifically “human nature” involve a complex 
of psychological, biological and ethical expertises with a religious mind-set at its root. The three 
appear to exist separately, impinging on each other of course, but only externally, as independent 
disciplines. In the long historical perspective, however, they remain a single complex. They belong 
together as much now as they did when they were all part of a single, divinely authored “Book 
of Nature,” which medieval thinkers saw as complementing scripture and revealing the order of
the universe. 
The primary role of ethics is to obscure the fact that the complex is sustained by values rather 
than science. While in philosophy “ethics” (Greek) and “morals” (Latin) are the same thing, 
modern medicine treats them not just as different but as mutually repellent. Morals is private, 
individual reasoning; it is heterodox and can thus itself be idiotic. Indeed Robert Edwards, 2010 
Nobel Prizewinner in Medicine, has said that morals in the sense of knowingly bringing to term 
a disabled child may – thanks to biotechnology – be considered a “sin.”1 Ethics by contrast is 
objective public reasoning, or at least public relations; it provides routine endorsements for the 
biologist’s and psychologist’s treatment of certain people as problems. The scientific description 
of those problems is in fact no less value-based and historically contingent than that of the private 
moralist. Bioethics, with its partner biotechnology, is part of the tightening of the codes designed 
to preserve the dominance of intelligence as the self-referential mode of bidding for status.
Modern scientists have tended to see morals and ethics alike as separate from the natural world. 
 Lois Rogers, Sunday Times, London 4 July 1999. 1
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Ethics in our field, apart from the special case of evolutionary ethics, appears to shine a beacon 
from outside on a natural phenomenon. Nevertheless, scientific enquiry into people described as 
intellectually disabled and our ethical view of them are in fact indissoluble. How do we know the 
difference between them and us? How do we value them? These two questions are not just related, 
they are one and the same question. 
Behind them lies a further, unasked question: Why classify them in the first place? At philosophy’s 
more rarefied altitudes a non-classificatory inclusiveness has tended to prevail. Since inclusion is 
a binary notion dependent on that of exclusion, inclusiveness might better be called indifference: 
indifference, that is, to any supposed problem of social or species membership.2 Devising criteria 
that classify certain individuals as proper species members and others as not begs the question: 
what are the problems which classification exists to solve? Philosophers have tended not to see 
any. Once Hobbes, for example, began writing about laws of human nature, the idea might have 
occurred to him of exceptions to such laws. Yet he set minimal requirements for what it means to be 
human or to differ from other animals, and this led him to be accommodating to “fools.” Montaigne 
similarly cited deaf people: “Our deaf-mutes have discussions and arguments, telling each other 
stories by means of signs,” indicating that they can access the common ideas – but also that “We 
are neither above nor below the animals,” since animals make signs too. In this sceptical view, the 
distance in intellect “is more between some men and others, than it seems to be between some men 
and beasts … which is but a bad business, and not much for our honour.”3 Nevertheless, they are all 
men. Descartes, starting from the opposite premise of a stark difference between cogitating humans 
and machine-like animals, arrived at the same conclusion about borderline cases. Everyone – the 
deaf, “those deprived of their senses (mente capti) … all men, however foolish (stupidi)” – is at 
least capable of a few signs and consequently of typically human behaviour. Marginal cases belong 
on the human side of the line; they are the border lights revealing the adjacent darkness of beast 
machinery.4 Gassendi reached the same conclusion by a different route again, a celebratory one. In 
intellectual difference, he said, one discovers exciting new opportunities to enrich that definition: 
“Our idea of man since the discovery of America is richer and more perfect than that of the 
ancients,” and despite the variability of “sharpness” among human souls, one has to acknowledge 
that “no one is created with absolute mindlessness or stupidity.” As one Gassendist put it, we would 
otherwise have to “classify foolish and mindless people (stupidi ac amentes) with the brute beasts” 
as lacking souls – an obviously absurd notion.5 
Inclusive indifference thus encompasses positions whose premises are in most other respects 
antagonistic. Modern philosophy’s prime example is Ludwig Wittgenstein. First, he said, the 
customary notion of the human mind – that it is a place where thoughts are stored as ideas about 
the real world, prior to being expressed in language – is an occult one. Rather, there is language 
itself, its meanings belonging to their particular contexts; its stability, its rules, exist only as a 
set of varying language games which resemble each other as family members do, rather than as 
revealing a systematic, certain knowledge. Secondly, he asked, if language, allegedly characteristic 
of our species, cannot be said to express certain knowledge, how can it indicate any difference 
between humans and other animals? From this came the famous aphorism, “If a lion could talk, 
we could not understand him.” In other words, it is true that human knowledge and abilities are 
anthropologically diverse, relative rather than based around “common ideas”; however, this does 
2 Jayne Clapton, A Transformatory Ethic of Inclusion.
 
3 Montaigne, An Apology, 18; 24; Charron, Of Wisdom, i, 381.
 
4 Descartes, Discours de la méthode, 96. 
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not stop them from being characteristic of the human species as a whole. Rather, our language 
games constitute a specifically human “form of life,” with which the leonine form of life is mutually 
incommunicable. 
Wittgenstein’s notion of diversity is not that of the social constructionist or postmodernist; 
he leaves room for a deeper common denominator which I have elsewhere called “deep culture,” 
a cultural difference between human and other forms of life which renders differences among 
humans secondary.6 To support his argument, he uses the example of “mental defectives.” He may 
have got this idea from his close friendship with David Pinsent, dedicatee of his Tractatus Logico-
Philosophicus. Pinsent’s mother Ellen, who corresponded with Wittgenstein, was a eugenicist and 
an architect of segregated “special” schools, set up to prevent the interbreeding of mental defectives 
with the rest of the population as part of the Edwardian social hygiene movement. She had in her 
kinship group several famous physicians, including the second generation of the Langdon Down 
dynasty, which had by now strayed from the founder’s original aim of demonstrating the fully 
human moral worth of his patients and was supporting the eugenics movement. For Wittgenstein, 
however, the defective utterances of such people, incomplete though they were, belonged 
recognizably to the set of human language games and therefore indicated a human form of life. 
The existence of exactly these people, their participation in the deep culture of being human, was 
what made it possible to verify the unity of the human species, the possibility of a general human 
understanding and a certain knowledge that might prevail over mere relativism.7 
For behaviourists, by contrast, absence is all. Gilbert Ryle wrote: “A lion not only cannot be 
good at reasoning, he cannot even be bad, and an infant or an idiot not only cannot argue logically, 
he cannot even argue illogically. He cannot argue at all, and so gets neither good nor bad marks for 
his arguments, since these do not exist.”8 But this case aside, inclusive indifference tends to prevail 
at elevated altitudes, and breaks down only when philosophy descends to the political and ethical 
arena. What we find there is something quite different: an ethics of exceptionalism. The idea that 
certain people are “special” expresses some value, whether negative or (less often) positive, and 
it does indeed involve ethical concerns about classification. Bioethicists, for example, view the 
question of who is intellectually disabled as urgently as any seventeenth-century pastor viewed that 
of who was reprobate. For the pastor, certain creatures existed which had a human shape but an 
animal’s complete absence of conscience; and as we have seen, rational conscience – the defining 
component of the human essence for the orthodox Calvinist – was not so far from Locke’s
defining component, which was logical reasoning. Conscience, the accounting to oneself for one’s 
own thoughts and behaviour, operated by reason. People deficient in this sense were corpses: to be 
dead in Christ was to be dead in one’s reason. And to be in this state but also to be breathing and 
walking around might even mean you were the Devil who, though incorporeal, could certainly take 
on a human form. One might want to have eliminated such creatures from the outset. 
Similar fears about an invasion of the bodysnatchers underlie the medical model of intellectual 
disability. From these fears has sprung the appropriate biotechnology, which today makes 
realizable the pastor’s and the eugenicist’s dream of elimination without infanticide. Of course 
not all bioethics is eugenicist. Even when it is not, though, one assumes that a problem exists, a 
priori: that “difficult” decisions about life and death have to be made, even where the criteria are 
solely intellectual and hence a historically and socially moveable feast. The diagnostic technique 
which launched second-wave liberal eugenics, amniocentesis, was for just such intellectual criteria.
6 C.F. Goodey, “Learning difficulties and the guardians of the gene,” in A. Clarke and E. Parsons (eds), 
Culture, Kinship and Genes. 
7 Ludwig Wittgenstein, Remarks on the Philosophy of Psychology. 
8 Gilbert Ryle, A Rational Animal, 4. 
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The justification for termination and even euthanasia on these grounds offered by utilitarian 
bioethicists such as Peter Singer in his Rethinking Life and Death reprises the ethical stance Locke 
reached three centuries earlier. If we could know an infant would grow up to be a non-reasoner, 
said Locke, infanticide might be excusable.9 In excluding non-reasoning “changelings” from 
membership of the human species, he was defending man’s intellectual uniqueness against those 
faith-based sceptics like Montaigne, who doubted the difference between humans and animals. 
Changelings lack the membership criterion of logical reasoning, so they have to be classified among 
the brutes for ethical purposes even though their physical appearance is human. Singer, as Licia 
Carlson points out in The Faces of Intellectual Disability, ignores the history, heterogeneity and 
instability of the concept, and can therefore add little to this picture. He is merely more optimistic 
about imputing intelligence to monkeys (“a rational soul to a drill,” to use Locke’s formula). If 
monkeys are capable of Sign, might they not be classified in the same species as humans despite 
their physical difference, and be treated as human for ethical purposes? Conversely, if a human is 
unable to reason logically, then is not eugenics or infanticide justifiable? 
Our long-term historical perspective shows us that the simple act of posing such questions 
in the first place is the sign of a deeply religious mind-set. Locke and Singer both invoke the 
underlying principle of nominalism in order to deny species membership to the disabled. As we 
saw in Chapter 8, this says that only particulars (individual creatures) are real; universal categories 
(species) are not themselves real; they are merely names we agree on to describe sets of particulars 
which appear to have shared characteristics, and which are therefore potentially changeable, by 
consensus. In naming certain individuals as members of a category (e.g., the “human species”), 
we are merely following some subjective inclination that prevents our knowledge of the world 
from being chaotic. And if it is characteristic of the human species to be rational, a permanently 
non-rational human is a contradiction in terms. However, also inherent in Locke-Singer’s affected 
humility about our ability to know real essences of species is the possibility that there is some 
higher authority who truly does know. As Singer himself says in the opening sentence of his 
Animal Liberation, “to end tyranny we must first understand it.” Some Catholic thinkers espoused 
nominalism in order to justify papal control over the imposition of universal categories. Luther and 
Calvin were nominalists too, on the grounds that only God can know universals. Either way, the 
possibility that there is some superior authority somewhere who really knows which individuals 
belong to which species survives in the nominalist approach adopted by modern bioethics. If it 
were genuinely the case that species boundaries have no real existence in nature, there would be 
no absolute basis in truth for proposing members or excluding non-members. One would have to 
admit that one was choosing subjective criteria for membership of the species and then eliminating 
the exceptions, and that this was no more than an arbitrary exercise of power over the powerless. 
This would be impossible, unless one were a psychopath. Species boundaries must therefore be 
real in some sense, even for the nominalist. 
Locke was forced as a result to come up with the novel and contradictory phrase “nominal 
essence”; he retained the noun and simply attached a new, oxymoronic qualifier to it. Before
Locke, essences had been nothing other than “real” categories, created as such by God; sorting things 
into categories “nominally” suggested that categories were mere names, created by human beings, 
and therefore in the last resort not essences at all. Yet Locke nowhere says that real essences do not 
exist, only that the most we can do is approximate to them (previous nominalists had maintained that 
we cannot even do that). Without a similar sense of quasi-reality, and without the implicit presence 
of some superior authority to uphold it, today’s bioethicists could scarcely support the measures 
of which biotechnology is now capable. If the classification of human beings were arbitrary, there 
Locke, An Essay, 453. 9
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would be no difference between compassion and hatred as motives for eradicating disability. What 
then is that superior ethical authority? It seems in fact to be the authors’ own. Locke’s nominalist 
scepticism about the fixity of species boundaries was the stepping-stone to a new positivity about 
defining membership of the human species in accordance with the individual’s rationality rather 
than his morphology. Singer in all these respects is Locke’s heir. It is true that both men claim their 
approach is probabilistic, based on a willingness to accept a balance of evidence rather than from 
what they would like to be true. But where is the guarantee that they have exorcized their own 
teleological tendencies? Having sceptically dismantled the existing realist view of the membership 
criterion for being human (bodily nature), Singer has no further inclination to any scepticism: his 
own revised choice of criterion (rationality and intelligence) just is the right one. He himself, with 
that presupposition, is the higher authority. He can then oppose religion’s dogmatic sanctity-of­
life arguments with his own, equally dogmatic reordering of species boundaries by rationality and 
intelligence. Meanwhile, from the religious substructure of bioethics comes the smoke of metaphor 
from a really existing fire: the “Book of Life” (the human genome); “virgin birth” (parthenogenesis, 
embryos bred without male genetic material); and “remaking Eden” (germ-line engineering). 
The modern biologist takes a purportedly nominalist approach to definitions of species: they are 
only ever an approximation. Nevertheless, when it comes to determining the boundaries of our own 
species, bioethics reverts with remarkable alacrity to straightforward realism. It just knows where 
the boundaries lie, and they are psychological ones. The most frequently cited ethical argument 
for the use of biotechnology in eliminating potential lives is not hatred but compassion: relief 
of suffering. But medicine’s official role of preventing harm is inseparable from its shamanistic 
claim, based on psychology, to know what is present and absent in the mind. To attack bioethics 
and preventive biotechnology on the grounds that this knowledge is not value neutral, as many 
critics do, is only half the story. Bioethics is not just a particular view about this knowledge, as 
if it were (say) a camera giving a different take on the same event according to the values of the 
person operating it. It constitutes that knowledge: it presupposes what is and is not in the mind, and 
the consequent suffering of certain singled-out individuals. This presupposition is inscribed in a 
liberal culture whose notions of suffering can be quite trivial and, as Hans Reinders puts it, “send 
the message that life is more worth living the less trouble it takes.”10 Moreover, one might think 
that only sufferers can make judgements about their own suffering. It is hard to see how “disabled” 
individuals, whose disability is said to consist in a lack of understanding, can understand that they 
suffer from lack of understanding. On the contrary, an “autistic” person who likes dancing naked in 
the street when it rains clearly enjoys being autistic, whatever the problems raised in other people’s 
minds. Intellectual suffering is no fit topic for scientific critique or empirical knowledge; and the 
problem is all the more acute when the supposed sufferer is a foetus rather than a living creature 
whom one might get to know. 
The negative stereotype conceals within itself a deeper, more fundamental thought: that there 
may be certain lives that ought not to happen. This is not yet a thought about suffering or about 
intellectual disability: it is prior to any specificity as to who is being discussed. The core thought 
is that a potential life of whatever kind should not take place. This “to be or not to be,” irrespective 
as yet of what human characteristic it is that ought not to be, already contains its own ethical 
premise: certain creatures exist that ought not to. The question of who exactly these creatures 
are takes historically shifting and contingent forms, within the longer-term utilitarian ethic of 
exceptionalism. In its modern form, the suffering attached to “intellectual” disability is a projected 
anxiety of the large in-group whose status is expressed through the mode of intelligence. From a 
broader historical perspective, the utilitarianism is of a deeper, more explicitly religious kind, in 
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which the desire to end suffering goes with a fear of the disabled person’s pollution of the sacred 
rite of intelligence – that same rite which confirms, for the intelligent, their species membership. 
Jeremy Bentham may have replaced “Is this person rational?” with “Does he suffer?” as the crucial 
ethical concern, but there is a difference between wanting to end the imagined suffering of others 
and wanting to keep the imagined suffering of others away from oneself. 
It is important to recognize that the ethics of exceptionalism can point in an optimistic as well 
as a negative direction. In the words of one Renaissance medical writer on faculty psychology, 
“the innocent souls of children and the foolish” do not suffer because “they do not commit sins 
of the flesh and therefore do not know what it is to endure deprivation of sinful bodily pleasures.” 
One might therefore want more foolish people around rather than less.11 What psychologists and 
doctors have stereotyped in Down’s syndrome as an infantile affectionateness, a pathology of the 
developmental plateau, both Down himself and Jérôme Lejeune (discoverer with Marthe Gautier of 
the 21 trisomy) stereotyped instead as a gift of intense fellow feeling. The isolation of a biochemical 
element in Down’s syndrome has led to the possibility of eliminating this characteristic, but if one 
did indeed see it as superior, as both those key historical figures did, one might want to engineer 
it into the human germ-line of the human species. Eugenic technology – Lejeune himself was a 
biotechnician – may go with any values it chooses. However, in both sets of values, negative and 
optimistic, the core component is one and the same: it is the singularity of the suffering/gift, which 
isolates certain people as exceptions to a classificatory rule. The alternative to both is inclusive 
indifference, and the distinction between indifference and exceptionalism is more fundamental 
than the distinction within the latter between suffering and gift. 
Disability and the Devil 
In order to understand how social anxieties about intelligence are transposed into natural criteria 
for membership of the human species, we need to know how it is generated and enters the world in 
the first place. The majority theory, laid down by Avicenna, was that the rational soul is generated 
by God, who “infuses” it into the foetus a certain (disputed) number of days after the vegetative 
soul, responsible for motion, and subsequently the animal soul, responsible for the external senses. 
His infusion of the rational soul was generic to all humans; individual differences in earthly wit 
were secondary and tied to the body. The existence of the rational soul was deductively proven 
from God’s existence and was thus demonstrably present in everyone, however problematic their 
intellects or behaviours. By the end of the sixteenth century, inroads into this theory had come from 
the theory of “traducianism.” “Who hath put the wisdom in the inward parts?” asks the Book of 
Job. Traducianists answered that it was parents who generated the rational soul and were therefore 
the natural cause of personality differences in offspring. Here we find a source for later, biological 
theories of hereditary intelligence. And if the offspring were deficient, co-participants in the act 
of generation were suggested: animals, or purely spiritual beings such as the Devil’s incubi and 
succubi, who have sex with witches and then insert the semen they have gathered into women with 
lustful imaginations. Devil and parents alike, or together, could be sources of pollution. 
Traducianism in general was an ancient theory, but its prominence in debate, like that of the
Devil, was new. Both were on the increase during the seventeenth century, in tandem with
the glimmerings of modern science. Although presentist historians of science like to think of devil 
beliefs as an archaism that gradually receded over a long historical period, in fact they were gathering 
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strength over the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries.12 They were partly fuelled by the confluence 
between theories of nature and those of election/reprobation: “Satan findeth his own seed in us 
by nature … a sprouting, and child of the house of Hell …. In Satan’s fools the right principle of 
wisdom is extinguished.”13 Later on, in the nineteenth century, when original sin was rephrased 
as degeneracy, demonic pollution would be rephrased as self-pollution. It became widely known 
that the cause of idiocy was masturbating parents: a mundane reconstitution of incubus theory, 
with the historical gap bridged by concepts of nocturnal pollution.14 It was from the reproductive 
role of the Devil among deficient, socially inferior or self-abusing parents that modern biological 
notions of intellectual disability emerged; the language is still being used by Langdon Down when 
he writes how “the largest proportion of idiocy is to be found amongst the lower orders, … where 
the afflicted child is not only a consuming member, but an incubus, paralyzing the efforts of the 
productive class.”15 
Devil beliefs and the modern medical model share several tacit presuppositions. First among 
these is fear. If definitions of disability are historically short term, the ethics of anxiety and the 
social phobia about pollution in general are long term. We understand people from another era best, 
wrote the historian Raymond Aron, if we know what they feared. In a broad sense we are still afraid 
of the same thing. Early modern people were scared of reprobate imitators and hypocrites: that you 
are not who you seem to be, or you are not who you say you are, or you are not the same person 
you were yesterday or will be tomorrow. This fear is focused on the creature who looks human but 
is not, because he seems not to exhibit the defining feature of your own species essence – whether 
this be the reasoning conscience of 1600 or the cognitive ability of 2000. The works of the Devil 
re-emerge as the works of genetic abnormality. 
Secondly there is shamanism, religion’s characteristic activity of administering control over 
presence/absence.16 This was encouraged by the dualistic approach to mind and body. The more 
the mind is seen as a natural entity in its own right, rather than (as previously) form to the body’s 
matter, the more it can be a supernatural entity too. It is easier to spirit away an invisible mind than 
one that is an organic facet of a visible body. Disability as imbalance has at the same time been 
replaced by disability as absence, and absence implies removal – prompting the thought, removal 
by some malevolent being. 
That thought leads, thirdly, to our preoccupation with cause. As we have already noted, this is 
something modern. Asking what causes a disability and asking who is to blame are two questions 
with one premise. If there were no phobia and hence no responsibility to allocate, one would not
be interested in causes. The notions of explanation and abnormality are mutually reinforcing. Why,
when this particular person is born, is an explanation required for his or her identity when for most
others no such question arises? In proposing a cause for something, one thereby presupposes and 
reinforces the reality of the thing caused. The ontological fragility of a status concept like intelligence
demands that causes be located in the realm of hard indisputable reality, to lend it extra credence. 
Causes exist along a spectrum from the microcosm of the individual to macrocosmic, universal
forces: from the immediate, material nature of the body (qualities of elements, humours, soul spirits, 
genes), to external nature (astrological influence, parental sexual behaviour, the environment), to 
some supernature beyond which no further explanation is possible (God, the Devil). The power of 
psychiatric medicine derives from these latter, from the explanations that lie furthest back along the
12 See Stuart Clark, Thinking with Demons.
 
13 Samuel Rutherford, The Trial and Triumph of Faith, 31. 

14 Samuel Gridley Howe, On the Causes of Idiocy, 32.
 
15 The Education and Training of the Feeble in Mind, 65. 





260 A History of Intelligence and “Intellectual Disability” 
causal spectrum: stories of saving and negative grace, of innocence and original sin and of “Christ 
the physician.” The world is in need of healing. Incurability provokes despair and its fellows, 
disgust and hatred. Medical science’s interest in the causal connection from bodily difference to 
intellectual difference is at root an interest in our salvation. Its overwhelming power in Lockean 
and post-Lockean accounts of intelligence and disability marks an advance on earlier periods, when 
medicine and philosophy were assumed only to deal with secondary causes since God and the Devil 
were beyond explanation. The Devil is the ultimate cause assumed in Locke’s psychopathology in 
the same way that God is in Newton’s physics: remote, unmentioned, indispensable. 
Fourthly there is the interest in moral consequences. Although it was the atheist Bentham 
who coined the term “utilitarianism,” the roots of the doctrine itself are, as Fenn describes them, 
religious ones. When the Reformation ditched belief in purgatory, with it went the comforting 
thought that the spirits of the dear departed could come back from the afterworld for an occasional 
visit. Spirits as such were not ditched, though. Instead, they became associated with the Devil alone, 
whose influence in this world remained an absolute presupposition. They became the agents of the 
disorder he creates in our everyday world. Religious utilitarianism focused on happiness in the 
next life but also on these unwanted consequences for life on earth. The task of tackling the Devil’s 
pollution of our lives, in its bioethical form, consists in the cost-benefit analysis of the supposed 
fiscal problems created by the presence of intellectually disabled people in the intelligence society, 
and their pollution of our status as its members of it; the bioethicists’ precursors were the early 
theorists of welfare such as Vives and Baxter. 
Last among these shared presuppositions between devil beliefs and the medical model is the 
tension between appearance and reality. In late medieval and Renaissance thought, there was 
continual dispute between those who argued that the Devil could create both illusions and real 
works, and those who argued that he could only create illusions. The purpose of illusions was to 
sow chaos. In the illusionist or apparitionist view, “devils cannot create any nature or substance, 
but in juggling show or seeming only”; you did not need to believe the Devil has really caused this 
or that in order to believe in his existence.17 Even for apparitionists, the apparitions were in their 
own way real; and even realists usually denied that “the Devil can make a true creature,” since “to 
make a true creature of any sort, by producing the same [sort] out of the causes, is a work serving 
to continue the creation” and that is God’s work alone.18 Nevertheless, inquisitors and witch finders 
would have been doing themselves out of a job if spirits and changeling children were not real in 
some sense. The realists interpreted the idea that such children were mere apparitions as a denial, 
a heresy which it was their job to purge. 
Some such opposition between apparitionist and the realist views has survived from these 
early accounts of substituted children through to psychiatric accounts of the twenty-first century. 
“Coping theory,” which describes how parents and families come to accept as reality the scientific 
diagnosis of disability in a child, is a realist doctrine of a similar and historically related kind. 
This axiom of psychological and medical practice identifies in parents the “natural” process of 
a multistage psychiatric disorder which begins with denial of the diagnosis, then leads through 
structured, clearly identifiable phases – typically shock, rejection of the child, guilt, anger, 
then a specific anger against professionals – and finally to acceptance. Moreover, it prescribes
this ritual disorder, which parents have to agree on unless they are to be labelled deniers and 
heretics. They must accept the child, but with the essential precondition that they undergo these 
purgative stages before doing so, thus confirming that they have accepted the child’s intellectually
monstrous character. 
17 Daniel Winkler, De Vita Foetus in Utero, 30. 










The Wrong Child: 

Changelings and the Bereavement Analogy
 
Coping theory is the intelligence society’s desanctification ritual. Parents, so runs the formula, have 
to “grieve for the child they have not had” as if they had undergone genuine bereavement, before 
they can accept the disabled one. To put this in its longer-term historical context: if parents do not 
grieve, it means that they have succumbed to the apparitionist heresy by not accepting the reality 
of evil. They must be encouraged to do so. For the psychologist, then, parental acceptance means, 
if not quite in these words, “I accept the expert estimate of my child as a monster.” For the social 
anthropologist, on the other hand, it means “I accept that my child is human, not the monster the 
expert led us to believe”; parents simply expand their concept of normal to include the new arrival.1 
In psychiatric terms the latter amounts to denial. Parents must come to accept, and the content of 
their acceptance has to be that which the theory has prescribed for them. Indeed, many accounts 
of coping theory subdivide the “anger” stage of parental recovery into two: anger at the event, and 
anger at the professional who has revealed the diagnosis – thereby accounting for any resistance 
to the coping model. Once this multistage process of disorder and recovery is complete, the family 
must then embark on a second prescribed acceptance, this time of the fact that the pathological 
intellect in its midst makes it a pathological institution: the “disabled family.” Parents, it is said, 
resort to clothing themselves in a spurious normality. They may allot the child a role in the family 
akin to that which they allot to their other children, but this inclusive indifference is supposedly a 
low-level prolongation of denial: making the best of a bad job.2 
Changeling stories: the origins 
Coping theory and the bereavement analogy have their origin in past accounts of creatures 
substituted by devils, witches and fairies, as the explanation for the arrival of a disabled child. 
Having long disowned the theory in that particular form, psychiatry has conserved it by imputing 
the concept of child substitution to parents instead; the appearance of a disabled child implies the 
existence of another (normal) child who has been taken away and for whom the parents mourn. 
This has the effect of focusing all anxiety on the disabled child. Pieter Brueghel the Elder’s painting
The Blue Cloak, known sometimes as The World Turned Upside Down or The Wrong World, stands 
on the threshold of this historical shift.3 Filled with images of sin and social disorder, including 
one of a devil-possessed child in the grip of an equally malign carer, it depicts a world corrupted 
by the Fall, where the child is not some pathological specimen but represents the malignity in all 
of us. Changeling theory, in its modern form, has replaced this general signifier with an image of 
1 See R. Bogdan et al., “Be Honest but Not Cruel,” in P. Ferguson (ed.), Interpreting Disability; Dick 
Sobsey, “Family transformation,” in R. Friedlander and Sobsey (eds), Through the Lifespan; Tim Booth, 
“From normal baby to handicapped child,” Sociology, 12 (1978); Tim Stainton and H. Besser, “The positive 
impact of children with an intellectual disability on the family,” Journal of Intellectual and Developmental 
Disability, 23 (1998); H. Reinders, The Future, 60. 
2 Margaret Voysey, A Constant Burden. 
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the wrong child, an individual on whom the whole weight of the world’s disorder is projected. The 
post-Reformation redrawing of the family, as an institution giving children a more distinct status 
and requiring from them both closer spiritual companionship and a tighter degree of obedience on 
everyday matters, made those less likely to conform more visible, and more problematic.4 
Roughly from the beginnings of the Royal Society to the early nineteenth century, “changeling” 
came to mean not only a substituted child but something like an intellectually disabled person in 
the modern sense: the term has a Protean range that will emerge in the course of this section. A
modern interpretation of changeling stories is that they were a projection of the parental instinct 
to reject the child, an explanation that appears to traverse historical and cultural boundaries. In 
fact the rejection, then as now, is that of an in-group which is seeking to impose watertight natural 
explanations on arbitrary social exclusions. The authority of today’s psychiatrist and yesterday’s 
theologian alike is based on the claim that distinguishing the real from the merely apparitional is 
the route to objective knowledge, and that their own discipline is uniquely capable in this respect. 
The grand historical narrative assumes a complete opposition between present-day scientific 
explanations for disability and the “folkloric” explanations of the past. But we shall see shortly 
how it was psychiatry’s elite theological precursors who invented the so-called folk tales in the 
first place. 
Just as today’s professional elite reproduces its anxieties about the child by projecting them on 
to lay parents, so the story has been projected on to primitive historical others. Here is the house 
journal of the British paediatric profession: 
The advance of science during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries slowly but surely eroded 
the popular belief that malformed and retarded children likely were not human at all, but rather 
the offspring of some demon … that could be neglected, abused and put to death with no moral 
compunctions. As these theological explanations for retardation gave way to medical explanations, 
community values and personal attitudes changed to such an extent that the very word ‘changeling’
… and their equivalents in other languages now have become historical curiosities, survivals of 
beliefs and practice that helped our northern European forebears … face the problems of life and 
death when confronted with mentally or physically defective children.5 
The notion of the substituted child “allowed [parents] to focus their aggression directly on the
child since, of course, it was not their own,” and the guilt which they might otherwise have 
internalized and seen as punishment for their sins was projected on to it. This author runs together 
“popular” and “theological” as if they were the same thing. It is true that theological expertise in 
the past was not separated from popular culture to the degree that scientific expertise is separated 
from lay beliefs today. Nevertheless, theological claims were the expert ones of their time. Our 
assumption that the substitute child story is popular in origin comes rather from the promotional 
efforts of knowledge elites, whether theological or psychiatric. The same went for witchcraft 
beliefs. Early modern professionals made a point of distancing themselves from the taint of social 
vulgarity; they discarded what had once been their own doctrines by pathologizing them as popular 
beliefs of the lower classes, who exhibit them as a “natural” form of cognitive dysfunction.6 In 
actual fact the changeling theory, at least as it relates to disability, is far from a folk myth; its origins 
are those of psychology itself, and of expert modern systemizations of human behaviour. Although 
the Brothers Grimm, the seminal modern folklore compilers, insisted on the rude and peripheral 
4 See Lawrence Stone, The Family, Sex and Marriage in England 1500–1800, 101 ff. 
5 David Ashliman, cited in J. Leask, “Evidence for autism in folklore?” Archives of Disease in 
Childhood, 90/271 (2005). 
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roots of the story in Germanic fairy literature, the ultimate textual sources come from the core of 
Western theology and its growing interest in the Devil. 
This process begins with Augustine’s commentary on Psalm 17 of the Vulgate Bible (18 in the 
Authorized Version): 
Children not worthy of being called mine, aliens who were rightly told “You are of your father 
the Devil,” have lied to me.… These estranged children [filii alieni], to whom I brought the New 
Testament that they might be restored, have retained the old man within them. And they have 
limped away from their path. Lame in one foot because they held to the old path, they rejected the 
New Testament and became cripples. 
The physical disability seems to be a metaphor for the Jews’ deviation from the New Testament path, 
which Cassiodorus a century later made explicit. “This clearly happened with the Jews,” he says. 
They had “weak minds,” “spoke irrationally” and had attention deficit, “with nothing constant in 
their mind.”7 Labeo Notker, the tenth-century German translator of these texts, embellished them. 
He, or more likely a shortsighted copyist, coined for the Jews the word Wechselkinder (literally, 
“exchanged children”).8 The underlying message remained the same: God’s degenerate offspring, 
succoured by the Devil, were the Jews as a whole. Notker was talking about their false doctrine, not 
about child substitution. Luther too, despite providing elsewhere one of the chief source texts for 
the child substitution story, glossed this particular passage as being about a whole degenerate race 
rather than about substitute children.9 Notker merely coined the word itself, Wechselkind; he was 
not responsible for the actual substitution story, though historians have made him out to be so.10 
The earliest extant text to mention child substitution comes two centuries later from William of 
Auvergne, Bishop of Paris: 
You should not overlook accounts of infants who conventionally [vulgo] are called cambiones
[exchanged children], which are mostly old wives’ tales: that they are the children of demonic 
incubi, substituted by demons … as if swapped and substituted to female parents for their own 
children. These are said to be thin, always wailing, drinking so much milk that it takes four wet-
nurses to feed one. They are observed to stay with their wet-nurses for many years, after which 
they fly away, or rather vanish.11 
Vulgo, in theological dispute, refers not so much to the vulgar crowd as to those fellow theologians 
from whom one is distancing oneself: the crowd of one’s peers. William may have been arguing 
against doctrinaires who believed that such children have a real existence – most probably the 
Dominicans, who were building an academic base at the University of Paris at this time. He sees 
the children not as generated by some real, para-sexual means but as “malign apparitions” (hence 
his self-correction from “fly away” to “vanish”), possibly of demonic origin but “permitted to 
appear for some divine purpose.” They belonged in the realm of appearances; only the Almighty 
himself could create things for real (this was the long-standing patristic view).12 When he says 
7 E. Dekkers and J. Fraipont, Sancti Aurelii Augustini Enarrationes in Psalmos. 
8 P. Tax, Notker Latinus, 56; P. Piper, Die Schriften Notkers und seiner Schule, vi; see also Goodey 
and Tim Stainton, “Intellectual disability and the myth of the changeling myth,” Journal of the History of the 
Behavioral Sciences, 37/3 (2001). 
9 E. Roach and R. Schwartz (eds), Martin Luthers Wolfenbütteler Psalter, 65.
 
10 Gisela Piaschewski, Der Wechselbag, 12; Jean-Claude Schmitt, The Holy Greyhound, 75.
 
11 William of Auvergne, De Universo, in Opera, 1072.
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the realist view is “old wives’ tales” and “senile delirium,” he is not referring to some supposed 
folklore but insulting an academic opponent. 
A corresponding account of the child substitution story from the other side of the dispute 
comes in the Popular Sermons of Jacques de Vitry, William’s contemporary at Paris.13 Unlike 
William, who wrote on philosophical topics, De Vitry, as a Dominican, participated in the first 
papal inquisitions and was concerned with the practicalities of purging heresy. He wrote these 
sermons for ordinary priests unused to preaching; it was partly a way of training them to implement 
the church’s centralization policy by unifying the diverse religious observances that still existed 
at local levels. De Vitry asked the priest to push each sermon home with an exemplum or moral 
fable “for those who find it hard to understand.” The exempla were subsequently filleted from the 
volume, circulated widely (the child substitution story among them) and became the founding 
texts for the many collections of moral fables that were an early modern literary genre. Many of 
them insist on the reality of demons, a common Dominican theme. By convention exempla came 
at the end of a sermon. However, in de Vitry’s original manuscript the child substitution story is 
not actually an exemplum but comes under the heading of testimonia; these carried the authority of 
previous authors and were placed at the beginning. This underlines the story’s importance. Child 
substitution was reality, not appearance. 
The story was designed to lead congregations to accept the reality of the Devil in their lives and 
therefore of God. It is set alongside other stories which all convey the same message: empirical 
evidence shows that the Devil exists, therefore religion is true and philosophy inadequate. A half-
eaten loaf is the work of the Devil, not mice; when you look in the mirror and see the Devil staring 
back, it really is him. Likewise the substitution of children by malign, demonic forces, “children 
called chamium [sc. cambio] who suck dry many wet nurses yet do not benefit or grow, but have a 
hard, distended belly.” One “purges” (cures) a doubting congregation by forcing them to admit the 
reality of what others regard as an apparition. The British Folk-Lore Society republished De Vitry’s 
exempla alongside the Grimms’ “folk” tales at the start of the twentieth century, when first-wave 
eugenics was at its height.14 There are close structural comparisons between De Vitry’s story and 
motivation and the psychiatrist’s normalization of disordered parents by making them accept the 
reality of their bereavement and the pathology of the creature they have ended up with. Both aim 
to eliminate all signs of non-acceptance (“denial”) as if it were heresy. 
After William and De Vitry, the story was reproduced by several German theologians who
endorsed the latter’s realist approach. Substitute children, says Nicolas of Jauer, are “themselves
demons, not … apparitions generated by demons.” These authors underline the immediate 
presence of the supernatural and of praeternatural causes in people’s lives, as an incentive to
piety; if the Devil is the real source for the evil of changelings, it proves that God alone, not 
any earthly authority, is the real source of grace.15 These elements then coalesce in the famous
Malleus Maleficarum (“The Hammer of Witches”) of 1486, the most frequently cited text in the 
later blossoming of the story. Its authors, like De Vitry, were Dominican inquisitors. Their fullest 
reference to the story runs: 
Some women have their own sons and daughters taken away by demons and substituted with 
strange children [filii alieni]. Commonly called campsores, or in German Wechselkinder, they 
come in three different kinds. Some are always emaciated and howling, even though four women’s 
13 Sermones Vulgares, Bibliothèque Nationale, Paris, ms. 17509, 77.
 
14 T. Crane, The Exempla or Illustrative Stories from the Sermones Vulgares of Jacques de Vitry, 129.
 
15 Nicolaus of Jauer, in A. Franz, Der Magister, 155; Dietrich of Münster, in J. Hansen, Quellen und 
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milk cannot satisfy a single one of them. Others are produced by the work of an incubus, though 
they are not its sons, but sons of men whose semen the incubus has collected as a succubus, or 
from nocturnal pollution.16 
The authors were trying to get local clergy to face up to the Devil’s dislocation of social life: 
changelings were like plague. They say nothing about any cognitive elements in such creatures, 
though an earlier German author (on whom the authors of the Malleus drew heavily) had said that 
they were “without speech.”17 The focus here and in succeeding texts is on how changelings are 
generated; though the Devil lacks the ability to generate new natural creatures, he is real enough, 
and he uses the natural magic of incubi and succubi to transfer semen. 
The fact that the Malleus did not become a major source for writers on witchcraft until a century 
after its publication helps to show how interest in the Devil and natural magic was increasing 
rather than diminishing over this period. The other main source for the child substitution story, 
Luther’s, also surfaced only posthumously. His Tischreden, published in 1566 and first translated 
into English as Colloquia Mensalia, or Table Talk in 1652, mentions the story several times.18 The 
most detailed version begins with the Devil taking the shape of a man’s dead wife. Luther says that 
their offspring were “not right human creatures, but devils … very horrible and fearful examples, 
in that Satan can plague and so torment people as to beget children.” He then distinguishes between 
this example and a second type, where the Devil simply swaps one creature for another: 
The Devil can also steal children away … and other children called supposititii or changelings 
[Wechselkinder] laid in their places …. At Dessau I did see and touch such a changed child which 
was twelve years of age; he had his eyes and all members like another child: he did nothing but 
feed, and would eat as much as two clowns or threshers were able to eat. When one touched it, 
then it cried out. When any evil happened in the house, then it laughed, and was joyful; but when 
all went well, then it cried and was very sad. I told the Prince of Anhalt, if I were prince of that 
country, so would I venture homicidium thereon and would throw it into the River Moldau. I 
admonished the people in that place devoutly to pray to God to take away the Devil; the same 
was done accordingly, and the second year after the changeling died …. Such changelings live not 
above eighteen or nineteen years. 
On the strength of this passage, Luther has acquired a reputation for advocating the elimination of 
disabled people, even being cited in a 1964 German court case on euthanasia.19 Yet the attributes 
corresponding to lack of soul here are not intellectual in a modern sense. Moreover, it is unreliable 
as evidence of Luther’s actual beliefs, since the volume is not his own published text but assembled 
from reported conversations by a disciple who seems to reflect the second-generation Reformers’
increasing focus on the Devil and witchcraft.20 
Another version of the story in the same volume suggests that the child be suffocated, on the
grounds that he is simply “a mass of flesh without a soul.”21 Locke may well have had this text 
in mind (it was published and widely disseminated in English during his undergraduate years) 
when he wrote in the Essay concerning Human Understanding about changelings lacking souls 
16 Jakob Sprenger and Heinrich Kramer [Institoris], Malleus Maleficarum, 2.2.8.
 
17 Johannes Nider, Praeceptorum divinae legis, 11.
 
18 Luther, Colloquia Mensalia, or, Table Talk, 387.
 
19 T. Tappert, in Luther’s Works, vol. 54, 397.
 
20 M. Miles, “Martin Luther and childhood disability,” Journal of Religion, Disability and Health, 5/4 

(2001). 
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and suggested that infanticide might therefore be appropriate. Luther’s “mass of flesh” echoes 
Augustine’s notion of fallen humanity in general as “a mass of sin”; his concern was the way the
Devil creates obsessions that blind all of us to the Word, and the child’s odd behaviour was symbolic
of this. It was Locke, the proto-modern psychologist and natural historian, who was to draw the full
conclusion: that changelings, creatures seen as entirely lacking a soul or mind, were non-human. 
Citations of the Malleus were on the increase from the 1590s onwards. A few writers, most 
controversially Reginald Scot in The Discoverie of Witchcraft, were sceptical about the abilities of 
witches and devils. This was picked up by poets such as Michael Drayton, whose 1627 Nymphidia: 
the Court of Fairy criticizes credulous people who 
When a child haps to be got,
 
Which after proves an idiot,
 
When folk perceive it thriveth not,
 
The fault therein [d]o smother:
 
Some silly doting brainless calf,
 
That understands things by the half, 

Say, that the Fairy left this elf,
 
And took away the other.
 
But this was not a scepticism about natural magic as such. Scot and Drayton doubted the Devil’s 
ability to procreate or witches’ ability to consort with him, but not his actual existence. When Scot 
ascribed the child substitution story to the masses, it was his way of pouring scorn on its realist and 
apparitionist interpreters alike: substitution could be done by natural magic, which did not need 
supernatural means to operate. Others who wrote of it as a popular story did so with the opposite 
intent; they claimed that it must indicate the real existence of devils and spirits because it was so 
widespread (hence James I’s order for Scot’s book to be burnt). Either way, this was the beginning 
of its career as a supposed folk tale, leading in a direct line to the modern psychiatric doctrine that 
parents grieve for the child they have not had. 
Protestants encouraged moral exempla of this kind in order to complement the reading of 
scripture and to spread at the grassroots the religious elite’s own utilitarian belief in the Devil and 
his works. It was Luther who had attached to the story its anecdotal style. This made it look folkloric, 
but embedding doctrine in anecdote was a common preaching device which Luther himself was 
especially fond of. It is too easy, looking through the lens of the Grimms and their presentation of 
the story to modern nineteenth-century audiences, to suppose that it was of specifically German 
and thereby rude and popular origin, and that the earlier theologians had just been attracted by 
its exotic subcultural flavour. Rather, it was the latter who had dreamed the story up as a way of 
universalizing it, and of proving the real presence of the Devil in this world. This is clear from 
Luther’s locating it among “the boorish Saxons” of Dessau, which subsequently became a stock 
feature of the story. From the very beginnings of a German high culture, Saxony had symbolized 
the ignorance of the fleshly, sinful and unconverted masses. It may sound convincingly specific 
to a folk-tale collector, but the creators of the story were already primed to set it there. William of 
Auvergne had placed his version of it alongside a series of other stories set in entirely mythical 
places; next to his account of substitute children was a story explaining that if oafish Saxons looked 
like bears, it was because human and bear semen were compatible. 
By the 1590s, writers were going out of their way to attribute the experience of child or sperm 
substitution to marginal cultures. In James I’s Daemonologie, written to advertise his role as God’s 
absolute commander of all forces fighting the Devil, his interlocutor asks, “What is the cause that 
this kind of abuse is thought to be most common in such wild parts of the world?” and receives 
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grossliest.” The Germans “have more experience of sorcerers because there it is quite ancient 
and there are more of them than in other countries,” and they “maintain that from such [demonic] 
copulation an infant sometimes springs whom they call Wechselkind.”22 Whereas the German-
speaking but Latin-writing authors of the Malleus had interpolated the German word merely to 
help the reader grasp an unfamiliar Latin noun, later commentators such as Caspar Bauhin, an 
early figure in the rise of natural history classification, glossed the authors as follows: “[They] 
write that the Germans think children are sometimes born from this [diabolic] union whom they 
call Wechselkinder, i.e., mutated children.”23 In fact the Malleus authors had said nothing about the 
story being German. The idea that the child substitution story was once a folk myth is itself a myth; 
it was precisely in being mythologized and attributed to the folk that the story could be naturalized
and (the same thing) modernized. 
Changeling theory and the rise of reason 
The first OED reference to the English word changeling is 1555. There were two early types of usage.
The first did indeed refer to substituted creatures; these could, however, be adults as well as children,
and explanations did not involve the Devil. Titania’s changeling in A Midsummer Night’s Dream, for
example, is the mundane result of a kidnapping rather than being demonically conceived. The second
usage signified not substitution by some external agency but a subjective condition, the internal
inconstancy of people whose will and opinions were always changing. It was this usage, rather than
the first, that thereby carried overtones of deviance. Even then, however, the term itself played no part
in the disputes over wardship law and “born fools”; Drayton’s 1627 example above, where the concept
if not the word itself appears in connection with juridical idiocy, is an isolated early example. In short,
the word signified at first neither cognitive impairment nor folk myth. In his mid-seventeenth-century
behaviour guide, Fuller, a regular visitor to Bedlam, talks about “a changeling, which is not one child
changed for another, but one child on a sudden changed from itself,” and differentiates this entirely
from a “natural fool.” By the 1660s however, when his great admirer Samuel Pepys observes of a
servant “how ill she do any serious part … just like a fool or changeling,” it is no longer clear that the
“or” is disjunctive.24 There seems to have been a sudden shift in the 1650s or 60s; in the index of his
prototype scientific dictionary, Wilkins advises his readers: “Idiot – put changeling.”25 
Reprobation was absorbed in this new concept. With religious tensions peaking in this period, 
changeability or “inconstancy in religion” came to be interpreted as intellectual absence, superseding 
the old model of organic imbalance. If men “are not able to give an account of their faith, nor tell 
any sound reason why, upon what grounds, to what end they do such and such things, can it be 
expected but that … they will be drawn without much ado to change their minds?” Changeability 
was already gendered, being typical of “silly women, who … never came to the knowledge of the 
truth: they were the fittest to become a prey unto false teachers and deceivers.” However, “in these 
times we have to blame men as well as women for this fault.”26 The disability is both praeternatural 
(the deceivers are the Devil and his sidekick, the papal Antichrist) and new (“in these times”). 
This changeling who kept changing his mind was deficient first and foremost in his will. But 
from deficiency of will to deficiency of reason was a smaller step than might be supposed, as 
22 Jean Bodin, De la démonamie, 182.
 
23 De Hermaphroditorum Monstrorumque, 262.
 
24 Fuller, The Holy and the Profane, 182; Pepys, Diary, 28 December 1667.
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demonstrated by Breton’s 1613 character-type of “a wilful Will-Fool.”27 The will, as the site of 
faith and especially of religious zeal, in retrospect had created civil war and social chaos, in which 
it was the professions of church and law, along with priests and justices themselves, that were –
even more than the political regime as such – the main targets for the insurrectionary religious 
movements of common people. This led a critical mass of the elite to promote human reason as the 
prerequisite of faith (“sweet reason” was an amalgam of rational and moral piety). By the 1670s, 
the Nonconformists and Dissenters were going further and asserting that the workings of this 
new reason could be detected in the subjective mechanisms of individual and heterodox minds. 
For them, reason was an internal condition of religious and political liberty. For the Anglican 
establishment, it was a set of principles received passively from God via divinely appointed bishops. 
Whereas the establishment thought that toleration of heterodoxy would reignite the unreasonable 
wilfulness of the civil wars, Dissenters spoke about “liberty of conscience” and against “the 
unreasonableness of [Anglican] persecutors”; their own dissenting reason, they said, represented 
the “interest” of religion.28 Each side conceived of the changeling’s deficiency as the polar opposite 
of its own particular claim to the new reason. Since the Dissenters located reason in the liberty and 
responsibility of all human individuals more or less regardless of their social status, the existence of 
an occasional creature who lacked even this species-wide reason revealed a classification problem. 
The ruling Anglicans, on the other hand, feared that a reason which sprang up directly in each 
individual plebeian mind might subvert the kind of reason they themselves were handing down 
by absolute authority; it threatened a return of the excessive liberty and relativism of the 1640s 
and 50s. In these circumstances it made sense for the Anglicans to take the changeling label, once 
used to describe someone with an inconstant will, and redirect it towards people with a defective
reason – by which of course they also meant a wrong, dissenting interpretation of reason. 
On both sides, then, the new reason involved a new kind of universalism, embracing all or 
most human beings and replacing the old quasi-universalism of the Arminians, which had been based
chiefly on belief and the will. Odd fusions and recombinations of doctrine were happening across the
spectrum. The now positive relationship between reason and grace became a touchstone of politico-
theological allegiance. Many leading figures in the Royal Society – Glanvill and Wilkins, for example
– were Anglican clergy who had been orthodox about predestination, election and reprobation before
1660; they now fell expediently silent about it, rather than directly recanting. They began to write
as if every individual holds his salvation in his own hands via a reasoned faith. As so often in the
history of the human sciences, “as if” then got its feet under the table and settled in for keeps. Reason-
based universalism became a tenet not only of Anglicans and many Dissenters but of a whole range of
anti-establishment types: from the Socinians, who maintained that religion and revelation were fully
compatible with reason, to the Baptists, who, though they stuck to a belief in grace and election, felt
pressed to accommodate the new reason within it.29 All this created a basis on which reprobation and
idiotism, the antitheses of spiritual and natural intelligence respectively, were to combine. The new
dispensations for reasoned behaviour had tacit predestinarian residues. By the end of the century, talk
about reprobates was inadvisable, as was “talk of the Devil” (a cautionary phrase that came into use
only around this time). They were no longer fit topics for the secular “polite society” that was now
replacing the church as arbiter of intellectual debate. They led to impolite disputatiousness; but they
existed all right, and talking about them might only entice them in. 
Medicine trailed behind these political adventures of ideas. Willis’s talk of certain people as 
stupidi, as we have seen, hardly amounted to the labelling of a type and was largely derived from 
27 Breton, The Goode and the Badde, 23.
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Renaissance melancholia. When Englished as “changelings” by various contemporaries, both 
Anglican and Dissenter, a new direction was forged. His colleague in the Restoration’s Anglican 
elite, Bishop Samuel Parker, adapted Willis’s anatomical theory in order to advance one of his own 
about social behaviour. Willis’s innovativeness lay in the detailed physiology of brain function; 
when he anatomizes “the brain of a fatuous youth,” he is interested in the smallness and weakness 
of the intercostal nerves through which the soul controls the bodily passions, rather than in fatuous 
behaviour as such. Parker comments on this, labels the youth a “changeling” and remarks on his 
inability to control his “passions and appetites”; the changeling’s soul has an “impotency and 
irregularity [that] consists in the nature of folly.”30 In short, this changeling is the antithesis of 
the Restoration’s own new man, the “man of judgement.” Parker mentions the intercostal nerves 
briefly, but that is not what he is interested in. 
Then there is the Dissenter, Samuel Pordage. Historians’ mistaken view of Willis as a modern pioneer
on our topic comes from Pordage’s translation of De Anima Brutorum. Not only does Pordage, like
Parker, replace Willis’s loose Latin adjectives with the positive label “changeling,” he also smuggles
in the Devil. For Willis, all humans have a modicum of reason in their rational (incorruptible) souls,
in spite of any injuries to the sensitive or corporeal soul. He merely employed an adjective, “slow”
(bardi), to describe the foolish or possibly melancholic offspring of wise fathers.31 Pordage, however,
marks out the latter by calling them changelings. Religious sects of the 1640s and 50s, self-appointed
companies of the elect, had used this word to describe people amongst them who were suddenly
“possessed”; it was the Devil’s way of polluting the company’s sainthood and thwarting the kingdom
of heaven on earth.32 Pordage was brought up and had continued to practise in just such a community,
the Behmenists (after their founder Jakob Boehme), where his father, the community’s leader, held
regular conversations with angels. Dissenters across the board were particularly fond of magical or
diabolic explanation since it hinted that the Restoration establishment did not have everything under
its control.33 The demonic overtones of the word “changeling” are clear in Pordage’s translation. 
Behmenists believed that human perfection was achievable on this earth, but also that hell and 
the Devil are at this very moment somewhere in the real world; and they mixed nature together 
with grace (or absence of it). Jesus said that a good tree cannot bring forth bad fruit; nevertheless, 
warns Boehme, “the forces of disorder can worm their way into the reason” by generating deficient 
offspring, thereby proving the Devil’s real presence among us. “False essences” – deviations from 
the species – were an example of the chaos he could create, a demonic obstacle to human perfection 
because they could mimic hypocritically the manifestations of grace. Where both the fruit and the 
tree are bad, then 
If the parents are wicked, and indeed in the kingdom of the Devil, and that they have thus begotten 
their fruit out of their false essences (in which [parents] there is no faith, but only a false hypocrisy, 
and yet will in an apish mockery be counted Christians; and as the Devil oftentimes changes 
himself into the likeness of an angel, so they also send their children with the like trimmed false 
angels before the covenant of Christ); such doing is very dangerous …. There must be earnestness 
in avoiding of the Devil.34 
30 Parker, An Account of the Nature and Extent of the Divine Dominion, 67; see also Rina Knoeff, “The 
reins of the soul: the centrality of the intercostal nerves to the neurology of Thomas Willis and to Samuel 
Parker’s theology,” Journal of the History of Medicine and Allied Sciences, 59/3 (2004). 
31 Willis, De Anima, 360; Willis (trans. Pordage), “Two discourses,” 311. 
32 Eugene Hynes, Knock: the Virgin’s Apparition in Nineteenth-Century Ireland. 
33 Keith Thomas, Religion and the Decline of Magic, 240. 
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The flavour of this reoccurs in Pordage’s own Mundorum Explicatio, a long epic poem about the 
creation roughly contemporary with Paradise Lost, where he writes about incubi who “shed their 
seed into old hags.” 
He also uses “changeling” to translate from Willis’s text a conventional classical epithet (“more 
sluggish than Bacchus”) which at that time signified drunkenness or melancholy. Willis did in fact 
contribute to Royal Society members’ attempts at a scientific cataloguing of the spirit world, but in 
terms of medicine he had deliberately kept his distance, as his caption to the illustration in his book 
on brain anatomy shows; he writes that the youth is “fatuus, though he might vulgarly be called 
a spirit [Lemur].”35 Pordage translates the adjective fatuus here again as the noun “changeling,” 
the connotations of which are much closer to (evil) “spirit.” In this sense Willis is the medical 
conservative, Pordage the psychological proto-modern. The distinct identity of the unreasoning 
changeling matches Pordage’s radical Whig political beliefs. (In the year he translated the Tory 
physician’s textbook he was also participating in the Monmouth rebellion.) 
The Restoration’s redefinition of reason, accompanied by a redefinition of the changeling as 
the creature in whom reason is absent, was not incompatible with a belief in the abilities of the 
Devil and perhaps encouraged it. The Devil, far from being scared off by Hobbesian materialism, 
had been honing his profile for a century or so. He was an absolute presupposition behind natural 
causes, and there was no getting round the back of him. The unitary cosmos of the Middle Ages, in 
which God was able to keep an eye on him, was replaced by one where he had some independence 
and an effective presence. By contrast with the sixteenth century – there is a mere handful of 
mentions of him in the 1,500 pages of Calvin’s Institutes – the Devil met with great success in the 
scientific speculations of the seventeenth. 
Consider this story, published in the same year as Locke’s Essay: 
A virgin got pregnant and said that she was visited every night by a handsome youth. Her parents 
lay in wait for this lover and the following night found a frightful monster in their daughter’s 
embrace. A priest was called and drove the devil out by reciting St John’s Gospel. Thereupon 
the devil set all the bedding on fire, let off a terrible fart, and made away. The following day the 
daughter gave birth to a monster or fantastic abortion.36 
This is not the folkloric relic of a bygone age; such stories were far more frequent than they had been
a century earlier. It was common for a woman to dream about having been visited by a devil who
leaves her pregnant, and for her husband (were she unwise enough to tell him) to take the dream
literally and demand to know where the child is now. The converse case, of an actually existing child
found to have the Devil as his father, was likewise written about as an everyday experience. It is true
that a writer like Nathaniel Wanley, a member of both Baxter’s and Boyle’s circles, could call “carnal
copulation with devils, either as an incubus or succubus … a horrible absurdity,” yet such a remark
needs to be taken in context. “All learned physicians who do know the way that nature breeds human
seed,” he says, “will deride this tenet and condemn it as false and abominable …. Devils, whether
conceived to be corporeal or incorporeal, … were not created of God to generate, neither have they,
nor can have any seed, or members fit for generation.”37 What Wanley is saying is that the Devil has
only natural means, not supernatural ones; it is just that in the case of human reproduction, he does
not have either. This did not mean that the Devil or his agents could not transmit semen by natural
magic, merely that they could not themselves generate offspring directly. 
35 Willis, De Cerebri, 51.
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The mid-century reconceptualization of the changeling took place amidst such debates. To 
deny the existence of spirits would be to deny a necessary slot in the cosmological frame. One 
questioned how the Devil did things, not whether he existed. “Of all the delusions wherewith 
[the Devil] deceives mortality,” says Browne, “there is not any that puzzleth me more than the 
legerdemain of changelings. I do not credit those transformations of reasonable creatures into 
beasts, or that the Devil hath a power to transpeciate a man into a horse,” the archetype of unreason. 
But, this famous physician continues, “I could believe that spirits use with man the act of carnality, 
and that in both sexes … yet … without a possibility of generation.”38 Changelings were a key 
example of the Devil’s methods. Even if he could not copulate with humans, he could create a 
whole “inner” nature in some of them, as Boyle pointed out.39 Scot’s denial of the Devil’s abilities 
even reinforced the realist view of him against the apparitionist one. The realist view demanded 
hard evidence, and this was consistent with the burgeoning sense of objective scientific critique in 
the Royal Society; it eschewed immoderate claims but, by the same token, trusted that some claims 
would thereby emerge that were indeed verifiable. Hard evidence, it was supposed, would turn up, 
if only occasionally. 
This was also the gestation period of Locke’s Essay, which saw a revival of debate about
Scot’s century-old scepticism about witchcraft. His denial of it, and that of his new editor John
Webster, were taken to be atheistic. Sceptical scientific experimentalists of Locke’s generation
such as Glanvill and More, who were among the loudest champions of the new reason, went
on the attack, claiming by a typical reversal that if someone has “lost all belief that there are
such things as spirits in this world,” it is a sign of their own “stupor,” “besottedness” and
“dull sense.”40 The grand modern narrative of reason might prompt us to think that once it was
espoused on both sides of the main politico-theological divide, devil beliefs faded away; but
far from the existence of the Devil contradicting the new reason, they rubbed along perfectly
well together. One might say they needed each other. The wise and ingenious, whether outside
or within the new scientific circles, were generally more likely to cite his presence than lay
people were. Doctors were particularly susceptible, since their specialism seemed to hold fewer
remedies for people’s problems than even the lawyer or the priest.41 The new reason supported
the idea that the Devil operated in the real world and produced dire social consequences there.
According to Glanvill and More, a “disbeliever” in the existence of the Devil, spirits or witches
was a disbeliever in that of God, a threat to “the greatest interests of religion” which consists
in the individual employment of reason.42 The idea of demonically conceived changelings was
absolutely necessary both to the scientific method of the Royal Society and to a reasonable
Christianity based on the notion of autonomous and active human subjects who follow their own
developmental paths. 
In fact Scot and Webster – the latter a Behmenist like Pordage – are examples of how a number 
of writers were reducing demonic activity to “mental operations internal to the ‘hell’ that was the 
state of mind of evil persons,” among whom changelings might be counted.43 Webster notes the 
stories about children “such as are real changelings or lunatics, who have been brought by such 
spirits and hobgoblins, the true child being taken away by them in the place whereof such are 
left, being commonly half out of their wits, and given to many antic practices and extravagant 
38 Browne, Religio, 34.
 
39 Cited in Wanley, 214.
 
40 Glanvill, Saducismus Triumphatus, A8r. 

41 Thomas, Religion and the Decline, 304; 638 ff.
 
42 Glanvill, “Against Modern Sadducism,” 58, in Essays. 







272 A History of Intelligence and “Intellectual Disability” 
fancies.” One might see their extraordinary “passions” as instead “proceeding from the powerful 
influence of the planet in their nativity.”44 The notion that they are physically exchanged through 
the intervention of the Devil is “foolish conjecture”; by reversal, the conjecturers are themselves 
“natural fools.” Nevertheless, “real changelings” exist. And they are still “the Devil’s instruments,” 
inasmuch as they create social havoc. In this restricted sense, Scot and Webster are realists. The 
Devil is not denied; he is merely not necessary to the operations of natural magic, which are seen 
as self-standing. 
The demonic elements behind Locke’s changeling had in any case already been predicted in 
Perkins’s suggestions about the Devil’s natural powers a century earlier: 
If any man in reason think it not likely that a creature should be able to work extraordinarily by 
natural means, he must remember that though God hath reserved to himself alone the power of 
abolishing and changing nature, the order whereof he set and established in the creation, yet the 
alteration of the ordinary course of nature he hath put in the power of his strongest creatures, angels 
and devils …. And this power is rather increased and made more forcible by [the] irreconcilable 
malice [the Devil] beareth to mankind, specially the seed of the woman.45 
This reference to the Devil’s intervention in human reproduction helps us to understand the 
reference which Locke’s Essay makes to the physiological causes of the changeling’s deficiency, 
its bodily “wheels and springs.” This can be seen as both scientific and demonic at the same time: 
they are not mutually exclusive explanations. The Royal Society’s hard-line empiricists insisted 
on keeping an open mind about any causes that remained occult. So internal bodily mechanisms 
and the Devil may well have been equal in causal status, or even colleagues. As Jonathan Edwards 
was to point out, the Devil could “come at” humans by bodily intervention or “some motion” of 
the soul spirits. He could induce the disability of the melancholic or despairing type, for example, 
though his sphere of intervention was limited to “the outward senses”; the “inward motions” of the 
psychological faculties, especially “abstraction,” were inaccessible to him. Locke himself mentions 
the changeling’s “wheels and springs” only in order to say that he does not want to account for 
them, or for any of the natural or physiological causes of intellectual shortcomings or absence. He 
simply thought it useless, in medical terms, to try and find “the hidden causes of distempers,” the 
natural magic or “secret workmanship of nature and the several imperceptible tools wherewith she 
wrought.”46 That does not necessarily mean he did not believe that the Devil existed or had a hand 
in those shortcomings. 
From the Brothers Grimm to Dr Mengele 
Over the course of the nineteenth century, changeling stories entered the burgeoning literary genre 
of compilations of world folklore.47 It is hard to distinguish expert theological tradition from popular 
folklore in the historical construction of intellectually disabled changelings, if only because nothing 
in the folklore tradition can be shown to predate its representation in printed texts. If it is absence 
44 Webster, The Displaying, 37; Scot, A Discourse concerning the Nature and Substance of Devils and 
Spirits, 50. 
45 Perkins, A Discourse of the Damned Art of Witchcraft, 18. 
46 Cited in R. Yost, “Locke’s rejection of hypotheses about sub-microscopic events,” in J. Yolton (ed.), 
Philosophy, Religion and Science in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries. 
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from print that defines the folkloric, one is scarcely in a position to verify evidence of any kind; 
one could just make everything up. And this seems to be what actually happened. The vital source 
for modern histories of the changeling is the Grimms. Scholars in the field now see all of folklore 
as at best an interaction between the oral and the literary, and it is no longer disputed that the 
Grimms’ stories all came from existing literary sources and nowhere else. They merely reshaped 
these sources into “educational manual[s] for children with good bourgeois upbringing” – moral 
exempla for the middle classes.48 This belies the Grimms’ reputation as itinerant chroniclers of tales 
told to them by sagacious yokels. Number 83 of their Deutsche Sagen is a straight paraphrase of 
the early German theological texts about Wechselkinder referred to above, merely embroidering 
them with a few folksy artefacts. Jakob Grimm’s Deutsche Mythologie, which has an entry on 
changelings, was by contrast a scientific dictionary of mythology, with a scholarly apparatus.49 In 
his footnotes to the entry Jakob gives as his sources both the theological writer Nicolaus of Jauer 
and the fake folk-tale he and his brother had themselves cobbled together earlier from that same 
writer; the two sources are cited alongside each other as discrete types of evidence, when in fact 
one had been manufactured out of the other by the very person doing the citing. 
It is true that anthropological and historical evidence for the existence of rituals and stories 
about the acceptance of new-borns is widespread. In the Greek ceremony of amphidromia, to take 
just one example, the father carried the baby round the hearth after a ritual washing to guarantee its 
purity and to mark the acceptance of a new arrival in the family. But a very general phenomenon 
cannot be used to credit the transhistorical claims of one highly specific legend. Our particular story 
as it appears in the nineteenth-century folklore compilations is clustered within predominantly 
Lutheran areas of Germany and Scandinavia. Reified into an explanation for disability, it was then 
imposed on the psychiatry of the next century. 
We can track the course of this reification very precisely. A generation after the Grimms, Kühn and 
Schwarz incorporated the changeling in a volume of stories, Norddeutsche Sagen, which resemble 
the Grimms’ literary artefacts very closely but which in addition are spuriously authenticated with 
a folk-collector’s subheadings (“Orally,” “From an old workman,” “From a peasant-woman” and 
so forth, or the name of a specific village). Johann Wolf, following up with a similar volume, was 
probably the first to add an intellectual element, writing about the infant’s failure “to develop mentally 
[geistig]”; he also added Luther’s phrase, “an unformed mass of flesh,” evoking the complementary 
sense of geistig, “spiritual.” This ambiguity, poised between theology and psychiatry, coincides with 
the latter’s coming of age as a discipline.50 Wolf also replaced the four wet nurses of the original
story with seven, a magic number, thus consolidating its mythic tone. 
Adolf Wuttke, in an 1860 work on German superstition, retained all these embellishments. He 
also turned the spiritual/mental deficiency into a more concrete diagnosis, namely the inability to 
develop reason or speech; and he created a formal link with medical science by suggesting that 
the story was a popular explanation for cretinism. A theologian, Wuttke was a leading opponent
of naturalistic ethics, well-known and translated in Britain and North America. He sought instead 
a systematized, Christian evangelical “scientific ethics,” in which the child substitution story had a 
role. By demoting the story to the level of mere superstition, Wuttke displaced the natural reality
of the Devil to the natural reality of popular belief in the natural reality of the Devil. Like the 
Grimms, whose works were intended to support German cultural and political unification, his 
purpose thereby was to demonstrate the “deeper unity and agreement” of superstitious beliefs 
among “our German people.” The beliefs may have been false, but precisely as such they belonged 
48 See Jack Zipes, The Brothers Grimm, 114.
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to the “natural man,” and were a “common source” for the Germans’ national unity.51 The scientific 
status of the story lay precisely in this, in its being positioned at a deeper, more permanent level of 
the Germans’ national psyche than their superficial political fragmentation might suggest. Wuttke’s 
transposition of the story to the realm of natural superstition and belief, through a systematic 
anthropology and a corresponding scientific ethics, was thus part of a broader political movement 
to prescribe and patrol human behaviour. 
The genre of fairy-tale compilations reached a climax in Britain with Edwin Hartland’s 1895 
volume for the British Folklore Society, which contains a whole chapter on changelings. This book 
is no more than a collation of the Grimms’ stories, but it bears the title A Science of Fairy Tales, 
and the author was advised on it by Havelock Ellis, a man with medical training and an officer of 
the Eugenics Society who campaigned against the menace of the feeble-minded. The reification 
was now complete. In Germany, it would prove to be the trail that led from the Grimms to the Nazi 
euthanasia programme. Ellis’s introduction to the volume says that the stories show how “man’s 
imagination works by fixed laws,” with “features absolutely identical … between the cultured 
Europeans and the debased Hottentots.” The changeling story thus became part of a modern, unified 
systematization of scientific knowledge precisely by being displaced to a universal superstitious 
past that allegedly persists today in the lay population, through the bereavement analogy. This is 
an expression of elite contempt: the story is natural to ordinary people because it is false. Evidence 
of this displacement can also be seen in the everyday language of insult. Etymologically, words 
such as idiot, imbecile, dunce, mong, moron and retard all began life as expert terms; even “fool” 
is probably from follis, a bellows or “windbag” (used of a debating opponent). They come not from 
the streets but from a self-styled intellectual subculture of professionals seeking to monopolize 
“intellect.” The source of out-group labels and insults is the seminary, the study and the clinic, and 
only secondarily the so-called popular culture. Psychology and psychiatry share with theology a 
zealous divisiveness in their view of human nature, which they project upon the popular past as 
well as today’s lay public. 
We can now see the paediatric journal cited above in a fresh light. As the geneticists’ religious 
metaphors demonstrate, it can hardly be claimed that a religious account of disability has “given way”
to a scientific one. Nor is it a bygone popular culture but the modern expert one of biotechnology 
that has “no moral compunctions” about eliminating certain kinds of people.52 As for the idea that
one purges parents’ disorder by forcing them to accept as reality that they have been bereaved,
we should ask which version of this – thirteenth-century Dominican, or twenty-first-century 
psychiatric – is the “historical curiosity,” and which the scientific axiom. And Kanner’s claim, on the
strength of Luther’s remarks, that “mental defectives were at their worst” in the sixteenth century, 
and that if we now take an ethical approach to disabled people it is thanks to modern science, comes 
from someone who was himself a major inventor of mental defectiveness categories.53 
Meanwhile liberal feminists have used the hints of infanticide in the changeling stories to project 
a kind of gender equality on the past. Women even then, it is said, were as brutally neo-Darwinian 
as men; they exercised their right to choose, even on a live human being.54 In earlier times the 
more reliable option must have been not to terminate a foetus but to kill a living infant. Today 
(outside the anti-abortion movement), a clear ethical distinction is maintained between foetus 
and child. However, liberal feminist accounts of the changeling story, as of modern disability, 
obscure the additional and quite separate ethical issue around intellectual (dis)ability, which hinges 
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on its historically and socially contingent distinction and is therefore not clear at all. Both the 
demonization and the justification of practices of the distant past displace the guilt from a present 
whose ethics is not up for examination because it cannot be disentangled from psychological and 
biological knowledge itself. 
Whose fault is it? Parents as authors of the child’s intellect 
The rise of the changeling story coincided with the rise of anxiety that the passage of gentle blood 
from father to son could not be taken for granted, or that election might not simply be handed 
down to children just because the parents, as “visible church members,” appeared to be elect. The 
Devil crept into spaces created by the dissolution of these old certainties. But he was not the only 
one. A causal role in generating deficient minds began to be attributed to parents as well. In the 
old Aristotelian tradition, the biological criterion for species membership had been the (physical) 
resemblance between offspring and parents. However, changelings loaded the emphasis on to 
intellectual resemblance, challenging the so-called Aristotelian principle that man is a rational 
animal. They are born of rational parents but are not rational themselves. Might not parental agency, 
especially when seen as compatible with diabolic agency, play a part in this otherwise inexplicable 
phenomenon of intellectual monstrosity? 
This notion was assisted by the increasing popularity of the idea that the parents rather 
than God supply the human foetus with its rational soul. Such a notion was controversial. The 
mainstream view had always been that its creator is God, by a process known as “infusion” 
(though opinion differed as to how and when the rational part of the soul got into the semen). The 
opposing “traducianist” doctrine of parental agency remained esoteric; nevertheless, it had long 
been used by some – including someone as important as Augustine – to explain how original sin 
could be “traduced” (led across) from one generation to the next. Moreover it was compatible 
with the periodic revivals of interest in Averroes’s theory that individual souls vary as a result 
of the “informative power” transmitted to them by parents. Some medieval scholars took this to 
mean that an individual’s disposition was linked to the act of his conception. The twelfth-century 
medical school of Salerno, followed by philosophers such as Michael Scotus and Jean of Jandun, 
found room for embryology in the new physiognomic science. Michael discusses “the problem of 
generation” and the influence of the parental body on the embryo, though he does not mention any 
accompanying cognitive or moral elements.55 
None of the above amounts to a theory of natural inheritance. While Averroes held that parental 
influence makes individual souls “subject to generation and corruption like other natural forms,” he 
had also insisted on the existence of a divine, immortal collective intellect wherein every individual 
intellect is a chip off the divine block.56 The presence of an informative power in the parental body 
explained how lower, bestial forms of existence might corrupt the soul. For example, if one of the 
parents had the excessively large head that signifies “a defect (depressio) of the rational soul” it 
could cause dwarfism.57 Yet it was precisely the notion of a continuity from foetus to living creature, 
suggesting for us a biologically determined personhood, that for contemporaries suggested instead 
the creature’s plasticity, and the responsiveness of its moral and intellectual state to providence.
55 Cited in Danielle Jacquart, “La physiognomie à l’époque de Frédéric II,” Micrologus, 2 (1994). 
56 Paulus Nicolettus [Venetus], Summa Naturalium, 5.2.37. 
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No impairment, even one existing from before birth, could alter the creature’s prior status as a 
rational being linked to all other rational beings through the collective intellect. 
By the eve of the Reformation, traducianism had spread widely enough to require anathema 
from the church, on the grounds that if the rational soul were generated by parents it would 
be a material entity and therefore not immortal. Traducianism’s appeal was that it avoided the 
absurdity of having God, in infusing the soul, become the author of individual imperfections and 
therefore of sin. Writers sticking to divine infusion pointed out that anatomists were unable to find
any “organ or instrument for the rational soul” in the brain. This “inorganity” of the soul came under 
challenge once Descartes located it in the pineal gland, a material entity.58 However, subsequent 
anatomists would note that the relative viscosity of a dissected pineal gland or the presence of 
stones bore no relation to the wit of the person to whom it had belonged.59 Infusionists also clung 
to the idea that God creates the soul directly out of nothing. The fact that miscarried embryos 
tend to be deformed was proof that at this stage God had not yet infused the rational soul; if it had 
been there, then as form to the body’s matter it would have remedied the physical deformity before 
birth. Traducianists claimed as supporting evidence that “wise people are born of wise parents, 
and conversely stupid ones (stolidi) from stupid parents.”60 The infusionists argued that this was 
not empirically adequate. Many authorities, as we have seen, testified to the opposite: “Why hath 
a wise man, to his son a sot? / But that he cannot make his son, God wot.”61 Traducianism was 
particularly popular with Anabaptists, Socinians and Levellers, among whom it had a socially 
subversive potential: the non-gentle ranks had no earthly honour to pass on to their children, and 
so might find a substitute in wit. 
The theory came in various guises. One of these was “mortalism.” Mortalists claimed that 
although parents generate the rational soul, this need not mean the soul is material or mortal. Its 
immortality is beyond doubt; but rather than being divinely infused in the foetus, it is bestowed 
only at the resurrection. This preserved a role for God, while absolving him from authorship of 
the soul’s defects or its original sin. Milton was a mortalist for just this reason. Hobbes was a 
mortalist because it helped him explain how earthly human behaviour could follow mechanical 
laws analogous with those of the material realm. The arrival of an “anatomy of the mind,” by 
analogy with that of the body, and the increasing separation between the two, had led by the end of 
the sixteenth century to theories in which parental authorship could be used to explain intellectual 
defect per se.62 Overton, also a mortalist, went on to remark: “by [the infusionists’] grounds there 
can be no born fools.”63 But there are, and it could not have been an all-loving God who created 
people in this state. 
Another version of traducianism involved reincarnation. This too freed God from any 
responsibility for defects. Writers of this persuasion denied that parents of fools transmitted original 
sin to their offspring; it did not make sense in terms of natural generation, since deficiencies in 
natural intellectual capacity are peculiar to the individual, whereas original sin was universal. 
According to Locke’s friend Franciscus van Helmont, “Many are born blind, deaf, dumb, and 
some natural fools [fatui] and mad, possessed with unclean spirits. Now is it not a great reproach 
to the providence of God … to say that God originally made those creatures so?”64 The infusionists 
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claimed that God creates the soul’s defects as a punishment for original sin. Not only does this 
seem unjust, says Van Helmont, but also “this misery fall[s] very unequally, some being born fools 
(stulti) and madmen (fatui [note here the precariousness of the translated terms]), others with a 
large capacity of natural understanding (ingenium); now how can this be only for Adam’s sin, … 
seeing … that all are equally guilty of it?” The reincarnationist idea of former earthly existences 
was therefore brought in to explain the individuality of intellectual defects. 
In face of the traducianist advance, infusionists tried to finesse their position by conceding a 
minor role to parents. One might say that “the soul is infused into the body by God the creator, 
without any virtue of the generative seed” and is therefore “incorruptible,” then simply add that it 
became corrupted at some subsequent stage through the parents’ “hereditary and natural filthiness.”65 
Or one could point out, as Henry Woolnor did, that bastards “have no less wisdom, wit, prudence, 
judgement and gifts of soul and body than other people,” so allowing that the soul is not created 
by God alone (for whom bastardy was sinful) but also by “natural means.” But even these minor 
concessions to the theory of parental generation were to prove fatal, opening the floodgates to 
ideas about the natural history and natural origins of the mind. The infusionists’ own attempts at 
refutation or accommodation forced them to rephrase the scholastic formula about rationality as 
human essence (“man is a rational animal”) in terms of rationality as human nature. They began 
saying, for example, that “the human species” (emphasis added) – that is, a natural phenomenon 
– “is constituted not through the body but through the rational soul.”66 The very title of the text 
from which this comes, a defence of the immortality and immateriality of the soul, centres on a 
phrase – “the nature of things” – clearly designed to recuperate for religion the terms of Lucretius’s 
De Rerum Natura, the period’s standard example of a materialist text. 
A Pandora’s box had been opened. Overton, for example, took the existence of intellectually 
disabled monsters to show that parental sodomy and bestial sex might be the cause.67 For the 
infusionists, the fact that “buggery births” lead to lack of a rational soul means they have been 
“propagated out of kind”; they are not full species members, so God cannot be responsible for that 
lack. But, asks Overton, where in that case would the infusionists place such creatures on the scale 
of nature? Being generated by buggery, he says, does not just mean being out of kind (non-human). 
Such creatures are more than just another species: they are in addition “unnatural and cursed.” 
God “raises and delivers” men from death at the resurrection, and he even resurrects (Overton is 
unusual in this respect) all the other species of animals. But he does not raise “unnatural” ones. 
They are done away with, as “filth which breedeth on corruption.” 
In pursuit of this argument, Overton draws a distinction between “mere” fools and “born” 
fools which prefigures the distinction made by Truman (see Chapter 11), the nineteenth century’s 
between imbeciles and idiots, and the twentieth’s between moderate and severe. We are not, 
says Overton, talking here about the usual course of events where there may be some “organical 
deficiency more or less, that is the cause that some men are less rational than others; for some have 
abundance of wisdom and some are mere fools.” “Mere fools” are still truly human creatures, on 
a spectrum with the wise. A “born fool” – no ordinary fool – “would have been a better instance” 
of the infusionists’ notion of buggery births. A born fool lacks a “rational soul.” This would better 
support, says Overton, the infusionists’ own view that nature without divinity “beget[s] mere 
irrational, brutish inhuman bodies,” by contrast with “rationality or humanity,” which for them is 
“a supernatural work,” divinely infused. 
65 Primaudaye, Académie, 6.
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Overton’s whole argument hangs on this distinction between “mere” and “born” fools. The 
latter’s “imperfections … argue the mediate generation thereof, because no imperfection of any 
kind can come immediately from the hand of God; imperfections are accidental, or from the curse, 
therefore not of creation but of procreation” – that is to say, not of God but of the parents. Born fools 
must therefore be products of buggery, and as filth and corruption they are an unnatural kind, to 
be disposed of. Here too the praeternatural (demonic) and unnatural (parental) forms of generation 
are becoming compatible. Overton’s proposition that certain fools are non-species members brings 
a modern, pathological concept of disability into view, reducing the dangers of ambiguity and 
strengthening conformity to current definitions of what it is to be human. In Mary Douglas’s words, 
“a rule of avoiding anomalous things affirms and strengthens the definitions to which they do not 
conform.” Parental agency (“buggery,” or natural causation) and diabolic agency (“the curse,” or 
praeternatural causation) coalesce where there is fear of pollution and filth. Together they lie at the 
heart of modern cognitive science, making it an appropriate additional specimen for William Ian 
Miller’s proposed “anatomy of disgust.”68 
It is worth noting, finally, the political manifestations of this. Cromwell’s old tutor, Thomas 
Beard, had warned in a text still widely circulating in the 1640s against “the monstrous fruits
of … profane marriages” between members of the “house of God” and “worshipper[s] of images 
and idols,” between the putatively elect and the definitely reprobate. Charles I’s marriage to a 
Catholic might be read into this, not to mention the product of their union, the prospective
Charles II. “Unlawful issue” had previously done “much wrong and violence in the world,” and God 
had drowned them in the flood – just as Luther had recommended the drowning of changelings.69 
Above all, as today, one had to prevent them from reproducing. It is no accident that the ousting 
of born fools from species membership on intellectual grounds should have come from radical 
egalitarians such as Overton and Locke. The Leveller Overton is to the political status of idiots 
what Humfrey, his exact contemporary, is to their ecclesiastical status (see Chapter 11). In both 
men, it is the dialectic of dispute that brings them to their position. Humfrey creates the excluded 
category of permanent, born idiots to support his argument for open admission to the eucharist 
for everyone else, regardless of whether or not they belong to the company of the elect; Overton 
creates the excluded category of permanent, born fools to support his argument for natural political 
rights for everyone else, regardless of whether or not they are members of the honour society. 
Planetary influences 
Natural forms of external cause were also being invoked in the early modern period, if in a 
less important role. Climate, for example, leads to people in different regions to have different 
humoral dispositions. And then there are “the stars and planets, with their several positions … 
under which men are born,” which “incline them several ways to one thing more than to another, 
and in some are more predominant and vigorous than in other.” These “special constellations” 
point to nature’s inefficiency: “not being able to bring forth that which she intended, she bringeth 
forth that which she can.”70 One physiognomist, for instance, gives astrological significance to 
the rounded ears, excessively narrow nasal passages and tapering shoulders that signify “a man 
68  Purity and Danger, 48.
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disposed to no cunning.”71 Retrospective diagnosticians may see in these the physical features of 
Down’s syndrome, but the crucial word here is “disposed.” Planetary influence, being natural, is 
dispositional rather than determinate, unlike election or reprobation which were predestined before 
the Fall – and, indeed, unlike chromosomes. 
Galenist accounts of external influence do not dwell at length on astrology, while Paracelsus 
explicitly rejects it in favour of something deeper, at least in On the Generating of Fools. The causes 
of foolishness, he says, are a matter of speculation (“philosophizing,” as he calls it); they exist in 
a realm beyond human reasoning.72 It only seems to us that “hard zodiacal signs” are a cause; such
a belief is itself stupid, coming from understandings that have been dulled by the Fall. He contrasts 
foolishness with madness and epilepsy in this respect. The latter have genuinely astrological causes. 
Significantly, the text of his that deals with them is entitled On Lunatics, not “On the generating of 
lunatics.” Foolishness is the upshot of a universal Adamite corruption; mental illness, by contrast, is 
a specific medical condition. Foolishness and madness do not form a diagnostic dyad, and modern 
historians accustomed to just such a dyad are mistaken in presenting these two texts as companion 
pieces. They differ from each other profoundly and probably date from different periods. Fools are 
“simple … intelligent animals”; lunatics are “various” in their pathologies, “irrational animals.”73 
So when a historian calls Paracelsus an early seeker for the causes of phenylketonuria, the error 
lies not just in the anachronism but in the assumption that in his work on foolishness he was trying 
to explain the causes of some particular disability, or even that he thought any natural explanation 
possible.74 The causes of foolishness are “hidden,” not part of any science accessible to humans 
such as astrology. In place of planets, Paracelsus supposes the existence of certain quasi-natural 
forces which he personifies as “Vulcans,” a kind of super-alchemists who forge each individual 
human being. All we can infer, he says, is that some Vulcans are more skilled than others. Their 
varying degrees of inexperience lead to varying degrees of foolishness in the individuals they 
produce; but the production process is not for mere humans to discover. This occult explanation 
lies further back along the causal spectrum than the natural science of astrology, though not as far 
back as predestination and necessity. The medical innovator Jean-Baptiste van Helmont, father 
of Franciscus, would resuscitate Paracelsus’s Vulcans a century later in the form of a single great 
artificer whom he calls “Archeus.” However, he bundles under one heading all of Paracelsus’s 
intellectual deficit concepts (foolishness, madness, epilepsy) regardless of their fundamentally 
separate classifications in the earlier man’s work. The effect of this is once more to start to blur the 
line between necessity and nature: a move which modern psychiatry completes.75 
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If the bereavement analogy is about not having the child one expected but having a different one, 
supplied perhaps by the Devil, it is tacitly also about having a child who perhaps belongs not to 
the human species but to a different one. Having dealt with explanations provided by everyday 
medicine as well as those lying further back in the praeternatural or occult, we therefore turn 
our attention now to the story of classification. This can be posed in two ways. One of them 
has to do with natural history: where, objectively, do human beings lie on the scale of nature? 
The second is normative: what, subjectively, are the criteria by which we define ourselves as 
human? Answers cluster around one and the same item: intellectual ability. It is only from 1200 
onwards that the objective framework becomes fused, and confused, with the subjective ability, in 
a single procedure. I examine here a few items from a vast hinterland of late medieval and early 
modern texts on the specific operations said to make up this ability, in particular logical reasoning
and abstraction. 
Logic and abstraction are among the main instruments in creating the classificatory framework 
for an understanding of nature (even if, on the long historical and anthropological view, this 
framework is only one among many possible ones).1 Certain concepts are universals: that is, 
they are predicated of more than one particular. Without grouping together the individual entities 
which the world presents to us, we could not make sense of it. Nor could the method of objective 
critique characteristic of the exact sciences such as physics and chemistry have arisen without this 
allocation of particular items to broader conceptual categories: “sorts” or “kinds,” in the vernacular 
language of the period. The universals which biology deals with are “species.” Psychology deals 
with just one species or universal, “man.” But its way of doing so, on the basis of certain abilities, 
is circular. The ability to make abstractions and to reason with logic is that subjectively existing 
element in the species man which leads him to his knowledge of universals, one of which says 
that the ability to make abstractions and to reason with logic is an objectively existing, universal 
characteristic of the species man. 
The circularity thus described is actually a social one, and therefore ought to be able to be 
detected by the person who lies outside it. However, the outsider is also the person who by definition 
cannot detect it, because he lacks the ability to make abstractions or to reason logically; in other 
words, he is “intellectually disabled.” In this respect, intelligence is – at least for the period it 
dominates – stronger than other self-referential status concepts such as honour or grace. Being born 
reprobate and beyond the reach of grace was a status one could rationalize and loudly make a virtue 
of, like the Marquis de Sade; the same was true of being born outside the honour society and having 
dragged oneself up from the gutter, like Mr Gradgrind. One cannot, however, rationalize or make a 
virtue of belonging to an out-group that consists of people defined by an incapacity for rationality 
or virtue. Yet it remains true that operative psychological concepts such as logical reasoning and 
abstraction present the “natural” face of what are really only insignia of social status. 
See George Lakoff, Women, Fire, and Dangerous Things. 1 
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Logical reasoning, abstraction and the history of psychology 
In order to grasp how abstraction and logical reasoning became naturalized in this sense, we need 
first to consider briefly the relationship between the history of the scientific revolution and that of 
psychology. Periodization in the history of psychology routinely assumes that medieval accounts 
of intellect and the soul were broadly the same as Aristotle’s; the whole conglomeration is then 
called primitive and separated off from the truly scientific disciplines that began to emerge at the 
end of the seventeenth century. The trouble with this picture, in addition to its false assumption 
of a continuity from Aristotle to medieval thought, is its inclusion of psychology with the rest of 
science. The history of psychology contains no decisive moment akin to Boyle’s law or Newton’s. 
The theologization of writings about the mind and the causes of its various states was increasing 
rather than decreasing through the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries, and it is hard to 
tell when thereafter this process actually ceased, if it ever has. When Rudolf Göckel (Goclenius) 
and his school, at the end of the sixteenth century, coined the term “psychology,” it was to defend 
the soul’s immortality. Their theory is no antique curiosity, as we shall see, and has been absorbed 
within modern psychology. Pastors may have been replaced by biotechnicians, but the goal of 
cognitive and behavioural geneticists is still the increasing perfection of an immaterial intellect. 
The one seventeenth-century candidate for a Boyle in psychology might be Locke, whose 
empirical and modern-looking approaches to both medicine and philosophy, and his nominalist 
approach to the definition of species, arose partly from his familiarity with Boyle’s experimental 
work. But whereas Boyle launched the historical process by which chemistry became disentangled 
from alchemy, Locke – many of whose scientific contemporaries sought an “alchemy of the soul” 
through the study of spirits and natural magic – never got to separate psychology from what one 
may call alpsychology.2 Boyle and Newton, too, were trying in their scientific work to get inside 
the mind of God, but at least they had to discover something outside themselves in order to do so. 
No such experimental controls have accompanied hypotheses about the mind, which in Locke’s 
case were suffused with pre-1650s Calvinism. In attributing psychological operations such as 
abstraction and logical reasoning to all humans on a quasi-egalitarian basis (all, that is, except the 
disabled “changelings” and “idiots” who test the rule), Locke had in mind a creaturely equality 
before God rather than an everyday meritocratic one. 
Nineteenth-century psychology then started to mimic the exact sciences in earnest. Its newfound 
interest in measurement suited the bureaucratization of social order in Europe, helping psychology 
to become an academic discipline in its own right. So if not the seventeenth century, was it the 
nineteenth that saw a scientific revolution in the study of the soul and the mind? The gulf between 
late medieval accounts of intellectual operations and the nineteenth-century discipline is wide, of 
course, but there are bridges across it; and there is probably a sharper divide between ancient Galen 
and the Renaissance Galenists than between the Galenists and Galton. It was from around 1200 
that a body of intellectuals armed with learned texts on abstraction and logical reasoning began to 
speak a shared language with social administrators. It is this medium-term historical development, 
unencumbered by revolution or indeed by science, that underpins the history of the discipline to 
which abstraction and logical reasoning are central. Theodor Adorno wrote that the abstraction of 
universals from particulars can be seen in market terms, as a currency of the intellect that strips 
individual thoughts of their singularity and makes everything in nature repeatable and commodity 
like.3 Commodification of thought met with commodification of time and labour, as sophisticated 
2 See Somerville, The Secularization of Early Modern England, 153 ff.
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money economies expanded from the thirteenth century. Thus the abstracting intelligence has 
become one of the currencies in which we exchange values about each other. 
However, the interconnections between cultural and economic capital cannot be traced in 
any detail. Bureaucracies are a more fertile source. The medical curriculum and the expansion of 
philosophy and law in the first universities coincided with the thirteenth-century extension of papal 
power and the unification of church government and doctrine down to the local level. The distribution 
of the new mendicant orders such as the Dominicans who headed up this ecclesiastical expansion 
was planned statistically, per head of population. Meanwhile the secular authority, too, sought more 
control over outlying populations. The growth in trade and division of labour, the material progress 
and expansion of towns, the cultivation of rural wastelands and the luxurious use of surplus all 
made social stratification more complex and increased the mobility of landholding. Corresponding 
new forms of social organization called not for sapient monks but for trained administrators, in 
whom the ability to sort, file and abstract was a prerequisite. The growth of bureaucracy created a 
clerical expertise to match the increasing complexity of social organization. 
If abstraction of universals from particulars is a mental filing system, it remained at this early 
stage fairly simple, while the social character of the out-group defined by their deficiencies in 
this respect was a far larger one than now. Neither women, servants nor landless peasants could 
or needed to do mental filing. As the out-group has since been pathologized into something 
much smaller, the profile of abstraction itself has become correspondingly much more complex. 
Take the Griffiths Test. This is a psychological assessment routinely used by paediatricians and 
psychologists on young children whom they already know or suspect cannot do things, and is 
designed to prove beyond reasonable doubt that indeed they cannot. A child, for example, may 
be asked to associate two objects normally unrelated, e.g., “put the rattle on the helicopter,” as a 
way of establishing that he does not understand the concept “on.” This relational task is a kind of 
meta-abstraction; it is unlike and goes far beyond any example a medieval philosopher would have
used. Here, abstraction itself is abstracted: what it tests is whether the subject will grow up to
have an intelligence equivalent to that of the psychologist doing the testing, whose own professional 
intellect is normative. Yet this modern meta-abstraction remains organically tied to the medieval 
doctrine from which it springs. If, as Karl Popper complained, the human sciences have failed to 
emerge from scholasticism, this has less to do with their inadequacies of method than with the fact 
that modern psychology is an outgrowth of notions of status, shifting class relations and new forms 
of social administration which all have roots in late medieval economy and society. 
The theology of abstraction and logical reasoning has been absorbed directly into material and 
cultural production. Rather than developing scientific clarity out of religious obscurity, modern 
psychology has driven theology in a particular ideological direction, towards the accelerating 
perfection and productivity of intellectual labour. It may be historicist to say that there are thirteenth-
century beginnings, however small, which point concretely towards modern psychology. But it 
certainly throws into relief the relative robustness of the exact sciences in the face of constructionist 
scepticism. In the long-term history of physics, one account of why a dropped stone falls to 
earth at least gives way to another account of the same phenomenon. In the long-term history of 
psychology, one account of a phenomenon (“intelligence,” for example), while seeming to give 
way to another account of it, is always surreptitiously giving way to that of a different phenomenon 
entirely. Culture is itself the root of intelligence; it is not simply a lens through which we are seeing 
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The professionalization of logical reasoning and the place of logic in psychology 
We can now look in more detail at the historical spread of logical reasoning and abstraction in 
turn, and at where they have positioned the human species in nature. Logic is above all a system 
of categorization. One might expect Aristotle to have put the capacity for logical reasoning at the 
centre of his categorization of the human species, but as we saw in detail in Chapter 2 the phrase 
“Man is a rational animal” is not only falsely attributed to him but is something he would have 
been incapable of saying, in the light of his general metaphysics. The phrase was in fact of Stoic 
origin, and got into European thought through a third-century AD introduction to Aristotle by the
neo-Platonist philosopher Porphyry, who wrote (claiming to paraphrase Aristotle), “Man is a 
rational, mortal animal.” The Stoics had also employed the adjective logikos in this phrase. This 
notion that man is “a logical animal” prefigures the way medieval philosophers would fuse logic as 
objective procedure with logic as subjective ability. 
Porphyry’s text, translated into Latin by Boethius and in this form known across medieval Europe
as the “Tree of Porphyry,” had a huge impact on early logic and the whole philosophical tradition:
to it, early modern thought owes its ubiquitous classificatory schemata of genus, species, difference, 
property and accident. Another input came from Alexander, an early systematizer of Aristotle and 
an influence on both the Arab and the scholastic philosophers. Entrusted by the Roman state with 
its educational policies, he reshaped Aristotle with Stoic content. He makes Aristotle out to have 
said that man is “an ensouled, biped and rational creature.”4 Alexander already saw this formula in 
psychological terms, unlike Aristotle. According to Alexander, the essential property of man is “to 
have understanding” (emphasis added); the statement “man is receptive of understanding” (Aristotle’s 
original and misinterpreted formula) was, he said, merely a “consequent” of this firmer, naturalistic
proposition. And where Aristotle had written only about man qua man, Alexander derives from this 
a truth about individuals: “Socrates is receptive of intuited wisdom and understanding” because
“man” is. A hypothetical niche was thereby established for some individual who is not receptive of 
wisdom or understanding, and who thus lacks the essential property of what it is to be human. 
However, it was only in the late Middle Ages that writers began to embed a theory of universals 
in their study of the human mind and its faculties. When the Arab philosophers, commenting on 
Aristotle’s texts, employed the formula “Man is a rational animal,” they took this to be a truth 
inscribed in the objective structure of the cosmos. In doing so, they were also rethinking the bonds 
between that macrocosmic structure and the natural species “man” who was a microcosm of it. “Man 
is …” in their formula was no longer (as formulae of this type had been for Aristotle) employed 
merely to illustrate or adjudicate disputes about universals, with man just one example among many.
At the same time, they did not yet display the value-laden anxiety about exceptional individuals 
that was to accompany the new forms of psychological classification in the early modern period. In 
Averroes’s words, “Differentia and species … are predicated of their subjects equally, not in degrees 
of less and more: no man is more man than another man.” If he were, then man’s ranking in the
cosmos in relation to other animals would no longer have its distinctive superiority and therefore
he would have no special relationship with God. Any idea of intra-species difference would have
threatened inter-species difference and man’s special place in nature. Nevertheless, the Arabs 
unwittingly created the basis on which a concept of natural intra-species difference might arise.5 
They completely reframed the relationship of “man” to logic. The general problem of what 
is a statement in logic and what is an empirical statement, and of their relationship to each other, 
4 In Aristotelis Topicorum, 173. 
5 Averroes, Three Short Commentaries, 54 ff.; Middle Commentaries on Aristotle’s Categories and 











Testing the Rule of Human Nature 285 
has been a constant preoccupation in Western philosophy and need not concern us here. But we 
do need to note that a special problem arises when the so-called empirical statements are about 
man. When we illustrate the formal procedures of logic with an illustration using, say, “table,” 
there is no question of our own human self-regard becoming entangled in those procedures. Their 
objectivity is not compromised: the distinction between the structural framework of the logic and 
the empirical content of the illustration remains clear. And this had been true for “man” even when 
Aristotle used the word in a logical context. For example, in his Prior Analytics it appears alongside 
other items – table, house, ice, triangle, cloak, etc. – which have equal status with it, as illustrations 
of how a syllogism may be constructed. The word “man” is as extrinsic to the syllogism as the 
word “table.” He does assume man to have a special importance, particularly in relation to other 
animals (man is “cultured and literate”), but this sense of being special merely reflects certain 
Greek conventions that predate the rise of logic, and does not intrude into the logic itself. In the 
rules of logical engagement, man is no more important than a table. It is true that in Posterior 
Analytics he interpolates a psychological note when he says that the first principles of syllogizing 
come from man’s “intuited intellect” (nous). However, this is unconnected to his account of how 
the syllogisms actually work. None of the illustrations Aristotle uses to explain their operation 
refers to man being an intuitively intellectual animal, or to any other psychological attribute.6 The 
Arabs and scholastics, on the other hand, allowed the internal nature of man to become entangled 
in the structure of the syllogism. They fixed man at the centre of nature, and welded an account 
of his unique place in the objective, logical order of the cosmos (midway between purely rational 
angels and purely material animals) with what was previously an entirely separate account of the 
subjective processes of reasoning within him. They made the former the “necessary consequence” 
of the latter: “If this thing is a rational animal, it is a man.”7 
Man’s logically inscribed place in the cosmic order would eventually be used to enhance the 
expert status of the nascent professions. Historians of logic make the case that it was only in the 
nineteenth century that the discipline finally shook off its origins in Aristotelianism; the logic of 
Ramus in the sixteenth century and Locke in the seventeenth were momentary diversions. However, 
these diversions were crucial to what non-philosophers of the time thought logic was, and how they 
made use of it. It was via the intrusion of these quasi-logical notions into everyday thought that 
one man did indeed become, in intellectual terms, more than another. The conceptual frameworks 
of the human sciences and of psychology in particular are descended from these degraded
forms of logic, which early modern professionals borrowed to resolve issues of status – of man 
to God, of man to the rest of nature, but especially between man and man. The real thing having 
been left behind on its esoteric philosophical perch, this ersatz logic became a vernacular tool in 
the practice of humanist law, religion and later (as usual) medicine. It was their application of the 
vocabulary of logic to prescriptive accounts of mind and behaviour and the maintenance of social 
order that both demanded and produced “man” – and of course a normative definition of him – as 
the primary illustration of how logical systems work. 
The point of logic in such texts was not, as it had been for Aristotle, to test the objectivity
of thought (though that was always the claim), but to justify the categorization of abilities and
personalities. Logic objectivizes status, lending the human sciences their air of authenticity
and their authority. In Aristotle, the actual truth content of propositions beginning “Man
is …” had been, if not irrelevant, then subordinate to the main task, which was to test out the
relationship of one proposition to another and thus the validity of certain formal procedures
either of analysis or simply of debate. But in Arab and scholastic philosophy, reason and man
6 Prior Analytics, 52a; Posterior Analytics, 99b.
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are embroiled with each other: these writers begin with the presupposition that man is a rational
or logically reasoning animal, as itself a universal truth that tacitly underwrites the validity of
logical propositions. 
Exacerbated by the rise of humanistic systems of thinking which were less about the cosmos 
as such than man’s place in it, this then reaches down to the professions and to the vernacular 
logic books that began to appear. The foremost example in England was Thomas Wilson’s 1551 
textbook, which went through many printings and for the next century was the first item educated 
people reached for when they wanted to know about logic (what they called “Aristotelian” logic, 
that is, the Tree of Porphyry). Wilson’s very first illustration of a universal or species difference, 
the paradigm of such differences throughout the cosmos, is the standard “Man is a rational animal” 
formula. Tables and triangles are notable by their absence. In the book’s opening address to
Edward VI, the content of man’s rationality is identified precisely with the humanist wit of the 
obedient professional classes, whom he presents as the elect caste of an elect nation: 
I have assayed … to make logic as familiar to the Englishman as by diverse men’s industries the 
most part of the other liberal sciences are, … considering the forwardness of this age, wherein 
the very multitude are prompt and ripe in all sciences … weighing also that the capacity of my 
countrymen the English nation is so pregnant and quick to achieve any kind or art of knowledge, 
whereunto wit may attain, that they are not inferior to any other.8 
Wilson has in mind the man who has the wit to adapt and bend logic to his own career while 
respecting social and religious norms. Most of the book’s illustrations of logic are drawn from 
human behaviour. This is presented in both political and religious terms, between which it seeks 
a balance. On the one hand, it promotes the “goodly [logical] reasoner” as the ideal citizen of a 
centrally and logically ordered state, and on the other it seeks in good Calvinist faith to prevent 
logical reasoning from overreaching itself: “Some heads are very bold to enter farther than wit can 
reach, or else have a mind vainly to question of … things that should not be brought in question,” 
such as the existence of God. 
Wilson’s application of this chop logic in the social realm coincides with  Ramus’s revolt 
against so-called Aristotelian logic. Ramus disliked its complexity, in which man could variously 
be this by essential property, that by definition, the other by difference and so on. He sought a 
simpler system, consisting only of universal kinds. He saw universals as a mirror, reflecting for the 
reader “the universal images and the generals of all things, making it much easier by means of these 
images to recognize each species and therefore to establish contact with that which he is seeking.”9 
Ramus’s most frequently worked example of a universal kind, central to his very idea of logic, 
was “man,” to whom also he wanted to restore a biblical simplicity. His highly influential analytic 
technique consisted in the simple division and subdivision of such kinds. Dichotomy was popular 
with double predestinarians because it reinforced the simplicity of the elect-reprobate division, 
but it was also popular with those who, like Amyraut and Baxter, were trying to flee the starkness 
of predestination, and (as we saw in Chapter 11) it is what eventually produced their concept of a 
natural disability of the intellect. 
This was not some esoteric dispute between schools of logic but part of a whole cultural 
transformation. In the late sixteenth century the professions, notably law and religion, were drawing 
on both “Aristotelian” and Ramist schools. Lawyers used them in their own handbooks on how to 
improve professional practice. Commenting on the charge that Ramism was plebeian (“hereby is 
8 Thomas Wilson, The Rule of Reason, A3r.
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logic … robbed of her honour … It comes to pass that every cobbler can cog a syllogism … hereby 
is logic profaned”), Abraham Fraunce asks, “Cobblers be men, why therefore not logicians?”10 
And of course if cobblers can be logicians, so too can lawyers. Logic should not be “locke[d] up 
in secret corners.” Human reason, public policy and the legal profession as practised by Fraunce’s 
readers, are all identified with each other, and logic is the cement that binds them: 
If laws by reason framed were, and grounded on the same;
 
If logic also reason be, and thereof had this name;
 
I see no reason, why that law and logic should not be
 
The nearest and the dearest friends, and therefore best agree.
 
Fraunce is looking for ways to police the microcosm of the individual as well as the social 
macrocosm. The threat represented by heterodox private reason could be cured by an injection 
of logic. After all, as Aristotle had said, “every common person or silly soul useth logic in some 
part, and practiseth of himself by natural instinct that which artificially logic doth prescribe in her 
several rules and constitutions; artificial logic then is the polishing of natural wit, as discovering 
the validity of every reason, be it necessary, whereof cometh science.” Of course Aristotle had 
said nothing of the sort; Fraunce is trying here to bind knowledge to power, by injecting with 
the scientific credentials of logic a mundane and secular wit whose status needed a lift. To some 
degree even people outside the honour society could reason logically; the point was to harness their 
reasoning to the public (state) good. 
But what if they could not? The new legal definition of the idiot, given a place within the simple 
divisions and subdivisions of Ramist logic in which “nothing is exorbitant or without the verge of 
that division,” helped to sharpen the idea of exclusion from the human species.11 The infiltration
of legal vocabulary into discussions of human nature confirmed that the absolute category 
boundary involved in possession and privation was taking over from the former, fuzzier notion of 
the unnatural as merely an exotic expression of the natural. This had its influence on definitions 
of man. Wilkins, for example, in his attempt to create a universal nomenclature for simple kinds 
or species (aimed at stabilizing the Royal Society’s investigations of the natural world), gave as 
his chief example of “natural power” or ability the man of “understanding, intellect, mind” and 
its privative, the “natural fool,” “idiot,” or “changeling.”12 The logic was deductive as well as 
dichotomous. Wilkins’s category of “idioticalness,” qua category, had to exist. Therefore, one 
could go out and look for people to fit it (and exactly the same is true of “intellectual disability”). 
As for religion, logic had already been brought into its service by Calvin, and even more by 
leading second-generation Protestants such as Beza and Philip Melanchthon. But what historians 
have seen as a humanist application of logic to religion could equally be seen as the infiltration
of logic by religion, as a way of finding a language in which the prescription of doctrine and the 
control of behaviour might be justified. Take the doctrine of election. I cannot offer good behaviour 
as collateral for my election or state of grace because that would amount to thinking that I can 
bargain with God. So I can only detect it from my feelings of certainty. Calvin’s logical-type 
formula for this ran: The elect are certain of their salvation; this man is not certain; therefore he is 
not elect. Now this might seem as if he were adapting for religious purposes the format of some 
already existing proposition from secular logic, say: Man is a rational animal; this man is not 
rational; therefore he is not a man. But in fact no one before the later seventeenth century had come 
10 The Lawiers Logike, 3.5.
 
11 Cited in Howell, Logic, 201.
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up with such a proposition. Nor could they have done, because species exclusion on the grounds 
of rationality demands a modern mind-set. Defects of rationality in individuals, as we have seen, 
had never challenged their essence or species membership; such defects were mere “accidents.” 
Neither Locke nor anyone else could say that a man without logical reasoning was not a man until 
Calvin had said that a man without certainty was not elect. We have intellectually disabled people 
only because we once had reprobates. 
The earlier part of the seventeenth century reveals the beginnings of this transition. “Man,” 
and his division into elect and reprobate, was the primary textbook example of the Ramist 
subdivision of universal kinds. The first guide to Ramist logic published in English, in 1584, is 
full of illustrations of dichotomy running along the lines of “Faithful men must either be saved or 
condemned: but they shall be saved: therefore not condemned.”13 This religious doctrine about elect 
status, historically contingent, was crucial in the very formation of a supposedly logical, objective 
structure of scientific expertise about the human mind. The seepage between illustrations involving 
man and election and those involving man and reason occurs in several ways. First, there was the 
dispute among faculty psychologists as to whether damage to one of the soul’s faculties remains 
limited to that part or whether it affects the rational soul itself. Various orthodox Calvinists took up 
this theme. Beza cast it in terms of grace and election. Each faculty, he said, is partly regenerate, 
partly unregenerate, and “that is why intelligence is not perfect.”14 Perkins drew a logic-based 
analogy between the individual’s membership of the species (“man is a rational animal”) and his 
membership of the company of the elect: 
[God] doth as well conclude in the heart of everyone one that believeth, that he is elected: as any 
man shall be able to conclude unto particular men, that every one of them is a living creature 
endowed with reason by this general proposition: Every man is a reasonable creature endowed 
with reason: the assumption being suppressed …. Furthermore, he publisheth it to all the elect by 
the Apostles in this general proposition, that all the faithful are elect to eternal life: the assumption 
(that whereby a man applies the general promise to himself) is concealed in the word of God 
[emphases in original].15 
In this analogy the two concepts, one about reason, the other about election, sit together in the 
same pseudo-logical framework. Of course they differ from each other in certain respects; it was 
not the case that every particular man is elect, whereas it was the case (according to the formula 
as then understood) that every particular man is a reasonable creature. But analogy can of course 
lead to osmosis. 
That was exactly what happened with Baxter’s friend William Bridge, who goes beyond analogy 
and asks himself: if the “essential property” of man is defined on the scale of nature as “rational 
animal,” then what exactly is the content of that rationality? Bridge answers: “To understand, to 
know, and to reflect upon a man’s own actions …. A beast does many actions, but a beast hath not 
power to reflect upon his own action.”16 This was a humanist convention; as Elyot had remarked, 
a horse “knoweth not that he is a horse … that ignorance that we call beastly, is in that, that beasts 
do not know what they themselves be, nor between them and men what is the diversity,” namely 
possession of an immortal soul.17 The ability to reflect on one’s own actions, and the understanding 
13 Dudley Fenner, The Arte of Logike, C1r. 

14 Cited in Jeffrey Mallinson, Faith, Reason and Revelation in Theodore Beza, 208.
 
15 A Briefe Discourse, 23.
 
16 Works, iii, 7.
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that this ability accounts for one’s place in the hierarchy of species, were the defining components 
of human reason. And it is on these grounds that Bridge excludes the reprobate from the human 
species: “A reprobate … does not reflect upon his own action” – i.e., he is without a conscience –
“and so does not have the essential property of rational animal.” By contrast, “every godly, gracious 
man hath this power.” Rationality here is fully identified with election. The out-group consists of 
people lacking both simultaneously. Moreover, reasoning conscience also involves a knowledge 
of the necessary, divinely determined mechanism that has caused one’s elect status, the “watches 
and springs” as Bridge puts it (reminiscent of Locke’s “wheels and springs”) that determine one’s 
human essence. Reprobates lack the ability to detect either their own human status or its causes. 
To summarize: Aristotle used the formula “Man is …” as one illustration among many in a 
psychology-less logic. By the thirteenth century, the individual human mind was being seen as 
possessed of its own subjective logical component, a logically reasoning ability; by the end of the 
sixteenth, the mind itself, as a whole, was starting to be called the “logical faculty.”18 The union 
between logic as object and as subject can be seen from the title of Watts’s seminal 1741 guide 
to education and behaviour The Improvement of the Mind: or, a Supplement to the Art of Logic. 
While logic as objective critique was contributing to the development of the exact sciences, its 
emergence in the human sciences came via salvation theology and preparation for the afterlife, and 
with modernity has ended up in what one might call a logic-less psychology. 
Abstraction: its medieval roots 
Locke’s doctrine of abstraction as the supreme intellectual activity led Edmund Burke, scourge 
of “the swinish multitude,” to describe “this disposition to abstractions, to generalizing and 
classification” as “the great glory of the human mind” (though it also led William Blake to scribble 
in his copy here: “To generalize is to be an idiot … General knowledges are those knowledges that 
idiots possess”).19 How did abstraction reach this elevated position? In medieval faculty, psychology 
abstraction was just one important operation, alongside contemplation and others. The operations 
were in any case secondary to the faculties, and even the faculties themselves were mere “qualities” 
of the soul, the latter being the really “substantial” entity. Later, abstraction would take over as the 
distinguishing feature of the human species, with the key role of enabling the mind to know itself. 
We shall come across it in two guises. In medieval philosophy, abstraction meant the separation 
of concepts from their corresponding sense objects in the material world, or of universal concepts 
from particular concepts. Gradually, however, it took on a second role, as the understanding of 
the understanding. (I use the word “understanding” here rather than “intellect” because it helps us 
to grasp fully the tautology involved, as in the ubiquitous phrase “the understanding understands 
the understanding,” intellectus intelligit intellectum.) Once the thinking individual had abstracted 
himself fully from the objects of his senses, there was only himself and his relationship with other 
fully abstracted entities left to think about: his likeness to God or (after the Reformation) his status 
with Him. 
Everyone writing on the topic claimed Aristotle’s On the Soul as his source. In fact Aristotle 
had not given abstraction any systematic treatment or even a dedicated vocabulary; even less did 
he see it as defining the human species. He uses at least five everyday terms – “to separate,” “take 
away,” “lift off,” etc., – for what the Arabs, or at least their Latin translators (to be followed in 
English by modern translators of Aristotle himself) describe by the one technical term, “to abstract.”
18 Casmann, Psychologia, 89.
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Aristotle does, it is true, draw a contrast between “feelings associated with the senses” and “that 
which is said to be at one ‘remove’ from them,” though only with the purpose of instructing us
that sensible forms are at the root of both. He also draws a contrast between “sense-perception 
which in practice deals with each thing” and “understanding (episteme) which deals with the whole” 
(“with universals,” say modern translators, anticipating what was in fact a later philosophical
development).20 These were passing remarks, but the Arabs and scholastics turned them into an 
overarching theory. Aquinas, for example, wrote about abstraction as a precise operation applied 
to objects in the external world: “What is received from the senses becomes actively intelligible
through a process of abstraction.”21 There is also the abstraction of universals from particular 
concepts: “The function of the theoretical faculty is to receive the impressions of the universal forms 
abstracted from matter …. If these forms are already abstract in themselves, it simply receives them;
if not, it makes them immaterial by abstraction, so that no trace whatever of material attachments 
remains in them.”22 Hence, abstraction is an operational component of the faculty of intellectus or 
understanding: “The uncorrupted understanding is that understanding in us which is abstracted.” 
According to Avicenna, abstraction is one of the highest ranking of the active operations. He 
looks for a concrete example of how it works, and the best illustration of a completed abstraction 
he can find is the concept “man”: “The faculty takes the unitary nature of the many [individual 
men], divests it of all material quantity, quality, place, and position, and abstracts from all these 
in such a way that it can be attributed to all men.” What is abstraction? It is that which the species 
man does. What is the species man? We know by abstraction. Abstraction is the process by
which man knows himself as an abstractor, the boundaries of this circle marking his difference 
from (and mastery over) the brute beasts. 
Abstraction in this sense implies that the essence of “man” lies in and is defined by the ability 
of the human intellectus to know itself. But this raises the question, how can it do so if subject and 
object consist of the same substance? An “understanding that understands the understanding” is 
also needed, to understand the workings of that very idea – and so on, regressively. Aristotle had 
explicitly warned against going round in circles like this (the same critique is routinely made of 
psychology today).23 There are limits, he urged, to what thinking can do; all there is, is a patchwork 
succession of thinking states – each of which will always exist only in relation to some specific 
thing. The Arabs tried to co-opt Aristotle, quoting him as saying that the understanding can be 
identical with its object. (In fact the passage they cited makes a rather different point.)24 Moreover, 
they owed much also to the Platonist theory of intelligences, in which the perfect movement of the 
psyche is a circle. Circularity was not problematic for them, but rather a positive principle. 
The Arab philosophers’ Islamist critics were sceptical of the idea that the understanding could 
understand the understanding – not because it was regressive or circular but because they doubted 
whether any merely human being could attain any such understanding. This faith-based scepticism 
survived into early modern Christianity, albeit as a minority doctrine. How can the soul know 
itself? As one writer put it, “Properly to know that by which it knows is impossible for any creature: 
because to know that, is to be above it self: and to have that which it hath not. This therefore is 
proper to God alone, whose essence and knowledge is both one.”25 Among the Arabs, Averroes 
20 On the Soul, 417b; 432a. 

21 Summa Theologica, 1.1.84.
 
22 Avicenna, Psychology, 33. 

23 For example Ilham Dilman, “Science and psychology,” in A. O’Hear (ed.), Verstehen and Humane 
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had been particularly optimistic. He thought that philosophers might sometimes succeed in having 
such knowledge: that “in contemplating the understanding as the understanding, they will think its 
abstracted substance.” This optimistic tone would come to dominate the early modern period and to 
presuppose the abilities of increasing numbers of people. For Averroes, the goal of philosophy was 
that ultimate point where “the thing which the understanding abstracts is the understanding as it 
abstracts and understands that thing.”26 In a human and partly material being, however, “the power 
of understanding, if it understands via its bodily instrument, does not understand itself, nor its own 
instrument, nor understands whether it understands.” Whatever operates through a bodily organ is 
not capable of knowing itself. Self-understanding can only occur if “between the understanding 
and its own essence there is no instrument”; only then does it “understand itself and that instrument 
which is ascribed to it, and understand whether it understands, so that it understands through itself, 
not through the instrument.”27 
It was because some at least of the Arabs thought that humans were at the occasional sublime 
philosophical moment capable of understanding the understanding that later commentators dubbed 
them “intellectualists.” This suggests a departure from their Greek predecessors, whose injunction 
“Know thyself” had strong ethical components. However, Greek philosophy was interested in 
the passions because they were a bar to understanding, and if the Arabs’ focus seems instead to 
have been on the sense objects in themselves, rather than on the fleshly passions they incite, they 
themselves did not overlook the passions. In either case, “disability” seems to have consisted in 
having a body – a fairly broad catchment. This ethical core to intellectual disability remains in 
the later vernacular literature dealing with knowledge of the self and the mind. In Book 2 of The 
Faerie Queene for example, Spenser describes how the knight Sir Guyon, on his allegorical journey 
through the inner man, comes to know his true self through his resistance to the female figure of 
Acrasia (“Intemperance”), who symbolizes “filth and foul incontinence” in “the mind of beastly 
man …. That now he chooseth, with vile difference,// To be a beast, and lack intelligence.” 
Abstraction in the natural history of the mind 
Whereas the Arabs had represented the abstraction of the understanding from sense objects and 
its understanding of itself chiefly as a vague transcendence, the seventeenth century brought the 
project down to earth by naturalizing it. Locke gave notice of the task in the opening lines of
the Essay, when he wrote: “The understanding, like the eye, whilst it makes us see, and perceive 
all other things, takes no notice of itself: and it requires art and pains to set it at a distance, and 
make it its own object.” Locke considered himself to possess the requisite art. One had to move 
beyond vagueness and focus on the specific detail of psychological operations and skills, of which 
abstraction was supreme. However fraught with problems this enquiry, however analytically 
difficult an animal man might be, the prospect of triumph was no longer in doubt. 
In humanism’s scientific project, the path to God had been through investigation of his works of 
nature. However, the classical sources from which this project started out (Lucretius, Pliny) were 
tainted with materialism. In treating the investigating entity itself, the rational soul or mind, as a 
work of nature too, humanism was trying to wrest its scientific project back on to sounder theological 
terrain. As Edward Reynolds, Dean of Christchurch during Locke’s time as an undergraduate there, 
put it: “Hereon is grounded another reason … to prove the soul immaterial, because it depends not 
on the body in its operations but educeth them immediately from within itself, as is more manifest 
26 Commentarium Magnum in Aristotelis de Anima Librum Tertium, 494; 480.
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in the reflexion of the soul upon its own nature.”28 The reconceptualization of the fully abstracted 
“rational soul” as a part of nature led to its simplification. Even in expert circles, the phrase began to 
be used casually, as if writers could no longer be bothered making a distinction (because everyone 
knew it to exist) between this immaterial entity and the sensitive or corporeal soul with its link to 
the corrupt material world. A requisite social stereotyping facilitated this shift in usage: “The most 
vulgar and illiterate,” said Glanvill, “have not souls for much knowledge” – clearly, we would now 
read this as “minds.”29 
As we saw in Chapter 4, an erosion also occurred of the old distinction between the operations 
(such as abstraction) and the soul’s substance and faculties. The immortality and divinity of the 
soul began to rub off on its operations, formerly seen as the secondary entities. Huarte, for example, 
argued that the operation of wit (ingenium) is actually a form of the infused soul itself coming 
directly from God, “whatsoever difference of ability” is owed to the bodily disposition.30 For Locke, 
though he retained the idea of the soul having innate faculties, the real work of acquiring knowledge 
was done empirically, via the operations and above all via abstraction; and his successors such as 
Condillac then got rid of the faculties altogether.31 
Another conceptual rearrangement facilitating the rise of abstraction was that between 
“passive” and “active” intellect (nous). We might assume that these phrases of Aristotle’s stood 
for what we know today as ability and performance, which for us are closely linked (and for 
the psychometrician are indistinguishable). However, the Greeks had a strong category boundary 
separating ability from performance, potentiality from actuality, possession from use. Aristotle 
saw them as belonging to entirely distinct orders of reality; understanding for example (episteme, 
associated with actuality/activity and use) lies in a strictly separate genus from ability (associated 
with possession).32 Categorically distinct, passive and active intellect are nevertheless aspects of a 
single thought event, relating to each other as matter does to form. In medieval philosophy “active” 
intellect became a divine force, activating what would otherwise remain passive in the sense of 
inert; hence passive intellect came to be known as “potential” intellect. The latter concept made it 
possible to stick to the Christian teaching that all individual rational souls are equal while allowing 
the more important actual/active intellect to differentiate among individuals: “If by ‘rational’ we 
mean ‘actual,’ it is not predicated equally.”33 
Renaissance writers began to say that “active and passive should be resolved into one,” and in 
the post-Cartesian world, passive and potential intellect lost their significance entirely, and active 
intellect became identified with the now all-important operative realm of abstraction.34 According 
to the anonymous author of a 1655 anatomical treatise (with “Know thyself” once more the header 
quotation), 
An intellectus agens [active intellect] is necessary for this reason, that it may make all things 
actually [sc. actively] intelligible …. For since every object or phantasm is material and so under 
the opposite condition of the power intelligent, which is abstracted and immaterial, it cannot be 
comprehended by the intellect until it become abstracted, immaterial, and proportionate to the 
28 A Treatise, 400.
 
29 An Essay concerning Preaching, 54.
 
30 The Examination, 102.
 




33 Levi ben Gershon, cited in H. Davidson, Averroes, 23; see also Zdzisław Kuksewicz, “The potential 

and the agent intellect,” in The Cambridge History of Later Medieval Philosophy. 






Testing the Rule of Human Nature 293 
intellect; and this can never be done but by a power abstracted, and an essence intelligent. From 
this we may derive information that the office of the understanding is agere [to act].35 
The distinction between the soul, as the underlying substance, and its operations had never been 
clearcut; but not only are the operations increasingly important here, the soul itself is reinvented 
as an abstracted “intelligence” – man’s rather than God’s – and the operations become this soul, 
so to speak, having absorbed its fundamental divinity. The “active” intellect was to be the only 
kind worth mentioning in the emergent discipline of empirical psychology. The category boundary 
between ability/potential and actuality/performance has finally disappeared, its one last refuge being 
in the philosophy of mind.36 This erosion is a precondition for the very existence of psychology 
as an applied discipline. Failure to perform is not merely evidence of intellectual disability but 
completely identifiable with lack of potential. If we are asked to use our intellect but fail, then we 
do not have it, either actually or potentially. 
Active abstraction is the centrepiece of Locke’s account of human intellectual abilities in the 
Essay: the ultimate criterion for human species membership. It is no longer a divine attribute 
to which humans occasionally have privileged access but something specifically and commonly 
human, derived indirectly from Perkins’s reasoning conscience. The importance of abstraction for 
Locke’s contemporaries, and for Locke himself, cannot be grasped in isolation from its role as main 
bulwark in defence of the soul’s immortality. A German theological text exactly contemporary with 
Locke’s Essay underlines the point. This author sees abstraction as the weapon to defeat atheism, 
because it proves the existence of the rational soul from the study of nature itself.37 Abstraction 
reveals how the understanding “in operation as well as in being” – the distinction hardly seems to 
matter any more – “is independent from the body … [and] the operations of the rational soul are 
immaterial.” It is the one operation that separates humans from animals, says the author; a sleeping 
dog does not see images while its body is asleep, because animals cannot abstract (“Brutes abstract 
not,” asserts Locke). The supreme natural example of an abstractor, and equally of the abstract 
knowledge of his species, is man himself – and not, as for earlier philosophy, man in a temporarily 
shared space with God. Man knows “how to conceive the species man, the common idea of it, 
by discovering it in every individual man.” He knows this “by abstraction, known as physics,”
that is, the study of nature. He knows that God exists “by abstraction, known as metaphysics,” that
is, the study of divinity. And finally he knows triangles and number “by abstraction, known as 
mathematics.” But it is the first of these, knowledge of the mind, which is paramount. We can know 
the immortality of this human rational soul “by light of nature alone,” and without it we could 
not then know God or mathematical truths. Abstraction here is the operator-in-chief by which the 
human intellect “universally comes to know universals.” We know abstraction by abstraction, and 
first of all by focusing on our individual selves. And it is from this that we get an inkling of the 
privileged position we occupy in nature as perfectible and immortal beings, who may become (to 
use the transhumanists’ phrase) “as radically different from our human past as we humans are from 
the lower animals.”38 In Paul Mengal’s words – it is the seventeenth century he has in mind, but 
of course they apply to the present day as well – “psychology thus reconstructs the relationship of 
mind to body by inscribing it within a new vision of the direction of history.”39 
35 Anon., Anthropologie Abstracted: or, the Idea of Human Nature, 19.
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The immortality of the soul and the origins of the word “psychology” 
At the core of logical reasoning and abstraction then, which defined the human essence and would 
at some point differentiate among individual humans, lay self-knowledge: of the individual and of 
the species. When the word psychology was first coined, towards the end of the sixteenth century, 
it was partly to describe this generic human understanding of the human mind, and partly to defend 
the existence of the immaterial and immortal soul. It arose at the height of a Europe-wide moral 
panic about atheism, from the theologians around Göckel at the leading Protestant university of 
Marburg. For these writers, “know thyself” meant: know that you have a rational soul; know that 
the foetus becomes human when God, not the parents, infuses its rational soul; know that this 
rational soul in man makes him entirely different from the other animals because it is the image 
of God.40 “Psychology” at its debut, in the various recensions of Göckel and his associates, is a 
rephrasing of man’s special relationship to the rest of nature. 
Doubts about the soul’s immortality and immateriality had always been around, but only as late 
as 1513 did the church anathematize such views: evidence that a full theoretical justification had 
become a political necessity.41 There immediately followed the momentous theological scandal of 
Pomponazzi’s assertion that philosophy alone could not prove the soul’s immortality. He and his 
disciples pressed home the question: if the soul’s component parts are subject to defect (lethargy, 
melancholy, etc.), can the substance of the rational soul itself be immaterial?42 The very word 
“psychology” was a response to this sceptical attack, even if the scepticism rested on a religious 
conviction that faith was more reliable than reason. One of the Protestant psychology men, Otho 
Casmann, warned against taking at face value the sceptics’ protestations that they were putting faith 
first. They claimed to be objecting to the idea that the human mind can understand itself through 
itself, on the grounds that this would mean we were trying to compete with God, who is in fact the 
“first intelligence” and the only being that can truly know his own essence. Casmann feared this 
scepticism might have a domino effect and discourage belief in the soul’s immortality altogether. 
The Jesuits had answered the sceptics by saying that the human soul can at least know itself “through 
its appearance” (per speciem), if not “through its essence” (per essentiam). Casmann complained 
that this response is inadequate, and typical of the Catholic obsession with externals. The mind 
knows itself not “directly by its appearance” but “indirectly, by reflection.”43 The psychology 
men’s purpose was thus to shore up – by rewriting – the principle that the mind is immaterial 
and immortal: it could only be true if the human mind can actually be known, reflectively and 
analytically. This reflective ability to study the soul or mind became indispensable to the principle 
of immateriality and immortality itself. The turn from pessimism to optimism over the prospect of 
doing so, and the resulting notion that disability is lack of psychologically reflective knowledge, 
would be neatly captured later in Glanvill’s remark: “The disease of our intellectuals is too great, 
not to be its own diagnostic. And they that feel it not, are not less sick, but stupidly so.”44 
The main stimulus for inserting self-reflection within the study of the mind was the writers’
anxiety about predestination and salvation. Göckel would later participate at the Synod of 
Dort, arbitrating on the doctrine of election. The search in oneself for signs of election led to 
the new epistemological concerns of philosophy foregrounded by Locke. As one preacher wrote,
40 Göckel, Psychologia, “To the Reader.”
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“How should we comfortably know that we are enriched with saving graces but by a reflexed act of 
the understanding, whereby we know that we have them?”45 This meeting between philosophical 
tradition and worries about election and reprobation, between “man the rational animal” and “man 
the difficult animal,” reinforced the study of the generic “self” as a burgeoning discipline that 
aspired to be at once a means for salvation and the starting point for knowledge of the rest of the 
natural world. At first “psychology” was only one among several names offered for this study. Here 
is another that did not catch on but might well have: “The way to God is by ourselves: it is a blind 
and dirty way; it hath many windings, and is easy to be lost …. He that would learn theology must 
first study autology.”46
 Sometimes the psychology men’s very choice of title points to the doctrinal thrust of the 
term: for example General Psychology: a Disputation on the Status of Souls after Death, a work 
whose opening sentence is again “Know thyself.”47 In the 1575 Quaestiones Physicae of Ramus’s 
friend and translator Johannes Freigius, which contains the earliest verifiable printed use of 
the term, psychologia (study of the soul) is used synonymously with anima (soul). There is no 
distinction between the thing itself and its study; this aggrandizes and reifies the soul (rather as 
“methodology” in social science today aggrandizes “method”). The book’s contents page consists 
in a list of Ramist-style divisions and subdivisions. The first, unitary heading is “Perfected Entity” 
(corpus perfectum). This then divides into inanimate and animate entities. The animate branch 
subdivides into “Soul” (anima/psychologia) and “Ensouled Body” (corpus animatum). The anima/ 
psychologia chapter turns out to be a routine description of the soul’s faculties that could have been 
written at any time over the previous two centuries. The novelty is the word itself, psychology:
a battle-cry signalling that the theory of the divinity and immortality of the soul and its alter ego 
the mind are under threat. 
Whatever the due caution of historians who have insisted on the “lexical fluidity” of the word 
psychology in this period, it seems that all the early usages share this same doctrinal stance.48 Only 
two works with the word in their titles were published outside the Goclenian circle at this time. 
Noël de Taillepied’s 1588 Psichologie, ou traité de l’apparition des esprits attacks people who 
deny the existence of spirits, a proxy for denying the existence of the soul; and in a new edition 
of Boehme’s Forty Questions on the Origin of the Soul, the word “psychology” was added to the 
title, perhaps in order to cleanse the original work of its traducianist views (denounced by its new 
editor as “heresy”). Whatever their differences, these authors share with the Goclenians a belief 
in the realist doctrine about spirits and the Devil, as well as a defence of the soul’s immortality. 
“Psychology” at the moment of its invention thus seems to have been an imperialist attempt, from 
an initially defensive redoubt, to turn the immaterial human soul or mind into the overarching 
study. From its beginning, it was dealing with biology too, since the question of ensoulment, of 
how the rational soul arrives in the body, opens up an arena of discussion for the physical causes 
of defect. The titles again give a flavour: for example, Fortunius Licetus’s Human Psychology, or: 
On the Source of the Human Soul, which attacks the doctrine of parental generation.49 A work by 
another of Göckel’s colleagues, Clemens Timpler (probably his Twelve Theses on the Essence of 
the Rational Soul), went under the nickname of “the Ensoulment Theory” (Empsychologia).50 
45 Estwick, Πνευματολογια: Or, a Treatise of the Holy Ghost, 88.
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Once again, one of the techniques employed by the psychology men was to try and recuperate 
the terms of their opponents. The traducianists, charged with implying that parental generation 
gives the soul material origins, had defended themselves by adopting Averroes’s theory that there 
is a single immortal and incorruptible abstract intellect, held in common by all mankind over 
and above individual corruptible souls. The psychology men took this notion of their opponents 
and used it to describe instead the incorruptible element of the human essence held individually, 
in each human soul. It is this that Licetus, for example, then labels “the abstracted intelligence” 
(intelligentia abstracta), as it emerges from the to and fro of theological debate.51 
From these debates there also arose, at the start of the seventeenth century and some time 
before Descartes, a routine subdivision of the study of man, “anthropology,” into “somatology” 
and “psychology,” body and soul.52 Further into the century, a second wave of Marburg physician-
theologians took Descartes’s cogito and identified it with the “soul” of their Goclenian predecessors; 
disability was identified, accordingly, as “lack of clear and distinct ideas,” of the Cartesian type.53 
There is then a connection from this second generation through to Christian Wolff, the German 
Enlightenment philosopher who during his stay in Marburg in the 1720s became the self-styled 
founder of empirical psychology. Wolff’s ties to the modern discipline are well established. 
Prompted by Leibniz’s proposal of an arithmetical calculus for the study of the soul and by Christian 
Thomasius’s 1690 “calculus of the passions” which scored individual personalities on a numerical 
scale, it was Wolff who first coined the term psychometrics (psychometriae).54 
Intellectual differences and human nature: difference by degree 
What kind of classifiable difference between one human being and another is created by this 
prominence of abstraction and logical reasoning? Answers can be found in the grand, long-lived 
theory of natural hierarchy known as the “scale of nature.” In our search for knowledge about 
ourselves and each other, when the going gets tough we reach for the principle, deeply embedded 
in our history, that order gives meaning to nature and creates a natural human hierarchy. In respect 
of intellectual disability, this differentiation follows three models: as part of a spectrum of degrees 
within a broadly human category, as an interstice between higher and lower forms of natural 
intellectual life and as a monstrous anomaly. 
The first of these models, difference by degree, is not entirely separable from the ethical principle 
of inclusive indifference, since it does not challenge the actual species membership of those of the 
lowest degree. The very existence of humans with disabled understandings, as long as they are 
classed within the species, might be taken as proof of “the principle of plenitude” in the “great 
chain of being,” showing that God has filled all the available spaces of creation.55 In Aristotle’s
On the Soul there are just two passing references to intellectual difference: the one already noted 
about the sense of touch, the other about the intellectual states of old people. All Aristotle wants to 
say is that such differences do not challenge the fundamental rule by which the soul is “form” to the 
body’s “matter”; only animated bodies can be thus graded, not souls by themselves. Pedagogical 
experts of the Roman Empire expanded on this text. Themistius, for example, in his commentary 
51 For example Licetus, Ψυχολογια, 253 ff.
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on Aristotle, adds blind people. It is not the sensory impairment in itself that is at issue but the 
intellectual impairment it creates. Because geometry is the paradigm of objective knowledge about 
the abstraction of form from matter, blind people’s inability to visualize geometric shapes leads 
to absence of this knowledge; correspondingly, their blindness means that their own souls are not 
and cannot be in a state of full abstraction from their bodies, and this prevents them from knowing, 
subjectively, that the abstraction of form from matter (of soul from body) is denied to them. Hence, 
in circular fashion, they are disabled from understanding their own lack of understanding.56 
Alexander, for whom the normative human group was “all those who are not impaired” in 
their understanding of universals, also noted that people are “more or less naturally endowed” 
with wisdom. All of us “have,” in a passive or potential sense, practical wisdom (mathematics, 
logic) and theory (physics, metaphysics). Whether we actually use them is another matter. By 
“all those who are not impaired,” therefore, he means people who do use them; they are those 
whose positions in Roman society afford them the leisure to “study” (contemplate). Alexander’s 
psychology is suffused with concepts of honour and social class, echoing the importance Aristotle 
gives to fineness of touch. Horny-handed peasants are impaired, but only because they have (and 
ought to have) no opportunity to practise any intellectual skills. Correspondingly, when he says that 
the unimpaired “are guided by nature itself to the apprehension of universals,” nature amounts here 
to training. If any determinism is involved, it is social rather than natural.57 
Following Alexander, Avicenna doubted whether abstraction could produce in us an 
understanding of the sensible images obtainable from the material world; it could only ever 
prepare us for the revelation, by some divine being, of their corresponding “intelligible forms.”58 
Averroes thought Avicenna overly pessimistic; he was conceding too much to Islamist religious 
sceptics, who argued that philosophy overestimated human intellectual abilities and was therefore 
“incoherent.” Averroes’s response to this scepticism, his famous Incoherence of the Incoherence, 
presents abstraction as the positive basis on which mortals themselves can occasionally achieve 
divine knowledge. It is the operation by which the “theoretical” faculty perceives “the real 
natures of intelligible things, in abstraction from matter, place and position,” concepts which “the 
philosophers call abstract universals.”59 Whereas Avicenna saw abstraction in ideal terms, only 
ambiguously accessible to human beings and suspended far above the material world, Averroes 
saw it as a genuinely human operation – perhaps a specifically human one, since angels and divine 
beings did not need abstraction to access theoretical truths. 
In what sort of people did this abstraction occur? Averroes’s normative human type is the 
speculative or theoretical philosopher. In the Platonist picture of a hierarchy of immaterial or 
angelic intelligences, which greatly influenced Arab philosophy, only the last and lowest of these 
had any point of contact with the material world. And the very prospect, however unlikely, of a 
divine intelligence within mere mortals created the thin end of a wedge for hierarchical difference 
among them. Some people are further abstracted from their own materially corrupting senses than 
others. At the opposite pole from the philosopher’s abstraction is carnal pollution. Between these 
two extremes are various grades of people who correspond with (rather than “are capable of”) the 
existence of various grades of intelligible forms. “Vulgar” people are on a level with intelligibles 
corrupted by the material world.60 On the next level up are novitiates undergoing an intellectual 
apprenticeship; they correspond with “speculative intelligibles,” i.e., concepts that approximate 
56 Themistius, On Aristotle on the Soul, 432a.
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better to what material things actually are and form part of the “knowledge of nature.” Since
this level too remains entangled with particulars, it still pertains to mere appearances; it is a 
“practical” level, tied to the material world as the vulgar are. Higher up are philosophers, who 
correspond with theory itself, i.e., with those intelligibles which are detached from the material 
world and which therefore constitute incorruptible, true objects of knowledge. And the summit 
of this grade is knowledge of the human soul: know your own essence, and you will know your 
creator. We know God through knowing in ourselves the image of God that we are, and this in 
turn is the basis of all knowledge of nature too. Most philosophers never get to this point, and 
even when they do, some of them know the image less well than others. Only in their optimum 
condition do they become, as pure intellect, the image of God. Averroes calls this transhumanist 
vision “a marvel of nature.” Although it displays man at his best, it is not a condition that is proper 
to man as man, inhabiting as he does the material realm. Five hundred years later the ballast had 
shifted; Locke would be claiming something like the abstracting abilities of the Arabs’ speculative 
philosophers for all – or most – humans. 
Status, then, is differential intellect. Our ability to abstract denotes honour to the extent that it 
removes us, as intellectual beings, from the corruptions of the flesh. Averroes and Albert, however, 
whose commentaries on On the Soul launched a copious Renaissance tradition, had presented these 
intra-species differentials in very general terms, though Albert did suggest they had corresponding 
physical brain states involving a greater or lesser subtlety of the soul spirits.61 Renaissance experts 
on the mind made the differentials socially specific. They rewrote Aristotle to say that the most 
honourable occupation of the understanding as subject is to contemplate the honourability of the 
understanding as object. (Actually, he had said it was mathematics.)62 Other occupations – especially 
those which did not involve thinking at all, or were not professional ones – were inferior. 
This social normativity of intellectual virtue was accompanied by the new emphasis on 
reasoning as a sign of grace; and a discussion about how the understanding and its operations 
represent the spectrum of individual abilities – once a largely philosophical discussion – was 
thereby theologized. It leads Andrea Alpago, an Arabic-reading doctor and Aristotle commentator 
of the sixteenth century, to expand the role of abstraction further by blurring the boundary between 
its subjective and objective roles; “abstractions,” in his formula, simply are “universals,” and
the subjective process through which one arrives at them. This model for the philosopher in his 
optimum condition is the soul after death in beatitude: 
The soul itself, separated from the body, understands … far nobler and more abstract things … than 
it previously understood …. There are men whose lives are not immersed in worldly delectation 
of the senses but abstain from them … and are only occupied in contemplation and knowledge, 
behaving thus because they are distanced and abstracted from the senses …. The more the soul 
is occupied with sense-objects, the further away it is from cognition of God, and of abstract 
forms.63 
In this Dantesque condition, which some of us occasionally attain here on earth and which remains 
an aspiration for everyone else, the soul shares in “divine substance and other abstract substances.” 
One is graded intellectually by one’s nearness to God. The normativity of abstraction for the 
general population, and its differentiation by degree between some men and others, have their 
61 Nicholas Steneck, “Albert the Great on the classification and localization of the internal senses,” Isis, 
65 (1974). 
62 Paulus Nicolettus [Venetus], Scriptum super Librum De Anima Aristotelis, 197v; Ruvius, Commentarii, 
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historical beginnings here, at the point where honour and grace enter the frame. While “only he 
is a philosopher who abstracts well,” abstraction is also that which all humans in general ought to 
be good at, even if only a few achieve it. Consequently it became possible that the rational soul, 
as such, might itself be “an abstraction from sensibles … acting like the angels.”64 And so one 
individual human being, and one rational soul or mind, might be more perfected and rank higher 
with God than another. 
The problem with this fusion between abstracting operations and the more fundamental 
substance of the rational soul was that it challenged the principle that this soul is divinely infused. 
Evidence had never been required to demonstrate the existence of “substances,” of which the 
rational soul was one; substance is that which just is. Evidence was appropriate to abstraction 
however, because as an operation rather than a substance, it was observable. If the rational soul 
just is abstraction, then perhaps not all rational souls on this earth are in an equally sound condition 
and the differences between them are observable; traducianist beliefs about the parental origins of 
the soul, and thus the possibility of a variety of material influences on it, might then be right. One 
infusionist author confronted this problem of the soul’s purity by means of a hard science analogy 
with alchemy and the activities of the soul: 
As for human understandings, we find by experience that the meaner and grosser they are the less 
they can abstract, and indeed abstraction in the understanding is a subtle act and like to extraction 
in chemistry, which takes the purer parts from the feculent, and resolves bodies into their several 
native parts, which before did lie confused in one heap and mingled together. 65 
Another consequence of this shift towards abstraction concerned predestination and grace. 
The elect had always been considered a smallish minority, which conflicted with an increasingly 
optimistic tone about the intellectual performance levels attributable to larger numbers of people 
and was provoked by the increasing division of labour. Edward Reynolds, writing in 1640, called 
for “the reflexion of the soul, upon its own nature,” and continued: 
Another reason may be drawn from the condition of the understanding’s objects, which have so 
much the greater conformity to the soul by how much the more they are divine and abstracted .… 
And the ground of this reason is, that axiom in philosophy that all reception is ad modum recipientis, 
according to the proportion and capacity of the receiver. And that the objects which are spiritual 
and divine have greatest proportion to the soul of man is evident in his understanding and his will, 
both which are in regard of truth or good unsatisfiable by any material or worldly objects, the one 
never resting in enquiry till it attain the perfect knowledge.66 
Reynolds was a stickler for election and reprobation, but was also famed for his ability to negotiate 
a way through doctrinal minefields. Here he opens up the exciting prospect of perfect human 
knowledge – no longer a hubristic dream but a real possibility. Without obscuring the difference 
between elect and reprobate, he obscures that between rational and elect. What is it man “receives” 
in the above: the abstracted objects of the understanding, or grace? The more likely answer is both, 
indiscriminately, and moreover on a sliding scale of “capacity.” 
In these and suchlike texts abstraction and the rational soul stand in for each other and merge 
to form one side of a dualistic scheme: a single “mind,” which is fully separated from the body 
and whose detailed operations are now the main business. George Hughes, exiled with Locke in 
64 Andreas Schubart, De Abstractione, A2; Ruvius, Commentarii, 3.
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Holland in the late 1680s, complained that in this doctrine all the old contradictions that mind/body 
dualism claimed to have solved had in fact resurfaced. The doctrine presupposes “a good mind or 
right reason, that is to say, an uncorrupted ability (potentia) to judge and to distinguish true from 
false that is by nature equal and innate in all of us” – whereas faculty psychology reveals “so many 
differences in wit (ingenium) [and in] the speed of cogitation, the distinct facility of imagining, 
the capacity for and use of memory!”67 Before Descartes, most writers had maintained a category 
boundary between the equality of the rational soul which exists both in “the least knowing man 
[and] in him who in sharpness of wit approacheth nearest to angelical and noetical spirits,” and 
an active or “actual ability” of which “nature admits a great variety in the use and exercise.”68 All 
Descartes has done, says Hughes, is relocate the latter, the element of “natural” differentiation, to 
the soul itself. Hence intellectual difference is not due only to the fleshly corruption of the sensitive 
or corporeal soul, but is an attribute of the rational soul too. The abilities of the “uncorrupted 
intelligence” can be seen as varying from one individual to another, qua uncorrupted (since even in 
its differentiated state the Cartesian mind is fully separate from the corrupting body). The mind is a 
permanent and, like the body, a natural aspect of the individual’s personhood. The consequence of 
dualism – that differences in ability exist in a purely intellectual medium which is bodiless, “arises 
out of itself” as Hughes puts it, and creates personal identity – are as clear to this run-of-the-mill 
theologian as they are to Locke, even if the latter was far less sceptical about this idea. 
Who and what lay at the bottom of this human spectrum? If the supreme theoretical knowledge 
was understanding of the understanding, what about “ignorance of this knowledge”?69 Returning 
once more to the Arab sources, we find Averroes mentioning three possible forms of it: simple 
ignorance (never having heard of the propositions that might lead us to knowledge), lack of 
opportunity to acquire knowledge by use and “deficiency (diminutio) in nature.” This last led to a 
conclusion that would one day become profoundly influential: that if there are natural differences 
among the souls of individuals, then “we and all those who are born to acquire this knowledge are 
called men equivocally.” This doctrine we shall discuss in more detail shortly. Pointing to more than 
a spectrum differential (an “equivocal” term is one that has more than one meaning), by Locke’s 
time it would call in question the species membership of the deficient. In Averroes’s time, however, 
“nature” was still dispositional; thus the differences the word implies were for him merely ones of 
degree, and until the mid-seventeenth century commentators still took them this way. Alpago, for 
example, took Averroes to be referring to “children and foolish people” (stolidi); and foolishness –
even “foolishness from birth,” it turns out – consists in a dispositional melancholy. They are fully 
human, says Alpago, with an ethical status in which the bad (lack of reasoning abilities) is balanced 
with the good (corresponding lack of incontinence).70 
Just as, at the top end of the human sector of the scale of nature, the intellectual elite is also 
the social honour elite, so the intellectually deficient group at the bottom end is also a social 
one. Reynolds writes about a “double disproportion” in precisely this sense. Combining Aristotle’s 
socio-political discussion of natural slavery with a psychological one about “abstraction … in the 
objects of understanding,” he continues: 
Neither is it possible for a man to be sociable, or a member of any public body, any further than he 
hath a proportion and measure of knowledge, since human society standeth in the communicating 
of mutual notions [sc. the common ideas] unto one another. Two men that are deaf and dumb and 
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blind, destitute of all the faculties of gaining or deriving knowledge, may be together, but they 
cannot be said to have society one with another.71 
Given that labourers are assumed to lack the common ideas, a wide social stratum is implicated in 
this deficiency. Labourers and disabled alike are defined simultaneously by their exclusion from 
and their incapability for “human society,” that is, the honour society. Lack of intellect and lack of 
social status are cognate characteristics, rather than the second being an outcome of the first. 
Intellectual difference and human nature: interstitial difference 
If the spectrum model envisages a single, broadly human class of creatures, the intellectual 
operations of logical reasoning, abstraction and understanding of the understanding at the same time 
form boundaries to that class. In short, intellectual differentiation always implies the possibility of 
exclusion. But where are we to situate the excluded on the scale of nature? Two answers come up: 
as monstrous anomalies (which we shall deal with shortly) or as interstices between species. 
The scale of nature was sorted into sectors of ascending value: mineral, vegetable, animal, 
divine. Odd, interstitial creatures were said to lie between these sectors: lithodendra between 
minerals and plants, oysters between plants and animals. Man too was somewhat odd, overlapping 
the sectors both above and below him in his unique condition of being animal as well as in some 
sense divine (that is, by his share in reason). Rather than just filling an awkward gap like the oyster, 
man was therefore the very fulcrum of the whole scale, the “amphibious piece between a corporal 
and spiritual essence … that links those two together, and makes good the method of God and 
nature.”72 According to Albert, the rational soul distinguishing man from the other animals had to 
indicate something more than just a species difference, since other animal species did not differ 
from each other by anything so significant.73 With his aspiration to ascend the dizzying path of the 
intellectus and join the immaterial beings above him, man’s greatest anxiety was the interstitial 
abyss between himself and the mere animals below: whatever you do, don’t look down. 
But what was in the interstice above? In thinking hard about nature and the cosmos, Albert 
must always at some point have come back to thinking about his own thinking. How did he know 
that what he thought about everything outside him was true? He would have pursued this question 
relentlessly, if only because unlike his pupil Aquinas he was something of a scientist in the modern 
sense; his study of nature was not entirely subsumed under his theology. So he would surely 
have gone on to the next question and asked himself where this intellectual ability to think about 
thinking was situated in the external scheme of things. And he would have recalled immediately 
that thinking-about-thinking already exists as an objective component of the scale, positioned on a 
hierarchy of relative perfection where it took the disembodied form of the angelic host. Angels have 
intelligentia. Albert, citing Avicenna, calls them the “sanctified intellect.”74 They not only have it, 
they are it. They are the perfect, completed understanding that understands the understanding, free 
of bodily encumbrance. 
In Albert’s example we can already see elements of the underlying metaphysic of modern 
cognitive disciplines. We begin by surmising about who might be immediately above us in the 
scale of perfection, and how far we may become like them. The notion that the self-reflecting 
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understanding has levels differentiating some human individuals from others, now as then, 
stems from this prior aspiration to perfectibility, and could not exist without it. Yet, unlike our 
transhumanists, Albert was grounded enough to know that there was a big difference between the 
perfected understanding and the specifically human wit of the everyday world. In fact the precise 
starting point for his discussion of angels was the question that forms his chapter title here: “What 
is the difference between man’s wit (ingenium) and his rational soul?” Albert’s answer was: a lot. 
Aquinas replaced Albert’s picture with a more elaborate one. Every single angel (and there was 
an infinite number of them) constituted a separate species on its own. Therefore the apocryphal 
question “How many angels can dance on the head of a pin?” implied another: “In what order of 
precedence?” 
Intellectual substances [sc. angels] are superior to other substances in the scale of perfection. 
These substances must also differ from one another in degree. They cannot differ from one another 
materially, since they lack matter; if any plurality is found among them, it must be by that formal 
distinction which establishes diversity of species …. Their degree and order must be taken into 
consideration. That is because, just as addition or subtraction of a unit causes variation in numbers, 
so natural entities are found to vary in species by the addition or subtraction of differences. For 
example what is merely alive differs from what is both alive and endowed with sense perception; 
and the latter differs from what is alive, endowed with sense, and rational …. The higher an 
intellectual substance is in perfection, the more universal are the intelligible forms it possesses. 
Of all intellectual substances, therefore, the human intellect … has forms of the least universality, 
because it receives its intelligible forms from sensible things.75 
Oscillation of this kind between optimism about man as an “intellectual substance” or subaltern 
angel (the bottle is half full of reason) and doubts about whether his reason can redeem him from 
original sin (half empty) is characteristic of all the Renaissance commentaries. The knowledge 
angels have represents the ideal of self-reflection; it is that of their own species essence (“they 
are intellectual species of a sort and are nothing else, and their existence is nothing other than 
their understanding that they are essences”).76 In man, the understanding cannot understand itself 
in its essence, only in a mediated form. There are nevertheless certain human minds which can 
occasionally leave the corrupted world entirely behind and so are close to angelic; hence those 
horizontally layered group adorations of the Godhead in paintings commissioned by bishops and 
princes, where saints like Aquinas and of course the commissioners themselves have their heads 
sticking up into the same row as the angels, above the masses. Likewise, when angels turn up in 
Locke’s Essay, they are no mere nod to some obsolete convention. It is true he only mentions 
them in passing. But for many of his Royal Society colleagues, the position of the human mind 
in cosmology rested on the premise that angels existed. In the search for a new metaphysics, 
angels remained key agents; Francis Glisson, for example, the inspiration for some of Locke’s 
early medical speculations, gave them pride of place in his grand attempt at a replacement of the 
Aristotelian classificatory system.77 If Locke says little about them, it is because their intelligence 
and abstracting abilities represent what he hopes (nearly) every human will be capable of in the 
not-so-distant future – not because they do not exist. 
What, then, about the interstice at the bottom end of the scale? Albert suggests children 
might be a good example. They are “quasi-intermediary” between animal and man because “like 
brutes they spend all day eating and drinking.” The child is a mere “mass of flesh” (recalling the 
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changeling story). Albert extends the example to “drunks and the intemperate,” since “their defects 
are childlike.”78 They are not brutes though, “because they possess a rational soul.” Childhood and 
drunkenness, like melancholy, are temporary. Where the brutish behaviours are permanent, the 
rational soul itself has to be missing, along with its abstracting operations. Or does it? Permanent 
interstitial types were certainly said to exist in nature. Half-men/half-beasts – notably “pygmies” – 
were much discussed by scholastic philosophers. Their primary classical source, Pliny, did not give 
pygmies any intellectual characteristics, but Albert adds some. He defines them by their failure to 
be fully human at the final hurdle, which is the inability to abstract: 
Although pygmies speak, they do not argue or speak about the universals of things …. Reason has 
two principles. One comes from sense and memory, where the perception of experience lies; the 
other is that which it possesses when elevated to a unitary intellect, i.e. that which is capable of 
eliciting universals …. The pygmy, however, has only the first of these.79 
There are humans, too, who lack this ability to abstract. For these, Albert uses Augustine’s term 
moriones. There is no problem about classifying them as human. They are “foolish [stulti] by 
nature because they are incapable of apprehending reason, and their speech utterances resemble 
the pygmy’s. But the pygmy lacks reason by nature, whereas moriones do not lack possession of 
reason but rather the use of it, as a result of melancholy or some other accident.” “Accident,” even 
though this might include some innate disposition, implies that the essential property of the human 
species remains unaffected in moriones; and the distinction between possession and use calls to 
mind Aristotle’s natural slaves, who likewise are fully human. 
Pygmies, by contrast, are a higher sort of monkey, separate from man as well as from the rest 
of the simian order: “The pygmy, inasmuch as it is an irrational animal, is the most perfect after 
man … it seems to have something that imitates reason, but is deficient in this respect, and thus 
does not possess reason except as a shadow.” Pygmies will learn something by imitation but are 
also capable of going away and thinking about it; “they do not immediately imitate what they see,” 
whereas monkeys can only be taught to mimic, “without discerning what or whom they imitate.” 
This puts pygmies above monkeys, “in whom there is no practical syllogism.” They are capable of 
the practical part of the syllogism, but “do not progress as far as to receive the universal.” Albert 
at least speculates about their having a soul. Just as the human soul is created “in the shadow of” 
the divine or Absolute Intelligence, he says, the pygmy’s soul is created in the shadow of human 
intelligence, whereas the monkey’s is merely the “imitation of a shadow.” Later commentators on 
these passages bowdlerized them, assimilating pygmies with monkeys: “Pygmies have a human 
shape, they have motion and perception, but they do not have a human soul … they are situated in 
a specific position immediately below the human species.”80 This move away from subtlety at the 
margins of definition of the human is characteristic of the early modern period. 
The interstitial slot in nature can be filled with whatever our real-world surroundings suggest to 
us. Some historians have claimed that Albert’s pygmies were orang-utans, which contemporaries 
believed capable of some human intellectual operations. Other historians, on the basis of 
racialization theory, have speculated that they were some African population whom Albert had 
encountered in real life.81 Yet they might simply have been creatures of Albert’s own imagination. 
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The two thought processes are not necessarily incompatible. After all, institutional segregation has 
made “intellectually disabled” people imaginary creatures to most of us today. 
Intellectual differences and human nature: difference as anomaly 
Towards the end of the medieval tradition more rigid species boundaries were being sought, on 
the hypothesis that a human shape might disguise a non-reasoning and perhaps non-human being. 
Here is how the Jesuits coped with such arguments in the 1590s: 
Some people think the monster differs from the non-monster by its substantial or essential form .…  
The truer opinion is that the monster differs from the non-monster by its accidental form. This 
opinion is proved 1. It is not possible for two natures of distinct species to coalesce naturally in 
one species. 2. It occurs because monsters of this kind are often born solely out of human seed, and 
not out of a mixture of seeds. Therefore we can say about semihomines and semibestiae that they 
differ not in their substantial form, but in their accidental form, and the more noble partial cause is 
believed to prevail over the less noble, and to draw the outcome into its own species.82 
Two traditional arguments are used here to haul monsters back on board: the impossibility of 
contradiction in nature, and the fixity of species. In man, the “more noble” substance that “prevails” 
is reason; monstrosity marks only an accidental difference. However, these authors are clearly on 
the defensive. By now, the very same arguments could be used to throw monsters, and particularly 
intellectual monsters, over the side. 
The modern biology-psychology-ethics complex emerges partly from this urge for sharper 
demarcations of the scale of nature. Intellectual deficiency may put a question mark over 
membership of the human species: not less human but non-human. Complex medieval forms of 
classification, with their “accidents” and varying modes of differentiation, gave way to simpler 
taxonomies, and this in turn encouraged theories about the praeternatural origin of spuriously 
human-looking individuals. The path would lead to the first clinical descriptions of idiocy as a 
form of monstrosity in the early nineteenth century, and thence to neo-Darwinian and eugenicist 
theories of mental degeneracy.83 It might be thought that the spectrum model has come to prevail 
more recently, given the minuteness of gradation in biochemically determined difference and the 
gradations of the IQ scale. Nevertheless, the law of uneven distribution at the extremes of the 
spectrum and especially the biological distinctiveness of single-gene or chromosomal pathologies 
carry within them a covert notion of species exclusion. The spectrum and its hierarchical scale of 
differentiation could not exist without this other, more radical division lurking somewhere in the 
background. 
A note is required here about that word “species” and its simplification. Aristotle’s biological 
system bears not the slightest resemblance to early modern notions of species. Medieval 
philosophers, largely unaware of the relevant texts, used instead the complex ramifications of
the Tree of Porphyry. In the classificatory simplification of early modern life-sciences, these 
ramifications were replaced by “species” (“kinds,” “sorts,” etc.) which, whether they described
real essences or merely nominal ones, were certainly seen as resembling logical classes: if their
boundaries were not watertight, they were good enough approximations. Moreover, the early
modern word “species” had a second meaning. As well as being used in this familiar classificatory
sense, it was also still used to signify the form things take when they appear to our senses
82 Collegium Conimbricense, Commentariorum Physicorum Aristotelis, 433.
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and imaginations. Ramist logicians merged the two meanings. Since the Ramist’s aim was to 
know universals by abolishing all “Aristotelian” encumbrances, they believed it was possible 
for external images (species in the second sense) to mirror faithfully our internal knowledge of 
essences (species in the first sense). Classification simply consisted in “burnishing and polishing 
the mirror before it can shine and render up those images.”84 And so there was no longer a need for 
two separate meanings: category and appearance were one. 
This tidiness about classification was also a rigidity, throwing a more intense light on those 
“equivocal” exceptions to the human rule that had been touched on by the Arab philosophers. The 
theory of equivocalism applied to differences both in number and in meaning. Number had always 
been important in species classification. Aristotle’s biological works rank a creature in the hierarchy 
of nature by the number of physiological “parts” it has; Albert echoes this when he compares the 
souls of humans, pygmies and monkeys according to the number of parts they contain. Aquinas 
describes species difference in terms of items “added” or “subtracted,” reason being the added item 
that differentiates man from the other animals. Number was therefore already a terrain on which 
one might plot human difference at the margins. In terms of number, equivocalism was presented 
as an inductive argument, since the advantages or deficits involved could be counted; but in fact it 
was deduced from an underlying metaphysic that attributed value to a superior number of parts. 
In terms of meaning rather than of number, just as today’s post-structuralist contrasts the 
univocal with the multivocal, so the medieval philosophers contrasted the univocal with the 
“equivocal” (though without making any clear distinction between a plurality of signifiers and a 
plurality of things signified). The supreme example of a distinction between the equivocal and the 
univocal was man’s relationship to knowledge and the divine intellect. If the knowledge which 
God has and the knowledge which man has were identical, says Averroes (citing his forerunner 
Avempace), that knowledge would be “univocal.”85 But most of the time they are different; and 
this discussion about intellectual difference between man and God leads inevitably to one about 
intellectual difference among men. The question once again is whether the human understanding 
can access “intelligible forms” fully “abstracted” from matter, and above all whether it can know 
the intelligible form of the understanding itself. When a philosopher’s understanding understands 
his understanding, his essential abilities are univocal with those of God; and “if there be those 
who are such as know all things through themselves, they are equivocally men, and should rather 
be called angels, on account of the godlike intellect they possess.”86 But what if such ability were 
entirely lacking? Should such “men” not rather be called something else too? 
For every angelic intellectual there is, at the opposite end of the scale, a “defect in nature” 
turning out creatures who likewise “are men only equivocally,” in Avempace’s terms. To take a 
modern example of the genre: “Rationality is not possessed by all the beings we should describe 
as human, but the exceptions are not of a kind calculated to undermine the principle…. They are 
defective human beings who look and are physically constructed like men, but are only marginally 
or by a sort of prudent and humane courtesy fully human beings.”87 The idea underlying modern 
pathology, that on intellectual grounds some apparently human creatures differ from genuinely 
human ones in kind rather than by degree, has distant roots in Avempace’s remarks about ignorance 
noted above. The understanding that understands the understanding is a form of knowledge with a 
basis in human nature; “the understanding is born to abstract it,” it is something “we are born as men
to know” (emphasis added). But because these early philosophers still maintained a strict category 
84 Pierre de la Ramée, Dialectique, 65. 
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boundary between nature and essence, they did not think of “natural” defects as challenging an 
individual’s essence, or as we might say his species membership. The human understanding could 
be dispositionally impaired by corrupt intelligibles, but it was not corrupt in itself, in its underlying 
substantial core (secundum substantiam). 
Despite Averroes, however, and despite the scholastics’ continuing insistence on the equality 
of rational souls, the exclusion of some individuals from the category “man” was early on at least 
hypothetically conceivable. Anxiety emerged in spite of doctrine. The solution to such tensions 
lay as usual in a proliferation of terms. Differences between people could exist in the rational 
soul as substance, said Aquinas, without their having to be of the soul’s essence. This influenced 
later doctrine, trapped as it was between notions of creaturely equality and the evident individual 
differences in the everyday vocations and abilities required by increasingly complex social 
organization. Manual labourers, with their apparent lack of wit, were said to be substantially on 
a par with animals, but their rational soul was essentially not in question: it was imputed to them 
as species members, even if they did not in fact as individuals possess it, let alone use or perform 
it. Moreover, it continued to be maintained that ethical qualities were no less important than 
intellectual ones, and that “man” was in no way an equivocal term anywhere outside of philosophy, 
including those areas (physiognomics, for example) where assessments of people were made and 
judgements passed.88 
Renaissance commentators on On the Soul revived the issue of “equivocal” creatures. The idea 
that natural intellectual defects might pose problems of species membership coincided with the 
increasing tendency to emphasize the operations, concrete and observable, over the vague and static 
faculties. The Goclenian psychology school resisted this tendency, attacking the mistaken belief 
that “man is not truly man unless he exhibits human actions.”89 However, even the Goclenians 
were by now conceding that in principle the rational soul was corruptible. Some of them restricted 
their examples of this to conventional ones (old age, drunkenness, melancholy), which posed no 
challenge to such people’s essential humanity because they did not describe a permanent identity.90 
The question of whether the rational soul was corruptible could be sidestepped by talking about 
such defects merely as secondary symptoms of original sin.91 However, some members of the school 
went further with their concessions, turning defects of the mind from dismissible “accidents” into 
troubling “essences” of their own that existed from birth to death. 
Georg Nagel, for example, writes about deficiency as originating in the bodiless “intellectual 
nature” of the foetus. Not only is the phrase a novel one in this sense (previously “intellectual 
nature” had been no more than a synonym for “angel”), intellectual nature here is identified with 
man’s species essence. Göckel’s argument for the immortality of the soul was that it possesses 
perfectible intellectual operations leading through “the steps of the operations of the understanding” 
to abstraction at the top, where the understanding’s “reflection upon itself” finally comes to lie 
“above the matter of nature.”92 In Nagel, however, essence and nature coalesce. This arose from the 
need to make an accommodation, to think about the possibility that God and the parents are joint 
authors of the rational soul. While God was responsible for the child’s essence, says Nagel, father 
and mother were responsible for its nature.93 In extreme cases, deficiency might be the result of 
“some equivocal act of generation” – bestial sex, for example – “in which cause and effect relate 
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to different species,” a natural event in which “the name ‘man’ has become disjoined from the 
essence” it is supposed to denote. Nagel knew that regurgitating old dogma about God being sole 
author of the rational soul would no longer do. And with this concession came a rephrasing of what 
it meant to be human. 
Another commentator on On the Soul, Antonius Ruvius, argued against the equality of rational
souls on the grounds that otherwise you could not say Christ’s soul was more perfect than a
Jew’s.94 Even Albert, says Ruvius, at least posed it as a question whether “all souls are equal from
creation, or some more excellent than others,” since “some are said to excel others in natural gifts,
or are more subtle than others in essence, and at understanding and remembering more easily, with
a sharper wit (ingenium) and more perceptive understanding (intellectus).” What Albert had in
fact said was that man is an “equivocal” term because of the variation in “theoretical abilities.”95 
However, he regarded all these variations as “accidental”; they were part of the “disposition and
organization of [bodily] material” and therefore of the secondary “operations,” rather than of
the faculty as such. Ruvius claims to agree with Albert, saying that such differences are always
“in degree, not in species.” But there is an ambiguity in the casual way he identifies “natural
gifts” with “essence,” in the above. This overturns the scholastic principle by which essence
is so definitive a category that it takes more than the superficiality of an accident or even a
contradiction in nature to alter it. Referring to the numerical expression of equivocal difference,
Ruvius continues: 
I would say that an individual difference is not distinguished by its possessing a separate essence 
in a real sense, nor does it arise from the nature of the thing, but simply has some foundation in 
that singular thing. On the other hand this foundation is itself a real nature, a substance which is 
produced out of the ordinary course of events and in which certain essential elements are exhibited 
that constitute a specific essence; and from this real entity numerical or individual difference may 
be assumed, in the sense that one individual item (individuum) differs from another by virtue of 
this real entity, which exists as substance and which it possesses as distinct from the real entity of 
another, and indeed from this entity the essential elements of one thing are numerically distinct 
from those of another …. Hence the items can easily be distinguished from each other as inequal 
degrees of a substantial, individual perfection. So why can there not be inequalities in the specific 
essence or distinct species, by which the different souls of that species may be rated? 
In short, Ruvius wants it both ways. There is a nod here to the old Aristotelian convention that 
intellectual variation among humans is accidental, but he undermines it by equating accident with 
“difference” (differentia, a stricter demarcation than “accident” in the old system). Inequalities of 
the rational soul or mind are turned here into quasi-real essences, a species-type difference which 
Ruvius knows from the basic doctrine (“Man is a rational animal”) he ought not to be able to get 
away with. 
Since an “equivocal” term implied uncertainty about the species membership of some 
individuals, it became entangled with the debate about nominalism. The possible kinship between 
equivocalism and nominalism was recognized by late medieval writers of a scientific bent such as 
Duns Scotus and William of Ockham,96 and regarded as dangerous. Then with the emergence of 
early modern biological notions of species, it no longer mattered whether our definitions of species 
essences were real or nominal because they could be handled as if they were real, but with a get-out 
clause in the case of anomalies. Real essences might exist, but they were simply unknowable as 
94 Commentarii, 92; 98.
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such to mortal minds; Locke’s “nominal essences,” which might not or indeed might correspond to 
real ones, worked well enough as a way of classifying nature, or of approximating to it. As we noted 
earlier, the modesty of modern biologists about the nominalist basis of their species classifications 
is false. They do not say, as their medieval forebears did, that they do not know universals or 
species essences but God does. The possibility of someone who really knows remains open. If not 
God, then who? The implication is that scientists do, however much they protest that science can 
only ever approximate to such knowledge. Modern nominalism is partly an appeal for obedience 
to the human authority of the expert, just as fourteenth-century nominalism was often an appeal 
for obedience to the expert authority of the Pope: an appeal to certainty of a socially enforceable 
kind, in lieu of any other. In natural history’s central case study, man, “nominal essences” formed 
the basis on which human authority could say what man is, thereby smuggling back a realist or 
essentialist agenda and enabling experts on the mind to establish surer boundaries to categories
of difference. 
In debates about human nature, equivocalism and nominalism alike provided the flexibility 
needed for tackling the contradiction between the species-wide equality of rational souls before 
God and increasingly important social differences in “intellectual” (vocational and professional) 
ability among individual species members. Some writers sought to refute both -isms as a 
“sophistic” response to a problem unnecessarily posed.97 Others found them useful. Baxter, for 
example, posed an antithesis between “real” and “equivocal” ways of classifying the elect and of 
distinguishing them from the reprobate; lacking divine omniscience, we make judgements about 
people that are “equivocal only” (he might as easily have said “nominal only”).98 For equivocalism 
or nominalism here, read humility; we cannot ultimately know who is reprobate. It may well be 
via this theological tradition, as much as any philosophical one, that the rather less humble Locke 
reached his own definition of man, from whose “nominal essence” he excludes those creatures he 
classifies as intellectually disabled changelings. His definition of “man” in the relevant passage of 
the Essay is almost verbatim that of Baxter, as we shall see in the next chapter. 
If the doctrine whereby exceptions are mere accidents and do not contradict man’s species 
essence was by now collapsing, this was partly because it had seemed a philosophy of low 
expectations. If it is true that defects do not matter, how can man aspire to something better – to an 
angelic intellectual perfection, if not membership of Mensa? In its developed form, equivocalism 
turned what had formerly been accidental into something essentially different, and transformed 
certain individuals into a pathological type. The question as to whether one rational soul might be 
less perfect than another had hardly arisen earlier because “soul” and “intellect” were notionally 
separate entities; there were “intellectual” variations, but these could be put down as facets of the 
sensitive soul, with its links to the body. Mind/body dualism subsequently enabled the soul in 
Locke’s changeling to be not differentiated but entirely absent: a numerical subtraction from what 
makes us human. 
By the mid-seventeenth century, this equivocalist model of intellectual difference was being
used to mediate the dispute between traducianists and infusionists over the origins of the rational 
soul. In the 1640s Browne, seeking a compromise, wrote about “equivocal and monstrous 
productions in the conjunction of man with beast.”99 The existence of such creatures, he says, 
favours the traducianist argument, since the small amount of reason these monsters do possess 
must have come from the human parent; they are not “merely beasts, but have also an impression 
and tincture of reason in as high a measure as it can evidence itself in those improper organs.” 
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Woolnor, Browne’s contemporary, likewise sought “to prove … that the production of man’s soul 
is neither by [divine] creation nor [human] propagation but a certain mean way between both.”100 
His premise ran: 
Propagation … is that most excellent and natural faculty whereby a living creature, by seed of 
generation, begets his like for the continuation of the kind …, univocal which is most properly so 
called when as a creature brings forth the like to itself … and equivocal [when there is] generation 
of unlike, as when a plant or living creature is bred of putrefaction, as mice, flies, serpents and the 
like, for the continuation of the kind. 
Then, narrowing the discussion down to equivocal humans: 
Not nature alone, but the efficient power of God is joined with the propagation of souls, because it 
is wholly denied to such copulations as are out of kind. For nature alone [i.e., by itself] would make 
a mixture, whereas notwithstanding we see that some kind of creatures … which … were at first 
begotten by such unkindly conjunctions, are not endowed with reasonable souls. Or if not they, yet 
it is possible that human seed should be mingled with other creatures (for which cause buggery is 
forbidden in the law), and yet such issue is altogether soulless and void of reason. 
He then concludes, insulting his opponents with the customary transferred epithet, that writers 
“make a monstrous and profane mingle-mangle that would have man propagate his like by the 
power of nature merely, as other creatures do.” If parents were sole authors of the rational soul, the 
whole world would consist of such mixed-up creatures, thereby defying the fixity of species. But if 
God were sole author, then he would be responsible for producing intellectual monsters and would 
thus (impossibly) be the cause of something profane. It was the negotiated avoidance of these two 
ideological extremes, dogmatic traducianism and dogmatic infusionism, that gave rise to the concept 
of reasonless offspring of reasoning human parents: Locke’s changeling, later our “intellectually 
disabled” person. The theory of parental causation gained a new degree of respectability on its 
arrival at the negotiating table. As well as preparing the way for a recognizably modern biological 
explanation of inherited intelligence, it brought with it a revised doctrine of pollution by introducing 
buggery and/or the Devil into the discussion, and with them parental dishonour and guilt: an entirely 
novel chimera that would penetrate deeply the mind-set of later centuries. 
100 The True Originall, 181; 316. 
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John Locke and His Successors: 

the Historical Contingency of Disability
 
Locke’s Essay concerning Human Understanding has been a recurring reference because it is the 
junction between early modern and modern, and because of his reputation as a founding father. 
The sixteenth and seventeenth centuries were an age of apocalyptic obsession; Locke marks not 
so much its demise as its secularization into a modern vision of progress and ultimate intellectual 
Revelation. We look now at the immediate influences on Locke, from English Puritans to French 
Cartesians and Jansenists, and then at the subsequent influence of his own psychology and logic 
on eighteenth- and nineteenth-century educational and behavioural prescriptions. We shall see 
in particular how his work demonstrates the historical contingency of the modern concept; his 
“idiots,” “changelings” and “natural fools” are discrete entities arising from disparate political and 
theological contexts, despite the temptation to see them as interchangeable. Moreover, other phases 
of his career are devoid of the anxiety that surrounds these terms in the Essay. 
Idiots and abstraction 
Locke’s account of idiots in Book 2 of the Essay is bound up with contemporary debates about the 
status of animals. He tackles human species difference in terms of abstraction. “Brutes abstract 
not” was his final word on the place of humans in the scale of nature. He was responding in part 
to sceptics such as Montaigne and Charron, who had refused to rank human behaviour above that 
of other animals. Following the widely publicized heresy trial of Daniel Sennert, who claimed 
that the souls of humans and beasts were alike, France had seen a great debate about animal 
psychology, which Locke encountered during his stay there in the late 1670s. The sceptics never 
seriously suggested that there should be no demarcation line. They merely said that brutes, while 
not completely lacking human-type operations, perform them more imperfectly. In any case, this 
was not some early form of modern comparative psychology but a faith-based doctrine about the 
vanity of supposing that human beings can have certain knowledge – the certainty that Descartes 
had been seeking to re-establish with his doctrine that animals are mere automata. 
Locke’s phrase thus also calls for the emphasis, “Brutes abstract not.” We know there must be 
something they do not do, but what is it? The Platonists said that animals have souls but no divine 
illumination. The Gassendists said they have a corporeal soul but not a rational one. Descartes 
said they do not have cogitatio or souls at all. The author at the centre of the French debate, the 
Jesuit scientist Ignace-Gaston Pardies, rejected animal automatism, saying that animals have some 
aptitude for reason, but that humans alone possess the higher operations of the mind.1 Locke refers 
to Pardies in his notebooks (drafts of the Essay dating from before his stay in France had not 
mentioned animal psychology). But where Pardies identified these higher operations with the innate 
“common ideas,” Locke takes an empirical approach, building from the bottom up. Although he 
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retains the faculties as an underlying structure, his main focus is on the active operations “exercised 
about our ideas” (emphasis added). On the bottom rung of these operations stands perception. It is 
this, “in the lowest degree of it, which puts the boundaries between animals and the inferior ranks 
of creatures.” On the next rung up is retention (divided into contemplation and memory), which is 
simply “secondary perception”; by this reckoning “intellectual creatures” still include songbirds. 
Next comes comparing: “How far brutes partake in this faculty, is not easy to determine; I imagine 
they have it not in any great degree” (emphasis added), leaving the door still ajar for the sceptics’
denial of a difference in kind. Likewise, in composition and enlarging, “brutes come far short of 
men.” Only in arriving at abstraction does Locke finally bang the door shut: “This I think I may 
be positive in, that the power of abstracting is not at all in [brutes]; and that the having of general 
ideas is that which puts a perfect distinction betwixt man and brute” (emphasis added).2 Jonathan 
Edwards glossed Locke’s account of abstraction by referring to it as “the peculiar, inimitable and 
unparalleled exercise of the glorious power of God” which grace produces in man. Edwards’s view 
of what Locke meant was not far from the truth. It expresses the theological core of Locke’s natural 
history of a specifically human mind, which he transmitted to modern psychology.3 
Locke asserts that brutes do not abstract on implicitly nominalist grounds: any creature that has 
“no use of words, or any other general signs” must be a “brute.” Not all nominalists placed such 
value on abstraction. Bacon, for example, saw it as implying a realist theory of universal kinds; it was 
a purely speculative Idol of the Tribe, blocking out “the light of experiment” and fixing that which 
should fluctuate – whereas for Locke it is what lets the light in, shining on what would otherwise 
be a chaos of “endless names.” Gassendi too viewed abstraction more favourably. Like Locke, 
he saw it as the drawing of common or universal ideas from particular ones received empirically 
through the senses; unlike Locke, however, he also saw it as a matching of the imagination to the 
understanding, with image and concept becoming as one. This necessitated a further operation, 
responsible for making adjustments between the two faculties: namely ratiocination, which he 
ranks above abstraction.4 Locke realized that if nothing is universal except names, then this separate 
ratiocinative stage is redundant. If words are “signs,” so too are ideas themselves. That is why for 
Locke deaf people, whose full humanity many previous writers had considered doubtful because 
they could not discern words, are intellectually complete. We know “real existences” only and 
precisely by sorting their corresponding ideas from each other and giving them names. Abstraction 
is this denominating process. In this doctrine, abstraction (something the human mind does) takes 
over the role which scholasticism had allocated to universals (which are said to inhere in real 
objects outside the mind).5 
It is only Locke’s idiots that are capable of showing how important abstraction in the above 
sense is. If brutes do not have it, it is not relevant to them and no problem arises. What happens, 
though, if some of the creatures who ought to be able to abstract do not do so? Nominalism throws 
up the same problems as social administration. Difference comes alive where there are borderline 
cases. Decisions have to be made. If to be human is to abstract, where do we put the non-abstractor 
in human shape? According to the Essay, the idiot “scarcely reasons or puts ideas together at all .… 
[He] cannot distinguish, compare and abstract.” Locke hovers short of making idiots non-human 
(here at least, though a different tone will be used for changelings). Nevertheless, it is his final 
remarks on the specific difference between humans and brutes that trigger his account of idiots, 
showing a train of thought from one to the other: 
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[Brutes] are the best of them tied up within those narrow bounds, and have not (as I think) the 
faculty to enlarge them by any kind of abstraction. How far idiots are concerned in the want or 
weakness of any, or all of the foregoing faculties, an exact observation of their several ways of 
faltering, would no doubt discover. For those who either perceive but dully, or retain the ideas 
that come into their minds but ill, who cannot readily excite or compound them, will have little 
matter to think on. Those who cannot distinguish, compare, and abstract, would hardly be able to 
understand, and make use of language, or judge, or reason to any tolerable degree but only a little, 
and imperfectly, about things present, and very familiar to their senses.6 
Abstraction is not a feature of “man the rational animal” but of individual rational men. One can 
therefore learn something about how it works in the majority by studying those individuals who 
are more or less disabled from doing it. And indeed, the exactness of observation of the “several,” 
i.e., specifically different ways of faltering in the disabled subject would form the core of modern 
psychology’s approach to intelligence. 
The passage above seems to point to a difference of degree rather than kind. Locke’s definition 
of the idiot here is poised here between the old sense of uneducated or uncultured and the “naturals” 
or born fools whom he mentions in the very next paragraph; idiots and naturals are not synonymous, 
but there is leakage from one type into the other, their common bond still underwritten by original 
sin. To seek coherence in Locke’s treatment of idiocy, as if to him it were a psychological object, 
is misplaced. It is instrumental to his main aim, which is to refute the theory of innate ideas and 
show that knowledge is acquired in the first instance from sense data. In order to do so, he takes 
Aristotle’s standard example of senility and expands it into one of birth-to-death personhood: 
Take one, in whom decrepit old age has blotted out the memory of his past knowledge, and clearly 
wiped out the ideas his mind was formerly stored with …. How far such an one (notwithstanding 
all that is boasted of innate principles) is in his knowledge, and intellectual faculties, above the 
condition of a cockle, or an oyster, I leave to be considered. And if a man had passed sixty years in 
such a state, as ‘tis possible he might, as well as three days, I wonder what difference there would 
have been, in any intellectual perfections, between him, and the lowest degree of animals.7 
As so often, the invention of idiots seems to be a device for answering some other problem; here 
they are mere cannon fodder in Locke’s anti-innatist attack. Nevertheless the “man” in his last 
sentence, positioned so low as to be in the interstice between animal and vegetable, is for Locke 
more than a philosophical hypothesis; he is an empirically observed creature, posing social and 
ethical problems in the real world. 
In Book 1, he has lumped idiots with a broader group that encompasses children, savages, the
illiterate, Indians, “wild men of the woods” (something like Albert’s pygmies), along with “at least
one half of mankind” in whom innate principles and common ideas are scarcely evident: that is, the
unlearned masses. But he also identifies the term with that more restricted group of congenital natural
fools (“naturals”), who of all the subgroups carry the ultimate burden of the anti-innatist proof: 
It might be very well expected, that innate principles should be perfectly known to naturals; which 
being stamped immediately on the soul (as these men suppose) can have no dependence on the 
constitutions, or organs of the body, the only confessed difference between them and others .… 
But alas, amongst children, idiots, savages, and the grossly [sc. generally] illiterate, what general 
maxims are to be found? What universal principles of knowledge?8 
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This list closely corresponds to an almost identical one in the much earlier Essays on the Law of 
Nature, where in the place later occupied by “idiots” the word is indocti, “uneducated”; in the same 
work he also uses “deprived of their senses” (mente capti) – an old legal term that covered madness 
in general. Thus one and the same anti-innatist point can be conveyed by a multiplicity of partly 
overlapping usages. 
In the section on retention and memory there is also a discussion of what we would now call 
information processing. His account of impressions and of defects in the reception and retrieval 
of information displays the influence of earlier writers. Descartes had used a similar vocabulary 
to Locke’s when he described how the pineal gland links mind to body; it radiates the soul spirits 
around the brain until they find the track that represents the relevant impressions that have previously 
been “stamped” there. Willis, Locke’s former physiology lecturer, wrote about brain function in the 
same way, as we have seen. Locke himself avoids any detailed discussion of physiology or of “how 
much the constitution of our bodies, and the make of our animal spirits, are concerned in this.” All 
we know is that the tracking varies in efficiency from one person to the next. Deficits are therefore 
explained by a spectrum model: they differ by degree. In this context the idiot is merely the “dull 
man,” prone to “stupidity,” who is none the less human (“one man [as] compared with another”).9 
Locke’s tone here is quite different from the one he uses for changelings, who clearly differ from 
the rest of us, not by degree but in kind. We should note, however, that the “natural fools” who in 
Books 1 and 2 stand in for idiots, in Books 3 and 4 also stand in for changelings. All this should be 
a warning that Locke has no unified theory of disability, and that a writer whom this book has so 
far set up to be the villain of the piece may indeed be a more complex character. 
Changelings and logical reasoning 
Locke uses the term “changeling” to denote a creature in human physical form, born of human 
parents, which does not have the mind or soul that defines someone as human. By the mid-eighteenth 
century, the changeling had become a routine usage for someone with a so-called intellectual 
disability in a sense partly recognizable to the modern reader. Locke uses “changeling” rather 
than “idiot” when he is discussing natural history rather than faculty psychology (to put it another 
way, when the context is theological rather than philosophical). By the end of the seventeenth 
century, natural history was not only a project for clearer definitions of species but, encouraged 
by contemporary geographical exploration, for the discovery of more species.10 One ought to 
consider, says Locke, whether the “drivelling, unintelligent, intractable changeling” might not be 
an additional, interstitial species between humans and other animals, perhaps on a par with “drills” 
(baboons) or even lower.11 
Locke’s changeling challenged two old Aristotelian conventions. The first of these was that 
the criterion for human species membership is to have human parents. Locke rejects the idea 
that the species membership of offspring is ultimately determined by the “originals … to which, 
by their descent, they seem to belong.” Children often differed from their parents in terms of 
their wit and behaviour. His friend Penn instanced “wild” offspring born of “sober” parents and 
“religious” of “debauched” ones: evidence that over and above behavioural differences there was 
in every or nearly every individual an equal and rational soul, of which God, not the parents, 
9 Ibid., 153.
 
10 For example Glanvill, “Of the modern improvements of useful knowledge,” 29, in Essays. 
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was ultimate author.12 Locke’s view of the soul, so far, is compatible with the theory of divine 
infusion, though also (in the case of changelings) with the occasional involvement of the Devil, 
that other praeternatural originator, with his skills in natural magic and his employment of incubi
and succubi as assistants. The changeling in this sense suits the Royal Society’s aim of using 
mechanical philosophy to authenticate spiritual phenomena.13 Locke’s reticence about angels and 
the Devil in the Essay may well have been due as much to his determination to couch it in ordinary 
language as to actual disbelief; as we noted in an earlier chapter, scepticism about both was more 
characteristic of the seventeenth-century layman than of the great intellects. 
The second convention which Locke challenged was the generic “man is a rational animal.”
Changelings resemble the human animal physically but lack the mind of one; they are born of
rational parents – “covenanted” parents, to use Owen’s theological expression of a similar thought –
but are not rational themselves.14 Locke’s criterion for excluding them from the human species
is their inability to reason, in the terms of the new logic as Locke himself conceives it. The term
“changeling” is the right one, he says, because it is an example of plain and “civil” (public) language,
by contrast with the existing abstruse Aristotelian classifications of the natural world. From this
we might infer that he chose it because it was already an everyday word for someone with an
“intellectual” disability. However, as we saw in Chapter 16, it was neither ordinary nor everyday,
nor had it till then referred to anything intellectual or cognitive in terms recognizable to ourselves.
Behind its entry into Locke’s vocabulary lay a whole new role for reason. The sudden intrusion of
this term may even have come from an expert consensus of some kind, perhaps as part of the Royal
Society’s project for a new terminological system in natural history. Bishop Jeremy Taylor, who was
close to its founders, wrote a “prayer to be used in behalf of fools or changelings” in which their
synonymity is clearly indicated, by contrast with Fuller’s behavioural guide of a few years earlier
which had insisted on quite separate meanings. The church, too, had previously had a standard
“changeling” prayer, a warning to church members to remain unchanging in their faith and quite
distinct from prayers such as “Upon the sight of a natural [fool]” which had a quite different moral
(“O God, why am I not thus?”).15 Susceptible to the new focus on reason in religion, Taylor now
defined fool and changeling alike, as creatures with “life, and no understanding.” 
The pathology of Locke’s changeling bears similarities to that of the reprobate. When he 
criticizes the classification of children by the species membership of their parents and says that 
they do not necessarily inherit their parents’ “rational” status, he employs exactly the same terms 
as Baxter when the latter criticizes the classification of children as elect just because their parents 
are hypothetically elect “church members.” Furthermore, Baxter had asked who was so “dead in 
Christ” that they might not have even the hope of regeneration, and concluded that it was “idiots.” 
Locke makes exactly the same point, in the same format, about changelings: 
It may as rationally be concluded, that the dead body of a man, wherein there is to be found no 
more appearance or action of life, than there is in a statue, has yet … a living soul in it, because 
of its shape; as that there is a rational soul in a changeling, because he has the outside of a rational 
creature, when his actions carry far less marks of reason with them, in the whole course of his life, 
than what are to be found in many a beast. But ’tis the issue of rational parents, and must therefore 
be concluded to have a rational soul. I know not by what logic you must so conclude.16 
12 Ibid., 448; Penn, The New Witnesses, ii, 158.
 
13 See Shapin, The Scientific Revolution, 155.
 
14 Owen, Of Infant Baptism and Dipping. 

15 Taylor, The Whole Works, xv, 355; Joseph Hall, Works, x, 141.
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A human being’s external shape could not be more important than the “internal perfections of the 
soul.” Locke purified religion of the excess baggage which Baxter’s work contained, but the core 
remains intact. 
Implicit in this discussion about parents and children is an opposition between two ways of 
classifying the universal, “man.” Locke’s view was that universals, being nominal, originate in 
the internal processes of abstraction (in the human mind); the opposite view was that, being real 
and knowable, they exist in the external world (in human morphology). Through the operations of 
abstraction and logical reasoning, the human subject arrives at the truth about his objective place in 
the scale of nature; and he does so, necessarily, via the denial of rationality to some other creature 
with a prima facie claim to it that turns out to be false. The person who thinks that mere physiological 
externals are definitive of the human is himself deficient, in both senses of “rationality” here: both 
in his psychological operations and in the common ideas to which those operations should lead. To 
deny the necessity of changelings is to have changeling-like characteristics oneself. Changelings 
are unable to do the new logical reasoning, but the new logical reasoning also requires all (rational) 
men to nominate Locke’s changelings as the creatures unable to do it. The changeling’s difference 
is one of essence rather than mere accident, thereby excluding it from the species “man.” Does 
it then, like that other spuriously human creature the reprobate, have a soul? Luther’s recently 
translated Table Talk had implied the answer No. Locke agrees. Neither his logic nor his theory 
of nominal essences, nor above all his claim that the defining element of the human lies in certain 
precise intellectual operations, could exist without such a creature. 
To grasp this fully, one needs to know that Locke thought of the Essay as a guide to logic 
(“another sort of logic,” in his own phrase) and that it was regarded as such by contemporaries 
and for the next hundred years. This was part of a broader trend. The French Cartesian Pierre-
Sylvain Régis, born in the same year as Locke, published in the same year as the Essay his own
Cours entier de philosophie, which he likewise describes as a “logic” book and which gives 
pride of place to abstraction. The same is true of Joachim Hildebrand’s 1680 text (cited earlier), 
which claimed that logic and abstraction could prove the immortality of the soul “by the light of
nature alone.” 
The core doctrine of logic in the Essay comes in the chapter entitled “Reason,” with which 
logic is more or less synonymous.17 Locke, complaining that the old notion of the syllogism was a 
jumble, promotes instead his own account of the way logical reasoning unfolds. It does so as a “train 
of ideas,” which in spirit if not to the letter resembles Baxter’s temporally ordered contemplation. 
Locke’s primary illustration of a correct train of ideas is drawn from debates over predestination: 
“Let this be the proposition laid down, ‘men shall be punished in another world,’ and from thence 
be inferred this other: ‘then men can determine themselves’.” What is at issue, so far, seems to be 
the mechanics of the logic rather than its truth content, which the anti-predestinarian Locke already 
takes for granted. He continues: “The question now is to know, whether the mind has made this 
inference right or no; if it has made it by finding out the intermediate ideas, and taking a view of the 
connexion of them, placed in a due order, it has proceeded rationally, and made a right inference.” 
In this illustration, he says, it has. But in fact the presupposed truth content of the propositions 
leaks into the inferential mechanism of the logic. If it is true that (as the inference runs) men can 
determine themselves, they can do so only and precisely by means of this subjective ability of 
theirs to find out the intermediate ideas and put them in the right logical order in the train, since 
man is presupposed to be precisely the kind of creature who can do that. 
This short circuit created a basis not only for the modern classification of the human species 
by an intelligence defined in terms of logical trains of ideas, but also for modern systems of
17 An Essay, 668 ff. 
 
319 John Locke and His Successors 
logic-based species classification right across nature, inasmuch as the latter have always begun 
from the difference between human and other animals (that is, from the superior abilities of one 
species above the rest). In fact such systems are in turn the projection on to nature of a social and 
religious judgement about the status of some men in relation to others. Without the changeling, 
who “reasons scarcely or not at all” and is therefore not a man, the modern-looking concept of 
intelligence as logical reasoning, apparently definitive of the human species but actually definitive 
of the group defining itself as the intelligence society, could not exist. Nor, and this is crucial, could 
the species or the society develop. It is here that Locke cites Hooker’s regret that human beings 
in general lack adequate reasoning skills, and that if only we had them, our descendants might 
thereafter progress in their religion to be as far ahead of us as we are now of fools or innocents. It is 
the right ambition, says Locke, but too pessimistically expressed. And that is because Elizabethans 
like Hooker still saw logic as consisting of innate syllogisms, bound to a divine reason. Trains 
of ideas will do the trick instead. People who develop trains of ideas on an empirical basis do so 
autonomously; they are not determined by others as changelings are, and can therefore develop 
personally, each as individual species members.
 Locke’s concept of logical trains of ideas was influenced by his own medical practice. In the 
four years up to 1671, when he began the first draft of the Essay, he and Thomas Sydenham were 
pioneering an approach (novel for the time) of empirical, observation-based case studies of the 
body, in which the physician examines how one symptom leads to the next: a train of symptoms, 
as it were. One might similarly trace how one idea leads to the next; for “ideas” in psychology, 
read “symptoms” in physical medicine.18 In Locke’s well-known theory about wrong association of 
ideas, expounded in the logic sections of the Essay, a correct association is also a correct train. One 
idea leads to the next; a wrong association is not a train at all, it is a sideways jump. Again, Locke 
refers in his introductory remarks to the parallel “trains of [bodily] motion” in the soul spirits. 
Descartes, Willis and Malebranche all described how soul spirits “by their continual course open 
out pathways [in the brain], so that with time they no longer encounter resistance,” as evidence 
that intellectual operations vary among individuals according to their personal physiological 
history.19 In some people, the pathways have run askew. For Descartes the parallel was between 
physiological defect and bad moral habits rather than bad logical moves; for Locke, however, the 
moral just is the logical. 
Locke’s fusion of the moral and the logical is clear in the way he merges the type of changeling 
so far discussed with a second type, where the same term is used to describe atheist libertines. 
Here he defends himself against the established church’s charge that his concept of liberty, as 
freedom from episcopal and monarchical coercion, is an Antinomian-type freedom to do whatever 
one pleases. He relies for his answer here on Samuel Bolton’s widely read text of 1645, The True 
Bounds of Christian Freedom. Libertine changelings fall short of species membership by exactly 
the same criterion as non-reasoning ones; they too are “determined,” in this case by their pleasures 
and perverse wills. Locke’s advocacy of religious and political toleration invited the accusation 
that he was stopping people from being determined by the wisdom of their ecclesiastical and 
political betters. His response was that one does not have to think of being free as the opposite 
of being determined. Libertine-type changelings illustrated the point: as the stock Puritan saying 
went, “libertinism is true bondage.” Otherwise “nature should in vain have given us the use of 
reason, to discourse or to consult, or the ability to will or choose any thing.” Locke compares this 
libertine changeling with his new, idiotic one, incapable not only of rational choice but of choice of 
18 Locke, Of the Conduct of the Understanding, 40. 
19 Malebranche, De la recherche de la vérité, i, 157; see also Willis (above, Chapter 14) and Descartes, 
Passions of the Soul, 1.7. 
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any kind. No autonomous individual reasoner, he says, would actively seek to be “less determined” 
by wise thoughts just so that he could consider himself free. Libertine changelings only seem to 
have freedom of will; in fact their “liberty” means that they too are totally determined by the flesh, 
and just like the idiotic kind have “no thought, no volition” of their own.20 
Hence the changeling void of conscience and the changeling void of logical reasoning are 
overlapping types, the necessary residue of original sin in Locke’s otherwise progressivist argument: 
more Luther’s corrupt mass of flesh than Descartes’s automative body or beast-machine. God 
does not excuse either type. Locke’s logical proposition about “punishment in another world” is a 
religious one, but an intellectual type of disability too is implied there, since inability to abstract 
meant an inability to choose between good and evil; that is how contemporaries would have 
understood the concept. The difference between the libertine type and the intellectual type is that 
punishment of the latter is displaced from the afterlife to here and now. Just as Locke’s “intellectual 
perfections” offer the fruits of election already in this life, so the intellectual disability of the idiot, 
and particularly the changeling, becomes a form of earthly suffering. Others close to the early 
Royal Society, such as Jeremy Taylor and Kenelm Digby, took the opposite tack. The Catholic 
Digby, invoking the notion of the holy innocent, suggests that changelings’ souls are purer than 
others’; the Anglican Taylor, in his prayer, likewise suspects that changelings “do not deserve hell 
so much as we have done.”21  They are the optimistic corollary to Locke, within an overall ethics 
of exceptionalism. 
Alongside this use of a new logic in the burgeoning human sciences came a new rhetoric, which 
contributed equally to Locke’s changeling. Rhetoric and logic were always closely associated, “the 
open hand and the closed fist.” Royal Society members reacted early on against the humanist style 
of rhetoric derived from Cicero. Wilkins’s first published work Ecclesiastes had been a polemic 
against the Ciceronians’ over-elaborate language, and recommended a single basic style for both 
preaching and science. Boyle in particular, in a work written in the 1650s that went through 
several subsequent editions, asserted that the plainness of scriptural prose was a better model for 
disseminating Christian and scientific values. A biblical, “plain” style might demonstrate God’s 
great work of nature as clearly as it already revealed the Word. Plain language was as intrinsic to 
the new, simplified logic as Ciceronian floweriness had been to the over-elaborate categories of 
the old Aristotelian logic. Plain language also helped to create a new out-group, as Boyle reveals 
when he extends his experimentalist approach to psychology and the faculties. The “style of the 
scripture” and “the [human] understanding,” he says, are interpenetrative, and this style operates 
upon “the generality of its readers, if they be not faultily indisposed to receive impressions from 
it.”22 In the socio-political context of the 1650s, plain style was the ideal method for weaning 
the great unwashed, caught up in political processes previously closed to them, away from their 
dangerous sectarian enthusiasms. The Bible has a transforming effect on readers and so, muses 
Boyle, its plainness of style may help the common reader – literate commoners – to understand 
nature. The Royal Society set great store by exposing their scientific practice to a wider public than 
the alchemists and other occultists did. The greater part of mankind may “have not that quickness 
which is wont to make men pass for wits, though they may have other abilities more solid, and 
desirable …. And yet the Bible has a great influence upon this latter sort of intelligent readers,” 
a group which Boyle says might extend downwards socially even as far as the self-educated 
ploughman. The redrawing of social categories implied in the above passage creates a new 
20  An Essay, 265. 
21 Digby, Of Bodies, ii, 10. 
22 Robert Boyle, Some Considerations Touching the Style of the Holy Scriptures, cited in Wilbur Howell, 
Eighteenth Century British Logic, 470. 
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exclusion, the “faultily indisposed.” These are no longer everyone beyond the honour society but 
that much smaller group whom the Honourable Robert Boyle, second Earl of Cork, distinguishes 
here from the “generality” of the commons. Crediting the latter with some higher understanding 
was a wise move for his own honour and the intellectual and scientific trustworthiness it entailed, 
since the first Earl, his father, had himself been plebeian, a convicted fraudster who had notoriously 
used the proceeds to buy his title. 
The smaller group of “faultily indisposed” will reappear in starker form in 1690 as Locke’s 
changelings. He discusses the plain style, cultivated throughout the Essay itself, in the chapter 
entitled “The Abuse of Words,” where he stresses the importance of fixing the right names for 
ideas.23 Rhetoric as much as logic helps to explain the difference between a “man,” a “drill” and 
“a monstrous foetus.” Plain style demands the most appropriate words for “things as they really 
are.” A flowery style encourages evasiveness: why not just call a spade a spade? “Changeling” 
describes the thing as it really is, in all its monstrosity. Moreover, it is no exaggeration to say that 
in Locke’s overall scheme, the changeling is the paradigm of things as they really are. As his 
opening paragraphs announce, he will be proceeding by a “historical,” that is, an investigative 
and empirically based “method” (the latter term being the signal that he is no Aristotelian). In 
the paragraph itself entitled “Method” he remarks: “It shall suffice to … consider the discerning 
faculties of a man, as they are employed about the objects, which they have to do with.” And 
what object, he asks here, could one have to do with more important than man himself and that 
which defines him as man, his “understanding”? Like Boyle he targets the understanding of a 
putative general or common reader, whom he identifies with “native rustic reason”: a calculated 
contradiction in terms, inasmuch as “native rustic” had previously always signified “born stupid,” 
like a peasant or labourer.24 Everyone, or nearly everyone, can do it. The psychological subject is 
about to be democratized – at the expense of changelings. 
Changelings and their natural classification 
Changelings are the supreme illustration of our uncertainty about real essences and about how 
individuals can be sorted into natural kinds. Boyle thought species should be sorted “as they 
deserve,” that is, with as much precision as we can muster. Locke seems to go further and to mean 
“as we prefer.”25 His nominalist attack on the reality of species begins in Book 3 under the heading 
of “general terms” and “simple ideas.” He is trying to pull off a difficult trick. He doubts whether the 
simple idea of something can refer to a “real essence” or species with secure boundaries; but at the 
same time he needs to maintain for species, and particularly for the human species, its proper place 
in a hierarchical scale of nature. Commentators treat Locke’s nominalism as a lofty philosophical 
discussion about the status of universals in general, as if the idea of man were merely one among 
any number of possible illustrations in that debate.26 But for Locke, what it is to be human was 
a unique problem. The only other extended illustration he uses is gold, another item of particular 
anxiety to him. It is true that his scholastic predecessors had also placed the human illustration at 
the centre of their logic and its related disciplines; realists in particular argued that if you could 




25  Boyle, “The origins of forms and qualities according to the corpuscular philosophy,” in M.A. Stewart 

(ed.), Selected Philosophical Papers, 49. 
26  Ruth Mattern, “Moral science and the concept of persons in Locke,” Philosophical Review, 89/1 
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not grasp that all individual, particular men are one in the species man, then you could not grasp 
that the several elements of the trinity are united in one God. What gives the human illustration in 
Locke an extra urgency is the intervening Calvinist anxiety about election and grace. 
He starts out by establishing that “the common names of substances … stand for sorts” and 
that the “boundary of each sort, or species whereby it is … distinguished from others, is that we 
call its essence, which is nothing but that abstract idea to which the name is annexed: so that every 
thing contained in that idea, is essential to that sort.”27 The species “man” is not some metaphysical
“mould” into which God somehow pours reason. In brief, a species is a “nominal essence.” It 
is quite possible that real, “natural species, established by the author of nature,” exist, but the 
material differences between them are unknowable to mere humans. There is nothing to prevent 
us from ranking these nominal essences hierarchically according to the scale of nature, just as if 
they were real ones. One can still identify and rank “perfections,” it is just that one does not have 
to rank them according to their supposed underlying substances; the scale is simply one of valued 
attributes.28 Nominal essences, perhaps because their correct definition depends on hard-won 
human consensus, make the hierarchy more rather than less rigid. Individual cases which seem 
to constitute exceptions to the human rule are no longer mere Aristotelian accidents, but sharply 
distinguishable from the species essence. 
It is the quasi-human non-reasoners that lie at the heart of this system. They are the best possible 
illustration of the experimental utility of nominal essences. We “try the truth” of names by analyzing 
the complex ideas corresponding to them, and this will always throw up borderline cases: 
To say, that a rational animal is capable of conversation [conversatio, an operation of the reasoning 
faculty] is all one, as to say, a man. But no one will say, that rationality is capable of conversation, 
because it makes not the whole essence, to which we give the name man. There are creatures in the 
world, that have shapes like ours, but are hairy, and want language, and reason. There are naturals 
[sc. changelings] amongst us, that have perfectly our shape, but want reason, and some of them 
language too.29 
There are also, it is reported, creatures with reason and language, physically unlike us because they 
have tails; “there are some brutes, that seem to have as much knowledge and reason, as some that 
are called men.” However, it is the “naturals” who bear the main illustrative burden here. Locke 
rephrases the hierarchy of nature to fit his new account of essences: 
If it be asked, whether these be all men, or no, all of human species; ‘tis plain, the question refers 
only to the nominal essence …. Shall the difference of hair only on the skin, be a mark of a different 
internal specific constitution between a changeling and a drill, when they agree in shape, and want 
of reason, and speech? And shall not the want of reason and speech, be a sign to us of different real 
constitutions and species, between a changeling, and a reasonable man? And so of the rest …. 
Locke’s library was full of travel literature featuring boundary crossers. He took notes from 
Gassendi’s book on honour and nobility, which describes people who look human but when cut 
open have the guts and entrails of a sheep, and “in the greater Java, certain livewights of a middle 
nature between men and apes …. In Guinea, apes with long, grey, combed beards, almost venerable, 
27 An Essay, 438 ff. 
28 Ayers, “Mechanism, superaddition and the proof of God’s existence in Locke’s Essay”, Philosophical 
Review, 50/2 (1981). 
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who stalk an alderman’s pace and take themselves to be very wise.”30 This was not some sceptical 
Montaignian doctrine about a lack of discernible difference between human and animal behaviour. 
Locke is pursuing seriously his proposition that nominal essences are better boundary markers for 
sorting nature into a hierarchy of species than the futile ontological claims of the Aristotelians. 
Nominal essences lead to real knowledge as such, including real knowledge about humans, because 
they are “as capable of certainty, as mathematics.” In fact they are even better than mathematical 
knowledge, which is merely the putting together of “such ideas as have no inconsistence.” They are 
the approximation of ideas to “real existences of things” in nature.31 The changeling and the drill 
(baboon) “agree in … want of reason” not just for the sake of argument but because, as Locke says 
in his very next paragraph, “if history lie not, women have conceived by drills.” Thus one cause 
of “absence of reason” in human-looking creatures was possibly bestial sex. (This was certainly 
Sterne’s prurient reading of Locke, in Tristram Shandy.)32 
To sum up, we “must ... renounce [our] sacred definition of animal rationale.” We should, 
instead, “substitute some other essence of the human species.” But how do nominal essences yield 
knowledge, if not of a realist kind? Locke replies that it is a process of making ever less inexact 
copies. Abstract ideas are first separated from their given names, then the names readjusted to the 
extent that one considers appropriate. This, and not Cartesian clarity, is how the ideas attached to 
real existences become “distinct” from each other. Moreover, it is just this activity that constitutes 
the most rarefied work the human intellect can do. On the one hand, there was justifiable anxiety 
about the chaos that might ensue from causing names to proliferate by this activity; as Montaigne 
had complained, “We change one word for another word, often more unknown. I know better 
what is man than I know what is animal, or mortal, or rational. To satisfy one doubt, they give me 
three.”33 On the other hand, says Locke, “If we rightly consider, and confine not our thoughts and 
abstract ideas to names, as if there were … no other sorts of things, than what known names had 
already determined, … we should think of things with greater freedom and less confusion, than 
perhaps we do.” He seeks the middle ground. “Where men in society have already established a 
language amongst them, the signification of words are very warily and sparingly to be altered.” 
Ambiguity can be tolerated most of the time. Nominal essences are thus a compromise between the 
moribund conservatism of real essences and a sectarian anarchy of excessive locutions. Language 
and classification should be renewed only where necessary, only for the sake of order. 
Having established this general principle, Locke goes on to give his example of something 
that does currently require a readjusted naming scheme. And it just so happens to be that dubious 
creature who is defined as non-human by his inability to do readjustable naming: 
’Twould possibly be thought a bold paradox, if not a very dangerous falsehood, if I should say, 
that some changelings, who have lived forty years together, without any appearance of reason, 
are something between a man and a beast. Which prejudice is founded upon nothing else but a 
false supposition, that these two names, man and beast, stand for distinct species so set out by real 
essences, that there can come no other species between them: whereas if we will abstract from 
those names, and the supposition of such specific essences made by nature, wherein all things 
of the same denominations did exactly and equally partake; if we would not fancy, that there 
were a certain number of these essences, wherein all things, as in moulds, were cast and formed, 
we should find that the idea of the shape, motion, and life of a man without reason, is as much a 
30 Gassendi, The Mirrour of True Nobility, 214. 
31 An Essay, 568. 
32 Lila Graves, “Locke’s changeling and the Shandy bull,” in Philological Quarterly, 60 (1981);
An Essay, 451 ff. 
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distinct idea, and makes as much a distinct sort of things from man and beast, as the idea of the 
shape of an ass with reason, would be different from either that of man or beast, and be a species 
of an animal between, or distinct from both. Here everybody will be ready to ask, if changelings 
may be supposed something between man and beast, “Pray what are they?” I answer, changelings, 
which is as good a word to signify something different from the signification of man or beast, as 
the names man and beast are to have significations different one from the other.34 
Changelings are not susceptible to cure; he continually emphasizes their birth-to-death continuity 
(here “forty years together,” elsewhere “sixty,” “the whole course of his life” and so on). 
Readjustment of the name to the idea that reflects the species is crucial because in this case the 
creature it names is, despite treacherous physical appearances, incapable of matching or readjusting 
names to ideas – an intellectual operation that is constitutive of being a member of the human 
species, and particularly of an extended civil society. It is vital that the creature’s pathological 
separateness from the rest of us be exposed. 
Once again, Locke leaves his reader to infer how in this sense Locke’s conservative opponents 
too are changelings, just as Eugen Bleuler, having only just coined the word “autistic” in 1911 
for the excessively inward phases of mental illness, and encountering opposition to his theory 
from fellow clinicians, immediately explained their arguments away by calling them autistic. 
We can summarize Locke’s position thus. The optimum human ability is abstraction; abstraction 
is the sorting of clear and distinct ideas into nominal essences (“a sort, or general abstract
idea …”), and the clear and distinct idea that sorts human beings from other animals is our ability 
to abstract in this way.35 And so the definition and place in nature of the human species or “sort” 
(he prefers plain language to jargon), amounts to the following: We sort ourselves as the sort 
that sorts. Commentators have noted that much of Book 1 of the Essay is a dismantling of the 
“self-validating circularity” of the political establishment’s assumption that abilities are acquired 
through membership of authoritative institutions, and that the abilities of those critical of them or 
outside them – the forty-shilling freeholder perhaps – are therefore by definition impaired.36 If so, 
then Locke has simply broadened the circumference of the circularity rather than removed it. 
The intellectually disabled, in terms of their natural classification, are whatever still lies beyond 
the circumference. To reach this point I have not just pasted together two different Lockes from 
separate phases of his theoretical trajectory. Of course the Essay had an 18-year gestation period. 
But the timing of the relevant entries in his notebooks shows the two usages rattling around in 
his head at the same time: of the changeling as non-reasoning subject, and as the paradigm of a 
correctly reasoned name for the distinct idea of a species. On 11 November 1677 he notes: 
In the discursive [sc. reasoning] faculty of the mind I do not find that men are so apt to err, but it 
avails little that their syllogisms are right if their terms be insignificant and obscure or confused 
and indetermined, or that their internal discourse and deductions be regular if their notions be 
wrong …. Where a man argues right upon wrong notions or terms he does like a madman, where 
he makes wrong consequences he does like a fool, madness seeming to me to lie more in the 
imagination, and folly in the discursive. 
A mere eight days later, this mention of foolishness in the human subject expands to encompass 
a discussion about how to name and place the foolish subject within the objective scheme
of nature: 
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Species … are but things ranked into orders because of their agreement in some ideas which we 
have made essential in order to our naming them. Though what it is to be essentially belong[ing] 
to any species in reference to nature be hard to determine. For if a woman should bring forth a 
creature perfectly of the shape of a man, that never shed any more appearance of reason than a 
horse nor had no articulate language, and another woman should produce an other with nothing of 
the shape but the language and reason of a man I ask which of these you would call by the name 
man? Or both or neither?37 
Locke argues against Aristotelian conservatives who “see religion threatened, whenever any 
one ventures to quit their forms of speaking” and to invent new terms. They would evidently 
dismiss the lack of reason in a changeling as “no more but an accidental difference,” a non-essential 
feature; they would judge the essential humanity of a new birth at baptism merely by “the outward 
shape and appearance of a man,” and the fact that they are “of human birth.” He responds: 
I am sure this is a conclusion, that men nowhere allow of. For if they did, they would not make 
bold, as everywhere they do, to destroy ill-formed and mis-shaped productions. Ay, but these are 
monsters. Let them be so; what will your drivelling, unintelligent, intractable changeling be? Shall 
a defect in the body make a monster; a defect in the mind (the far more noble, and, in the common 
phrase, the far more essential part), not?38 
That common phrase is of course “man is a rational animal” – the conservatives’ own. And so, 
Locke suggests, they are hoist with their own petard. This conservative who denies that the mind 
is the “more noble” part is, however, a straw man. The “nobler part” had been long been a standard 
epithet for the mind as distinguished from the body, well before Descartes. Elizabeth I’s minister 
Nicholas Bacon, in a 1561 policy document to design a state curriculum for royal wards, had 
complained: “Hitherto, the chief care of governance hath been had to the land, being the meanest; 
and to the body, being the better, very small; but to the mind, being the best, none at all, which …
is plainly to set the cart before the horse.” The most that could be said for the body was that 
although the “virtue” of the rational soul “could appear in deformity, yet it is more honourable in a
comely personage.”39 
There is again a religious back story to Locke’s ethical discussion, one that involves infanticide. 
He cites a “monstrous,” physically impaired child who due to his outward shape might have been 
destroyed at birth or at least barred from the church, but was instead “declared a man ‘provisionally’
till time should show what he would prove,” and grew up to become the Abbot of St Martin. 
(Locke’s source here is his contemporary Gilles Ménage, who was simply illustrating the same 
point as Locke himself; though presented as a historical case, it is more likely the skewed residue 
of medieval legends about St Martin of Tours’s charity towards the physically disabled.) It is 
deformity of mind, by contrast, that really ought to be “exclude[d] out of the species of man” and 
“determin[e] life and death.” The only thing that stops him short of recommending infanticide for 
changelings is that at birth “the faculty of reason [is something] which no body could know would 
be wanting in its due season,” a problem which modern pre-natal technology seems to have reduced. 
Locke may have had Luther’s story in mind here which says that changelings are only baptized “in 
view of the fact that they cannot be known the first year.” We should list as impediments to baptism 
only those things we can observe, and cognition and behaviour are not observable in early infancy. 
The doctrine of reprobation is implicit in this. Locke adds here that “the wheels, or springs … 
37 R. Aaron and J. Gibb, An Early Draft of Locke’s Essay, 98 ff.
 
38 An Essay, 571.
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within, are different in a rational man, and a changeling,” who is man only “in a physical sense.”40 
Today we may be inclined to interpret the clock metaphor of wheels and springs as physical – that 
is, deterministic – in a biological sense; and as we saw above, Locke like his contemporaries may 
have seen the changeling as a product of bestial sex. But it must also be remembered that at the 
time “physical” also meant divinely determined, as reprobates were. When Locke claims that such 
differences are unknowable at birth, he has in mind not of course (anachronistically) the lack of a 
diagnostic technology such as amniocentesis but the unknowableness of God’s purposes. 
Infanticide had already been raised in this context by the Sidney circle’s Lodowick Bryskett, 
who in his behavioural guide of the 1590s notes that because “children newly born … are not
able … to give any sign or token … that they will prove either good or evil …. So is it much more 
to be discommended … that an infant newly born should be killed, though by defect of nature, 
want of seed, or any strain or mischance of the mother, or through abundance of ill humours or any 
other strange accident, it be born imperfect.”41 His fear is rather of that other spuriously human 
creature, the reprobate hypocrite: “Goodly personages who carry one thing in their tongue and 
another in their heart, be they that deserve to be hunted out of all civil society …. These be they that 
in very truth are crooked, misshapen and monstrous, and might well be condemned to be buried 
quick [sc. alive]: not simple innocent babes who, having no election, can yield no tokens either of 
good or evil.” (This is very similar to Locke’s point about the changeling.) Why then should we 
“esteem a person in body misshapen or deformed less worthy to be nourished, or to be admitted to 
magistracy?” (And this is exactly Locke’s point about the Abbot of St Martin.) Bryskett goes on 
to rule that the distinction between elect and reprobate must override that between rational man 
and fool; his examples of the latter are the conventional ones of his time (“lethargies, frenzies, 
melancholy, drunkenness and such other passions”) rather than Locke’s birth-to-death absence of 
reason. Locke replaces an organic, behavioural and provisional model of foolishness with one that 
is disembodied, intellectual and permanent. Furthermore, not only is old-fashioned foolishness 
clearly not the precursor for this latter model, reprobation is. The real underlying and unifying 
threat is the deceptive morphological appearance of someone whose humanity is dubious, where 
“human” means susceptible to being ruled or amended. 
Even physical monstrosity by itself contradicts the tired realist hypothesis of real essences as “a 
certain number of forms or moulds” into which God pours the relevant characteristics. Physically 
deformed people do not match the mould. Then how much less so does the intellectual monster: 
The frequent productions of monsters, in all the species of animals, and of changelings … carry 
with them difficulties, not possible to consist with this hypothesis: since it is as impossible, that 
two things, partaking exactly of the same real essence, should have different properties as that two 
figures partaking in the same real essence of a circle, should have different properties.42 
Descartes’s immediate successors (despite his own inclusiveness) had already gone down this 
route of disjoining name from idea in the case of intellectual monstrosity. Louis de Cordemoy, 
for example, in another book in Locke’s collection, extends Descartes’s sceptical method to the 
definition of man itself. He decides he must ask himself the preliminary question, whether “all 
bodies which I recognize as similar to mine are necessarily joined to souls like mine; I tell myself 
not to believe it until I have signs so clear that I can no longer doubt it.” Likewise, it is to the 
accompaniment of the changeling example that Locke announces his well-known general principle: 
40 An Essay, 453; 464.
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“We cannot be too cautious, that words and species, in the ordinary notions which we have been 
used to of them, impose not on us.”43 
Why not? The answer seems to be chiefly an epistemological one: “from thence has rose a great
part of the difficulties about truth and certainty.” But there is also a social “inconvenience” behind this, 
namely that allowing ourselves to be imposed upon “would disturb our discourse with others.” Our 
awareness of a lack of fit between existing names and the abstracted ideas of the species they purport
to refer to shows that there can or should be matching of some kind: that there is a ground on which 
the human and the divinely ordained aspects of reason meet, so that consensus on some important
public issues may be both possible and certain, and dangerous disputes among opinionated and 
competing real-essence systems avoided. It is therefore also the rationale for toleration. Toleration 
was incompatible with the doctrine of innate ideas, for if people were not allowed to reason out the
common ideas for themselves, from their own empirical starting points, then their rulers would be
encouraged to pose as the personally infallible mediators of those ideas. 
The seemingly Protean concept of the changeling, the prototype of the modern intellectually 
disabled person, can be summarized therefore as: (1) a creature who is completely determined, the 
type we would all resemble if we allowed ourselves to be imposed upon – but also (2) a creature 
who actually does have to be imposed upon, for its own good and ours; (3) an illustration of the 
lack of fit between the names of species and the ideas which correspond to them – but also (4) an 
illustration of the concrete threat which this lack of fit poses, so long as it is not rectified, to a liberal 
politics of rational consent. In each of these respects, changelings are the paradigmatic case. And 
(4), it will be noted, returns us to (1). 
The legal and ethical standing of idiots and changelings 
As proponents of the Argument from Design were fond of pointing out, the very complexity of 
the world is an indicator of its perfection, and of the existence and perfection of its divine author. 
Therefore no one can be “so brutish” as to fail to recognize “the surprising variety” that is in nature. 
The archetype of the brutish and spuriously human, then, has to be he who does not understand the 
variety of species; he must himself be another item among that variety, different in nature from all 
those who do have this understanding of the idea of their own natural species, “man.” Difference 
in nature required a corresponding revision of previous ideas about whether all (seemingly) human 
beings are “intelligent agents capable of a law.”44 A conventional list already existed of those whom 
for the purposes of law one need not treat as legally or ethically kin to oneself: prisoners of war, 
libertines, children, mad people. We will look briefly at how Locke views each of these groups in 
turn, at how they relate to the more fundamental category of idiots and changelings, and at how the 
conventional grounds for disqualification became distilled in the treatment of the latter. 
To begin with, some background. Today we consider it self-evident that competence, in legal
terms, is largely a matter of reason. To have a right (the right to consent for example), you must
have cognitive competence or ability. Appeal is then made to an expert, objective assessment of this
competence, whose source is assumed to lie quite outside the sphere of law itself, in the subjective
nature of the individual. So on the one hand, some specific relation is implied between competence
(defined as intellectual) and rights; on the other hand, though, competence and rights are radically
different entities, their only relationship being a causal one. With the intellectually disabled, the causal
link is from “no intellectual competence” to “no rights”: the first appears to lead to the second. 
43 Louis de Cordemoy, Le discernement du corps et de l’âme, 128; Locke, An Essay, 573. 
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Historically it was the other way round. One had in the first instance a right (or to be more 
precise one had power), and therefore one had competence. The parenthesis is necessary because 
in fact “right,” jus, was not then used in the way we are familiar with. Before the seventeenth
century, right was a legal relationship between two parties, not the possession of either. The sole 
one-sided right was the power which “man” in general had over the brute beasts below him. It 
did not imply a right over other men (even if the word “man” was socially ambiguous: hence the 
frequency and seriousness with which the labouring classes were described as brute beasts).45 It 
is true that the form of legal incompetence to plead known as mente captus, “deprived of one’s
senses” (from the Roman law of the Twelve Tables), existed in medieval times, but there was no
notion of individuals having rights. Only in the early modern period did people like Francisco 
Suárez, Hugo Grotius, Samuel Pufendorf and, under the influence of all three, Locke, shift the 
word “right” so far into the subjective sphere that it became a claim on one party’s side. And only
once this had happened could a right come to be seen as something that exists in nature as it is in
modern political constitutions, and hence as something individuals can assert, usually on the basis
of their intellectual ability. 
The idea of competence-based rights in its fully modern sense has its roots in the idea of 
individual property rights, and can be discerned in the political theories of self-ownership 
promoted by Locke and before him by absolutists (Hobbes) and egalitarians (the Levellers) alike. 
For Hobbes, the importance of self-ownership reflected that of self-preservation, in a world of 
competing egoisms that required an all-powerful state to control them. For the Levellers, it went 
with extension of the franchise and the right of resistance to the ruler’s suppression of individual 
freedoms; a free man was free in being possessor of his own person and hence of his own abilities. 
For Locke, self-ownership signified an intellectual and hence moral autonomy of the individual, 
corresponding with the ownership of material property. Ownership of the self was a form of 
trusteeship; the reason I cannot belong to someone else, an absolute monarch for example, is 
because ultimately my self, like everyone else’s, belongs to God. But this egalitarianism contains 
certain intrinsic exceptions. Leveller proposals for the franchise did not for the most part extend as 
far down as servants, who had willingly alienated their self-ownership, i.e., their ability to labour. 
Locke’s notion of intellectual autonomy presented its own specific alienation in the form of idiots 
and changelings. 
Thus rights and ability form a vicious circle. When we say that this person with a disability 
has no right because they are not able to exercise it, we have already defined “right” in advance 
as whatever it is that the person is unable to exercise. Many writers before Locke had explicitly 
refused to make exceptions on the grounds of absence of intellect alone, or to attach it to some 
other difference. Hobbes, for example, attributed to “fools … a common human nature,” expressly 
attacking the tautology by which the existence of fools offends the law of nature because they 
are excluded from it in the first place. Suárez refused to allow it to be attached to race, attacking 
fellow Spaniards who attributed a permanent “mindlessness” to indigenous Americans in order to 
justify their enslavement. (His criticism matched a 1537 papal bull stipulating that Americans were 
“rational creatures.”) Pufendorf, like Suárez, criticized the theory of natural slavery, though he 
noted, albeit merely as an aside, that it stood up in the exceptional case of people who really were 
“natural” or “born fools.”46 Locke was to fasten on Pufendorf’s passing surmise. 
The paradigmatic case of an ethical exception to natural law in earlier times was that of the 
aggressor taken prisoner in a just war. He could be treated like an animal because he had ceased 
45 See Joan Lockwood O’Donovan, “Rights in Christian discourse,” in M. Cromartie (ed.), A Preserving 
Grace. 
46 Samuel Pufendorf, De Jure Naturae, 3.6.3. 
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to be capable of a law. This did not necessarily indicate an absence of intelligence, only of agency. 
However, lack of reason was characteristic in most other cases. Libertine-type changelings, for 
example, follow their appetites alone and therefore make irrational choices. But because they are 
born teachable, they are the illustration that humans can reason and that natural law obliges them to 
do so, even if they resist. Idiot-type changelings, by contrast, are born unteachable, and this lack of 
potential distances them as much from the libertine type as from the captive aggressor. In Locke’s 
Essay, the naturalistic framework applies to mind alone, taken separately. As a species distinct 
from all other animals, we are determined by the mind’s operations; it is therefore the existence 
of idiot-type changelings above all that confuses this overridingly important natural distinction, 
and the onus on their mindlessness is therefore that much greater. They are denied a soul and an 
afterlife on grounds of their natural lack of a mind, not merely on grounds of their willful failure 
to exercise it. 
Then there are children. In his early Essays on the Law of Nature, Locke, like his predecessors, 
still thought of natural law as binding on “all those who are endowed with a rational nature, i.e., 
all men in the world,” by some generic essential property. But he already feels a need to add here: 
“There is no reason that we should deal with the case of children and fools [fatui]. For although 
the law is binding on all those to whom it is given, it does not, however, bind those to whom it 
is not given, and it is not given to those who are unable to understand it.” Only when natural law 
comes to signify that which binds human beings as a species in nature, with reason no longer 
directly locked into divine law, does it become contradictory to say that fools are members of 
a rational species. Only then, therefore, does it become necessary to hedge natural law round 
with exceptions. The humanity of children – little monsters – is diminished in an exactly similar 
way, despite Locke’s reputation for having an enlightened view of them. But at least children, 
like libertines, are hypothetically teachable, which is ruled out for idiot-type changelings. The 
authorially approved Latin translation of the Essay concerning Human Understanding renders 
“changeling” as puerulus aut fatuus homo (“childlike or foolish man”); the second adjective is 
old-fashioned terminology, but the first is novel and has developmental implications, reinforcing 
Locke’s view of the understanding as a gradual, empirically based acquisition. 
This view of childhood as temporary idiocy also comes up in his treatment of natural rights 
theory in the second of the Two Treatises of Civil Government, which is partly based on the theory 
of Grotius and Pufendorf. Here, law is not a “limitation” so much as “the direction of a free and 
intelligent agent to his proper interest …. Is a man under the law of England? What made him 
free of that law …? A capacity of knowing that law …. Thus we are born free as we are born 
rational.” There is no deep difference here between natural law and that of the courts, or between 
the history of society and that of the individual. As a result, Locke’s critique of Filmer is not quite 
complete. He admits as much. Filmer had modelled the absolute ruler’s right to authority over 
his subjects on the father’s right to authority over his children, and Locke concedes that we are 
born to a freedom that is only ever eventual: “age and reason” are inseparable companions, and 
children will cross the threshold of humanity only when they reach the age of “discretion,” that is, 
when the faculty of reasoning starts to develop its operations. Pagans in the process of conversion 
(“intelligent Americans” and “Indians”) arrive at autonomy in the same way. Idiots are those who, 
by this definition of autonomy, do not and cannot. Relying on Hooker yet again, Locke asks what 
if “through defects that may happen out of the ordinary course of nature, anyone comes not to such 
a degree of reason wherein he might be supposed capable of knowing the law?” The answer is that 
he is “never set free from the government of his parents.” 
This is more than just a minor concession to Filmer’s paternalist absolutism. Rather than an 
exception to the rule, it is a genuine and necessary survival of the original absolutist principle. 
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same thing. So are their absences, therefore. The result is that the idiot has a claim to protection 
which the feckless libertine, having failed to fulfill his obligation to develop his given faculties, 
does not. Despite the dissolution of the honour society, it remains the case in this instance that 
noblesse oblige, and our own noblesse today is the intelligence society as a whole (that is why, for 
example, we donate to disability charities). 
Finally, there are mad people. In Book 2 of the Essay the abstract common ideas, once acquired, 
take on a meme-like quality, a quasi-material existence, “such as [man] has no power over, either 
to make or destroy.” Of the potential destroyers, idiots and mad people alike illustrate the negative 
limits of competent abstraction, and of logical trains of ideas. How then do the two groups differ? 
They do not sit alongside each other in a level taxonomy but on hierarchically different rungs in the 
intellectual scale of nature. Idiots are to be lumped with beasts, whereas the mad belong without 
demur in the world of humans, 
For they do not appear to me to have lost the faculty of reasoning: but having joined together some 
ideas very wrongly, they mistake them for truths; and they err as men do, that argue right from 
wrong principles. By the violence of their imaginations, having taken their fancies for realities, 
they make right deductions from them. Thus you shall find a distract man fancying himself a 
king …. In short, herein seems to lie the difference between idiots and madmen. That madmen put 
wrong ideas together, and so make wrong propositions, but argue and reason right from them: but 
idiots make very few or no propositions, and reason scarce at all.47 
Madness lies along a spectrum with ordinary intellect, while foolishness occupies a separate niche 
in nature. In a species defined, for Locke, by the operation and association of ideas, the mad are 
full members: “A man, who is very sober, and of a right understanding in all other things, may 
in one particular be as frantic, as any in Bedlam.” It is the absence of (Lockean) ideas, not their 
misassociation, that bars one from membership of the species. 
In medical theory, mania had usually been located in the “discursive” or inference-drawing
operations of the reasoning faculty. Mania, said Willis, was an “alienation of the mind,” whereas
(melancholic) stupidity was an alienation of the imagination; he linked mania to excessive speed,
which meant that people “very badly infer one thing from another.”48 Locke switched templates.
He put madness in the imagination, and allocated idiotic stupidity to the “discursive” or reasoning
faculty. In this new template it is the slow type in whom the problem is a discursive one; the mad
infer correctly, albeit from wrong ideas (i.e., from an over-hasty mismatch of idea to image). We
can see how this gradually emerges into the public version of the Essay from the entries in his
private notebooks. On 15 July 1676 he asks how madness can be a fault in the reasoning faculty,
if “mania be … putting together wrong ideas and so making wrong propositions from them,
notwithstanding the reason be right?” A week later, he has madness as “the wrong application of
mad ideas to things that exist, as for example [those] made in fantasy [such as] him to be either
king or castle.” Later entries, on 5 and 11 November 1677, develop the dyad into the form later
found in the Essay: “Madness seems to be nothing but a disorder in the imagination, and not in
the discursive faculty.” The mad are just like “sober” humans who get lost in a town they know a 
little but not well: they think they know where they are and act accordingly, but discover that they
were under an illusion, whereas fools draw wrong consequences.49 
47 An Essay, 161.
 
48 Hieronymus Mercurialis, Medicina, Chapter 16; Willis, De Anima, 350.
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While madness is Locke’s main concern in the notebooks, the Essay’s greater concern with 
changelings, natural fools and idiots seems to belong with that work’s more public aims. The 
published edition intensifies the fusion between a jurisprudential dyad (congenital idiots versus 
periodically lucid mad people) and a medical one (slothful versus furious soul spirits), and 
transforms it into something almost recognizable to modern psychiatry. The old mean between 
slow and fast is still there (“the deficit in naturals seems to proceed from want of quickness, activity, 
and motion, in the intellectual faculties, whereby they are deprived of reason: whereas madmen, 
on the other side, seem to suffer by the other extreme”); but the “activity and motion” previously 
attributed to material, physiological entities such as the soul spirits has here been transferred to the 
entity of pure mind.50 
Policing the borders of Moral Man 
Permanent absence of ideas lies beyond what is human or has a soul. A question then arises: if 
Locke thought definitions of species were purely nominal, how is he so certain about excluding the 
changeling from the human species? 
In Locke, for man to be moral meant precisely to belong in a natural realm. In its surface terms 
this reflects the orthodox Calvinist view discussed in Part 5. An old scholastic distinction held that 
while “natural” qualities can vary by degree (e.g., between hot and cold), “moral” ones do not
(e.g., good or evil, elect or reprobate). When Amyraut and Baxter proposed that there was a 
disability of the intellect that might be natural, their more orthodox opponents thought they were 
threatening that strictness of a moral divide, that between elect and reprobate. Baxter did in fact 
regard this divide as fixed and important above all others. As for “idiots,” although he claimed only 
God knew whether they were saved, he tended to presume in favour of their exclusion: hence his 
allocation to them of their corpse-like role of being “dead in Christ,” like reprobates. Again Locke 
is repeating Baxter (see p. 197 above) almost to the letter: 
It will be asked, if changelings are something between man and beast, what will become of them 
in the other world? To which I answer, 1. It concerns me not to know or enquire. To their own 
master they stand or fall …. But, secondly, I answer … it may as rationally be concluded, that the 
dead body of a man … has yet nevertheless a living soul in it, because of its shape; as that there is 
a rational soul in a changeling, because he has the outside of a rational creature, when his actions 
carry far less marks of reason with them, in the whole course of his life, than what are to be found 
in many a beast.”51 
Hence there is more than a resonance of Calvinism in Locke’s application of the theory of nominal 
essences to human beings. There is an actual line of descent. When Baxter and others said that 
classification into elect and reprobate was “equivocal” (nominal) rather than “real,” they meant that 
the pastor, in his examination of each individual, could only guess at people’s inner state but also 
that guesswork can be empirically supported. Our sinful ways tend to be observable, as are certainly 
our wrong answers to catechical assessments. Even if human beings are “only equivocally called,” 
says Baxter, we often have a shrewd idea who is who. Moreover, the nominal or equivocal is not 
some epistemologically lower level of knowledge: “As there is an outward effectual vocation,” 
says Baxter, “yet that outward is real … and not equivocal only.”52 Locke’s and Baxter’s aim was 
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the same: to screen out a category of questionably human creatures who are unprepared for the 
afterlife because they are incapable of rational choice. The two men differ over the secondary 
matter of how such creatures arrive in the world: through creation directly (Baxter), or via occult 
bodily mechanisms (Locke). Creation in both cases is “physical,” in the sense of determined. 
Locke’s own early views on election and reprobation are unknown. Of the people he was in 
touch with on theological matters, Ferguson stuck to it while Penn, a former student of Amyraut’s, 
rejected it. All three were conferring together regularly during the 1670s with each other and with 
Owen, the erstwhile high priest of election who had by now transformed himself into a defender of 
toleration and of “reason in faith.” We can surmise that at some (probably early) point Locke must 
have rejected predestination. But how deep was this rejection? It was certainly not as vehement 
as that of the Levellers. John Howe’s letters to Boyle on predestination (Howe was in exile with 
Locke in Holland) confirm that the new psychology arose from epistemological concerns about 
knowing whether one was elect. One wonders, says Howe, imputing the thought to Boyle himself, 
whether the anxiety about second-guessing God’s plan for us “be not wholly in our own minds.”53 
Why? Because “labouring under the natural defect” of an “incomprehensive narrowness … it is 
very incident to our minds, to grasp at more than they can compass.” The suggestion seems to be: 
let’s stop trying to guess about our own inner states. But he continues: “Though the comprehension 
of our minds be not infinite, it might be extended much further than usually it is, if we would allow 
ourselves … gradually [emphasis in original] to stretch and enlarge our own understandings.” And 
by this he means the understanding of our status with God. Hence the novel idea of development –
the development of a reflexive psychological knowledge – absorbs, rather than contradicts, the 
“old” one of election and predestination. 
The notion of a developmental growth in our knowledge about our own minds and those of 
others was a counter to the zealous notions of sectarians, dangerous says Howe because they 
“disdain to be thought not able to see through everything, by the first and slightest glance of a 
haughty eye.” The issue of whether one was elect or not became secondary to this new concern 
with the steady pace and sequentiality that went with “making yourself part of your own study.” 
Nevertheless, difference was as much the ontological premise of this approach to human nature 
as it had been of the orthodox Calvinist’s. Locke drew his own dividing line between moral man 
and the changeling as zealously as they had drawn theirs between elect and reprobate. Changelings 
may be defined by an inability to reason logically or form abstract ideas rather than by hypocrisy, 
but ultimately their pathology is like the reprobate’s: they are fundamentally incapable of faith, to 
which abstract ideas are (in Ferguson’s phrase) “the previous exercise.” The psychology of Locke’s 
“moral man” reconstitutes, in a new format, the status of the elect in the orthodox theology of 
men such as Du Moulin and Spanheim. To be moral means precisely to belong in a natural realm; 
Locke differs from his orthodox Calvinist forebears simply inasmuch as now the foundation of 
one’s relationship with God lies in developing one’s intellectual operations. He exhibits none of 
Amyraut’s subtleties, which had arisen in the interim, about a part discontinuity between the moral 
and the natural. Despite Locke’s rejection of predestination theology, then, the Essay is partly 
the product of those earlier doctrines about how one can know the signs of election in oneself:
a reading of perfectibility and personal destiny. 
Moreover, he is far less agnostic about people’s religious status than many. Baxter was wary of 
claiming to know who is elect. He complains about those who have lived for a long time in doubt, 
albeit “very conscionable and blamelessly,” who suddenly go astray when they hear Anabaptist or 
Familist doctrines: that is, once they hear “the doctrine of perfection in this life and suddenly been 
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past their fears, as if hearing of perfection had made them perfect.”54 Locke is more confident. He 
just knows who is the moral man and who is the changeling. He asserts it as self-evident that “man” 
cannot signify both a rational being and its opposite, such as a changeling, at one and the same 
time; to say that it can encompass both is contradictory. But this is trickery on Locke’s part, since 
intellectually disabled changelings are not a different species in a positive sense; a changeling is 
something that can only be defined by reference to its failing to be a man. 
Like election, faith too remains embedded in Locke’s account. Although the focus was now on 
the operational exercise of reasoning abilities, faith was no discarded husk. Reason did not muscle 
faith aside but came to its rescue, reinforcing its substructure and transforming it into eighteenth-
century “belief.” When Locke described his “skills” in writing the Essay as those of “an under-
labourer,” the foundations he was building were reasoning ones but the edifice itself was faith, and 
the aim was to ensure that one might be in grace. This was certainly understood by the religious 
educators for whom Locke was a major resource. When Wesley said, “He that believeth shall be 
saved; he that believeth not shall be damned,” he meant a belief not categorically distinct from 
reason but underpinned by it.55 Amyraut had started the whole process by suggesting the existence 
of a discretely “natural” realm in respect of the intellect. However, this realm was occupied only 
by those with “natural disability”; ability itself was still a matter of grace. Locke and others then 
wrote about everyone (or nearly everyone) as having abilities in this realm of intellectual nature, 
as a gradual preparation for the afterlife. Locke’s moral man, suggested by a new-found optimism 
about the developmental character of intellectual abilities, is so often seen as the prototype of 
Enlightenment universal man. However, he could equally be seen as the elect homo morale of 
Calvinism, supplemented with Baxter’s “labouring intellect.” Calvinists had long complained that 
the old formula homo = animal rationale was inadequate. Its replacement, homo = animal morale, 
seemed to breathe new life into the idea of what it is to be human. Our species is that which owes 
a moral duty to God on the basis of certain natural intellectual abilities which we should work
at developing. 
Locke wrote the Essay, as he said on its first page, in order to specify what those abilities were 
and how they worked in detail, as a preparation for higher (theological) things. What the abilities
in fact comprise is not “the moral man, as I may call him” (the emphasis in the text), but “the 
moral man, as I may call him” – not a new coining but a readjustment of the existing Calvinist 
epithet described above (see Chapter 10). He will use the criterion of intellectual “skills” and
“abilities” to reconstruct the definition of man, as a seamlessly natural-moral creature. But Locke 
could not have done so without that intervening stage of Amyraut and Baxter, in which “natural 
intellectual (dis)ability” had been separated from moral (dis)ability. It was the disability of the 
“changeling … man in a physical sense” that allowed Locke to establish as a truth “capable of
demonstration … the moral man … that ha[s] the use of reason.”56 Moral man does not construct 
changelings as his other; he appears as it were by their prior permission. Pathology etches in
the normal. Sceptics used the existence of fools to prove that a unitary, fixed reason does not exist 
in man. The answer to this claim had so far been that anyone who says something like that must 
be a fool himself. Locke realized this was an inadequate response. His strategy was to take the 
sceptical challenge about fools and use it to prove that reason does exist naturally in man. The 
existence of born fools or changelings, as natural creatures lacking intellectual ability, proves that 
we – the rest of us, the definitively human individuals – each have within us the specific operations 
that characterize that ability. The name he attaches to us, “moral man,” signifies our ability for 
54 The Cure, 170.
 
55 Cited in C. Pinnock (ed.), The Grace of God and the Will of Man, 262.
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abstract ideas; our abstract ideas refer to nominal essences; the nominal essence referred to by our 
ability for abstract ideas is “moral man.” And so the circle excludes the changeling. 
But does “man,” this closed natural-moral community, really embrace everyone apart from 
changelings? That is another matter. Locke’s changelings, to judge from the way he describes them, 
were a tiny group, corresponding with the “severely” disabled person of today quantitatively as 
well as qualitatively. Yet unlike today’s psychologist, Locke still maintained a distinction between 
lack of the ability to abstract and its non-performance. In many people non-performance was 
typical because of the external constraints of poverty and social rank, and the Essay in this sense 
still belongs to an old textual tradition, already noted.57 Locke’s remark here about labourers being 
too taken up with their croaking bellies to aspire to abstract ideas follows closely a text published 
in 1652 by the Restoration bishop and mathematician Seth Ward, a founding member of the Royal 
Society.58 Again it was a book that Locke is likely to have known, having been published in Oxford 
during his attendance at the university and reprinted often over the next 20 years. Ward writes of 
the common ideas as “undeniable” evidence “of the spiritual and incorporeal nature of our mind, 
from whence will necessarily follow the natural incorruptibility of it, which is all that we pretend 
to, when we say, that it is immortal” (emphasis added). Out of the common ideas or “first and most 
common principles of intelligence,” says Ward, the most clearly demonstrable is the immortality 
of the soul, so that “it must be the fool alone, as the Psalmist speaks, which can be an atheist.”
As for the individual subject, he continues: 
Considering the darkness of our minds, and that inability towards a strict and vigorous reflection 
which even in those who are most practised in the contemplation of themselves, and in the scrutiny 
of the ways of their own internal operations, is over frequent; and considering how little reason 
there is to expect it of those who by their way of living are more deeply engaged among … the 
affections and circumstances of bodies and bodily motions, and perhaps may think themselves 
unconcerned to be busy in the knowledge of themselves, it will be requisite that we insist more 
particularly, that so the matter may be cleared even to the most vulgar apprehensions. 
On the optimistic side, knowledge of the self is that which, even more than knowledge of 
mathematics, will lead to “mastery over the works of nature, and so imitate God and nature in great 
and marvellous conclusions.” However, there are clear doubts about the possibility of instilling 
this self-reflecting and self-policing “ability” in ever broader social groups. The dubious status of 
Ward’s fool is at once religious (fool as atheist) and social (fool as vulgar). Writers such as Locke, 
Ferguson and Truman too envisage a spiritual element ensconced within the “natural mind working 
in a natural way,” but that word “natural” had stubbornly pejorative resonances; only with an 
imported nugget of divine grace is the natural mind ready to be reborn and validated as a secular 
psychology. There remains the question: do the labouring poor – the archetype of the old “natural 
man” – really belong to “moral man”? In terms of performance, if not ability, there is no category 
difference between Ward’s fool or Locke’s idiot and this broader group. At best the unimprovable 
condition of idiots is an object lesson to manual labourers about how they should occupy the few 
non-working hours they have. When Truman writes about “natural disability of the intellect,” for 
him it still encompasses both the lack of “a sufficient estate to give” and the lack of an intellectual 
faculty, in a single overarching concept.59 
In the event, the reinvention of idiots as unnatural creatures by virtue of their permanent lack 
of human reason or of capacity for intellectual labour is the ploy by which the rest of us are 
57 Ibid., 707.
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able to present ourselves as intelligent, autonomous citizens capable of consent and democratic 
government. And the more Locke tends towards a universalist concept of man – not just forty-
shilling freeholders but landless labourers, women, perhaps even the slaves of the colonial trading 
companies he invested in – the more sharply are the residual exclusions drawn, the non-elect 
detritus of civil society. Modern commentators routinely take the line that “Locke [maintained] 
that all men are proprietors of their reason” (emphasis in original). This only holds true if we have 
previously deemed any exceptions not to be men. Yet even the division by natural intellect and its 
absence does not overlap neatly with Locke’s perceptions of the society around him. For example, 
he wants to point out that “Gentlemen should not be ignorant” (emphasis added).60 He is anxious 
about the intellectual deficiencies of the social ranks for whom the book was written. At the genesis 
of modern psychological criteria of disability, deficiencies of intellect still operate at different 
degrees of strictness according to one’s place in the social order. Exclusion on the grounds of some 
natural condition could only matter in people who had prior social grounds for inclusion. 
Scientific psychology: a historical contingency 
What scientific basis did Locke offer for exclusion from the species? The thinkers most influential 
in subverting the old “Aristotelian” certainty about man (Montaigne, Descartes, Hobbes, Gassendi) 
had all nevertheless retained its inclusive indifference. Gassendi is an especially good example. 
Although he refurbishes the essence of man as a “common human nature” (emphasis added), any 
natural variations or defects in the operation of the individual understanding remain as before 
dispositional and organic to the “corporeal” soul, leaving the rational essence and the rational soul 
perfectly intact in everyone: a psychology in which Gassendi, in order to preserve the principle 
of immortality, eschews his more usual quasi-materialist stance and demonstrates a residual 
Aristotelianism. He expressly denies that differences among human intellects amount to “unequal 
orders of perfection,” because this would infer (impossibly) that they resembled the orders of 
angels, who are unequal in precisely this respect.61 Locke alone does not recoil from the logical 
possibility of species differences among so-called men. However, he turns it into scientific fact 
only at a certain point during the gestation of the Essay concerning Human Understanding. His 
certainty about excluding changelings from the species of “moral man” is tied to his assertion there 
that “morality is capable of demonstration, as well as mathematics,” and “moral knowledge is as 
capable of real certainty as mathematics.”62 
How did he arrive at this point? Alongside the separation of objects of knowledge into physical 
and moral, mentioned above, philosophers of the time also discussed a quite different kind of 
separation, between two ways of knowing: demonstrative and moral. Demonstrative certainty was 
absolutely certain, in an a priori sense, and had a divine or physical source; “moral certainty”
was merely practical, and could not exist without a human agent. Locke probably absorbed this 
doctrine from the Cartesian logicians whom he was reading during his stay in France in the late 
1670s. It is the demonstrative type that prevails in the published edition of the Essay when he 
writes about the species exclusion of changelings. This pessimistic certainty about changelings was 
tied to his increasingly optimistic ethical certainty about everyone else. This in turn sprang either 
out of desperation (when would the rational political moment actually arrive when the English 
might be free to prepare for glory?), or out of foresight (that moment did in fact arrive, in 1689).
60 I. Shapiro, The Evolution of Rights in Liberal Theory, 137; Locke, An Essay, 710.
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His certainty about fundamental questions of human nature thus came as much from his efforts to 
establish a rational ethics as from an attempt to build a psychological theory. 
One can see the progression of these efforts by comparing An Essay concerning Human 
Understanding with his 1663 Essays on the Law of Nature. In the earlier work, he had seen no 
contradiction between the existence of fools (fatui) and the principle that reason is the essential 
property of all humans. His certainty here was of the old Aristotelian variety. Certainty about human 
nature did not have to be demonstrative; it was simply implicit in the Argument from Design.
Draft A of An Essay concerning Human Understanding, by contrast, starts to hint at problems 
with “man is a rational animal.” If the predicate (rational animal) is contained in the definition of 
the subject (man), he says, then it is a verbal truth only, “it being evident that children for some 
time and some men all their lives are not so rational as a horse or a dog, at which time I cannot 
see how the idea rational doth belong to them or can be affirmed of them.” Even so, Locke has 
still not shaken off the old doctrine. The terms of the argument remain Aristotelian; he is merely 
using this example to illustrate the principle that “it is impossible for the same thing to be and not 
to be.”63 A child who has never seen a “negro” makes white skin a part of the definition of man 
and will tell you that black people are not human. Absurd maybe, says Locke, but someone else 
“that hath gone further” than the outward shape and has started to consider “coherent language or 
reasoning” would find it difficult to include deaf mutes as human. Moreover, “he may demonstrate, 
that infants, changelings and maniacs are no men, and I have discoursed with very rational men 
who have actually denied it.” The more rational such men are, of course, the more likely they are 
to regard this exclusion as demonstrative and scientific. Nevertheless at this stage all he is doing is 
being open about the need for new approaches. Besides, he writes, “it is no very material question 
to our present purpose,” though between this draft and the published version of the Essay idiocy
will have become a very material question indeed. 
With the typical caution of the early drafts we are said to have knowledge of all ideas “only in 
particulars (unless we will think mathematical demonstrations to be universal, of which I will not 
here dispute but all the rest are certainly particulars)” – and that includes ideas about the mind.64 In 
order to have really certain knowledge, you would need to know “the precise bounds and extent of 
the species its terms stand for.” Draft B then complains about the “time and sedulity” required for 
this. The chief illustration as usual is ourselves: “I think none of the definitions of the word man, 
nor descriptions of that sort of animal has done so perfectly and exactly as to satisfy a considerate 
inquisitive person.” This is all very tentative by comparison with the old-fashioned certainties of 
the Essays on the Law of Nature or the novel ones of the eventual published version of the Essay 
concerning Human Understanding. In the latter the problems of time and sedulity seem to have 
been overcome. He claims that his definition of the human, the readjusted idea of moral man, is 
equally accessible to a priori demonstration as the properties of a triangle. In that case, there is 
no difference between the moral and the demonstrative certainty about either “man” or “triangle.” 
One may as well say it is a moral certainty that the precise essence of a triangle is such-and-such, 
since that is just the consensual way in which human reason conceives of triangular bodies and 
no divine intellect needs to come from outside to say so; likewise one may as well say it is a 
demonstrative certainty that the things “moral names” stand for are “moral man” and “changeling.” 
They are identical types of statement, he says. Hence it would appear that the certainty of the laws 
of human nature is the same as the certainty of, say, the law of gravity. 
63 Peter H. Nidditch and G.A.J. Rogers, Drafts for the Essay concerning Human Understanding; 
Nidditch, Draft A of Locke’s Essay concerning Human Understanding, 106. 
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Locke’s new stance is that not only do we have the same kind of certainty about human nature 
as about mathematics, we have it from a specifically human source, that of our own intellectual 
“abilities.” This provoked the question as to whether all ideas about human nature are not tainted 
by their imperfectly human origins. Locke responded by saying that in the phrase “man is subject to 
law,” man itself can only mean a “corporeal rational creature,” and “whether a child or changeling 
be a man in a physical sense, may amongst the naturalists be as disputable as it will, it concerns not 
at all the moral man, as I may call him, which is this immoveable unchangeable idea, a corporeal 
rational being.”65 Sceptics who said that “rational being” was a merely verbal and therefore shifting 
definition would be right, were it not for the fact that a firmed-up account of it has emerged in 
the “moral man” as demonstrated by Locke himself. His confidence is misplaced, however. His 
demonstrative certainty about the underlying reality of the moral man is glued imperceptibly in 
place by his exclusion of the changeling. Uncertainty therefore remains unresolved. If the precise 
essence of a triangle is the way in which human reason conceives of triangular bodies, then the 
precise essence of human reason is the way in which human reason conceives of human reason. 
And so the definition of man remains changeable and open for power bids as to what that reason 
consists of. 
Of course this scientization of psychology did not have to lead to pessimistic ethical 
conclusions about the intellectually deficient. It led certain other writers in the opposite direction, 
giving the ethics of exceptionalism an optimistic spin. Digby, for example, had used the notion 
of demonstrative certainty to claim that when one compares “the ranks of intelligence” from “the 
most contemptible idiot” to “the greatest clerk that ever lived,” one finds that “the lowest knows 
as much as the highest,” since “indifferent knowledge in this world, shall be replenished with all 
knowledge in the next … This amplitude of knowledge is common to all human souls (of whatever 
pitch soever they seem to be here), when they are separated from their bodies.”66 The idiot’s soul 
“climbs up by degrees” to this knowledge of itself, says Digby, by exactly the same method that 
mathematicians compose their demonstrations. Digby can be optimistic because he is talking about 
the afterlife; the afterlife was important for Locke too, but he thought the hard intellectual graft had 
to be done here on earth, and everyone had to be prepared for it. 
Can changelings be persons after all? 
More fluctuations in Locke’s outlook can be seen from the famous chapter on personal identity 
which he added to the Essay’s second edition. Here the correlation between his pessimism about 
the changeling and his optimism about everyone else recedes once more. 
Locke’s concept of personhood owes much to Puritan and Jansenist notions of the moral 
responsibility of the person over a whole lifetime and thus on his intellectual unity; indeed, there 
could be no modern intellectually disabled identity without the historical arrival of the person 
in this more fundamental sense. The ancient Greek medical texts contain pre-natal explanations 
for physical disability, but none for intellectual states; the core concept of a birth-to-death self 
is absent from ancient thought in general.67 Autobiography, as a self-conscious genre, is largely 
modern. When Augustine wrote his Confessions it was a religious therapy, marking the cataclysmic 
65 An Essay, 516. 
66 Digby, Of Bodies, ii, 95. 
67 Hippocrates, On Joints, in Hippocrates III; see also Giuseppe Roccatagliata, A History of Ancient 
Psychiatry; Richard Sorabji, “Soul and self in ancient philosophy,” in M. James and C. Crabbe (eds), From 





338 A History of Intelligence and “Intellectual Disability” 
moment of a total spiritual transformation rather than reflecting on a life considered as a whole. 
Correspondingly, intellectual impairment did not describe a permanent personality; even senile 
dementia was curable by divine intervention before death. And in medical accounts of idiocy, 
it was as late as the end of the nineteenth century that the vital ingredient of incurability took
hold definitively. 
Pre-Lockean thinkers had conceived personhood not in terms of time but of space; the persona
was that aspect of the human being which is “one in itself,” like the trinity – not an individual 
member of the species but a hypothetically abstracted unit of rational nature as a whole. Theology 
explicitly rejected any notion of a permanent intellectual identity because this would have implied 
a denial of providential intervention. One’s character, like one’s body, was transient because 
temporal, by contrast with one’s immaterial rational soul which was God’s creation and thereby 
transcendent, not bounded by notions of time (or thus even of permanence) at all. Even if the 
instruments and operations of the faculties failed to operate throughout someone’s life, this did 
not affect the transcendent permanence of their rational soul. The modern disabled person, in the 
sense of someone whose absence of intellect determines the personality over a lifetime, is not only 
absent from medieval thought but inconceivable, moreover morally inconceivable, since before 
the seventeenth century any talk of incurability is only ever a reference to original sin and so to 
humanity as a whole. 
Locke on the other hand wrote in the first published edition of the Essay about the “intractable” 
changeling: his unteachable condition lasts inevitably for the whole of his life. In denying a role for 
providence, Locke had his forebears. In 1646 Overton, from his prison cell, had challenged the state 
by extending the notion of equality from the religious sphere of souls equal before God to an earthly 
political sphere of “self propriety,” based on “natural rights” to which “all men are equally and alike 
born.”68 This was a psychological as well as a juridical usage of the word “propriety” (property), 
evoking both legal ownership and the philosophical sense of a defining characteristic (in this case, 
the essential property of “rational animal”). In yoking the words “self” and “property” together, 
Overton was shifting the grounds for defining humanity. Where previously it had been taken as a 
whole, here it is coming to be an aggregate of individual selves. The result is that “accidents” in 
the old sense become pathologies. Locke’s changeling, and the modern “intellectually disabled” 
person, came about once individuation began to be seen in terms not of mere seedlings planted out 
from a universal humanity, but of individual selves who each represent that humanity on a one-by­
one basis. Overton excludes certain accidents from the species, along lines that foreshadow Locke. 
He cites Montaigne’s proposition that the difference between man and beast is one of degree only; 
to see a difference in kind would be to overlook the fact that “some [men] … have no more souls 
than beasts, and some less.” Montaigne was of course just trying to shock everyone into behaving 
properly, but for Overton it is serious scientific stuff. Overlooking Montaigne’s irony, he takes lack 
of a soul to indicate a difference in kind. “Fools” are the exception that really tests the rule, since 
they “are born, live and die without souls” and do not even have a soul to be given them on the 
day of judgement. In Overton’s pessimistic ethics of exceptionalism, permanent foolishness is the 
positive opposite of the uncorrupted innocence it represents for the optimists. 
Franciscus van Helmont asks similarly, “How is Christ said to ‘enlighten every man that cometh 
into the world’ (John I.9) that they may believe and be saved, seeing there are many born fools 
or idiots, and possessed with a deaf and dumb spirit; and yet are very unclean and wicked, and so 
die?” In short, they surely die in the same unregenerate condition in which they were born: 
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Doth not all divine illumination presuppose and pre-require a capacity of understanding in some 
measure, in order to the improvement thereof? … Does it not hence appear then, that all such 
as from the womb have never had the use of their understandings [emphasis added], have lived 
in former times, and enlightened by Christ, but are now, for some extraordinary abuse of their 
understandings then signally punished, suitable to their crimes? And shall not all such, if this be not 
their last hour, or that the day of their visitation be not over, yet come to live again in the word, and 
have the use of their understandings, and a divine illumination as well as other men?69 
Van Helmont’s belief in the transmigration and the possible restoration of souls only serves
to highlight the “misery” of “being born fools,” and the finality of foolishness over any one
individual lifetime. 
The religious element of confessional was not so much replaced by birth-to-death personhood 
as absorbed within it. The new ways of conceiving personhood that Locke typifies were new 
ways of assessing moral responsibility: the submission to divine authority of an audited account 
of actions undertaken over one’s entire life, thereby co-operating rationally with God’s grace. 
Where Locke writes of personal identity as “owning one’s own actions,” we should be aware 
that in the English of that time “owning” meant not just possessing but confessing or “owning up 
to.” Locke replaces Descartes’s spatial notion of a thinking substance with the temporal one of 
consistency and unity over time, the whole lifetime of an individual. What makes the “person” is 
his consciousness, which is etymologically related to “conscience” or the rendering of accounts 
with God. Conversely, in today’s pathological identity, where biological conception is linked to the 
impossibility of cure, absence of moral worth amounts to absence of personhood. 
Locke, however, does not reprise the changeling theme in this context. Precisely here, he seems 
to relax once more the qualifications for species membership. His focus on the lifetime leads him 
to minimize the difference between humans and other animals; they all participate “in the same
continued life, by constantly fleeting particles of matter, in succession vitally united to the
same organized body.”70 This principle of continuity “makes an embryo, one of years, mad, and 
sober, the same man.” The threshold for being a “person” may look at first as steep as it did for 
being moral man, inasmuch as it “stands for … a thinking intelligent being, that has reason and 
reflection, and can consider itself as itself, the same thinking thing in different times and places; 
which it does only by … consciousness.” But consciousness, while “inseparable from thinking,
and … essential to it,” is not here some high-flying ability of its own but a mere accompaniment to all 
the mind’s operations, including even the most basic ones such as perception, “it being impossible 
for any one to perceive, without perceiving that he does perceive.” Hence it is an inclusive concept. 
In his attempt to extricate himself from the problem of dualism – that it reproduces within the realm 
of mind alone all the old Aristotelian contradictions which dualism sought to simplify – Locke 
finds himself retreating from a scientific to a commonsense, non-demonstrative definition of the 
human for support: 
For I presume ’tis not the idea of a thinking or rational being alone, that makes the idea of a man 
in most people’s sense; but of a body so and so shaped joined to it; and if that be the idea of a man, 
the same successive body not shifted all at once, must as well as the same immaterial spirit go to 
the making of the same man. 
Although he has not actually relaxed the qualifications for species membership, the emphasis is 
different. Exceptions to the rational rule are dealt with leniently: 
69 Two Hundred Queries, 75.
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I think I may be confident, that whoever should see a creature of his own shape and make, though 
it had no more reason all its life, than a cat or a parrot, would call him still a man; or whoever 
should hear a cat or a parrot discourse, reason, and philosophise, would call or think it nothing 
but a cat or a parrot; and say, the one was a dull irrational man, and the other a very intelligent  
rational parrot. 
The tone of voice, if nothing else, has changed. Unadjusted names (a “man” who none the less has 
“had no reason all his life”) may not be accurate, but they will do. The chapter on personal identity 
is about the individual self as such, not about its relationship to the species; correspondingly, 
the treatment of supposedly inadequate individuals swings towards inclusive indifference and an 
everyday account of what it is to be human. 
We should note finally that even within the first edition, Locke’s exceptionalism is dependent 
upon context. For example, differential psychology is brought up yet again under the heading of 
“Probability,” but in this context it suits him to depict differences of ability as gradual. It is true, 
he says, that “if we will compare the understanding and abilities of some men, and some brutes, 
we shall find so little difference, that ‘twill be hard to say, that that of the man is either clearer or 
larger”; nevertheless, the point of saying this here is to show that the scale of nature has “gradual 
and gentle descents,” rather than the precise interstitial categories he mentions elsewhere such as 
lithodendra, oysters and changelings. 
From theology to psychology – and vice versa 
In a final twist, Locke’s On the Conduct of the Understanding, unfinished at his death, manages to 
be more pessimistic even than the first edition of the Essay. The logic of the earlier work was not 
an end in itself but a ground-clearing exercise for the directly theological themes of the Conduct, 
which he had always had in mind as being the final destination of the trajectory he had mapped out 
in 1671. The express purpose of this last work was to identify the “great many natural defects in 
the understanding capable of amendment” (emphasis added), in preparation for the afterlife.71 As 
our own nature-versus-nurture reflex might lead us to expect, he distinguishes such natural defects 
from “differences which arise from acquired habits.” But equally clearly he demarcates a further, 
internal distinction within the realm of nature itself: between “want of a due improvement” of 
natural defects, and “want of parts” or “lack of natural faculties.” We might think that by natural 
defects, therefore, he means some pathological condition with the prospect of some improvement 
within strict limits. However, that is not what he means: he is referring to the majority of human 
beings. Amendment of their natural defects is a plausible aim, and it thereby throws into much 
sharper relief the actual absence of faculties in a small minority. “Want of parts” is not natural at 
all but unnatural, because unamendable. Locke, expert in the operations by which one arrives at 
the common ideas, is lead climber on the ascent to intellectual perfection: not yet at the summit 
but with an idea of the best, if not the sole route. The rest of us will follow in our own ways. His 
changeling is the person who, by contrast, does not have any equipment to start with. 
The Conduct is pessimistic even about those large numbers of people whose faculties are 
amendable. If we compare it with the Essay’s positive account of those people who are restricted 
only by social circumstance, such as malnourished labourers or gospel-less Americans, we find 
in the later work that although “Americans [are] not all born with worse understandings than the 
Europeans … we see none of them have such reaches in the arts and sciences.” In general, “We are 
born to be if we please rational creatures but ‘tis use and exercise only that makes us so, and we are 







341 John Locke and His Successors 
indeed so no farther than industry and application has carried us.”72 That “industry” is intellectual 
and professional. He writes about the man “of low and mean education who ha[s] never elevated 
[his] thoughts above the spade and the plough nor looked beyond the ordinary drudgery of a day-
labourer … used for many years to one tract, out of that narrow compass he has been all his life 
confined to; you will find him no more capable of reasoning than almost a perfect natural,” that is, 
a born fool. “Tract” recalls the term used by Descartes and Willis to denote the physical pathways 
carved out in the brain by the soul spirits, with the addition of a further, social resonance: the one-
track mind is also the track or furrow ploughed by the country labourer. 
This time, it is not only changelings that challenge the principle “man is a rational animal,” 
but natural defects of this far more widespread type. “Wherever a man’s rational faculty fails 
him and will not serve him to reason there we cannot say he is rational how capable soever he 
may be by time and exercise to become so” – time and exercise that for so many of the working 
population remained entirely hypothetical. The concept of rationality presented here is even
more firmly linked than it was in the Essay to that of development. It is also – and therefore – more 
firmly linked to social status: the highest “knowledge and science in general is the business only 
of those who are at ease and leisure.” In the Conduct the requirement is not that everyone become 
a Lockean philosopher but, as his early Calvinist upbringing had taught him, that everyone has the 
reason appropriate to their calling. Hence his advice during the 1680s to a friend about the latter’s 
“blockheaded” son, affected by what has been retrospectively diagnosed as encephalitis (but which 
Locke refers to as “melancholy”). Locke suggested finding the boy a calling he could cope with, 
so that he might lead his earthly existence in a social niche which, while it did not correspond with 
his ascribed rank in the honour society, was still as close to honourable as possible. He proposed 
“a handicrafts trade”; this could still fit a “gentleman’s calling,” he said, as long as – crucially – he 
did not depend on it for his living. (Basket weaving springs to mind.) In addition to the professional 
calling there are certain natural graces – “concern in a future life” and “thoughts in religion” –
which are not related to social status at all. No one can be excused from “understanding the words 
and framing the general notions relating to religion right”; after all, as scores of earlier Protestant 
writers had said, there were “instances of very mean people who have raised their minds to a great 
sense and understanding of religion.”73 If they can do it, says Locke to his readers, so can you. 
So much for those whose failure to try is not to be excused. As for those others who do not 
have the natural ability to try in the first place, Locke’s intuition is not that they should therefore 
be excused but the opposite. In them, the very grounds for excusal are absent. Absolute absence of 
any such natural graces, of the basis for any calling at all, logically means “levelling them with the 
brutes and charging them with a stupidity below the rank of rational creatures.” Those who simply 
do not try “might be brought to be rational creatures and Christians,” whereas the second type 
“can hardly be thought to be so who wearing the name know not so much as the very principles of 
that religion” (a description which he allocates to both the idiotic and the libertine changeling).74 
He follows up immediately by asserting that knowledge of the mind is the necessary precondition 
for all other types of scientific knowledge: “Great advancements might be made in knowledge 
of all kinds especially in that of the greatest concern and largest views if men would make a 
right use of their faculties and study their own understandings.” The seeming switch here from an 
understanding of religion to understanding of the mind is not a switch at all because they are the 
72 Ibid., 119. 
73 Letter to Edward Clarke, 6 February 1687; Marshall, A Kind of Life Imposed on Man, 89; Of the 
Conduct, 170. 
74 Of the Conduct, 171. 
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same thing. The notion of what constitutes intelligence, in being rescued from old conventions, is 
also being rescued from pagan influence or Catholic ones. 
The application of logical forms to the study of one’s own understanding and to the human 
sciences in general would become increasingly common after Locke’s death. The line runs from 
the Essay and the Conduct, through his influence on eighteenth- and early nineteenth-century 
nonconformist educators and behaviour experts, and thence into modern applied psychologies. 
Whereas (as we saw in Chapter 17) the emphasis in logic had once been on the consistency of its 
procedures, Locke and his eighteenth-century followers invested a greater importance in the truth 
content of the propositions handled by those procedures. Verbal statements used in the exposition 
of logical procedures now had to correspond rigidly with their corresponding factual states. This 
kind of logic turned out to be the framework in which modern scientific theorems could be cast. It 
would certainly work for practical purposes in physics. In the human sciences, though, a problem 
arose. An ideological statement could become a factual statement simply by being proposed in a 
logical format. One could then assert as scientific truth whatever one liked. Take the example of 
the eighteenth-century logician and Locke disciple William Barron, who wrote: “Truth relates to 
the enunciation of knowledge, and is the agreement of ideas with words. If I assert that the British 
is a free government, and that the English are more industrious than any other nation in Europe, I 
maintain truth, because my words actually correspond to the accurate ideas of the facts.”75 Indeed, 
palpably value-laden truths of this kind were to form the content of the verbal components of 
early IQ tests. But Barron’s proposition is no passing travesty. Locke’s own model of logic used 
religious examples that were similarly value laden, as we have seen. Whatever he said in the Essay 
and the Conduct about his intellectually disabled creatures being non-human because they lacked 
a rational soul, he believed at the moment of writing. He was not just shuffling an array of “well­
established doctrines” which he may or may not have endorsed, and was certainly not playing 
devil’s advocate. 
But if the burden in logic had come to lie as much on the truthfulness of its constituent 
propositions as on their consistency with each other, the very starting point for this shift, across the 
board, was a religious proposition – a dogma, in fact, with God as its unchallengeable guarantor –
about the centrality of man’s place in nature and of his logically reasoning intellect in relation 
to other creatures. What about the truth content of that proposition? Ray and Linnaeus launched 
modern forms of biological classification on the basis of a logic that likewise developed out of this 
prior theory of man’s relationship to God; but while modern biology has undergone a critical process 
enabling it in many respects to migrate to the land of objective scientific critique, the psychology of 
intelligence remains in the land of its birth. Without the benefit of a scientific revolution of its own, 
its theological core has never dissolved. Human reason’s vision of its own self remains tethered (if 
tacitly) to God, to stop it from simply blowing away. The kinship between psychology and religion 
is a familiar theme in critical histories of the discipline; but the relationship is more than one of 
mere analogy, or of similarity of their respective professional roles in the social order. The twenty­
first-century psychologist’s secularism is as flimsy as the eighteenth-century gentleman’s Anglican 
faith was once said to be. 
Logical “trains of ideas” thus emerged from the substructure of the Protestant ethic. Locke 
applies Baxter’s notion of “intellectual labour” to the detail of the intellectual operations, in a proto­
industrial concept of mind. Education means coaxing children into continuous trains of ideas; that 
is why Locke was against corporal punishment (it confuses and interrupts the train). Political and 
religious ideas should likewise be free from external compulsion, so that individual opinions can 
negotiate their own route more easily towards the single revealed truth. In this respect the Conduct 
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brings up another component of intelligence, attention span. Where once the relevant pathology 
was “instability of opinion” about the common ideas, now it is a discontinuity in the trains by 
which one reaches them. Locke comments in this respect, “He that will observe children will find 
that even when they endeavour their utmost they cannot keep their minds from straggling.”76 This 
found its way into the eighteenth century’s everyday culture and behavioural advice. Isaac Watts 
emphasizes how necessary it is to “fix attention”: “a student should labour, by all proper methods, 
to acquire a steady fixation of thought. Attention is a very necessary thing in order to improve our 
minds. The evidence of truth does not always appear immediately, nor strike the soul at first sight.” 
Watts cites mathematics as the best pedagogy in this respect, because it is the most abstract form 
in which “a perpetual chain of connected reasonings” occurs. Mathematical trains are the model 
for moral and religious ones; scientific and exact, they are the best exercise for learning one’s 
catechism and the ideal “young gentleman and lady’s monitor,” a social control mechanism.77 
The need to labour at knowing one’s own internal psychological operations and making them 
more efficient, says Watts, is a constituent of faith itself, thus endorsing Locke’s assertion in the 
Conduct: “God has made the intellectual world harmonious and beautiful without us but it will 
never come into our heads all at once; we must bring it home piecemeal and there set it up by our 
own industry or else we shall have nothing but darkness and a chaos within, whatever order and 
light there be in things without us.”78 Watts’s 1724 Logic was published in countless editions well 
into the nineteenth century; it transmitted the logic of Locke’s Conduct to the burgeoning public 
education system, in the form of a theology of the inner person that corresponded with the public 
functions and prescriptions of reason and emotion in everyday human life. Once again the work’s 
full title demonstrates the point: Logick: or the Right Use of Reason in the Enquiry after Truth 
with A Variety of Rules to guard against Error, in the Affairs of Religion and Human Life, as well 
as in the Sciences. It is true that Watts is not Locke’s star pupil. Often he seems to be trying to 
shoehorn the latter’s logic back into some older Aristotelian framework. And when he paraphrases 
Locke’s theory of nominal essences, he unwittingly gives the master’s well-guarded secret away: 
nominal essences are real enough, he says; they only need to be flexible when species boundaries 
are threatened as in “monstrous births.” In short, they are a way of having your cake and eating 
it. Watts’s examples of a logical proposition are nearly all drawn from religious knowledge. 
Logical trains of (religious) ideas thus become a textbook method for inculcating appropriate 
behaviour, more open to monitoring and assessment. Students’ abilities, as he says elsewhere, can 
be differentiated by their capacity to “take in propositions,” from those who “can take in a long 
train of propositions” to those who can only take in two at a time, for whom “it is hard for them 
to discern the difference between right and wrong in matters of reason on any abstracted subjects; 
these ought never to set up for scholars.”79 
The other writer of mass influence to inherit Locke’s logic and embed it in behavioural and 
educational prescriptions was John Wesley. He too tries at first to wiggle it into a conventional 
Aristotelian framework. However, he also reports faithfully Locke’s description of logic as a set of 
rules for “the proper use of words.”80 Wesley starts off with simple terms, the “common word or 
noun.” The very first of these, as we might expect, is “man.” The first subsequent division is then: 
“a man or a brute.” From here he proceeds to “Definition.” In the case of man, “Homo is defined 
76 Of the Conduct, 210. 
77 Watts, The Improvement of the Mind; or, a Supplement to the Art of Logic, 150; John Hamilton Moore, 
The Young Gentleman and Lady’s Monitor, 2. 
78 Of the Conduct, 224. 
79 Watts, The Improvement, 168. 
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nominally, which … is: accidentally, a two-legged unfeathered animal; logically, a rational animal; 
physically, a being consisting of an organized body and a reasonable soul.” For Wesley, logic is 
a therapy. Its job is to clarify the intellectual operations; and clarified intellectual operations are 
those which can understand intellectual operations in all their clarity. Their condition correlates 
with the individual’s state of grace and status with God. Wesley’s examples are exclusively of 
the type “Every wicked man is miserable; Every tyrant is a wicked man; therefore Every tyrant 
is miserable,” or “All the faithful are dear to God; Some, that are afflicted, are faithful; therefore 
Some, that are afflicted, are dear to God.” And so on. It would be easy to think that he was just 
using a rhetorical device familiar among preachers, imparting to dogmatic assertions about faith a 
scientific logical structure to which the statement is obviously not suited; but in fact the logic and 
the faith were integral to each other, from the beginning. 
Watts, Wesley and Jonathan Edwards, all of whom minimized reprobation out of good taste 
as much as doctrine (thus leaving room for it to spring up in some other guise), probably had 
a greater influence on the general culture, and hence on the school curricula from which the 
everyday practices of psychology would later emerge, than did any writers on higher-level matters, 
and certainly more than any medical men. David Hume elevates the discussion of changelings 
on to the plane of a liberal argument about the social limits of justice. He posits “a species of 
creatures intermingled with men which, though rational” may be of such “weakness of mind” 
that we “should not, properly speaking, lie under any restraint of justice with regard to them”; the 
qualification “though rational” appears to suggest that, however arbitrarily we may act towards 
them in ethical terms, we should at least not classify them out of the species. Adam Smith identifies 
idiocy in pre-Lockean terms as the lack of formal education and lack of a personal sense of honour. 
Thomas Reid’s discussion of Locke on abstraction and nominal essences steers clear of intellectual 
monstrosity entirely, even though he acknowledges elsewhere the existence of people who lack 
reason, that “gift of heaven” (and does not see them as problems).81 As for the medical men, they 
did not open their doors to Locke’s natural history of the mind immediately and indeed spent most 
of the eighteenth century attacking it, for the same old reason that their predecessors had attacked 
Epicureanism: he was threatening the equality and immortality of the soul. Sometimes they take 
the positive step of insisting that the “changelings” are fully human and have souls.82 The same 
insistence featured in eighteenth-century London’s obsession with Peter the Wild Boy, and in his 
feral successor Victor of Aveyron (since retrospectively diagnosed with “mental retardation” or 
“autism,” according to taste). 
Only later in the century did doctors develop proto-psychiatric classifications of intellectual 
pathology, which nervously begin to ape those of bodily disease. The framework for this was 
the Lockean logical paradigm: the moment for his proposed “observation of [the] several ways 
of faltering” had arrived. François Boissier de Sauvages, acknowledging Locke’s principle that 
“names are the signs for ideas,” followed by William Cullen, Philippe Pinel and others, provided 
the classificatory basis for those nineteenth-century categories of idiocy and imbecility with which 
historians have already familiarized us.83 Typically, John Mason Good’s The Study of Medicine finds 
a spot for our topic at “Class 4 (Neurotica), Order 1 (Phrenica), Genus 6 (Moria or Fatuity), Species 
2 (Moria demens), Variety 3 (Anoea or Idiotism).” However the question, as always, is: what was 
81 Hume, Enquiry concerning the Principles of Morals, 190; Smith, The Theory of Moral Sentiments, 
260; Reid, Essays on the Intellectual Powers of Man, 190 ff., 232. 
82 Henry Lee, Anti-Scepticism, or Notes upon Each Chapter of Mr. Lock’s Essay concerning Humane 
Understanding, 261. 
83 See also Suzuki, “Anti-Lockean Enlightenment? Mind and body in early eighteenth-century English 
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the symptomatic content of the patient’s idiotism? In this respect the full impact of the Lockean 
paradigm had yet, even then, to be felt. Most of the symptoms Boissier lists under amentia still 
evoke Galenist tradition. It would take the arrival of the formal disciplines of psychology, under the 
influence of the everyday behavioural mind set inculcated by Watts, Wesley and Edwards, before 
lack of abstraction and logical reasoning became embedded in medical and psychiatric descriptions 
of disability. 
Locke and our history 
Like his fellow Royal Society members, Locke sought a language in which all terms have the 
precision of mathematics. Human reason, needed to maintain a perfectly ordered commonwealth, 
lay in the public effectiveness of ordered language. However, in the term for the species “man” –
that is, the term language users apply to themselves – precision and order emerged upon forfeit of 
a sacrifice, namely the intellectually disabled changeling. The sacrificing of some piece or other to 
make the whole comprehensible is of course characteristic of science in general: 
Such stability as there is in a system of knowledge comes entirely from the collective decisions of 
its creators and users. It derives from the active protection of parts of the network. That is to say: 
from the requirement that certain laws and classifications be kept intact …. The rest of the network 
then becomes a field of resources to be exploited to achieve this end – a place where thresholds 
can be moved with relative ease; where complexity or blame can be conveniently located, or 
troublesome cases relegated.84 
But as we have seen throughout this book, psychology in this sense is a very special system indeed. 
What is the stable network that Locke wants kept intact? The link between human beings and
reason – a link that formerly went under the classification “Man is a rational animal.” Why is 
a moving of the classificatory threshold, the readjustment to “moral man,” necessary? Because 
reason is now the responsibility of imperfect but hopefully perfectible beings, of individuals, rather 
than a ready-made and uniform divine gift. What must now therefore be protected against? Not so 
much relativism, as absence. The special characteristic of systems of psychological knowledge, 
unlike our knowledge of physics or chemistry, is that the system under observation is not the 
conceptual handling of objects in the external world but that of the system’s creators and users 
themselves; and correspondingly, the troublesome and blameworthy case is not only a conceptual
one, it is troublesome and blameworthy people, the system’s non-users. Intellectually disabled 
people, as people, are absent from a system of knowledge in which both object and subject are the 
intellectually able species “man.” However, as a concept, they are key to it. The system cannot 
exist without their separate conceptual classification, yet their real existence as people threatens it. 
Or would threaten it, if ever those people might miraculously present the abstracted and logically 
reasoning abilities that are the entry ticket to the system, according to its own creators’ and 
users’ rules of self-representation and status – but of course, this is impossible as they cannot, by 
definition, abstract or reason logically. Hence modern man (that is, the intelligence society) more 
than “relegates” them, it turns them into objects of “ritual avoidance,” both in an existential sense 
and in our social institutions.85 
84 David Bloor, “Durkheim and Mauss revisited: classification and the sociology of knowledge,” Studies 
in the History and Philosophy of Science, 13/4 (1982). 
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An Enlightenment concept of man was subsequently generated, and could only have been 
generated, by excluding a priori from that concept certain “men.” With the positive establishment 
of the human mind as a natural and quasi-secular realm of its own came intellectual disability as its 
generalized negative. Locke’s theory of consent promotes liberty as key to plucking ecclesiastical 
and social order out of a volatile political environment; but accompanying the strange birth of 
liberal England were some other, anomalous offspring. Inhuman changelings, incompetent, totally 
determined and at the opposite end of the scale from liberty, were necessary to the theory of 
consent. Locke’s out-group, conceived out of a particular political conjuncture, has been taken 
by modern psychology to be a self-evident fact of nature. Of course Locke too presented it as if it 
were, at the time. However, his invocation of nature was merely an ad hoc remedy, a bandage for 
the fissures in a doctrine of human reason that was wide open to sceptical attack. As Montaigne 
had remarked, “They cannot even dream up an ordinance for man, let alone find a true one, without 
there being some sound or cadence which they cannot quite fit in, however abnormal or monstrous 
they make their contrivance and however much they try and botch it up with a thousand false and 
fantastical patches.”86 
How does one combat debilitating scepticism? The Essay is partly a response to a widely debated 
exchange from earlier in the century. Lord Herbert of Cherbury had argued for the innateness of 
the common ideas on the grounds that if they are innate they must also be beyond doubt. There 
are, he said, ideas that are certain because all members of the human race agree about them. Back 
came the sceptics, such as Gassendi: a madman might not agree.87 All right then, says Herbert, 
everyone except madmen or “idiots” (this probably still included the labourers on his estate), and 
for good measure the sceptics themselves: everyone who ignores or doubts the common ideas 
is “insane, addled, weak-brained, unreasoning, witless, and stupid.” But in that case, returns the 
sceptic, how can we be certain who is right in the head and who not? Enter Locke with a fully 
scientific rejoinder, grounded in the idea that the autonomous mind has its own separate existence 
in nature. It is not the actual content of the common ideas, he says, but the operations leading there
that are innate and can be known with certainty. It follows that these operations, in reconstituting 
what “ability” means, have their own specific impairments, in which madmen remain human (the 
operations run askew) but not changelings (the operations are absent). 
In a liberal society that defines human ability in terms of autonomy, consent and rational choice, 
the idea of intellectual disability as natural absence gives the psychology of intelligence a place on 
which to stand, and to move its intellectual universe. Locke was, if momentarily, as desperate as 
our own bioethicists for an ethical certainty about what it is to be human; without the “intellectually 
disabled” changelings and idiots he describes, all his anti-sceptical efforts would have been in vain. 
This shows us that exclusions from the magic circle of intelligence are in fact the freakish product 
of a particular set of circumstances in the relatively recent past. There were and will be other ways 
of sizing up other people, and other ways of promoting one’s own self-esteem. 
86 An Apology, 112. 
87 Herbert of Cherbury, De Veritate, 83; Gassendi, Letter to Elie Diodati, 29 August 1634, in Actes du 
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